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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
This thesis comprises a critical examination of Information System Strategy (ISS) 
formation in a public sector context, namely the Police Service in Scotland. Despite the 
apparent importance attached to ISS, and the proliferation of many methods to assist 
those engaged in ISS formation, the practice of ISS formation remains comparatively ill- 
understood.
The concepts of strategy and power can be viewed as being closely linked. Using theory 
based accounts of power, we put forward a multi-dimensional conceptualisation of 
power as an aid to organisational analysis of ISS formation. Consequently, the focus of 
this work is not only a detailed investigation into ISS formation practice, but also one in 
which we evaluate the way in which a multi-dimensional conceptualisation of power 
affects our understanding of ISS formation practice.
This research is based upon six longitudinal case studies of ISS formation in the Police 
Service. Data collection involved a number of methods: in-depth semi-structured 
interviews, informal conversation, participation, collection of documentation produced 
within the case study settings, and collation and analysis of documentary materials from 
secondary sources.
The abstraction of several themes from a cross-case comparative analysis of issues has 
led to the development of a conceptual framework which underpins our contribution to 
knowledge: namely, a means of understanding ISS formation as micro-political activity, 
based upon an ongoing process of construction and reconstruction of social reality. This 
in turn can be considered as being based upon individual mental constructs, which in 
turn are influenced by the themes identified. Our framework has been developed as an 
epistemological device to aid thinking about ISS formation, rather than as a 
representation of what an ISS formation process is. Implicit in the framework is the 
contention that ISS formation reflects power relations; however, the practical difficulties 
in researching power issues should not be underestimated. Several areas for further 
research arising from this thesis are discussed.
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION
1.1. THE RESEARCH ISSUE
In this thesis we undertake a critical examination of Information System Strategy (ISS) 
formation. Here we argue that ISS formation can be viewed as a phenomenon that is 
socially constructed and reconstructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1967), and that focussing 
upon the exercise of power can enhance our understanding of ISS formation. We argue 
that ISS formation can be perceived as being determined through the interaction of 
people, and from our work we have identified four themes which we have found to be 
important in the way in which people, socially construct and reconstruct ISS formation. 
These themes we argue can be understood in terms of the dynamic mental constructs 
(Jayaratna, 1994) of those involved in the process of social construction and 
reconstruction in ISS formation.
This research has been motivated by the author's experience of ISS projects in practice 
and through familiarity with literature in the area. Published work on ISS formation has 
tended to focus upon what to do prescriptions, and the attainment of an outcome - such 
as improved competitive position, increased profitability, or upon the production of a 
plan which can then be implemented (e.g. Earl, 1989; Ward & Griffiths, 1996; Robson, 
1997). Such work intimates that ISS formation is a relatively straight-forward activity 
that can be accomplished in an objective manner. Against this, the comparatively 
limited amount of empirical research that has focussed upon ISS formation in practice 
suggests that such activity is not straightforward, but instead is a complex, socially 
located activity (Davies, 1991; Walsham, 1993; Jones, 1995). Furthermore, an 
evaluation of literature concerned with strategy in organisations per se suggests that 
power is central to our understanding of the concept of strategy, but we find that this is 
not an area explicitly addressed in literature looking at ISS formation. We argue that 
this represents a gap in the literature, and that we can contribute to existing knowledge 
by exploring the role of power as a means of improving understanding of ISS formation 
in practice.
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The development of ISS is regarded as an important issue to those concerned with 
information systems (IS) in organisational settings (Niederman et al, 1991; Badri, 1992; 
Brady et al, 1992; Galliers et all, 1992; Atkins, 1994; Reponen, 1998), and a wide range 
of methods have been developed to aid the process of ISS formation (Rockart, 1986; 
Earl, 1993; Sullivan, 1992; Ward & Griffiths, 1996; Fidler & Rogerson, 1996). Despite 
the apparent importance attached to ISS, and the proliferation of many methods to assist 
those engaged in ISS formation, the practice of ISS formation remains comparatively 
ill-understood (Waema & Walsham, 1990; Knights & Murray, 1994; Jones, 1995).
Concepts associated with a technical-economic rationality have tended to dominate ISS 
literature (Kling, 1989; Clemmons & Row, 1991). Key aspects of such a rationality are 
that people and organisations are focused upon maximising their respective utilities, be 
they economic or socio-psychological, and that something akin to an ideal market exists 
(Kumar et al, 1998). This view suggests that buyers and suppliers act in a market with 
limited appreciation of historical context, with interchangeability of suppliers, and 
relationships based largely upon price, some or all of which become the focus for ISS 
(Cunningham & Tynan, 1993). Some ISS literature considers alternative perspectives 
which accentuate the socio-political nature of ISS practice (Bloomfield & Coombs, 
1992; Knights and Murray, 1994).
In developing such accounts, the concepts of strategy and power can be viewed as being 
closely linked (Knights & Morgan, 1990; Walsham, 1993). It will be argued in this 
thesis that ISS formation practice can be perceived as a socially constituted 
phenomenon, and that one way in which we can improve our understanding of this 
concept is through addressing the exercise of power. However, as will be seen, few 
studies on ISS formation have attempted to address the concept of power directly. Using 
theory based accounts of power, we have put forward a multi-dimensional 
conceptualisation of power (Hardy, 1994) as an aid to organisational analysis of ISS 
formation practice. Consequently, the focus of this work is not only a detailed 
investigation into ISS formation in practice, but also one in which we evaluate the way 
in which a multi-dimensional conceptualisation of power affects our understanding of 
ISS formation practice.
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1.2. THE RESEARCH CONTEXT: ISS FORMATION IN THE 
POLICE SERVICE
There is a tendency within the literature associated with ISS formation, and indeed ISS 
in general, to concentrate upon private sector organisations. Willcocks (1994) highlights 
four reasons why more attention should be given to the public sector. Firstly, "the sheer 
size and rising trend in expenditure on information technology" (ibid. p. 13), with £1,749 
million being spent by the Department of Social Security on their operational ISS 
between 1982 and 1999 (ibid. p. 13). Secondly, "the widespread, frequent perception of 
lack of value for money arising from these large expenditures" (ibid. p. 14). This is not 
to say that the private sector are necessarily exemplars in this area, but can be seen as an 
acknowledgement that the public sector is prone to scrutiny regarding the value 
obtained from information technology (IT). Thirdly, acknowledging that somewhere in 
the region of 20% of UK IT expenditure is apparently wasted, "the mixed performance 
by government, policy makers, management and other stakeholders that [this figure] 
partially reflects]" (ibid. p. 14). This latter issue is seen as a particularly important area, 
with there being particular weaknesses in relation to formation of ISS in public sector 
organisations (Willcocks, 1994). Finally, the centrality of information related 
technology to the management and delivery of public services, where, "the broad moves 
towards various forms of New Public Management may well be heavily dependent on 
the effective delivery and functioning of various forms of information-based 
technologies and networks" (ibid. p. 14). Thus, the public sector deserves, and indeed 
requires much greater attention from IS researchers than has been the case to date. 
Indeed, in addition to the work mentioned above, a number of other authors have also 
highlighted the growing significance of strategy related to IS in many areas of the 
public sector (e.g.: Keen, 1994 - the NHS; Collingridge & Margetts; 1994 - the DSS; 
Westwood, 1994 - the Police).
Although a review of ISS literature indicated that the public sector in general was not 
very well represented, it would be a misnomer to view this sector as a unified entity - it 
is not. Within this notional grouping we can include: government agencies such as the 
Department of Social Security, offices of state such as The Scottish Office, bodies for 
the protection of national interests such as the Royal Air Force, quasi-public bodies 
such as hospitals (quasi because of the blurring of their status vis-a-vis funding), and 
service organisations such as the Police. While by no means a complete list, it does
indicate the wide range of responsibilities, reporting, and funding arrangements for 
institutions that are covered by the title 'public sector'.
The Police Service utilise computer systems widely, being dependent upon effective IS 
for the delivery of the service. Nonetheless, research looking at ISS specifically in the 
Police Service is extremely limited. While the usage of computer systems has developed 
relatively slowly in the Police Service (Ackroyd et al, 1992), from the 1980s onwards 
the Police Service has been under increasing pressure to demonstrate cost effectiveness 
and operational efficiency in all areas of activity (Taylor & Williams, 1992). To this 
end, the Audit Commission and Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC) 
have been at the forefront in encouraging improvements through their inspecting, 
monitoring, and reporting activities. For some senior Police Officers, ISS assumes a 
particular significance due to a perceived view that if the police are not judged by 
government to be successful in their use of IT, then a solution may be imposed upon 
them (from personal conversations with senior police officers). This is something senior 
Officers are keen to avoid, and hence ISS formation has come to be regarded as an 
increasingly important issue (Sillince & Mouakket, 1997).
The reasons for choosing to conduct research on ISS formation in the Police Service are 
as follows. Firstly, in 1993 the author knew that at National Level work was 
commencing on ISS in the Scottish Police Service, and then found out that several of 
the individual Police Forces were also engaged in developing ISS. Thus, this presented 
an opportunity to conduct research where several people in several organisational 
settings were, according to their own views, engaged in ISS formation.
Secondly, with the author having worked in the Police Service (although not in any of 
the Forces chosen for the case studies), he had in-depth pre-knowledge of the general 
domain and was able to negotiate excellent co-operation for the research study which 
would otherwise have been very difficult to obtain. This allowed detailed longitudinal 
case study research to be conducted.
Thirdly, the concept of strategy is often perceived to be associated with notions of the 
market, competitors, and profitability (Whittington, 1993), as the many techniques 
developed to assist in formulating ISS make clear (e.g. Ward & Griffith, 1996; Robson, 
1997), and perhaps as a consequence comparatively little published work has addressed
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ISS in public sector contexts. However, not only is the public-sector under-researched 
in relation to ISS, but for the Police Service information and information systems are 
central to their role, in that they rely upon effective systems on a 24 hour/365 day a year 
basis. Hence, ISS is perceived to be of importance to the Service both in terms of 
fulfilling operational duties, and in terms of spending upon information technology.
Finally, the Police Service is unusual in that its very existence arises from a societal 
need to be policed, and this raises particular expectations which govern not just purpose 
but also operation. What Police Officers do and the way they do it is laid out in 
numerous statutes. This is not to deny the discretion that officers have in carrying out 
their duties at a local level (Horton, 1996), but rather to highlight that at an institutional 
level, what the Police Service do and how they do it is by and large determined by 
bodies other than themselves. Therefore, the use of the language of strategy in relation 
to IS intimates practices associated with determining a future direction (Earl, 1999), 
which in view of the relationship with the other bodies discussed above makes the usage 
of such language in the Police Service an interesting area for investigation.
The Police Service therefore presented an opportunity to research ISS formation in a 
context that had not been explored. In addition, the author had specialist pre-knowledge 
which enabled the gaining of access and which aided the level of understanding in 
subsequent field studies. The research in the Police Service, has entailed case studies 
being undertaken of ISS formation within five Scottish Police Forces, and at a national 
level for the Scottish Police Service.
1.3. AN OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The perspective underpinning this study may be characterised as interpretive, and more 
particularly as an interpretive approach based upon critical hermeneutics (Myers, 1997). 
A central tenet of such a view is the belief that in the social world, of work based 
organisation in this instance, it is through the interaction of individuals that social 
reality for them is constructed and reconstructed as part of an ongoing dialectic (Berger 
& Luckmann, 1967). Furthermore, this is characterised by the belief that it is only 
through interpretation of social constructions that we can develop our understanding of 
what happens in institutional settings, and that this should be undertaken through an
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ongoing dialectic between theory and analysis. Views about what happens in such 
settings exist in the meanings that people develop as they interact with one another and 
with the physical world, with such meaning being a consequence of context and time. 
While some meanings will be shared, others will vary from place to place and from 
person to person (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). In addition, this approach recognises that 
individuals will have an awareness of their environment, and that it will have an impact 
upon their actions (Aldrich, 1992). Thus within this perspective there is a concern to 
understand both what has occurred as well as the context, which means that we must 
enter the social arena to conduct our study.
A number of authors consider case studies to be a preferred means of investigating 
strategy formation practice (Pettigrew, 1990, 1992; Walsham, 1995; Myers, 1997), being 
recognised as an appropriate and valid IS research method (Galliers, 1992; Cavaye, 
1996; Doolin, 1996; Darke et al, 1998). We undertook longitudinal, multiple case 
studies (Yin, 1993; Cavaye, 1996), with the case studies having been developed with 
five Police Forces between 1994 and 1998. Data collection has involved a number of 
methods, principally: in-depth semi-structured interviews, informal conversation, 
participation, collection of documentation produced by the people involved, and 
collation and analysis of secondary materials produced outside of the direct areas of 
study.
Multiple cases in single sector studies such as this are recognised as being of 
considerable value in providing a research arena in which to address differences, or 
variability, in strategy formation (Pettigrew, 1985; Child & Smith, 1987). Thus, given 
the apparent homogeneity of the Police Service and of the politico-economic 
environment in which they operate, researching in such a domain enables us to 
concentrate upon social practice of ISS formation, drawing attention to similarities or 
variations therein.
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1.4. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
This research was initially stimulated by a desire to make a contribution to knowledge 
by addressing the following question which had become apparent as a result of the 
author's own experience and through reading of literature in the area:
Why is ISS formation apparently not straightforward given that there is ample 
prescriptive literature available to assist the process?
This led to the development of this particular research programme which has addressed 
these related questions:
When people in an institution such as the Police Service say they are involved in 
ISS formation, what happens, and why?
Does addressing the exercise of power explicitly, in this instance utilising a 
multi-dimensional theoretical conceptualisation, further our understanding of 
ISS formation?
From the above questions, the following sub-questions have been used to guide and 
structure the research:
1. What do we understand by the term ISS formation?
2. Why is there apparent disparity between how some literature suggests ISS formation 
should happen, and what other literature suggests does happen?
3. Why is power a valid concept through which to explore ISS?
4. How and why is ISS formed in the organisations studied?
5. What implications does this study of ISS formation have for theory?
6. What implications does this view of ISS formation have for practice?
7. What have we learned about the area of investigation, about the way we have 
investigated it, and about ourselves in order to abstract generic notions which may 
have applicability for the field of ISS?
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1.5. STRUCTURE OF THESIS
Figure 1.1. illustrates an outline of the structure of this thesis, after which we discus the 
content of and rationale for each chapter.
13. Evaluation
12. Synthesis 
based upon 6-11 
& 2/3
1. Outline of 
Thesis
4. Research 
Philosophy & 
Methods
5. Background to 
case studies
2. ISS Formation 
- relevant 
literature
2/3. Evaluation 
of literature & 
Theoretic 
framework 3. ISS Formation 
& the exercise of 
Power 
- relevant 
literature
6-11. Cases:
- discussion
- analysis 
-abstraction of 
key issues
Figure 1.1. Outline chapter structure of the thesis
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In Figure 1.1. we not only outline the structure of this thesis, but also indicate the ways 
in which earlier chapters contribute to later discussions. In our view, the thesis must be 
viewed as a whole, consisting of a progression from initial identification of a gap 
through to the contribution to knowledge.
1.5.1. CHAPTER 1
What - This chapter sets out the research focus and research questions that have guided 
the work undertaken, and provides an introduction to and overview of the following 
areas of the thesis: background to the research area, the reasons for doing this research, 
the methodological focus, the practical research work undertaken.
Why - The content of this chapter provides the reader with a clear understanding of what 
the thesis is about, what was done, why it was done, and how it was done. Finally, the 
reader is given a clear understanding of the structure and content of the remainder of the 
thesis.
1.5.2. CHAPTER 2
What - In this chapter we undertake a critical evaluation of theory relevant to the area of 
ISS formation, highlighting the key issues that have been identified, including problems 
and deficiencies in the field which pave the way for the work in this thesis. Specifically, 
this chapter considers the nature of IS and the nature of Organisation, the nature of ISS, 
and finally ISS formation. In particular, the work in this chapter highlights the need for 
in-depth analysis of ISS formation.
Why - There is considerable literature on ISS. The role of this evaluation of research 
literature is to clarify what knowledge exists, what gaps exist, and to justify the research 
as being an important area for exploration.
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1.5.3. CHAPTER 3
What - This chapter builds upon the work in chapter two by highlighting the exercise of 
power in terms of ISS formation in an organisational context. A critical evaluation of 
literature looking at the exercise of power in relation to IS in organisational contexts is 
undertaken, and a case is made for the examination of ISS formation through focussing 
upon the exercise of power. Finally, a conceptual investigative framework that can 
assist our understanding of ISS formation is discussed.
Why - There is not much discussion on the exercise of power in ISS formation. By 
critically evaluating literature, the thesis establishes that there is indeed a case for 
exploration of the exercise of power in relation to ISS formation.
1.5.4. CHAPTER 4
What - This chapter discusses and justifies the philosophical position underpinning the 
research methodology, the research methods employed, and the means of analysis.
Why - It is essential to make clear the philosophy and methods underpinning the thesis, 
and to set out exactly what was done, how, and why in the practical research work. This 
establishes the credentials of the researcher and the validity of the data.
1.5.5. CHAPTER 5
What - The main focus of this chapter is to evaluate the context of the case studies. The 
role of information technology in the Police Service is examined, and an evaluation of 
issues allied to the concept of ISS in the Police Service is presented.
Why - To ensure that the reader is presented with a clear discussion of the context in 
which the research has been undertaken, which is pertinent to a consideration of ISS 
formation in the case studies.
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1.5.6. CHAPTERS 6 TO 11
What - In these chapters the detail from the practical research work in the case studies is 
discussed. In this discussion we abstract issues from our analysis of ISS formation in 
each of the cases.
Why - To understand ISS formation in practice.
1.5.7. CHAPTER 12
What - In this chapter the analytic findings from our analysis of the case studies are 
synthesised. From this we develop theoretic understanding of ISS formation by 
developing a model based upon our analytic work.
Why - To synthesise the themes which have been extracted from the analysis of practical 
research work, and to discuss them in terms of issues which emerged from our 
evaluation of literature. To demonstrate the validity of our analytic propositions to 
theory.
1.5.8. CHAPTER 13
What - This chapter presents an evaluation of the research undertaken and a conclusion. 
Firstly, an evaluation of the findings from the research case studies is presented in 
relation to ISS formation. Secondly, an evaluation of the research approach and 
methods is presented. Thirdly, an evaluation of the role and development of the 
researcher during the process of researcher is presented. Finally, it sets out some 
directions for future work that follows on from the findings of this research.
Why - To demonstrate the learning that has occurred in conducting the research based 
upon critical reflection.
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1.6. SUMMARY
This chapter has set out an overview of the research issue, research context, and 
research method for this thesis. In the next chapter we evaluate literature relevant to ISS 
formation, highlighting a gap in the literature to which our work contributes.
CHAPTER TWO - INFORMATION SYSTEM STRATEGY 
FORMATION
2.1. INTRODUCTION.
This chapter evaluates literature that is pertinent to our understanding of the concept of 
information system strategy (ISS) formation. It highlights a disparity between a rational 
perspective of ISS formation and a number of empirical studies which contradict this 
dominant view. This leads to the argument that it is necessary to address this disparity 
through research which investigates the micro-politics of ISS formation.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: firstly it evaluates literature concerning the 
nature of IS and organisation, arguing that practice associated with IS in organisational 
settings is inherently social, and can usefully be considered in terms of political activity. 
Secondly, it evaluates literature on ISS, noting that this is a relatively young field of 
study, and one that borrows heavily from the area of business strategy. It is argued that 
while much is written about ISS, how ISS actually comes about - that is, ISS formation 
- is not well understood. Thirdly, it evaluates ISS formation specifically, arguing that 
there is a disparity between a majority of literature which displays ISS formation as a 
rational process, and some research studies of practice which conflict with the 
rationalist perspective. Finally, drawing the above together, the chapter closes with the 
argument that research is required that is sensitive to the political phenomena that 
pervade practice associated with ISS formation.
2.2. ORGANISATIONS: THE CONTEXT FOR ISS FORMATION
A traditional and what has been termed a functionalist perspective (Burrell & Morgan, 
1979) considers the notion of an organisation as an objective entity, something that 
exists in its own right. This suggests that once established, an organisation tends to 
assume “an identity of its own which makes it independent of the people who have
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founded it or of those who constitute its membership” (Blau, 1974, p.54). This can be 
regarded as a domain assumption that continues to dominate research in organisational 
contexts (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Reed, 1985; Knights & Wilmott, 1999). Here, 
organisations are seen as being ontologically distinct, that is, having an existence of 
their own with clearly identifiable boundaries, and where the organisation is ascribed 
the capacity for deliberation and action (Morgan, 1986).
There are other perspectives however, and of particular significance to us are those that 
consider the concept of organisation in a subjective sense. The term organisation can be 
considered as an embodiment of social reality, reproduced through a network of self­
constructed subjective meanings which become institutionalised over time (Silverman, 
1970). Such a view of organisation acknowledges a socially constructed dimension, 
which functionalist views referred to above, do not address. By socially constructed 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1967) we mean the way in which people construct knowledge of 
the social realities that they are engaged in, which can be considered in the form of an 
ongoing dialectic between people and the world they inhabit (ibid.). Such an ongoing 
dialectic can be thought of in terms of three aspects of extemalisation, objectivation, 
and internalisation. Here,
“society and each part of it are simultaneously characterised by these three 
moments”, and where an individual “simultaneously externalises his own being 
into the social world and internalises it as an objective reality. In other words, to 
be in society is to participate in its dialectic” (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 149)
Such a view challenges the assumption that there is one external reality within which 
organisations are located, and with which people interact. Typically, a functionalist 
view regards organisations as predominantly market driven entities which have to adapt 
to environmental pressures, where organisations are “islands in an environmental stream 
of change” (Scarborough, 1998, p.21), with people assessing and responding to 
collectively understood pressures. Instead, in our view the notion of organisation will be 
perceived differently by various people, and similarly, so-called environmental activity 
will also vary depending upon the mental constructs that people, either individually or 
collectively, develop. In such a perspective, we view people as knowledgeable and 
proactive beings, who shape their organisational setting though their interactions with 
other people. The complex social processes through which organisational arrangements 
are constituted and the reproduction of organisation structures is seen to be directly and
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inextricably tied to the social interactions taking place between participants (Giddens, 
1976).
In our view, we think about the concept of organisation as social practice, where,
“organisations are viewed as administrative mechanisms containing authoritative 
and allocative resources through which collective action can be coordinated and 
mobilised in support of productive activity which transforms the environmental 
conditions in which it is undertaken. ”(Reed, 1992, p.l 14).
Such a view highlights a number of aspects. Firstly, the recognition of action through 
mechanisms associated with the manipulation of resources highlights both social 
aspects as well as more physical elements - in the form of resources - associated with 
practice in organisational settings. Secondly, such a perspective acknowledges that 
political activities are embodied within organisational practice, and it is argued that that 
these will be geared towards desires to gain access to the authoritative mechanisms that 
form the basis for organisation (ibid.). Therefore, we contend that addressing political 
issues is important to our understanding of the activities in organisational settings 
(Mintzberg, 1983; Clegg, 1989; Eden, 1992.).
This highlights that the concept of organisation can be understood in terms of 
perceptions of people, and these perceptions may vary between individuals, across 
groups, and over time. Furthermore, for those actually working in organisational 
settings, what they do, how they operate, and the meanings they attach to what happens 
are all part of cultural and political practice inherent in the concept of organisation, 
something which they may not explicitly reflect upon but which they are nonetheless 
implicitly a part of.
This view of organisation draws attention to differences in what people seek to achieve, 
and to diversity in the ways in which practice occurs. This conception of organisation 
indicates that we must be aware of elements such as diversity in approach that people 
take, differences in perspective and meaning attribution, multiple coalitions with 
potentially conflicting ambitions, and shifts in the nature and bases of power. Such 
elements are at the heart of what Checkland (1981) means when considering 
organisation as human activity systems, in that, organisations have no particular state or 
form which can be identified. Instead, in our view the notion of organisation is ever 
changing, and only has meaning through the perceptions of the people with some
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interest therein. As Jayaratna (1994) observes, it is impossible for someone to make a 
complete study of the notion of an organisation, because what an organisation is, and 
how said organisation is perceived, will vary from person to person, and from day to 
day - the notion of organisation is a consequence of socially constructed interpretations. 
When we use the term organisation it is to such a concept that we refer, and from this 
we can now move on to consider the nature of IS.
2.3. INFORMATION SYSTEMS: THE FOCUS OF ISS FORMATION
Technological thinking has often dominated IS related research and practice, lacking an 
appreciation of either social, or the generally unpredictable nature of IS in 
organisational settings (Angell & Straub, 1993). In our view information systems are 
not just technology. Long before computer technology was available, information 
systems were a part of human activity, where data became information in human 
consciousness (Boland, 1985) through the utilisation of technological artefacts such as 
printed and written materials, or other apparatus. The adoption of computer based 
technologies into information systems has represented a technological evolution of a 
basic human activity (Checkland, 1988; Wilson, 1990; Land, 1992), and we can think of 
information systems as entailing purposeful human activity making use of information 
technology artefacts (Checkland, 1981; Boland, 1987; Jayaratna, 1994). Thus, when we 
think of practice associated with computer based information systems (IS) in 
organisational settings we must address both technical and social phenomena.
Further to this, computer related technologies have elements of subjectivity about them, 
in that their significance within any setting can be perceived as being based upon the 
meanings attributed to them (Checkland and Holwell, 1998), through “socially 
constructed definitions of their value and utility” (Knights & Murray, 1994, p.250). 
From our perspective the concept of IS embodies social practice, and is given meaning 
through socially constructed views. Such a view means that the application of a 
seemingly objective entity such as a computer will be subject to a wide variety of 
socially formed interpretations. We note therefore that discussions related to such IS in 
organisational settings may not be consistent in meaning amongst participants given that 
the significance of any such system will be based upon variance in individual, or 
collective interpretation. The increased recognition of the social dimensions of IS has
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led a number of authors to call for more empirical investigation of IS which explicitly 
addresses these social dimensions (Boland, 1985; Davies, 1991; Jayaratna, 1994; 
Walsham, 1995; Myers, 1997), and which our research is a response to.
2.4. INFORMATION SYSTEMS STRATEGY FORMATION
This section firstly considers general business strategy formation literature to identify 
schools of thinking which are relevant to ISS, before moving on to evaluate literature on 
ISS formation specifically. In discussing strategy, we find that there are numerous 
definitions within the literature, although broadly most tend to reflect the same 
underlying concerns; namely, that that strategy is an activity which affects all parts of 
an organisation, which examines the scope of an organisation's activities, and which is 
concerned with relationships between organisation settings and environmental factors 
(Asch & Bowman, 1989; Whittington, 1993; Lynch, 1998). We will now move on to 
consider differing views regarding the nature of strategy and how strategy comes about.
2.4.1 DIFFERING VIEWS ABOUT STRATEGY & STRATEGY FORMATION
Much of the business and management literature published about strategy, has been 
criticised as being unrepresentative of practice (Mintzberg, 1978; Chaffee, 1985; 
Whittington, 1993; Lynch, 1998). This is because traditionally, strategy has been treated 
as something "explicit, developed consciously and purposefully, and made in advance 
of the specific decision to which it applies" (Mintzberg, 1978, p.935), or as a clear 
process . Such views, which we term traditional, exhibit the notion of intended strategy 
which involves deliberate planning activities in advance of implementation, which in 
turn leads to intended outcomes.
Mintzberg (1978) draws a distinction between two schools of thought on strategy 
formation: the traditional view is termed deliberate, and the other emergent. Emergent 
strategy is something that can only be determined by looking for "a pattern in a stream 
of decisions" (Mintzberg, 1978, p.935). This is strategy in retrospect, that is, it is
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perceived to emerge over time, in contrast to being the result of something that has been 
rationally planned before being implemented.
This distinction is important for a number of reasons: firstly, it challenges the traditional 
view of rationally planned strategy by introducing the notion that strategy formation 
also has an emergent quality. For example, it has been argued that in practice there is 
neither purely deliberate nor purely emergent strategy, but that strategy formation 
inhabits a continuum between these two extreme forms (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). 
Secondly, it highlights the thought that there are multiple influences upon strategy 
formation as a process that are outside of conscious thought or deliberate action, in 
effect saying that the reality of strategy formation is highly complex. Finally, it is 
claimed that in fact researchers know very little about the practice of strategy formation 
due to the limited volume of empirical work (Mintzberg, 1978; Eden, 1992; Johnson, 
1997).
Pettigrew (1977) argues that the way in which strategy comes about can be considered 
as, "a flow of events, values and actions running though a context" (p.79). This suggests 
that contextual issues may be important in helping us to understand the way in which 
ISS comes about, and also that political considerations may be an important means 
through which the issue of strategy formation may be investigated. This highlighting of 
contextual and political issues in relation to strategy formation contrasts with the more 
traditional views referred to above.
Difference in perspective about how strategy comes about are not new however. While 
some argue that strategy is a rational activity which could be planned via a series of 
stages (Ansoff, 1965), others suggest that strategy development is in practice somewhat 
haphazard and ad-hoc in nature (Lindblom; 1959), and that political and social factors 
are influential in the strategy development process (Allison, 1971; Datta; 1980).
Several schools of thinking about strategy formation have been identified (Chaffee, 
1985; Kay, 1993; Whittington, 1993). We can summarise these views in terms of four 
schools of thinking about strategy formation (Whittington, 1993), which can be 
differentiated along two axes, one which we have labeled Intention and the other we 
have labeled Perception of Process. We illustrate these schools of thinking in Figure
2.1. below.
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INTENTION 
Profit maximising
CLASSICAL EVOLUTIONARY
PERCEPTION (formal rational)
OF PROCESS
Deliberate
SYSTEMIC PROCESSUAL
Emergent
Pluralistic
Figure 2.1. A Classification of Four Perspectives on Strategy Formation (Adapted from 
Whittington, 1993, p.3)
The vertical axis indicates the degree to which strategy efforts are focussed upon either 
profit-maximising, or whether there are more pluralistic intentions which address other 
foci in addition to or instead of profit maximising, for example, delivery of a public 
service, provision of an enhanced work environment, or survival. The horizontal axis 
addresses perceptions of process, and differentiates between planned, deliberate 
processes at one end of the continuum through to more emergent, or serendipitous 
approaches at the other end.
The Classical perspective in the upper left-hand quadrant is the formal rational view. 
The Evolutionary and the Processual perspectives categorise strategy formation as being 
based upon more emergent processes, but differ in their intentions for strategy 
formation. An Evolutionary perspective is seen as being more concerned with profit 
maximisation through processes of natural selection, having little faith in the ability of 
managers to plan rationally. The work of Henderson (1989) and Williamson (1991) 
typifies the approach of the evolutionists, arguing that for most firms strategy is a 
distraction, as only those with true market power can hope to choose their direction. For 
the remainder, it is a question of fighting to survive through ever greater efficiency in
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the quest for profits. For the evolutionist, it is the environment which will decide who 
survives, not the managers.
A Processual perspective intimates strategy formation that is oriented to additional, or 
alternative, outcomes. The work of both Mintzberg (1978) and Pettigrew (1977), 
referred to above, is characteristic of the processual viewpoint, where both are interested 
in the process of strategy that exists within complex situations. However, while they do 
address the political nature of strategy, both Mintzberg and Pettigrew can be criticised 
for accepting the classical assumption that strategy "exists to solve problems vis-a-vis 
the organisation and its environment" (Knights & Morgan, 1991, p.267). Instead, we 
should remain aware to the possibility that "strategy does not simply respond to pre­
existing problems", but that in the process of formation, "strategy is actively involved in 
the constitution, or redefinition, of problems in advance of offering solutions for them" 
(ibid., p. 267). Hence, strategy according to this view need not be seen as in someway 
representing a solution to a problem that is already evident in organisational settings, 
but rather that the concept of strategy can be re-thought in terms of a social practice that 
involves forming, or coming to know of the problem(s), as well as addressing said 
problem(s). This leads us to a more sociologically sympathetic view.
Finally, within a Systemic perspective,
"a central tenet ... is that decision makers are not simply detached calculating 
individuals interacting in purely economic transactions, but people rooted in 
deeply interwoven systems" (Whittington, 1993, p.28).
Here, strategy formation is perceived as encompassing a sense of deliberation to 
strategy development in addition to an emergent aspect, but will also be concerned with 
a variety of intentions that go beyond one solely of profit maximisation (Whittington,
1993). In particular, this dimension acknowledges socio-political dimensions to strategy 
formation, and requires modes of enquiry that are sensitive to social and political 
aspects (ibid.).
However, we consider that the terminology we have used to label the axes requires 
further discussion in the light of our challenges to Whittington's (1993) classificatory 
framework. The term Process was originally used to label the horizontal axis, and in our 
view this intimates a concern with how people see an observable process, rather than 
how people perceive of any notional process from amongst a range of possibilities. We
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prefer the term Perception of Process, which is in our view all that we can hope to gauge 
from people. The use of the term Outcomes which Whittington uses to label the vertical 
axis intimates that there is a clearly understood outcome, although we can by no means 
be sure that this will be the case. Instead, we prefer the term Intention, by which we 
mean endeavouring to gauge what the intentions are of those thinking about strategy.
One problem with such two-by-two matrices as displayed in Figure 2.1., is the danger of 
over-simplifying concepts (Collins, 1998). However, this is less problematic if we do 
not imply from Figure 2.1. that this is how things are, but rather that here is one way of 
thinking about strategy. With this in mind we note that Whittington (1993) is not 
entirely clear about the relationship between the systemic perspective and the other 
three views. From Figure 2.1. it would be relatively easy to infer that both classical and 
systemic perspectives consider that strategy comes about in a deliberate mode, whilst 
the other two schools are differentiated by a view of strategy as emergent. This is 
simplistic, and in our view misleading. While much of the literature in the classical 
view does indeed view strategy as something that is planned in a deliberate fashion 
(Scarborough, 1998), this is not the claim of a systemic perspective. Rather, the basis of 
the view of the systemic school of thinking is that what happens with regard to strategy 
is a consequence of the particular sociological context, and that strategy is not 
necessarily purely emergent, but equally, nor is it necessarily wholly planned 
(Whittington, 1993). The main contention is that a sociologically sensitive approach is 
required in acknowledgement of the view that, "strategy reflects the particular social 
systems in which strategists participate, defining for them the interests in which they act 
and the rules by which they can survive" (ibid., p.5).
One further problem is that the use of the term Systemic is not explained sufficiently by 
Whittington (1993). While the reference to thinking about strategy formation in terms of 
systems is made clear, it is not made clear whether the term Systemic is being used to 
differentiate this view of how we think about what happens in practice from association 
with the term S ystem ic  (Checkland, 1981; Jayaratna, 1994). It appears to us that the 
term systemic is being used by Whittington to infer that we should understand strategy 
formation in terms of systems in an ontological sense, "as it exists in its environment" 
(Thomsett, 1980, p. 8). While we agree with the sentiment expressed within the 
Systemic perspective that a more sociologically sensitive view of strategy formation is 
required, we need to consider the terminology usage. Whittington (1993) argues that to
21
be within the Systemic perspective is to be sociologically sensitive to the political and 
cultural systems of the strategy context. We argue that in addition to this, in our view 
the term Systemic can be used in a different sense (Jayaratna, 1994), to imply the use of 
the term in an epistemological sense rather than an ontological sense. This view infers 
that rather than thinking that there is a strategy formation process waiting to be 
identified, in an epistemological sense, what may be seen as constituting strategy 
formation will depend upon the perspectives of those involved, and it may well be that 
another person will perceive strategy formation in a different way. Thus, we can 
conceive of many systems in relation to strategy formation, which will vary in relation 
to the mental constructs (Jayaratna, 1994) of those involved. If we accept this 
alternative view, then we are alerted to the possibility that there will be various 
perceptions of strategy formation amongst the people involved in the process of ISS 
formation.
Thus in evaluating the field of strategy formation, traditional rational planning 
approaches to strategy formation are considered to be unrepresentative of practice 
(Datta, 1980; Quinn, 1980; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Pettigrew, 1985a; Pettigrew & 
Whipp, 1991). We have acknowledged that there are a variety of perspectives that we 
can take of strategy formation, and we note the view that the Systemic perspective 
offers an alternative means of thinking about strategy formation that overcomes the 
weaknesses that we have identified in the other views. That said, when we turn to the 
literature on ISS formation, we find that the majority of this literature reflects a 
Classical perspective.
2.4.2. CLASSICAL PERSPECTIVES OF ISS FORMATION
ISS literature shares much in common with the business strategy literature; not only are 
there numerous definitions (Baets, 1992), but there is also diversity in perspectives 
about how ISS comes about (Walsham, 1993; Jones, 1995; Scarborough, 1998).
First we must address what we mean by ISS. Lederer and Sethi (1992) argue that ISS 
comprises two strands; one is concerned with identifying high-impact applications, 
while the other focuses upon a process of "identifying a portfolio of computer based 
applications to assist an organisation in executing its current business plans" (p. 70).
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These authors go on to claim that ISS involves an organisation selecting a methodology, 
and undertaking a major study involving teams of staff. Furthermore Lederer and Sethi
(1992) identify eighteen reasons why ISS often fails, none of which explicitly mention 
social or political problems. The problems they identify concern getting resources, 
implementing the methodology, and getting leadership - the reasons why these factors 
become problematic are not explored in any depth. This view is one that can be 
categorised within a classical perspective, being one of many such views we see 
reflected in ISS formation literature (e.g. Miller, 1988; Wiseman, 1988; Atkins, 1994; 
Prince, 1994).
Much of the literature that addresses ISS formation exhibits characteristics of the 
Classical perspective, where the authors present a view of ISS formation as a distinct, 
deliberate process, with profit maximisation as the intention of those involved. A 
number of authors do present ISS formation in systematic terms, with ISS practice 
being presented as a process that consists of distinct steps, with formulation being 
differentiated from a separate process termed implementation (e.g. Earl, 1989; Andreu 
et al, 1992; Ward & Griffiths, 1996; Fidler & Rogerson, 1996; Robson, 1997). As we 
have argued, we believe this is an unhelpful distinction, intimating as it does that there 
is a distinct stage when ISS is formulated followed by a further distinct, and separate 
stage when strategy is implemented. There is in this an inherent presumption of 
sequence, and furthermore the concept of formulation carries with it connotations of a 
systematic, rational approach. When we talk of ISS formation we are deliberately 
distancing ourselves from the terms formulation and implementation. We use the term 
formation to refer to a range of practice through which we see the development of ISS, 
potentially in relation to a range of social phenomena and not just as a natural 
organisational activity (Knights & Morgan, 1991; Jones, 1995), a view that is more 
attuned to a systemic perspective of ISS formation. Works demonstrating a classical 
perspective often focus upon producing a distinct output, for example: a focus upon the 
production of an ISS plan (Premkumar & King, 1992; Flynn & Goleniewska, 1993); the 
delivery of value to the business following integration with the business strategy 
(Brown, 1994); the provision of better information with a view to enhancing business 
competitiveness (Fray, 1993); the delivery of applications (Moynihan, 1990).
We note that numerous tools have been proposed to enable ISS to be formulated. 
Examples of such tools and techniques include: value chain analysis (Porter & Millar,
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1985); strategic opportunities framework (Benjamin et al, 1984); strategic options 
generator (Wiseman, 1988); opportunities matrix (Kettinger et al, 1995); strategic 
information system planning framework (Ward & Griffiths, 1996). Some have bundled 
many methods together into a toolkit approach (e.g. Hickey, 1993; Robson, 1997; Fidler 
& Rogerson, 1996).
An example of this proliferation of tools for ISS formation is the work of Ward and 
Griffiths (1996) who argue that, "..it should now be clear that information system 
strategies must be developed within the context of the wider corporate and business 
strategic planning process. In this way the investment in information systems and 
technology throughout an organisation can be directed towards the achievement of 
business objectives and goals." (Ward & Griffiths, 1996, p.47). The objective of ISS 
formation as they see it lies in 'gaining competitive advantage' or 'repel[ling] 
competitive threat' (ibid., p.47). These authors present a view of ISS formation which is 
outcome oriented, and which consists of a series of linear steps, which they set out in 
the form of a strategic information systems planning framework (ibid.). Ward and 
Griffiths (1996) claim that their framework is essential for the development of ISS, and 
intimate that by following their framework an implementable ISS will be developed. 
The problem we identify in such work is that the authors spend no time considering how 
ISS formation actually comes about in organisations. Rather, it is assumed that formal 
planning equates to ISS formation (see also for example: Andreu et al, 1992; Hickey,
1994). Furthermore, there is a clear assumption that there is a formal strategy process, 
that is in an ontological sense, but do not question different conceptions that may exist 
within organisational settings of either ISS or of activity associated with formation. This 
represents a limited view of ISS formation, and such views do not offer people the 
opportunity to think about the concept of ISS formation - instead they are presented 
with a what to do recipe.
We are critical of the limited perspective of these classical views of ISS formation as a 
formal, rational, planning activity (Scott-Morton, 1988; Waema & Walsham, 1990; 
Galliers, 1991; Walsham, 1993; Knights & Murray, 1994). There are a range of noted 
assumptions underpinning this perspective of ISS such as: that social relations are co­
operative, that resources are available as required, that objectives are known, that people 
will be able to develop necessary aspects strategy in an objective manner, that there is a 
clear appreciation and understanding of cause-effect relationships, and that there is
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enough information to enable the required activities to operate (Kling, 1987, Waema & 
Walsham, 1990). Such assumptions inhabit a perspective based upon realism, where the 
social world is seen as constituting hard, tangible and relatively immutable structures 
that are perceived to' exist, with the social world viewed as being independent of any 
one individual’s appreciation of it (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Pfeffer, 1981; Hirschheim 
& Klein, 1989). One consequence is said to be that such a view tends to focus upon 
information technology as a factor that determines organisational outcome (Coombs et 
al, 1992). This is to the detriment of focussing upon the social practices surrounding the 
development and application of such technology.
Galliers (1991) cautions against persisting with an overly optimistic, formal and rational 
model of strategy formation, suggesting that different approaches are needed which 
better reflect the ways in which ISS may come about (Galliers et al, 1994). This echoes 
Kling (1987) who argues that social context and historical influences are either ignored 
totally, or are expressed in a few simple formal relationships in studies inhabiting the 
Classical perspective. Much of the ISS literature is solution oriented (Knights and 
Murray, 1994), and takes too limited a perspective in seeking to address the 
complexities surrounding ISS, in particular the need to consider power as a key 
influence in relation to ISS (Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992; Walsham, 1993; Sillince & 
Mouakket, 1997). We therefore agree with the view that research into ISS is required 
from perspectives that, "recognise the importance of behavioural contexts, such as the 
existence of coalitions and multiple goal structures, political differences between 
participants and negotiation in conflict situations" (Waema & Walsham, 1990, p.30).
Our argument is that a considerable amount of the literature on ISS formation presents a 
view which is very limited. While some authors have considered ISS formation as more 
emergent than planned (e.g.: Hopper, 1990; Ciborra, 1994), this has done little to break 
the mould of the dominant formal-rational approach within ISS research in general. ISS 
is persistently articulated as a discrete process in an objective sense, which proceeds in a 
planned, linear manner. However, critiquing ISS formation literature is only the first 
step. The problem with such literature stems from what they do not say, and from what 
they do not include or seek to deal with in ISS formation in addition to what they do 
say, which leads us to explore alternative perspectives.
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2.4.3. EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES OF ISS FORMATION
The perspective that a researcher has of a situation is a consequence of the researcher's 
views on ontology and epistemology. By this we mean their assumptions about the 
essence of the phenomena to be investigated, the nature of the world, and assumptions 
about the grounds of knowledge, how we know what we know about that world. We 
consider perspective to be something that is innate to the individual, and that it is only 
through a process of reflection that researchers can begin to understand their own 
approach to investigation. However, the point of this is that the view taken here is that 
the perspective we adopt in research is a result of considered thought regarding the 
nature of what is being attempted, the nature of the domain, and appropriate means of 
investigation. In our view it is not a result of merely picking a perspective - a label - and 
making the resulting account ‘fit’ with practice (Tsoukas, 1994).
Therefore, in thinking about reasons behind the predominance of a formal-rational view 
of ISS formation, it is necessary to consider the stance of the researcher. This does not 
necessarily mean that a researcher, or group of researchers will adopt a particular view 
of ISS formation because it happens to suit their purpose. Rather, it implies that a 
particular view of ISS formation will be articulated as a result of the beliefs and 
assumptions that are held about the domain under investigation. In essence, such a view 
of ISS formation will be inexorably bound up with the researcher's beliefs about the 
nature of the world that they are investigating and the grounds of their knowledge of 
that world. That many people articulate a Classical perspective of ISS formation is a 
reflection of their understanding of the nature of ISS formation in the organisational 
setting.
However, the point is not that views of ISS formation that exhibit a Classical 
perspective are bad, and that we should therefore adopt another approach. Rather, we 
contend that such a perspective does not adequately deal with the social complexity that 
we have noted constitutes organisational settings, of which ISS formation activities are 
part.
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In looking at the ISS literature, there are comparatively few authors who have reported 
upon research in the area of ISS formation that develop alternative perspectives to the 
Classical viewpoint. In this section we consider several empirically based contributions 
that have sought to investigate perspectives other than the Classical view.
In defining ISS, we see alternative perspectives being explored by some authors, 
although most agree with the ethos that ISS is concerned with a process of deciding 
what to do with IS in furtherance of the aims of the organisational members as a whole 
(Wilson, 1989; Baets, 1992). However, Reponen (1998) contends that ISS is "something 
which is essentially a planning process in the minds of the decision makers, users and 
developers of the system. It is supported by written reports and plans, but they are of 
secondary importance" (p. 137). This suggests that ISS may not then be a formal, 
identifiable process per se, but instead indicates a social element, and although not 
discussed by Reponen, as something that is socially constructed, a view supported by 
others (Knights & Murray, 1994; Scarborough, 1998). We therefore begin to see that 
there are alternatives views concerning the nature of ISS, and find that these view 
extend to differences in thinking about ISS formation.
Davies (1991) highlights the importance of social dimensions through which 
organisation, as a collective social activity, can be explored in relation to ISS. Davies 
reflects upon political activity as a key facet of the social complexity of organisation, an 
area that much ISS related research has failed to acknowledge. In particular, the 
concepts of power, context, and time, are noted as factors of importance in seeking to 
make sense of what occurs with regard to ISS. Davies (ibid.) argues that an interpretive 
approach is especially useful as a basis for enhancing understanding of ISS by giving 
attention to facets of organisation that previous research have rarely acknowledged. 
However, one weakness in Davies' work is that the issues of power, context, and time 
are not explored in any depth.
A further weakness is that Davies (1991) does not discuss her conceptualisation of ISS. 
On the one hand Davies' use of language about ISS suggests that her perspective can be 
classified as a Classical view, for example when, "checking for a logical flow through 
the necessary steps required to carry out the strategy" (1991, p. 156), and that, "...the 
army needs to allow its strategy to be implemented' (p. 160). On the other hand though, 
is her espousal of a view of life in organisational contexts as socially constructed, where
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she is concerned to address both the micro and the macro aspects of the socio-political 
nature of organisational life. Such views would seem at face value to contradict one 
another, however, it may be that Davies is acknowledging a certain amount of formality 
to ISS while at the same time arguing that the strategy is embedded in the deeply 
interwoven social systems to which Whittington (1993) refers.
In a similar vein, Waema and Walsham (1990) discuss the impact of social/political 
power behaviour which they suggest forms part of ISS formation. The outcome of their 
work, is to highlight the social complexity of IS related activities, and amongst these, of 
ISS formation. They argue that power is implicit in ISS formation, noting a number of 
manifestations of political behaviour, for example: IS as sources of power for the Chief 
executive, power oriented behaviour of groups, changes in power distribution (pp.37- 
38). In this work however, the authors do not adequately explain either their own 
conception, or other theoretical views of power, something which we regard as a 
weakness.
An empirically based assessment of ISS in organisations is provided by Walsham
(1993), who utilises an interpretive perspective that acknowledges the social complexity
of organisation. Mintzberg’s (1978) view of strategy formation as something that
emerges from a pattern in a stream of decisions is accepted by Walsham (1993) who
argues that ISS formation may well incorporate a sense of deliberate planning in
addition to an emergent quality. Walsham argues that,
“information systems in their organisational context have holographic 
properties, in that their development and use could be taken to involve all 
aspects of human life”(1993, p.7),
drawing attention to the social dimensions surrounding ISS, and hence the complexity 
of the notion of ISS as an organisational activity. Walsham (1993) illustrates a move 
beyond the Classical perspective on ISS, with ISS formation “viewed as a process of 
continuous discourse” (Walsham, 1993, p. 157), where communicants both provide, and 
take meaning as part of an ongoing ISS process. We are given some indication of 
Walsham's perspective from this; that is, to highlight the process of discourse is 
indicative of a view that is sensitive to the socially constructed nature of peoples 
activity in organisational settings. We see here the importance of language, vocabulary, 
and degrees of participation, which are a means of contributing towards an enhanced 
understanding of the nature of ISS formation. We also note the importance of social
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processes whereby ISS formation can be conceptualised as “involving a social process 
of communication, learning, and negotiation both within and between individuals and 
stakeholder groups” (Walsham, 1993, p.236).
One further point from Walsham's (1993) work is important to us here, and that is the
role of power that is referred to in his discussion of ISS. Power relations between
individuals are viewed as being closely tied to the continuous discourse which is central
to the formation of ISS (Walsham, 1993). Walsham notes that,
“the main messages are that power and its use in political activity pervade all 
action and discourse in organisations, that the exercise of power is a continuous 
process that has subtle local properties, and that local actions are linked in a 
complex way to more general networks and institutional frameworks” (1993, 
p.40).
Although the role of power is again highlighted in relation to ISS formation, Walsham 
does not explore the concept in any depth.
The concept of power in relation to ISS is also discussed by Knights and Murray (1994)
in their empirical study of I.T. developments in the U.K. financial services industry.
They argue that one of the main problems with Classical views of ISS is the generally
unacknowledged political nature of such activity, with power relations being viewed as
a central ingredient of political activity. At the heart of this is their view that,
“power might be seen to infuse all organisational relationships such that rather 
than being an exception or aberration from the norm, political activity is the 
focal process through which organisations are sustained, reproduced or 
transformed” (Knights & Murray, 1994, p.38, original emphasis).
Knights and Murray are unequivocal in their demand that more research into the social 
and political dimensions of ISS in organisational life is required, and that in particular 
we must address the central issue of power relations, through and within which so much 
of organisational activity can be considered to be enacted (Pfeffer, 1981; Clegg, 1989). 
They are equally adamant that the notion of IS in an organisational setting that is 
perceived to be objective and rational is a redundant notion, given the socially 
constructed nature of organisational settings, where politics is considered to be "the 
motor of organisational life" (Knights & Murray, 1994, p.245). From such a standpoint 
it is the socially constructed meanings attributed to IS, and to ISS that define the 
significance of these concepts for those involved.
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In a study of ISS formation, Jones (1995) utilises an in-depth case study method to 
research in a District Health Authority. Jones' view of ISS is very similar to that of 
Walsham as discussed above, where the concept of ISS formation can be considered to 
encompass elements of both emergence and planning, but where the nature of ISS 
formation can only be understood in relation to "the broader social phenomena" (Jones, 
1995, p. 121) within and through which organisational activities are embedded. In an 
effort to understand and inform the social phenomena associated with ISS formation, 
Jones argues that an analysis that addresses four concepts of learning at four levels is 
appropriate: namely, "of strategic resources, of the strategy process, of the discourse of 
strategy and of broader social discourse" (ibid. p. 119). While Jones is keen to point out 
that these levels of analysis do not form part of a "unified hierarchy of strategic action" 
(p. 121), they do he argues, "offer particular readings of the strategy process, based on 
sometimes quite different assumptions about the nature of organisation and of social 
activity. They may be seen as levels however in the sense that their focus is 
progressively wider, from the internal, formal processes of an organisation to the 
societal context within which it operates" (p. 121). The findings of this study do however 
highlight that ISS formation can be viewed as being embedded within the wider social 
discourses that take place as part of organisational life (Knights & Morgan, 1991; Jones,
1995). Thus, in considering ISS formation in such terms, it is suggested that it is this 
concept of discourse "that shapes the way in which organisational members see 
themselves and their world and also constitutes the problems it claims to solve" (Jones, 
1995, p. 120). Despite this use of the notion of strategic discourse, Jones remains 
wedded to an ontological view of strategy, despite the epistemological connotations that 
the notion of strategic discourse implies. That is, it seems to us that the very notion of 
strategic discourse intimates that people will participate and perceive strategy in 
different ways as a consequence of their participation in parts of this discourse. 
Therefore, Jones talks continually of the strategy process (1995) without questioning the 
assumption that everyone identifies with a single process.
In addition, Jones (1995) has taken his four levels of analysis from authors with quite 
markedly different perspectives of the nature of both strategy and of organisation, a 
point which Jones does acknowledge but does not justify. The four approaches that 
Jones adopts exhibit characteristics from all four of the views of strategy in 
Whittington's (1993) classification which we discussed previously. The bringing 
together of levels of analysis which embody such differences, that is, views which
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would seem to be divergent in terms of the ways of thinking about strategy formation is 
not explained nor justified clearly by Jones (1995). While the levels of analysis 
presented do represent developments in thinking about ISS in so far as they move 
beyond a Classical view, it would have been helpful to have a more detailed discussion 
of the theoretic bases of the work.
Despite this, Jones makes some interesting points, in particular that in considering ISS 
formation we should not consider either the issue of resources, or process, or politics, or 
the social discourse of strategy in an isolated manner, but should see them all as 
interconnected. He argues that, "the way in which strategy facilitates and legitimates the 
exercise of power was very much in evidence", and that, "information systems strategy 
was central to [the] changes in power relationships" (p. 138). The point being made here 
is that the link between ISS and way in which power is exercised is again evident, if in 
this instance not explored. However, having made such observations, and highlighted 
the role of power in the case a number of times, Jones does not address the concept, or 
conceptualisations of power in any depth, concentrating instead upon the concept of 
learning. Thus, power is raised as an issue in respect of ISS formation, but exploration 
of that issue is left for others to take up.
Auer and Reponen (1997) adopt an action research approach to investigate ISS 
formation in a food-agro/chemicals conglomerate. They note that ISS formation has 
both predictable and unpredictable elements, but that what happens must be seen in the 
light of the organisational setting. Whilst they do not address the issue of power, in 
seeking to understand the context which they say is so important in shaping ISS 
processes, they do highlight practices which raise barriers against learning in 
organisational settings and which prevent "both the assimilation and quality utilisation 
of IS" (ibid. p.42). They do not speculate as to what these practices might be, saying 
that further research is necessary to address such issues. It is however surprising that 
they do not consider that a more sociologically sensitive approach is needed to address 
the micro-politics of ISS formation given their concern with the concept of learning.
This latter study stands in marked contrast to the previous four works (i.e. Davies, 1991; 
Walsham, 1993; Knights & Murray, 1994; Jones, 1995) in that Auer and Reponen's 
(1997) discussion of organisation and of strategy processes could be labeled as 
distinctly Classical in perspective (Whittington, 1993). This is despite the authors
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apparent sensitivity to social complexity when declaring that action research is needed 
to understand the contextual dependence of ISS (Auer & Reponen, 1997). While their 
ability to explore issues such as power is more limited than the other authors that we 
have addressed, we do see once again that political activities are regarded as present in 
relation to ISS when such empirical studies begin to consider both the nature of 
organisation and the concept of ISS in a more sociologically sensitive manner.
What we see therefore is that in the empirical studies referred to above, the authors 
highlight that ISS formation is a complex social process, involving relationships and 
interactions between a range of people. That is, ISS is perceived as a range of complex 
phenomena, which goes beyond anything suggested by the apparent simplicity 
embodied by literature inhabiting a more Classical perspective. Thus, it can be seen that 
research conducted in a way that is more sociologically sensitive, within what 
Whittington (1993) terms a Systemic view of strategy, suggests that we can unearth 
layers of political activity in relation to ISS formation which traditional literature 
adopting a more traditional, Classical perspective has rarely considered. The role of 
political activity as an important facet of IS development is well documented 
(Checkland, 1981; Mumford et al, 1985; Jayaratna, 1994) We have found that the 
concept of power is raised time and again in relation to ISS by the studies evaluated, but 
the authors do not pause to explore the concept of power in any depth, and with the 
exception of Knights & Murray (1994) albeit that ISS formation is not their main focus, 
do not evaluate their empirical material in terms of the role of power. We consider that 
this is an omission which needs to be addressed.
The works that we have evaluated display perspectives which are alternatives to the 
Classical viewpoint. While Davies (1991) displays some contradictions in her work, 
each of the authors mentioned is sensitive to the social and political nature of 
organisational settings. They indicate that far from being the result of a deliberate, 
planned process, ISS in fact comes about in a far more messy way than the Classical 
perspective would have us believe. Furthermore, in all cases, where intentions were 
assessed, it was found that profit maximisation was not the sole goal of those involved 
in considering ISS. For example, Walsham (1993) found that shifting the balance of 
control to the centre was an important intention for those engaged in ISS formation; 
while for Knights and Murray (1994) an intention was for IS staff to maintain their 
position of apparent omniscience. In other words, we see a plurality of intended
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outcome in ISS, not necessarily because a certain number of intended outcomes are 
chosen and then worked towards, but because if we accept that our understanding of 
what happens is socially constructed, there are a range of perceptions and intentions 
across the groups of people involved.
However, we also note another difficulty with some of the studies that we have 
evaluated. Davies (1991), Walsham (1993), Auer & Reponen (1997) each continues the 
assumption of the Classical perspective that strategy is a natural occurrence within 
organisational settings, and that it is something that senior managers do to achieve a 
desired end, this being a criticism of the Evolutionary and Processual perspectives also 
(Knights & Morgan, 1991). The other two studies, Knights & Murray (1994) and Jones 
(1995) are proponents of the view that ISS is a part of the broader social being of 
organisational settings through which people engage and are engaged, and where 
"strategy is seen as the skilled accomplishment of social actors rather than a ‘fact of 
organisational life’" (Jones, 1995, p. 121). This then suggests that the views associated 
with a Systemic perspective (Whittington, 1993) on ISS formation are worthy of further 
consideration.
There is then a gap in the literature: while Jones (1995) does address ISS formation in 
some depth, using a single case study, he does so utilising a theoretical perspective 
based upon learning. The other studies evaluated above, while addressing ISS 
formation, tend to do so as a small part of a wider concern with ISS. It is worth noting 
that a number of authors have made calls for research which focuses specifically upon 
ISS formation (e.g.: Boynton & Zmud, 1987; Earl, 1993; Atkins, 1994; Lederer & 
Salmela, 1996), and in particular, for in-depth research which provides a rich 
understanding of both social practice and context (e.g.: Preston, 1991; Walsham, 1993; 
Myers, 1997). At the same time, we require greater understanding of the practice of ISS 
formation as a counter-balance to the Classical perspective of ISS formation, a 
perspective which we have argued has severe limitations. Thus, there is a gap in the 
literature for studies which consider alternatives perspectives when investigating in 
depth the range of social practice associated with the concept of ISS formation. 
Furthermore, we have noted that there is a related gap in the literature for studies which 
explicitly address ISS formation in terms of power, this being a concept which is 
referred to by a range of authors referred to above as being at the heart of political
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activity surrounding ISS formation practice and yet to date this remains an under­
researched area.
2.5. SUMMARY
This chapter critically evaluated literature in the area of ISS formation. A considerable 
amount of the research in the area of ISS per se can be considered to exhibit a Classical 
perspective, at the root of which is a functionalist view of organisational settings. We 
have argued that such a view is but one perspective of the nature of organisations and of 
information systems, and in our view leads to a limited account of the nature of ISS 
formation. Viewing ISS formation as part of organisational activity, which in turn can 
be understood in terms of social practice, brings to our attention political elements such 
as power. In particular, we have argued that there is a gap in the literature for research 
that examines ISS formation in detail focussing upon the concept of power. We have 
noted that a number of studies in the area of ISS formation have reinforced the view that 
the concept of power is one to which further attention should be given.
Chapter three evaluates the concept of power in relation to ISS formation, discussing an 
investigative framework that informs our research.
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CHAPTER THREE - THE ROLE OF POWER IN 
INFORMATION SYSTEM STRATEGY FORMATION
3.1. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter evaluated literature in the area of ISS formation where we argued 
that in-depth investigation was needed that moved beyond a classical perspective. In 
considering alternative perspectives, we also noted from the literature that the concept 
of power was raised a number of times as an influencing factor in the practice of ISS 
formation. This chapter evaluates literature which has addressed issues of power in 
relation to ISS. From this we discuss the investigative framework that we have used to 
inform our fieldwork and analytic work. This framework incorporates a multi­
dimensional conceptualisation of power based upon the work of Hardy (1994, 1996), 
which we argue provides a means for investigating ISS formation through focusing 
upon the exercise of power. We conclude by arguing that it is important also to address 
contextual issues, but not by viewing context as something separate and removed from 
the social practice with which we are interested. Instead, we contend that using Kling’s 
(1987) web metaphor we can explore situations in which contextual elements and social 
practice are linked, and which are spatially and chronologically specific so as to be 
distinct from other situations.
3.2. POWER IN ORGANISATIONS
Despite the importance of power to the understanding of organisational settings 
(Mintzberg, 1983), power as a topic has been regarded as conspicuous by its absence 
from literature on organisations (Hardy & Clegg, 1996). We can identify three reasons 
for the absence of the topic in literature: firstly, because social science literature regards 
the concept as problematic; secondly, because not only is it hard to say what power is, 
there are competing perspectives of power, the more popular of which seem to be 
attractive because they conform to traditional assumptions of rationallity in 
organisations; and thirdly, because the practice of management is uncomfortable with 
the implications of power as a factor in what managers do (Pfeffer, 1981).
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The attempts of rational management theory to adequately explore the concept of power 
has been criticised as unrepresentative of practice in organisational settings (Mintzberg, 
1983; Clegg, 1989), not least because of the assumption that rational choices are made 
in settings of consensual equilibrium in organisations (Parsons, 1951). However, while 
there is a danger of concentrating upon issues of definition, rather than attempting to 
explore the nature, and/or role of power in practice (Levine and Rossmore, 1995), it is 
nonetheless important to determine the nature of the concept being addressed.
Most definitions in organisational literature (Pfeffer, 1981) revolve around a view 
highlighted in Dahl's (1957) view of power as the ability that someone has to get another 
person or persons to do something that they would not otherwise have done, which 
intimates a person's ability to secure their will even against resistance (Weber, 1968). 
Wrong (1979) argues that, "Power is the capacity of some persons to produce intended 
and foreseen effects on others" (p.2). While still locating power firmly with the agent, 
Wrong is careful to distinguish his definition from social action per se. In doing this, he 
suggests that it is the intent and foreseeing of effects that is important. He contends that 
to include unforeseen and unintended effects of an individual's action on others as an 
exercise of power would mean that this would make any social activity an exercise of 
power. This would mean that, power would not be seen as just a concept but as the key 
concept when looking at organisations (Wrong, 1979). We see in each of these 
definitions the idea that power is a capacity of an individual, having power over another. 
Thus, power can be considered episodic through the explicit act of an agent through the 
exercise o f power , but also it may be considered as dispositional in relation to it being a 
capacity to exercise (Wrong, 1979; Clegg, 1989). This begins to lead us to question 
whether an exercise of power comes from within an individual, or is shaped and 
mediated by factors external to the individual (Clegg, 1989; Fincham, 1992).
This is something considered by Giddens (1976, 1984) who locates power at the centre 
of the action/structure debate in his structuration theory. Here, Giddens attempts to 
resolve the action/structure duality by considering the ways in which action is shaped by 
structure (rules and resources) but where structure is produced and reproduced by action 
(Giddens, 1976). For Giddens, (1976) “‘Power’ in [a] relational sense is a property of 
interaction, and may be defined as the capability to secure outcomes where the
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realisation of these outcomes depends upon the agency of others” (p. 111). Thus, here 
the notion of power is extended beyond the idea of power as an individualistic facet, and 
can be considered as a dimension of interpersonal relationships, a view reinforced 
elsewhere (e.g. Pettigrew, 1973; Pfeffer, 1981).
The use a simple analogy will help explain our view. In our perspective a person 
standing alone on a desert island does not have power in a social sense, and there can be 
no exercise of power. In our view it is only when one or more additional people are 
present on the island that issues of power become relevant, but even then we do not 
believe that power is inherent to any one person; instead we believe that the exercise of 
power becomes meaningful only in the context of the relations between the people. Thus 
for us power is seen as a phenomena of social interaction.
We agree with the sentiments expressed in the view that power is “a force that affects 
outcomes” (Hardy, 1996, p.3) and that, “power is a relation in which the actions of some 
people have an effect on the actions of others” (Knights and Wilmott, 1999, p. 166), 
because of the acceptance of a relational element and notion of effect upon outcomes. 
This suggests to us that power in organisations has a social construction element to it, 
founded in relations in which the actions of some people may be perceived to have 
impact on the actions of others. In this view the relational dimension of the phenomena 
is made explicit, but equally it is not necessarily the case that an exercise of power will 
be against someone’s interests, nor that the exercise of power will meet resistance or 
involve conflict. In this view, power need not just be seen as a negative influence, or as 
something which is always expressed in terms of power over someone (Hardy, 1994). 
Rather, power can also be seen as a liberating, and positive phenomena (Knights & 
Wilmott, 1999), where the exercise of power can be expressed in terms of the the power 
to do something. This view of power also accepts that the concept of power can be 
viewed as something that is both socially constructed and contested (Bloomfield & 
Coombs, 1992; Brown, 1998), and which is something which can be grasped only 
relationally, as a network of force relations which is ever present (Clegg, 1989; 
Fincham, 1992; Hardy & Clegg, 1996; Introna, 1997).
That said, to focus excessively upon what power is deflects attention away from 
questions such as, how power works and by what mechanisms (Knights & Vurdubakis,
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1994). Consequently, in addition to defining power, research in organisational settings 
should seek to, “use the concept of power to reveal the complexity and multi­
dimensionality of the phenomenon” (Hardy, 1994, p.220). The point about such 
definitions of phenomena in the social world of organisations is that in our view they 
cannot be absolute truths, they can not be seen as either universally correct or incorrect 
because of the different ways in which people can perceive and attribute meaning to 
what happens; hence, we contend that in seeing power as a concept that is socially 
constructed, we must accept that people will conceptualise power in different ways. 
Thus, having set out our view of power, we must now direct our effort towards 
explaining the mechanisms, or workings, of power in organisational settings.
Clegg (1989) argues that we can examine power by thinking of it in terms of circuits, 
and identifies three such circuits: the episodic circuit refers to the intermittent agency 
based exercise of power; the facilitative circuit (or, system integration) refers to 
techniques of domination arising through conditions of empowerment and 
disempowerment; the dispositional circuit (or, social integration) refers to the "fixing or 
refixing of relations of meaning and of membership" (p.224). Central to this framework 
are obligatory pasage points which represent the points at which new meanings are fixed 
in the circuits of social and system integration having disturbed the circuits (Introna,
1996). The problem we find with Clegg's (1989) framework is that although obligatory 
passage points are said to be central to the argument, we are not given any clear means 
of indentifying them. We remain unconvinced by Introna's (1996) attempt to use the 
circuits of power framework, which while claiming to have identfied obligatory passage 
points (e.g. p. 142), remains vague as to what they are and how they may be identified.
Mintzberg (1983) argues that we can examine the exercise of power in terms of internal 
and external coalitions which give rise to six power configurations in the form of a 
number of metaphors. These are:
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The Instrument - where the organisation is seen as an instrument of a dominant 
external coalition, where control is predominantly exercised through 
bureaucratic means. Internal coalitions tend towards bureacratic modes of 
operation.
The Closed System- Internal coalition is very similar to that of The Instrument, 
but faces no focussed power from an external coalition; instead, faces passive 
control from a range of influencers.
The Autocracy - External coalition dispersed and passive, as with The Closed 
System, but internally all power focuses upon the chief executive giving tight 
control.
The Missionary - Being dominated by ideology external influence becomes 
viewed as passive, and The Missionary tends to seek to influence those in its 
environment. The internal coalition coalesces around ideologically driven goals, 
with members given freedom to make decisions.
The Meritocracy - Power is focused on expertise, with an internal coalition 
based upon professionalism. Different forms of professionalism give rise to 
internal political activity, but external influence becomes seen as passive as it is 
dealt with by the professional experts.
The Political Arena - Conflict characterises both the external and internal 
coalitions. Political pressures come from a divided group of external influencers, 
while political activity is high amongst factionalised internal groups.
These configurations may be investigated by focussing upon those influencers who seek 
to control actions within organisational settings, together with the means or systems of 
influence which they seek to use (Mintzberg, 1983). What we look for in terms of 
activity and in terms of means or systems of influence is less clear. While we think that 
the configurations are a potentially useful means of thinking about power in 
organisational settings in addition to the limitations noted above, Mintzberg (1983) does 
not discuss the possibility that we could conceive of a system of power relations within 
which the interaction between both internal and external coalitions takes place. 
Mintzberg's argues that the main basis for deriving his power configurations is "the 
relationship between external and internal power" (1983, p.295). The internal coalition 
is made up of internal influencers, the full-time employees of the organisation 
(Mintzberg, 1983). The external coalition is made up of those external influencers such 
as employee associations, associates, owners, and publics - governmental agents, special 
interest groups, purveyors of pubic interest - who endeavour to influence outcomes by 
bringing forces to bear on organisational activity (ibid.).
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The distinction between internal and external raises questions which Mintzberg does not 
answer, for example: in differentiating internal from external, does it matter whether 
people distinguish internal from external in the same way; what about where power may 
be said to straddle the internal/external divide, as with trade union representation in an 
organisation for example, or with consultants; does it matter where the researcher places 
the boundary? In our view, Mintzberg's view of a commonly understood organisational 
boundary, with internal and external power either side of it, denotes a functionalist view 
of organisation (Burrell & Morgan, 1979), which we see as a limited perspective, as 
argued in Chapter Two. Furthermore, Mintzberg's (1983) explanation of five bases of 
power revolves around the manipulation of and abilities to access resources or expertise. 
However, the meanings that people have and the possibility that people may seek to 
influence such meaning, the use of symbols, and the affect of cultural factors are all 
issues which may be relevant to an exercise of power (Morgan, 1986). Thus, while the 
configurations of power give us a means of thinking about the exercise of power at a 
macro-level of analysis, we need some means of exploring the exercise of power that 
takes account of micro-political issues such as symbolism, culture, meaning, and a 
system of power relations (Knights & Vurdubakis, 1994).
Given the preceding discussion, we argue that the work of Hardy (1994; 1996; Hardy & 
Redivo, 1994; Hardy & Dougherty, 1997) is valuable in providing a means for exploring 
the exercise of power. Hardy (1994, 1996) argues that this multi-dimensional 
conceptualisation of power is central to understanding strategic action in organisational 
settings. Hardy has proposed a framework for investigating strategy related issues in 
organisational settings which conceptualises power along four dimensions as a means of 
investigating the exercise of power. We can differentiate between the notion of a 
concept (in this case of power) and a view - or conception - which can be termed a 
dimension (based upon Rawls [1972]; see Lukes, 1974, p.27). Whereas people may be 
in agreement regarding a concept of power, they may then vary in how they 
conceptualise, or rather what set of principles they ascribe to, that notion of power. 
There is not one ultimate conception, or set of principles about power, awaiting 
discovery, rather, given the socially contested nature of the concept, interpretations are 
bound to vary, and indeed to develop in different ways over time (Lukes, 1974). 
Therefore, dimensions can be thought of as differing views, or conceptualisations, about 
a central concept of power. Hardy (1994, 1996) has developed this thinking further, by
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exploring the way in which we may think about the exercise of power. We regard this as 
valuable, as given our understanding of power as a social construction in organisations, 
we now have a means through which we can explore various dimensions of the exercise 
of power. We have used this framework as the basis for our enquiry, and our amended 
framework shown below in Table 3.1.:
Pow er o f  
Resources:
1st Dimension
Power o f  
Processes:
2nd Dimension
Power o f  
M anipulation o f  
Perception:
3 rd Dimension
Pow er o f  the 
System:
4th Dim ension
Focus upon 
view that 
power can be 
exercised 
through:
Management o f  
resources: physical, 
financial, human; 
this includes ability 
to hire and fire, 
rewards, 
punishments, 
funding, authority, 
expertise.
Management o f  
levels o f  access to 
and participation 
in decision­
making processes 
and agendas.
Manipulation o f  
perception through 
use of: images, 
symbols, rituals, 
language, norms, 
values, ceremonies, 
stories.
Web o f  power 
relations in which 
individual 
constructions o f  
reality and 
organisational 
setting are 
embedded; 
differential effects 
evolve over time.
This dimension 
is a challenge 
to:
Elitism: views o f  
power as
concentrated in the 
hands o f  the few - 
i.e. this view  
considers that 
power does not 
automatically rest 
with an elite but 
with those able to 
control resources.
Pluralism: 
assumption o f  
equal access to 
decision arenas & 
agendas - i.e. this 
view considers 
that some may be 
prevented from 
accessing, or 
participating.
Behaviourism: 
assumption that 
power is used only 
in response to 
conflict - i.e. this 
view considers that 
overt conflict is not 
a necessary 
precondition for 
exercise o f  power.
Sovereign power: 
view that power is 
in the control o f  
people - i.e. this 
view considers 
that people 
operate within an 
already and 
always operable 
web o f  power 
relations.
Exercise of 
power:
Intended, 
deliberate, causal, 
visible.
Intended, 
deliberate, causal, 
less visible.
Intended, 
deliberate, causal, 
often invisible.
Not intended, not 
deliberate, 
arbitrary, invisible 
& persuasive; may 
subordinate some 
while privileging 
others. This view  
forms a backdrop 
to other three 
dimensions.
Contribution to 
understanding 
of exercise of 
power
Multiple groups 
influence decision 
making; focus is 
upon use o f  
resources.
Prevention o f  
access or 
participation to 
suppress 
opposition.
Use o f  manipulation 
o f  perception to 
prevent opposition, 
move towards 
desired outcome.
Inability to 
control power: 
power embedded 
in system; 
problem o f  
resistance.
Table 3.1. A Framework for Understanding Power in Organisations (adapted from: 
Hardy, 1994; Hardy, 1996; Phillips, 1997)
Hardy (ibid.) attempts to provide a way of seeing in organisational situations, with a 
view to “peeling back the layers of power” (p.234). In focusing upon "the relationship
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between individuals, the organisational context within which individuals interact, and 
the societal context of the organisation" (Phillips, 1997, p. 44), this framework provides 
a means of investigating the intricate weave of power and influence in organisations. 
Some means of addressing the complexity envisioned through this web of power is 
central to the nature of strategy in organisations (Knights & Morgan, 1990) and has been 
referred to in studies of ISS formation (Davies, 1991; Walsham, 1993; Jones, 1995).
Hardy’s (1994, 1996) approach takes account of and develops theoretical perspectives 
on power that have been proposed over a number of decades, and in particular is 
focused upon strategic action in organisational settings. This framework is useful 
because of the way in which it provides for a multi-dimensional analysis of power that 
can be applied in research studies (Phillips, 1997).
The framework addresses an area that has been subject to criticism in previous views of 
power, this being the focus that has been placed upon the activity of individuals, or 
human agency (Clegg, 1989). In literature that refers to power in social settings, the 
concept of human agency has often been discussed in relation to notions of structure 
(Lukes, 1974; Giddens, 1976, 1984). That is, that there has been considerable debate as 
to whether power results from human activity, or whether power results from social 
structures within which activity is located and indeed shaped. This reference to 
structures is not intended to intimate solid, physical artefacts. Instead, the notion of 
structure can be considered in Giddens’ (1979) terms as social rules and procedures 
which give shape to, and for Giddens, are in turn shaped by, practices - in fact, a 
dualistic approach.
The question is, does Hardy address notions of agency and structure, given the above 
mentioned criticism of earlier views on power which the four dimensions framework is 
supposed to address? Implicitly Hardy does seek to reconcile these views by 
incorporating the 4th dimension. Here, Hardy is suggesting that it is valuable to think of 
a further dimension to the exercise of power, namely in terms of system power, where 
the, "power of the system produces advantages or disadvantages without the active and 
conscious intervention of any actor" (Phillips, 1997, p.44). Where other analyses of 
power have emphasised the action or inaction of individuals, the addition of this fourth 
dimension adds to such analyses by allowing consideration of the exercise of power in
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terms of the social system within which ISS formation is enmeshed. This is in effect 
proposing a consideration of the underlying social structures that lies beyond the action 
of any one individual, meaning that such rules and resources to which Giddens (1976) 
refers are not directly attributable to the activity of individuals. Rather, such structure 
represents properties of a social system which are drawn upon by human beings, but 
which at the same time are both produced and reproduced through such activity 
(Walsham, 1993).
However, it does not mean that such structure exists only in an idealist form solely 
through interaction of individuals. Rather, "that relations between individuals and other 
forms of collective agency are constituted in relatively enduring ways which routinely 
constrain and enable differential opportunities for action and inaction on the part of 
those agencies" (Clegg, 1989, p. 145). Hence, in thinking about the nature of a social 
system in this way it can be envisaged that both social action and social structure are 
entwined in the production and reproduction of the situation. Outcome is thus a 
consequence of both social action and social structure, contextualised at a point in time 
and space, but taking into account the view that structure has some enduring quality to it 
(Clegg, 1989). It is the interdependency between these factors that has too often been 
ignored in research associated with ISS, and indeed this reinforces our view that the 
need to attend to context is vital in such research.
From our look at general literature looking at power in organisations, we have argued 
that a perspective that looks at multiple conceptualisations of power is valuable as a 
means of structuring our thinking, bearing in mind the relational perspective of the 
phenomenon that we have found support for. We can now turn to consider the ways in 
which power has been viewed in IS literature.
3.3. CONCEPTS OF POWER IN IS LITERATURE
3.3.1. AGENCY VIEWS OF POWER IN IS LITERATURE
Power has been raised as an issue of importance in improving our understanding of ISS 
by several authors (Davies, 1991; Walsham, 1993; Knights & Muray, 1994; Jones 1995; 
Introna, 1997), although literature that has specifically addressed the concept of power
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in relation to ISS formation is less numerous. Some authors have addressed the role of 
power in relation to systems development and implementation efforts (Markus, 1983; 
Hirschheim & Newman, 1988; Newman & Noble, 1990; Levine & Rossmoore, 1995; 
Myers, 1995; Cavaye & Christiansen, 1996), and it is to such work that we can now turn 
in order to clarify our understanding of the concept of power and the ways in which such 
a concept may be investigated.
Within some of the literature we note some seeming contradictions that begin to hint at 
difficulties surrounding a concept of power. For example, Levine and Rossmoore (1995) 
claim that power is exercised by individuals, while Cavaye and Christainsen (1996) 
argue that power is not exercised by individuals but is a function of relationships 
between people. Another contradiction occurs with Levine and Rossmoore (1995) 
claiming that power cannot be exercised by groups of people, while Markus (1983) 
argues that organisational subunits (groups of people) can exercise power. A final 
contradiction occurs when Markus (1983) argues that no individuals or groups own 
power, whilst Cavaye and Christansen develop a relative power rating (1996, p.230) of 
either high/medium/low to denote the power that various organisational sub-groupings 
have. It is a little ironic that these latter authors also caution against the rating and 
ranking of issues associated with IT implementation, before going on to provide their 
own rating of power in relation to IT implementation. However, there is more to this 
than apparent contradictions between papers in the IS field, because these differences in 
perspective can be understood in terms of a more fundamental diversity in thinking 
about power.
The effects of introducing IT into organisations have been researched by Pettigrew 
(1973), who argues that access to, and the ability to control, information represents a 
resource that people (in this case systems analysts and programmers) can use to gain 
power. Thus in such a view, power is something which rests with individuals, and which 
can be won or lost. A number of other studies of IT implementation have reinforced 
such a perspective (Markus, 1983; Markus & Pfeffer, 1983; Levine & Rossmoore, 1995; 
Cavaye & Christiansen, 1996). Despite the apparent commonality in focus of interest 
upon IT implementation, views of power evidenced by the respective authors differ 
considerably. One means of exploring some of these differences within the literature is 
to consider three differing perspectives: where power is a capacity of the individual;
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where power is exercised through systems and structures; and where power is exercised 
through behaviour.
The first perspective is that which considers power to be something which is a capacity 
of people, a facet that resides with and is exercised by the individual (Pettigrew, 1973; 
Levine & Rossmoore, 1995). Such a view suggests that people have power, which they 
then exercise over others, or conversely if they do not have power then it is exercised 
over them. Power is seen as a thing, with causal effects, and which is a possession 
(Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992). Power is seen as a struggle for control over an object, 
often for control of resources, for example in terms of finance, role, control of physical 
assets, expertise. The role of IS has been noted in this area as contributing to the 
resources to which people may lay claim and seek to make use of (Pettigrew, 1977; 
Winfield, 1991). The focus therefore is upon a source-locus of power (Sillince & 
Mouakeket, 1997) which entails conflict, and such a view has been described as a zero- 
sum view of power (Fincham, 1992). This means that where one person gains power 
another loses it -  hence, zero-sum. Those researchers who conceptualise power in terms 
of actual behaviour in making decisions, suggest a view that sees the locus of power 
residing with the victor in a decision situation that entails a conflict of interests, often 
considering power in relation to the control of resources (e.g. Hickson et al, 1971; 
Narayanan & Fahey, 1982). Thus, people are deemed to exercise power through the 
manipulation or utilisation of resources which others depend upon to some degree or 
other, and hence influence decision making. Such resources included: information, 
expertise, political access, credibility, stature and prestige, access to higher echelon 
members, control of money, rewards and sanctions (Pettigrew, 1973; Hardy & 
Dougherty, 1997).
There are though some difficulties with a view where power is assumed to be derived 
from sources who are intentional agents, and where power is assumed to be located. 
Firstly, such a view assumes that if power is associated with intentional actions of 
individuals, then power is only evident where we have such intentional actions being 
undertaken, typically in decision making environments (Clegg, 1989). Similarly, 
without an evident locus of power, for example as demonstrated by the absence of 
evident conflict, then power is presumed not to be exercised (Kling, 1980). Studies that 
conceptualise power solely within this perspective focus upon decisions that are made,
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and hence no account is taken of those issues that have been ignored, pushed to one 
side, or sidelined, for whatever reason. Thus, this view concerns itself with concrete 
instances of power being exercised in the form of a decision being made, through the 
deployment of resources that are important to one or other of the parties. A problem 
considering power only in terms of resource manipulation is that what may be 
considered to be a basis of power in one context may not be in another; hence, 
contextualisation of such discussion becomes critical in giving such a discussion any 
meaning. Furthermore, in considering actual decision making, those looking at this area 
can be criticised because of the assumption that any exercise of power is confined to 
such situations, and that all people have equal potential to participate in decision making 
situations (Hardy, 1994).
Despite the problems inherent with such a view, the idea that power is seen as 
something that an individual has, a capacity to exercise power, which can be located, 
and indeed mapped as changes in the balance of power alter over time, has dominated 
the literature on organisations (Hardy & Clegg, 1996).
The second perspective sees power as lying in organisational processes, not in people, 
where giving attention to systems and structures is central to understanding the bases of 
power (Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992). It has been suggested that one way in which we 
can understand power is in terms of information systems and the affects that they have 
upon associated organisational structures (Kling, 1980; Cavaye & Christiansen, 1996), 
and through which people attain desired outcomes, particularly in consolidating the 
position of those already in strong positions through providing another resource to 
which they can lay claim (Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992). The symbolic aspects of IT in 
this view are also highlighted, in potentially indicating to other groups that decisions are 
in progress, or in suggesting that certain people are more influential in view of their use 
of, or close association with IT (Kling, 1980; Markus, 1983). These views are also 
recognisable in contributions from the literature on organisational strategy formation 
where power is discussed in terms of organisational structures and how best to distribute 
power around the organisation amongst such structures (Mintzberg, 1983).
The expression of power within this view is typically concerned with structures and 
systems surrounding processes of decision-making. Within these processes a range of
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political routines and procedures are enmeshed which may be utilised to influence 
decision outcomes (Hardy & Dougherty, 1997). This is where outcomes can be 
influenced by dominant groups or individuals through political manipulation of 
procedures surrounding decision processes, and participation in or access to such 
activities (Hardy, 1996). Non-decision making is often perceived as a means by which 
dominant people maintain the status quo, as it can be seen as a way of maintaining 
existing biases in the associated processes. Such a view, “allows for consideration of the 
ways in which decisions are prevented from being taken on potential issues over which 
there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as embodied in express 
policy preferences and sub-political grievances” (Lukes, 1974, p20, original emphasis). 
There are other reasons that may lie behind the manipulation of processes though. 
Firstly, less dominant groups may be able to use the procedures to their advantage, and 
secondly those with power may seek to alter the status quo by allowing others to 
participate and to impact upon agendas (Hardy, 1994). This represents a broadening of 
the concept of process power, illustrating how the powerful and the powerless may be 
advantaged. This view possess similarities to the earlier view, in that it regards non­
decision making in much the same way as it does decision making, that is as something 
concrete, overt and observable (Lukes, 1974).
A third perspective may be described as being behavioural, being associated with power 
that can be understood in terms of behaviour of people, for example where IS staff 
exercise power over non-IS users (Markus & Bjom-Andersen, 1987), or where changes 
in IS management's behaviour can overcome resistance to change in IS strategy 
initiatives (Auer & Reponen, 1997). Thus, in this view power can be understood in 
terms of the behaviours of and relationships between people, in particular the 
overcoming of opposition or resistance, often where the intervention of a powerful actor 
is crucial in bringing about the change in state (Pfeffer, 1981). One further aspect of this 
view is that as a result of the exercise of power some people act in a way that they 
would not otherwise have done (Markus & Bjom-Anderson, 1987). As Bloomfield and 
Coombs (1992) observe, such a view is not without its problems, in particular in 
assessing just what someone would otherwise have done were it not for the exercise of 
power. For example, Pettigrew (1972, 1985a) views power as being the ability to 
achieve outcomes that are in line with individuals perceived interests. There is a 
presumption within such a view that the exercise of power has acted against the real
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interests of the people concerned, but the problem is in determining exactly what those 
real interests might be. This is problematic because it not only assumes that people have 
real interests as distinct from those that were actually served by a particular intervention, 
but also because there is an assumption that those interests can be determined. We could 
make judgements about what an individuals real interests may be, but then such views 
could not be validated, given that the situation in which real interests were exercised had 
not arisen. A fundamental problem in such views is the belief that real interests exist 
separately from the power in action (Knights & Wilmott, 1999), and that it is when 
power is exercised that these interests are either made clear, obscured, or circumvented 
in some way. We do not subscribe to this view; rather we perceive interest to be 
interwoven with the operation of power and to flow from such interactions.
In each of the views above, power is discussed in terms of a rather mechanical, but 
nonetheless person based, or agency, perspective (Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992; Introna, 
1997; Brown, 1998). This means that power is viewed as being located with the 
individual, in clear cause and effect terms, that is as something people do to bring about 
a specific outcome. The exercise of power by someone that has caused people to do 
something they otherwise would not have done can be described as a deterministic 
account of power, a view which has been criticised as being too restricted to take 
account of the varied way in which power is exercised in practice (Clegg, 1989; Knights 
& Morgan, 1991). Furthermore, in each of the perspectives there is a presumption that 
through the exercise of power someone is advantaged while someone is disadvantaged; 
that there are the powerful and the powerless. Such a view can be seen as lacking 
explanatory capabilities, as we have to ask how those who we may regard as the 
powerful came to be seen in such a way, and how they maintain their position relative to 
what happens around them. This leads us to a relational perspective of power 
(Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992; Brown, 1998), which challenges some of the 
preconceptions underpinning an agency view of power, and is an area to which we now 
turn our attention.
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3.3.2. A  RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON POWER IN  IS  LITERATURE
Within IS literature we see views about the exercise of power that both challenge and go 
beyond the agency perspective discussed above. For example, the exercise of power can 
be understood as exercised in relations between people (Bloomfield & Coombs; 1992; 
Introna, 1997; Brown, 1998). This view argues that, "the key to understanding resides in 
thinking of power as a phenomenon which can be grasped only relationally. It is not a 
thing, nor is it something people have in a proprietorial sense. They possess power only 
as far as they are relationally constituted as doing so" (Clegg, 1989, p.207). In this 
relational view, power is not seen as being in any one place or as something that people 
have, but is dispersed and enacted through the range of relational interactions between 
people.
This view addresses the problem in establishing real interests noted previously by 
arguing that interests are established through relations -  and that interests do not 
therefore pre-exist relations (Foucault, 1980). It argues against “a belief that power 
determines choice and change as if the intentions of the powerful were directly 
coincident and continuous with their effects” (Knights & Morgan, 1991, p.268). The 
problem then is in seeing power solely in a cause-effect sense whereby someone through 
their possession of power eventually brings about a change in someone else's behaviour, 
to act or fail to act in a particular way. This is not in keeping with what is found in work 
situations very often where a considerable amount of what occurs results from activity 
that had other intentions, and hence renders deterministic accounts inadequate (Knights 
& Morgan, 1991). In other words, it is difficult to single out a single cause-effect 
relationship. That is not to say that such a view of power is wrong per se, but rather that 
it is limited. In an effort to resolve these limitations, some authors have concentrated 
upon other means of understanding relational forms of power. One view has been to 
address discursive practices; the “discourses, ways of thinking and speaking, instituted 
within organisational practices -  which define the way in which subjects see the world 
and themselves and thereby discipline those subjects” (Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992, 
p.467). This expresses a desire to understand the dominant views and associated 
meanings through what people say and the knowing that they are able to express.
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Sillince and Mouakket (1997) highlight the relational nature of power, in exploring the 
operation of political processes in a systems development. Here they refer to five 
different perspectives on power which they argue can be utilised as a means of 
enhancing understanding of power, which they argue should be regarded as a complex 
phenomenon. The five perspectives on power utilised are: a zero-sum view, where 
power is a capacity which is exercised in a win-lose fashion; a processual view, where 
power is exercised through processes surrounding resource exchanges; an organisational 
view, where power is exercised through the structures and roles; a structurally 
constrained view, where power is exercised from the wider society to constrain 
behaviour in organisations; and finally a socially shaped view which they also term a 
socially constructed view (Sillince and Mouakkett, 1997). They argue that it is valuable 
to explore power through several dimensions as a means of explaining the richness of 
the concept in action. By combining perspectives, where each enlarges upon and 
encapsulates the preceding view, the multi-dimensional nature of power is addressed. 
This is based upon the premise that any one of the perspectives chosen does not of itself 
allow for adequate exploration of the concept.
Despite this however, there are certain areas of their work which require clarification. 
For example, Sillince and Mouakket (1997) initially define power in terms that include 
viewing power as an individual capacity and as something that involves conflict. They 
do not clarify this definition, although they later contradict this definition by claiming 
that power can also be seen as something that is socially constructed. It would therefore 
seem to us unfortunate that they do not use this opportunity to reflect upon and to clarify 
their view of power. Furthermore, whilst Sillince and Mouakkett (1997) claim that the 
five perspectives they identify develop from one another, they do not adequately explain 
how they are related. Each is discussed in isolation, apparently unconnected to either the 
preceding or to the following perspectives. They incorporate a fifth perspective, which 
they term socially shaped power. However, here they display their confusion in using 
the terms social shaping and social construction, which they seem to regard as 
synonymous despite their association with different theoretic views (Knights & Murray, 
1994). Finally, we are not convinced that the way in which they seek to simultaneously 
hold five different views about the nature of power is defensible given the problems 
noted earlier. Sillince and Mouakkett (1997) not only seek to explore the exercise of 
power through the five views, but also argue that each of the views is grounded in a
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theoretically different understanding about the very nature of power. To illustrate, in 
their zero-sum view, power is seen as a capacity of the individual, while in their social 
shaping view power is a social construction. To us it would seem preferable for them to 
state how they understand the nature of power in organisational settings, and then to 
explore various ways in which the exercise of power can be investigated. This highlights 
the necessity of establishing our view of the phenomena in question, and then to 
consider ways in which we can seek to address that phenomenon.
We have now seen a range of viewpoints on power: from views which see power as a 
capacity of the individual to be exercised as and when the person sees fit, and normally 
over someone else; through to views where power is seen as something that does not 
reside within individuals, but rather something which can only be understood in terms of 
relational interactions between people. While there are numerable viewpoints, we have 
not argued that one is better than the others, but rather we have shown how each 
successive view has widened understanding of both the nature of power and the exercise 
of power. In this sense we do agree with Sillince and Mouakkett (1997), who argue that 
the complex and multi-dimensional nature of power in operation in organisational 
settings requires us to address power from a number of levels, effectively incorporating 
several perspectives. Therefore, we would argue that use of the framework proposed in 
Table 3.1. presents an opportunity to address some of the limitations seen in ISS 
literature.
3.4. IMPLICATIONS OF OUR FRAMEWORK FOR 
RESEARCHING ISS FORMATION
We now move on to consider different ways that we can conceptualise the exercise of 
power based upon the work of Hardy (1994, 1996) in relation to ISS formation.
Hardy (1994) has developed the framework (See Table 3.1.) from a strong tradition of 
work in the organisation theory domain, where in particular the work of Lukes (1974) 
has been used to inform debates on power in organisational contexts (Clegg, 1989). We 
now discuss each of the dimensions in the framework.
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3.4.1. THE POWER OF RESOURCES - A FIRST DIMENSION
In much of the IS and management literature which looks at issues surrounding power, 
the views expressed about power reflect the ways in which people manipulate resources 
and has been termed a behavioural perspective (Clegg, 1989; Bloomfield & Coombs, 
1992; Fincham, 1992; Knights & Vurdubakis, 1994; Brown, 1998). We term this as the 
first dimension. Those researchers who conceptualise power in terms of actual 
behaviour in making decisions, presume that the locus of power resides with the victor 
in a decision situation that entails a conflict of interests, often considering power in 
relation to the control of resources (e.g. Hickson et al, 1971; Narayanan & Fahey, 1982). 
Thus, actors are deemed to exercise power through the manipulation or utilisation of 
resources which others depend upon to some degree or other, and hence influence 
decision making. Such resources included: information, expertise, political access, 
credibility, stature and prestige, access to higher echelon members, control of money, 
rewards and sanctions (Pettigrew, 1973; Hardy & Dougherty, 1997; Sillince & 
Mouakkett, 1997).
One problem with work that conceptualises power solely within this dimension is that in 
studying decisions that are made, no account is taken of those issues that are ignored, 
pushed to one side, or sidelined, for whatever reason. Thus, this dimension is concerned 
with concrete instances of power being exercised in the form of a decision being made, 
through the deployment of resources that are important to one or other of the parties. We 
must look therefore for instances related to ISS formation where resources are deployed 
and the associated perceived influence on decision making from any of those involved.
A problem considering power only in terms of resource manipulation is that what may 
be considered to be a basis of power in one context may not be in another; hence, 
contextualisation of such discussion becomes critical in giving such a discussion any 
meaning. For example, introduction of IT may well be seen to affect the balance of 
power between groups in a department, but as Willcocks and Mason (1987) note when 
regarding a medical IS, we cannot assume that the same IT introduced into another 
department will have any affect on power relations. Furthermore, we must be wary of 
any assumption that all those people in the situation have equal potential to participate
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in the decision making (Hardy, 1994). It is the inadequacies of viewing power solely in 
terms of this view that lead us to consider an additional perspective.
3.4.2. THE EXERCISE OF POWER THROUGH PROCESSES - A  SECOND 
DIMENSION
It is possible to address the limitation of the first dimension by attempting to study non­
decision making (Bachrach & Lawler, 1980). This dimension remains essentially 
behavioural in perspective, as it regards non-decision making in much the same way as 
it does decision making, that is as something concrete, overt and observable (Lukes, 
1974). Lukes argues that work within this dimension, “allows for consideration of the
ways in which decisions are prevented from being taken on potential issues over which
\there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as embodied in express 
policy preferences and sub-political grievances” (Lukes, 1974, p.20, original emphasis).
Non-decision making is often perceived as a means by which dominant people maintain 
the status quo, as it can be seen as a way of maintaining existing biases (Hardy, 1994), 
for example, as Levine and Rossmoore (1995) note in the case of ISS implementation. 
There are other reasons that may lie behind the manipulation of processes though. 
Firstly, less dominant groups may be able to use the procedures to their advantage, and 
secondly those with power may seek to alter the status quo by allowing others to 
participate and to impact upon ISS agendas (Sillince & Mouakket, 1997). This 
represents a broadening of the concept of process power, illustrating how the powerful 
and the powerless may be advantaged.
Views in this area have moved beyond a concern with the manipulation of resources in 
relation to decision making situations, to address the exercise of power where issues 
may have been ignored or sidelined. However, we do note that such a conceptualisation 
is still concerned with decisions - whether taken or not. This represents a study of the 
exercise of power in relation to activity of people; such a view does not take account of 
the exercise of power through the inactivity of people, or where the sheer weight of 
institutions (Lukes, 1974), such as political, commercial, or educational, represents an 
exercise of power in preventing issues from arising or being developed (Lukes, 1974).
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The expression of power in the second dimension is concerned with processes of 
decision-making, within which a range of political routines and procedures are 
enmeshed and which may be utilised to influence decision outcomes (Hardy & 
Dougherty, 1997). This is where outcomes can be influenced by dominant groups or 
individuals through political manipulation of procedures surrounding decision 
processes, and through managing levels of participation in or access to such activities 
(Hardy, 1996).
3.4.3. THE EXERCISE OF POWER THROUGH THE MANIPULATION OF  
PERCEPTIO N-A THIRD DIMENSION
Exercises of power in this dimension have been termed by some authors as the 
management of meaning (Morgan, 1986; Hardy, 1994), which can be thought of as the 
legitimation and de-legitimation of actions in ISS formation through the establishment 
of meaning based upon stories, symbols, norms, and values (Brown, 1998). However, 
we consider that the concept of the management o f meaning is flawed, as in our view 
meaning is socially constructed by individuals and hence we cannot manage the 
meanings that others attribute to what happens in organisational settings. In our view, all 
we can hope to do is to influence the way in which people perceive events, and we can 
therefore more appropriately conceptualise this exercise of power in terms of the 
manipulation of perception. By seeking to influence understandings, people "create a 
milieu where others make a preferred decision or take a preferred course of action 
without any direct application of decision making power" (Phillips, 1997, p.45). Here, 
the way in which the people view a situation may be influenced so that they may accept 
things as they are, perhaps for example because they see no alternative to what happens, 
or because they are content with the situation as it is, or perhaps because they do not 
think that anything can be done about it (Lukes, 1974; Hardy 1996).
The main contribution of the third dimension is to move concepts about the exercise of 
power beyond a link with conflict, given that the first two dimensions are concerned 
with issues where there are at least two parties seeking conflicting outcomes. The way in 
which we can conceptualise the exercise of power in this dimension acknowledges the 
ways in which issues can be prevented from arising at all. Hence, we are concerned in 
this dimension to appreciate why issues in ISS formation are not presented, why
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opposition or conflict does not arise in ISS practice, because the basis for these things 
not happening may be due to the exercise of power (Hardy, 1994; Lukes, 1974).
However, we must be aware that establishing such exercises of power related to ISS 
may not be simple and that there may be practical difficulties in validating such a view 
of power, that is, one which explores why something did not happen (Introna, 1996). 
We can however distinguish between instrumental power and symbolic power. The 
former, instrumental power, is concerned with the first two dimensions above, where 
there is a desire to secure an outcome against opposition (Pfeffer, 1981; Hardy 1994). 
In the latter, symbolic power, an unobtrusive use of power occurs in order to secure an 
outcome by preventing conflict (Hardy, 1994). Symbolic power is "derived from sources 
which are brought into play to legitimise outcomes through the management of 
meaning" (ibid., p.229). In this way, symbolic power can be perceived as being used to 
influence attitudes through for example, the use of images, symbols, stories, language, 
rituals, and ceremonies. Power may be exercised through symbolic power in conjunction 
with instrumental power - for example, with the one producing a substantive outcome, 
the other seeking to influence the development (post-hoc) of favourable feelings towards 
the outcome. Symbolic power can also be exercised instead of instrumental power to 
avoid conflict (ibid.). In this case, the legitimation and justification of desired outcomes, 
through endeavouring to manipulate perception with a view to producing favourable 
attitudes to ISS, reduces the threat of opposition (Brown, 1998); "steps are taken to 
persuade other groups to accept certain outcomes although they may be unaware of this” 
(Hardy, 1994, p. 229).
In conceptualising the exercise of power in terms of three dimensions, we are 
acknowledging the idea that the exercise of power is concerned with some person or 
persons determining what others should do. This is an agency view of power, one which 
has caused concern due to the perceived assumption that power is possessed, or that 
power is exercised in a simple cause-effect relationship (Clegg, 1989; Knights & 
Morgan, 1991; Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992; Knights & Vurdubakis, 1994; Phillips, 
1997). Viewing the exercise of power solely in terms of the three dimensions discussed 
can be considered problematic in given that each of the dimensions exhibits, “a belief 
that power determines choice and change as if the intentions of the powerful were 
directly coincident and continuous with their effects” (Knights & Morgan, 1991, p.268).
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This would not account for ISS practice where a considerable amount of what occurs 
results from activity that has other intentions, and hence renders such a deterministic 
account inadequate (Knights & Morgan, 1991). This is not to say that such a view of 
power is wrong per se, but rather that it is limited. In an effort to resolve this problem, 
and to move beyond such a limitation, we introduce a fourth dimension - the power of 
the system.
3.4.4. THE POWER OF THE SYSTEM  - A  FOURTH DIMENSION
In seeking to respond to the above concerns, Hardy (1994, 1996) argues for a further 
dimension which incorporates a view of power that acknowledges the power of the 
system. Power in this sense, "is often beyond the reach of tampering by organisational 
members. It lies in the unconscious acceptance of the values, traditions, cultures and 
structures of a given institution and it captures all organisational members in its web. 
Since it advantages or disadvantages individuals without being consciously mobilised, 
even those who profit from it find it difficult to change. This power is the backdrop 
against which all organisational actions and decisions take place" (Hardy, 1996, p.8).
This view of power develops the work of Foucault (1980) in understanding the power of 
the system which moves beyond conceptions of power along sovereign lines (Clegg, 
1989), where power is seen purely in terms of a capacity or capability of any individual 
to attain an outcome. Instead, power can additionally be perceived in terms of relations, 
as, “historically constituted configurations of practices” (Knights & Vurdubakis, 1994, 
p. 172). Power can thus be viewed as a pervasive phenomenon that is concerned with 
relationships between parties (Hardy, 1994; Knights & Vurdubakis, 1994), whereby, 
“power is neither given, nor exchanged, nor recovered, but rather exercised, and that it 
only exists in action”(Foucault, 1980, p.89). In this dimension, power can be 
conceptualised as, “the name one attributes to a complex strategical relationship in a 
particular society” (Foucault, 1981, p.93, quoted by Knights & Vurdubakis, 1994, 
p. 172), as opposed to something that an individual possesses and exercises. These 
complex relationships have been referred to as net-like, or a web of power relations 
(Smart, 1994). Here certain people are advantaged while others are disadvantaged 
without any clear notion of power being actively engaged. This view of power of the
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system lies, “in the unconscious acceptance of the values, traditions, cultures and 
structures of a given institution or society” (ibid. p.232). To put it in context, "this 
power [of the system] is the backdrop against which all organisational actions and 
decisions take place" (Hardy, 1996, p.8). We also note that power need not be seen as 
something wholly negative (Foucault, 1980). The exercise of power can be considered 
as something positive, where power relations are something within which people 
operate, and are a part of the means through which individuals construct their 
understanding.
Having discussed the four dimensions, we must ask how the framework is to be used - 
do we look at one, some or all of the dimension?
3.4.5. UTILISING MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS
In setting out the framework in Table 3.1. we are not arguing that we should choose any 
one of the dimensions as the most appropriate view; instead we argue that it is by taking 
all four dimensions collectively that we can address the multi-dimensional nature of the 
exercise of power, and through which we can investigate the nature of ISS formation.
We contend that the first three dimensions, that is, the exercise of power through the 
management of resources, through the management of processes, and through the 
manipulation of perception, should be seen as operating against the backdrop of the 
power of the system. It may well be that we are able to explain a situation in terms of all 
four dimensions of power, or equally it may be that one particular dimension is adequate 
in accounting for a particular outcome or outcomes. The point is that this multi­
dimensional approach is necessary if enquiries into the exercise of power are to improve 
our understanding of ISS formation. Exploring the exercise of power solely in terms of 
the management of resources of resources view, the first dimension, has been the 
downfall of much ISS literature to date (Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992; Knights and 
Murray, 1994; Jones, 1995; Sillince & Mouakket, 1997).
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3.5. INVESTIGATING ISS FORMATION: THE PLACE OF 
CONTEXT
The importance of addressing contextual issues when seeking to research either ISS 
related activity at an organisational level, and indeed other areas of activity associated 
with IS has been noted elsewhere (e.g. Pettigrew, 1977; Mintzberg, 1978; Kling, 1987; 
Davies, 1991; Hanseth, 1991; Levine & Rossmore, 1995). We argue that some way is 
needed of making sense of the circumstances within which and through which social 
practice may be considered to occur. These two aspects are not remote from one 
another, so that any analysis that seeks to evaluate one independently from the other, 
that is, context separately from social practice, would in our view be incomplete. 
Context is a generic term; a dictionary definition refers to context as the conditions and 
circumstances that are relevant to an event, fact, etc. (Collins Dictionary of the English 
Language, 1986). We have already outlined a framework based upon a multi­
dimensional view of power that will be utilised to help make sense of social activity, but 
we must be sure to adequately address this notion of context.
Pettigrew (1985) argues that in much of the general literature on strategy where context 
is considered, it is taken to refer to the competitive environment that exists beyond the 
notional organisational boundary. This view of context is reflected in some of the ISS 
formation literature, where context is out there, is separate from the organisation, and is 
something that can be appraised in order that the organisation can take the appropriate 
action in response (e.g. Earl, 1989; Ward & Griffiths, 1996; Robson, 1997). This view 
reflects a functionalist view of organisation, as we have discussed previously.
One means of addressing context is through combining levels of analysis, one aspect of 
which may be thought of as vertical in considering levels of analysis, and a processual 
analysis which may be viewed as horizontal, representing a based view. Such an 
holistic, contextualist perspective (Pettigrew, 1985) seeks to address the way structural 
and contextual variables and categories (vertical analysis) are linked to process(es) 
(horizontal analysis) being investigated. There are two dimensions to this: one considers 
how context is involved in the production of action, while the second considers how 
aspects of context are mobilised or activated by actors or groups. However, Pettigrew's 
view seems to us to be solely concerned with an agency view of social action, while
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context is discussed in terms of an inner context and an outer context - something to be 
examined as scenery almost on a film set within which action occurs. This idea that 
there is a certain degree of separability between what occurs and context, with a view to 
explaining the interaction between the two does not to us seem adequate. It is because of 
this that we find Kling’s (1987) approach to addressing contextual issues more 
persuasive.
Kling (1987) explores context in relation to a particular situation of interest, noting that 
while context is often explained in terms of relationships, resources, and procedural 
constraints, these often differ between given situations. Therefore, we adopt a web 
model (ibid.) perspective where we focus upon infrastructural, spatial, historic, and 
social relations. That is, we need to examine infrastructural, geographic, and historic 
issues through which we can understand both the situation in which events are enacted, 
and the defining situation (ibid.) which can be considered as a means of bounding our 
analysis. Thus, for any two situations, the term context represents a relationship between 
those situations. For any given situation, population, equipment, spatial, and temporal 
elements help us to bound that situation when considered in relation to another situation 
(Kling, 1987). It is the discussion of these factors in relation to one another that form 
our view of a context of interest, and it is these which have shaped our analysis. We are 
however sensitive to the problems of determining where boundaries may be placed 
(Jayaratna & D’Arcy, 1991) given the differing perspectives that people have of a 
defining situation. In particular, we recognise that while we can make use of the web 
model approach to define a boundary, we must remain sensitive to the possibility that 
other people with whom we have contact may define boundaries in different ways. This 
highlights the need for the analyst to be clear in explaining the level and scope of 
analysis.
Kling’s (1987) use of the metaphor of a web to illustrate the complexity of activity 
surrounding development, application and usage of computerisation in organisations 
explicitly includes social relations in the model, to provide "a model of the social terrain 
on which people act" (p.321). Viewing the notion of context in terms of a web metaphor 
helps us to define a social context for our case studies of ISS formation by taking into 
account the following aspects (based upon: Kling, 1987, p.309).:
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• the social relations between a set o f participants who can influence ISS formation, 
which we term Social Practice;
• the infrastructure available in support of these relations;
• the history of commitments made which influence the aspect of ISS formation of 
interest
Kling (1987) argues that the social practice element should be considered in terms of 
political or cultural models, a point with which we are in agreement. However, we find 
Kling a little imprecise in making clear just how he seeks to make sense of social 
relations. A feature of Kling’s lack of explanation may be related to a certain laxity in 
the use of terminology, where for example Kling appears to use the terms social 
relations, social elements, social processes, social terrain & social relationships as 
synonyms (e.g. 1987, pp.318-321). Without delving in to the definitions of each term, 
we would suggest that such imprecision in terminology does little to help understanding 
of his argument. We have argued for an analysis of social practice that addresses the 
exercise of power, and it is this interpretation of web models that we utilise for our 
analysis of the case studies, in tandem with infrastructural and historic dimensions as a 
means of defining and exploring the situation of interest.
What is also interesting in Kling's discussion of web models is that he puts forward a 
view of social context which is a combination of social action and situation specific 
elements combined. So far as we may use the notion of context he says, then this refers 
to one situation (and associated elements) in relation to another. In such a view, context 
and social practice are not readily separable. Kling argues that having addressed 
infrastructural, spatial and historic issues, we need some way of understanding social 
elements. We have already argued that we can address social practice associated with 
ISS formation through focussing upon the exercise of power.
Therefore, while it is necessary to look at a range of elements, including populations, 
equipment, space, and time, these should only be thought of as making sense in relation 
to the social practice under consideration. We argue that it is the inclusion of the web of 
elements which help explain a situation of interest, and which enable us to differentiate 
between that situation and any other. In our view a situation is neither explainable solely 
in terms of social practice, nor solely in terms of any of the elements referred to above.
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In our view ISS formation as a social practice can addressed in a thorough analysis in 
terms of web models (Kling & Scacchi, 1982; Kiling, 1987), exploring situations within 
and through which social practice is constituted.
The use of a web model perspective represents an area of weakness in Walsham's (1993) 
work, in that his explanation is limited. Walsham incorporates Kling's view of web 
models in a model that attempts to explain organisational activity utilising structuration 
theory (Giddens, 1984) . Walsham distinguishes between Social Process and Social 
Context as representing “an action/structure duality” (Walsham, 1993, pp.58-70), and 
seeks to link them using structuration theory as a meta-theory. The problem with this it 
seems is that in the way in which Kling articulates web models this does not seem 
possible, because web models according to Kling already incorporate social relations 
(e.g. 1987, p.347), which we would argue cannot be seen as somehow being distinct 
from notions of social process. Thus, Walsham (1993) argues that he is able to link an 
understanding of social process through the duality of structuration theory with an 
understanding of social context, both being distinct areas for analytic focus. However, 
by using web models to understand social context Walsham is in effect arguing that 
investigating social relations between people is somehow entirely different from 
investigating social processes, which are described as encapsulating elements of 
interaction between subcultures, meanings ascribed by groups, and issues of autonomy 
and control (ibid., p.69). How this differs from social relations is not explored, as we 
would argue that the elements Walsham describes as social processes cannot be 
differentiated from social relations between participants (Kling, 1987), which 
encapsulates division of labour, relative status, power, and the way in which people 
define their situations (ibid. pp. 311/316). To us it would seem that this area requires 
clarification by Walsham, and highlights our need to explain the perspective taken in 
analysis, which has been the focus of this chapter.
3.6. SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed our investigative framework for considering the exercise of 
power, and which has been utilised as an initial guiding device in exploring ISS 
formation in terms of power. We argue that we can consider the exercise of power as an
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important factor in understanding ISS formation, utilising a range of literature to 
reinforce our view. From this we go on to argue that a multi-dimensional 
conceptutalisation of power presented provides us with a useful, and valid means 
through which we can investigate ISS formation in terms of the exercise of power. The 
framework that we adopt is theoretically grounded in the literature, providing a means 
of understanding organisational activity by "peeling back the layers of power" (Hardy, 
1994, p.234), but framed within a web-model analysis (Kling, 1987). It is through the 
latter that we address contextual issues within we believe ISS formation practice is 
embedded. We do not to see the notion of context as separate and distinct from the 
social practice of interest, but rather to understand that both aspects are enmeshed in 
specific situations, functions of time and space.
The next chapter discusses the research philosophy, methodology and methods used in 
this research.
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CHAPTER FOUR - RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND
METHOD
4.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the philosophy, methodology and methods which underpin our 
research. We provide an overview of these aspects in Figure 4.1. below prior to 
discussing each of the areas in turn.
Research philosophy:
Ontology:- Social reality as a social construction; 
Epistemology:- Interpretivist perspective -  critical 
hermeneutics
Informs choice o f
▼
Research Method:
Longitudinal Case study research
Figure 4.1. An overview of research philosophy and method
4.2. RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY
4.2.1. ONTOLOGY & EPISTEMOLOGY - A N  INTERPRETIVIST PERSPECTIVE
Ontology is concerned with the'taken-as-given nature of reality. In the natural world this 
may be thought of as being about the physical properties of our world, those elements 
that are built, or which grow in some physical sense. In addressing ISS in organisational 
settings we are referring to the nature of the social world, as opposed to the natural 
world, and we are therefore concerned with the nature of that social world, and how we 
view that world. In our view organisational settings for ISS formation can be thought of 
as being socially constructed through human activity, relationships, and interactions 
(Berger & Luckman, 1967; Chaffee, 1985; Scarborough, 1998). People socially
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construct what is meaningful and what is significant in their environments, within and 
through their interactions with others.
Hence, in research with people in work based situations - where we address what they 
do, why they do what they do, and what they think they have or are doing - we are 
investigating a social world. We must therefore be explicit about the perspective that we 
hold and the methods that we adopt to investigate this world (Galliers, 1992).
Indeed, in our view researchers are as much a part of this social world as are the subjects 
of the research. This observation goes to the heart of a long standing debate in research 
inquiry (Gummesson, 1991), namely as to whether researchers can be impartial 
observers of what is occurring, or whether researchers should be regarded as fellow 
actors in an evolving occurrence. Our view is in accordance with the latter view, in that 
social occurrences do not happen independently of any of the people involved, or have 
meaning independent of them. Our area of inquiry only has meaning through the parties 
involved; they ascribe meaning to what occurs - they socially construct occurrences 
within that domain. The idea that we can be impartial observer of what appears to us to 
be an objective reality is in our perspective misleading. Instead, the researcher is 
engaged in the mutual construction of the social world through their involvement with 
and thinking about that world. This may be categorised as internal realism, where, 
"reality-for-us is an inter-subjective construction of the shared human cognitive 
apparatus" (Walsham, 1995, p.76). This means that in our view people are jointly 
involved in constructing realities, and that some of the aspects of social reality are the 
subject of shared understanding. This is as distinct from external realism where a 
definitive reality would be perceived to exist independently of us, or subjective idealism 
where any sense of reality is constructed and is unique to any individual. The action of 
individuals cannot be understood purely in terms of the individual, that is, being 
reducible to the human being with the social world equating to the sum of that 
individually held consciousness (Doyal & Harris, 1986). Instead, we can view the 
actions that occur within the social world as being a product both of individual action 
and also as being a consequence of situated interaction, in this case in organisational 
settings.
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Epistemology is concerned with our theory of knowledge, and how we gain knowledge 
about the area of interest (Hirschheim, 1992). This study has not sought to identify, 
observe, or to comment upon what may be regarded as an independent reality as we do 
not consider that there can be such an independent reality to be found. The notion that 
there are observable facts or a single explanatory theory awaiting discovery can be 
considered as implausible if we accept the view that perception can be ambiguous, and 
varies from person to person (Doyal & Harris, 1986).
In our view ISS formation becomes meaningful when we address the perspectives of 
those involved, and that to understand this world we need to gain access to those 
perspectives through social constructions such as language, consciousness, shared 
meanings and instruments (Myers, 1997). We also recognise that that a researcher is one 
more actor in the social construction of this reality, so that we need to be aware of, and 
reflect upon, the effect we have upon the articulation and interpretation of events. We 
describe our own perspective as being interpretivist, whereby "interpretivism is an 
epistemological position, concerned with approaches to the understanding of reality and 
asserting that all such knowledge is necessarily a social construction and thus 
subjective" (Walsham, 1995, p5.). As seen, in our view the concept of power in relation 
to ISS formation is just such a subjective, socially constructed phenomena, and hence an 
interpretive approach is indeed appropriate. Furthermore, interpretive research has been 
identified as highly appropriate for the examination of social phenomena in the IS field 
(Lee, 1991; Orlikowski, 1991; Walsham, 1995).
The science of interpretation can be labeled as hermeneutics, and although classically 
this refers to the interpretation of texts, in an organisational sense it can be applied to the 
construction of organisational settings as texts for interpretation. Such an approach is 
aligned with a social constructionist perspective, highlighting subjective meanings of 
people and social structures within which and through which meanings are constructed. 
This "enables one to portray the real complexity of organisations as social, cultural and 
political systems" (Myers, 1997, p.250). Furthermore, we can distinguish between pure 
hermeneutics and critical hermeneutics. While the former is concerned with 
interpretations which are accepted at face value, the latter incorporates a reflective 
critique of the interpretations within organisational settings. Our perspective is in line 
with a critical hermeneutic perspective, which:
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• recognises that pre-knowledge and prejudice can affect our interpretations and 
must be acknowledged;
• maintains a dialectic between analysis and theoretic critique in developing our 
interpretation;
• addresses and reflectively integrates the historical context in which research 
takes place (Myers, 1997).
While such an approach may seem similar to critical theory, we would argue that a key 
difference is that in critical hermeneutics researchers do not carry from the start an 
assumption as to where the main issues or conflicts are to be found (Poster, 1990). The 
main epistemological assumptions of our interpretivist perspective are set out in Table
4.1. below:
Main Assumptions of our Interpretive Perspective in relation 
to ISS formation
1 Reality can be seen as subjective, socially constructed & 
interpreted based upon beliefs & value systems
2 Attempts to understand phenomena through addressing meanings 
that people assign to what happens.
3 There is a focus upon social, cultural and historic context.
4 Research is not seen as being value free; and this implicates 
researchers as active influences upon any findings as much as it 
does those researched.
5 Facts are not seen as being independent of any meaning that people 
may attach to them; for example, what is done, what is said, what 
is read, what is seen in the course of ISS formation - all are 
interwoven with perception, & meaning.
6 Evaluation will include:
logical consistency - where the principles of logic are evident in 
the explanation given of an event;
subjectivity - where the meaning and understanding that has come 
from the people involved is clearly reflected in the research; 
adequacy - where it is evident that the author has sought to 
uncover and explain the rationale behind what takes place so far as 
they are able.
Table 4.1. Assumptions of Interpretive Perspective (Based upon: Walsham, 1995; 
Cavaye, 1996; Myers, 1997; Darke et al, 1998)
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The assumptions set out in Table 4.1. above, lead us to consider the benefits of an 
interpretive perspective. In our view, the benefits of such an approach are that the focus 
remains upon understanding the subjective nature of the research situation, whilst at the 
same time maintaining an awareness of potential problems. There is a danger with an 
interpretive view which is that researchers may presume that they have some form of 
empathy or indwelling with the subject (Miles & Huberman, 1994). It is in our view 
debatable whether an individual can truly empathise with another in a research situation, 
as researchers are either trying to empathise on the basis of what is expressed through 
language, or through what is seen by them, or a combination of both. The problem with 
the former is that we see language as contextual in use and development, and it would 
not be certain that researchers and those researched share a common understanding of 
the language used. The problem with the latter is that what we see may be conditioned 
by attitude, belief, experience, and that what researchers perceive to be happening may 
be very different from what the people being researched perceive. The point is that it 
may be naive for researchers to assume that they can truly empathise with those they 
endeavour to research. For example, in many instances there will be an awareness that 
one party is an insider and one is an outsider, albeit it possibly with some pre­
understanding of the situation. It is better therefore to confront the differences that exist, 
as a major difficulty with many studies in organisation concerns the lack of openness 
about the role of researchers in relation to the person or persons being observed 
(Wilmott, 1987). In this research, although an outsider to the Police Forces being 
researched, the researcher came with a level of pre-understanding having previously 
worked in the Police Service for several years. On the one hand this gave the researcher 
a certain understanding of some of the cultural aspects of the Police Service. On the 
other hand though, the researcher had to remain alive to the possibility that he might 
make assumptions, or presumptions about the research settings, which in fact required 
further exploration.
Finally, we also take note of the practical view of interpretivist approaches whereby 
researchers are as inseparable from the domain that they seek to examine as are the 
alleged informants. Thus, researchers will have, "their own understandings, their own 
convictions, their own conceptual orientations; they too are members of a particular 
culture at a specific historical moment. Also they will be undeniably affected by what
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they hear and observe in the filed, often in unnoticed ways. Where we as researchers 
interact with the people who are the subjects of the research then we must remain aware 
that such an interaction will be a co-elaborated act on the part of both parties, and not a 
gathering of information by one party (Miles & Hubermann, 1994). This observation 
means that we have to give careful attention to the appropriateness of research method, 
and it is to a discussion of method that we now turn.
4.3. RESEARCH METHODS
4.3.1. CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVE METHODS
Tesch (1990) highlights twenty one distinct methods associated with qualitative research 
alone, although this is by no means to suggest that research in an interpretivist tradition 
equates to qualitative research and vice versa - a problem of some researchers in the IS 
area (Myers, 1997). While there are many research methods that could have been chosen 
for this research effort, the choice of method must take account of both the researchers 
own philosophy, the research context, and any constraints that may be pertinent. For 
example, given our philosophical beliefs discussed above, it was apparent to us that 
methods such as laboratory experiments, surveys, forecasting, and simulation were not 
appropriate as they would not allow us to adequately explore what we saw as 
fundamentally social phenomena in ISS formation. An approach involving a 
questionnaire based survey for example would not enable us to get close enough to the 
social, cultural and historic context of the phenomena (Silvermann, 1993; Easterby- 
Smith et al, 1991). The essence of such methods, which have been labeled as scientific 
(Galliers, 1991a), is that they are characterised by repeatability, reductionism, and 
refutability (Checkland, 1981). By contrast, an interpretive approach suggests that many 
interpretations are possible of any particular event, that researchers will have an impact 
on the situation of interest, and that human activity contains a mixture of both intended 
and unintended events (Checkland, 1981).
As several authors have argued (e.g. Walsham, 1995; Cavaye, 1996; Darke et al, 1998) 
interest in organisational and social issues associated with computer based information 
systems leads us towards methods which focus upon understanding social phenomena in 
their natural settings and cultural context. With these points in mind, we narrowed our
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choice of research method to the following: action research; ethnography; case study 
research. Each of these methods has been identified as an appropriate IS research 
technique where there is a desire to get close to subjective and social phenomena 
surrounding IS in organisational settings (Orlikowski, 1991; Galliers, 1992; Myers, 
1997).
Action research is a widely used method in IS research (Checkland, 1991; Baskerville & 
Wood-Harper, 1998). This method was of interest to us because of the possibility to be 
actively engaged in the problem situation, while at the same time reflecting upon, and 
integrating the evaluative outcome of our own and others interventions in that situation. 
The reflective element in action research is important as a means of learning and 
adapting the action that one takes (Checkland, 1991; Jayaratna, 1994), although it has 
been argued that action research is merely a combination of observation and 
participation (Cavaye, 1996). If we accept that researchers are actively taking part in 
attempting to solve the problem (Mansell, 1991) then this suggests that Cavaye's (1996) 
view is limited, and that reflective engagement in the problem situation is an essential 
component of action research (Schon, 1983).
Action research seemed to us an appropriate means by which to conduct research in to 
ISS formation, and would also satisfy the criteria of our philosophical position. This 
method also seemed to be valuable for research that was endeavouring to explore the 
exercise of power. However, we decided that we would not adopt action research as a 
method for the following reasons: we were not going to be able to become engaged for 
any significant periods of time in the situation given that we were undertaking the 
research on a part-time basis while working full-time as an academic; in addition, we 
were not engaged in an action role initially, and were not going to be able to engage in 
directly addressing any specific problem situation.
Ethnography is an acknowledged IS research method (Myers, 1997). This was 
considered by us as a method because we felt that it would have enabled us to get close 
to the activity surrounding ISS formation, and also to become engaged on a day to day 
basis with the social and cultural aspects that needed to be considered in relation to the 
exercise of power. In an ethnographic study we are concerned to grasp the view of the 
native, by drawing out the way in which people constitute and interpret organisations on
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a daily interactional basis (Schartzman, 1993). This requires ongoing immersion in an 
organisational setting if researchers are to be able to legitimately claim to be engaged in 
ethnography. We decided that an ethnographic method would not be feasible for this 
study given our inability to spend the time required in an organisational setting, even 
were access to have been granted for such a study. Similarly, such a method would have 
meant that we would have had to choose to limit our study to one, or at best two, 
organisational settings because of the time involved in undertaking ethnographic work.
4.3.2. INTERPRETIVE CASE-STUDIES
We have adopted interpretive in-depth case studies as our research method, this being a 
recognised method of conducting IS research (Galliers, 1991a; Walsham, 1993, 1995; 
Cavaye, 1996; Myers, 1997; Darke et al, 1998). Case study research has been defined as, 
"an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life 
context, when the boundaries between the phenomenon and its context are not clearly 
evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used. It is particularly valuable in 
answering who, why and how questions in management research" (Yin, 1989).
Although the use of case studies has been widely acknowledged as a valuable research 
method in IS, there are several ways of perceiving the use of a case study method and no 
one universally accepted right way (Galliers, 1992). Where choices of case study 
method are discussed we tend to see a distinction drawn between positivist and 
interpretive case study approaches (Cavaye, 1996; Darke et al, 1998). However while 
we note that such terminology can create a false impression of an either/or choice where 
one is bad and one is good - with positivism increasingly cast in the role of bad in 
organisation based research (Silvermann, 1993) - we take the view that the selection of a 
method should flow from our philosophical position, and not merely be adopted because 
it is seen as being good.
Nonetheless, we do recognise that there are different approaches to case study research 
(Cavaye, 1996). For example, case studies in what has been termed a positivist tradition 
(e.g. Yin, 1989) tend to see controlled observations, replicability of study, and 
generalisation of findings as key factors in such methods (Cavaye, 1996). However, in
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our view social situations are akin to a duree (Giddens, 1984), and never the same twice, 
so that it is simply not possible to replicate a study precisely. A critical hermeneutic 
perspective by contrast addresses the social, cultural, and political aspects of 
organisational settings in an historic context, recognising that this will be constantly 
changing over time. Generalisation in a positivist sense is problematic if it is seen in the 
context of causal relationships from a sample to a population, as this would seem to 
indicate that one is searching for universally applicable truths. However, in our view we 
acknowledge,
"a second mode of generalisation that is 'the extension from the micro-context to 
the totality that shaped if [Buraway, 1985]. In the latter view every particular 
social relation is the product of generative Forces of mechanisms operating at a 
more global level, and hence the interpretive analysis is an induction (guided and 
couched within a theoretical framework) from the concrete situation to the social 
totality beyond the individual case" (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1989; quoted in: 
Walsham, 1993, p. 15).
Hence, in this sense, based upon interpretation of the research situation a form of 
generalisation is possible to an existing body of knowledge. In terms of the contribution 
to knowledge from such an approach, it has been argued (Myers, 1997) that one way in 
which the interpretive case-study method provides a contribution is through the 
development of a rich description of a situation, a view that we find problematic. While 
the provision of a description may well inform the reader about a situation, we argue 
that to make a contribution to knowledge it is necessary to at least demonstrate how the 
findings contribute to existing theoretic understanding. We have identified themes based 
upon the abstraction of issues from our case studies, which has led to the development 
of an analytic proposition to theory through the construction of an explanatory 
framework (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
There are a number of aspects of an interpretive case study method that we consider 
valuable, these being:
• Investigation of contemporary phenomena in organisational contexts. With a 
focus upon in-depth understanding of phenomena and context;
• Appropriate for answering how? and why? questions;
• Understanding of phenomena by addressing meanings attributed to them by 
people in cultural & historic context;
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• Allows theoretic or analytical generalisation, development of concepts, and 
abstracting of specific implications;
• Enables dialectic between theory and development of understanding throughout 
research process.
In determining our choice of research method it seemed impossible to disregard 
researchers situations in terms of time, resource availability, and geographic location, 
and indeed it would be dishonest to suggest that they play no part in method 
determination - this is part of the reality of research (Jones, 1985). In addition to the 
other factors mentioned above, this led us to conclude that an interpretive case study 
method, from the perspective of critical hermeneutics, was the most appropriate method 
for the investigation of ISS formation. This method enabled us to maintain a dialectic 
between analysis and a theoretic framework that addressed ISS formation in terms of the 
exercise of power.
4.4. THE RESEARCH PROCESS
Having chosen the interpretive case-study method, we conducted six longitudinal in- 
depth case studies from 1994 to 1998, which provided a rich set of data for a cross-case 
comparative analysis. The longitudinal approach enabled a detailed series of 
interpretations to be developed over the four years. Such longitudinal comparative case 
studies enable the investigation of processes in context, highlighting the various 
connected levels of analysis, which provides for a richer understanding than would be 
possible than by taking a snapshot of a brief moment in time (Franz & Robey, 1987; 
Pettigrew, 1990; Van de Ven, 1992). This in turn provides, "scope to reveal the multiple 
sources and loops of causation and connectivity so crucial in identifying and explaining 
patterns in the process" (Pettigrew, 1990, p.271).
Here, the cases studies comprised five Police Forces in Scotland, with a small number 
of case studies being chosen to enable sufficient depth of analysis while at the same time 
allowing for a greater possibility of analytic generalisability than would a single case 
(Benbasat et al, 1987; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1989; Easterby-Smith et al, 1991). A 
single case study allows for a rich, in-depth analysis of a specific organisational
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situation (Walsham, 1995; Myers, 1997). Yin (1989) argues that for a single case study 
site to be acceptable it must represent either the critical case in testing a well formulated 
theory, or must be an extreme or unique case, or especially revelatory. However, a 
weakness of a single case study is that the study may turn out not to be critical, extreme, 
unique, or even particularly revealing. Multiple case studies are preferable when the 
intent of the research is description, theory building, or theory testing as such a study 
allows for cross-case analysis and theory building (Benbasat et al, 1987).
Having decided to study several organisations, we established that each organisation 
was willing to cooperate with the investigation, and that each was engaged in ISS 
formation. In each of the case studies our focus was upon ISS formation, which 
followed discussions with representatives from each Force in which they claimed that 
they were engaged in developing ISS. In each of the cases, we focussed upon practice 
associated with ISS surrounding one specific strategic decision area for IS (Waema & 
Walsham, 1990). In all of the cases, the interviews were all prearranged, with visits 
made to institutional sites to speak with the individuals. In addition, in one of the cases, 
we spent a period of three months working with the case organisation, during which 
time numerous interviews were undertaken where we could be considered to be in the 
role of participant (Walsham, 1995). Throughout the research process we were 
conscious of the need to assess our own prejudices and assumptions, indeed to reflect 
upon our own mental construct (Jayaratna, 1994), and to be aware of the influence that 
we may have.
We deliberately avoid use of the term participant observer because we do not accept 
that an individual can be a participant without observing in the research situation. The 
very act of participation in our view means that the researcher is observing in some 
sense; hence the term participant observation is redundant from our perspective.
4.4.1. VALIDITY OF THE RESEARCH
A number of authors (e.g. Yin, 1989; Easterby-Smith et al, 1991) have sought to 
develop criteria by which researchers may judge the validity, reliability and 
generalisability of qualitative research. These terms reflect an attempt to adapt criteria 
used in quantitative research for those doing qualitative research. While we would argue
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that the aspirations of qualitative research are fundamentally different from quantitative 
research (Miles & Huberman, 1994) it is nonetheless just as important to address issues 
of validity so that others may appraise the worth of the research (Kvale, 1989). These 
criteria are summarised in Table 4.2. below.
Criteria Issues For Consideration
Validity Has the researcher gained as much access as is reasonably 
possible to the knowledge and meanings of informants? 
Construct validity - use multiple sources of evidence
- establishing chains of evidence
- have key informants review draft cases 
Internal validity - do pattern matching
- do explanation building
External validity - use replication logic in multiple cases
Reliability Will similar observations be made by different researchers on 
different occasions?
- use case study protocol
- develop case study database
Generalisability How likely is it that ideas and theories generated in one setting 
will also apply in other settings?
- rely on analytical rather than statistical generalisation - that is, 
develop propositions to theory
- use multiple case studies in order to strengthen the analytic 
generalisations
Table 4.2. Issues of validity, reliability and generalisability in qualitative research 
(developed from Yin, 1989; Easterby-Smith, 1991).
The use of multiple case studies was one of the ways in which we addressed validity. 
Although we did multiple case studies, we used our initial series of interviews and data 
collection efforts in one of the case studies as a pilot study, which was in 1994. This 
enabled us to reflect upon our research methods, including the interview process, the 
analytic methods, and to reflect upon the initial stage of the dialectic between theory and 
analysis. It was from this initial reflection upon our interpretations of the data in this 
case study that we began to notice the emergence of a concept that we had not 
previously focussed upon in the literature, this being the role of power. Following this 
pilot exercise, we returned to the literature to address the nature of power in relation to 
ISS formation, and as a result subsequently incorporated a perspective on the exercise of 
power into our research efforts. This demonstrated the utility of using one of the cases
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as a pilot study, although the process of reflection and evaluation was one that we 
continued throughout the research process. This also enabled us to address issues of 
reliability as we were able to develop our case study protocol and to set up a form of 
case study database using NUDUST1 (Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing 
Searching and Theorising) software following this pilot study.
Also in terms of validity, data was collected through a number of methods, with 
multiple sources of evidence:
• through formal in-depth interviews, and informal discussions;
• through a three month period of participation working with people in one of the 
case-Forces, when many formal and informal discussions were undertaken, as 
well as a series of observations made while working full-time with people;
• through a diary kept during the period of participation by the researcher;
• through the collection of documentary material from the case-Forces as well as 
from other institutions and groups;
• through the collection of secondary material published about the case-Forces.
The range of data sources noted above provided a degree of triangulation (Fielding & 
Fielding, 1986) which enhanced the validity and reliability of the study overall. In 
discussing triangulation we are not referring to the collecting of different kinds of data 
per se, but rather as a means of relating the various data, "in such a way as to counteract 
various possible threats to the validity of our analysis" (Hammerseley & Atkinson, 
1983, p. 199). Triangulation does not in our view prove validity or reliability of either 
the data or the research, but instead to interpret the data in a more critical manner, 
testing, probing, looking for weaknesses across the range of data, with a view to 
improving confidence in the data of the researcher and of the audience (Fielding & 
Fielding, 1986).
We used replication logic across the case studies by asking similar questions during our 
semi-structured interview sessions. Using the range of data gathered, each case study 
was written up, with copies being returned for factual checking and comment to people 
in each of the case studies. This provided valuable additional comment, and stimulated
1 NUD*IST is produced by QSR (Qualitative Solutions & Research Ltd.), and distributed by Sage 
Publications @ www.sagepub.co.uk.
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further discussion regarding each of the cases, further addressing the validity of the 
study.
We addressed generalisability by focussing our efforts upon analytic generalisability, 
using a cross-case comparative analysis to generate our propositions to theory (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). We set out the way in which we undertook this analysis in due 
course, before which we discuss our primary research method - interviewing.
4.4.1. INTERVIEWING
As part of the data collection, in-depth interviews were conducted with a range of 
personnel in each organisation. Initially a decision had to be made as to who within the 
case-studies should be spoken with as part in the research. It is here in particular that 
some of the reality facing the researcher becomes apparent. For no matter who the 
researcher may think it appropriate to speak with, the decision for access remains in the 
hands of the key staff acting as gate-keepers in to the institution. That said, the 
likelihood of successful access also rests to some degree with the researcher, in terms of 
being well prepared for contact with such people by finding out as much about the 
organisation as possible. Holdaway(1989) makes the point that researching in the Police 
can be problematic given that research is not usually possible without their co-operation, 
and in addition he notes that there can be problems in the framing of proposals if the 
Police do not see some direct relevance to policy issues. In terms of the research 
reported upon here, gaining co-operation did not prove problematic, perhaps because of 
the currency of the issue to the Police themselves, and because of a certain degree of 
novelty in that information technology was something that they were beginning to 
discuss amongst themselves - to varying degrees. With the Police it was important to 
follow appropriate protocols for gaining access to the organisation, which meant 
addressing all requests for access via the chief constable.
It was decided that those involved in the interviews would be those holding the most 
senior positions, and/or who were concerned with ISS practice. In each case, members 
of the senior executive, operational senior management, and those involved in the 
management IS/IT within the Forces formed the interviewees. In all cases, the
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researcher adopted a semi-structured approach to interviewing, allowing the interviewee 
latitude to discuss areas of concern to them as seemed appropriate at the time. The 
researcher did have a series of topics and questions with him at each interview which he 
wished to address, and in nearly all cases the interviewees knew in advance what the 
broad area of discussion was to be. This approach meant that the researcher had a 
preparatory guide with which to negotiate the interview (McKracken, 1988). Latitude 
was required in interviews, especially in the early stages of an interview as interviewees 
quite often seemed to turn the conversation to what seemed to be a pet interest of their's. 
Where this occurred, this was felt by the researcher to be a useful, and important, means 
of developing relationships with the interviewees that would facilitate discussions 
(Stebbins, 1972).
Overall, 182 people were interviewed during the course of the study, some a number of 
times during the period of research. The interviewees were informed that their views 
would remain anonymous, as had been agreed with the representative of each case study 
who served as the initial point of contact. Many formal and informal meetings and 
discussions occurred during visits to the case organisations, and notes were made 
following such meetings. Formal interviews varied in length from one hour to 3 hours, 
and some individuals were interviewed a number of times across the 1994 -1998 period. 
Sixty two interviews were tape recorded, with the agreement of the interviewee. Where 
interviews were tape recorded, tapes were transcribed with a copy of the transcription 
returned to the interviewee for comment. All transcripts were produced by the 
researcher, which was felt to be important given the importance of the process of 
transcription as well as the outcome in enhancing an understanding of the data 
(Silvermann, 1993). For example, where interviewees were laughing, the reasons for 
such laughter was highlighted, or where interviews were alluding to an object in the 
room this was incorporated.
Transcribing the tapes personally, was an extremely labour intensive activity although it 
meant that the researcher stayed close to the data and ensured a consistency in method 
and notation. Notes were also made where possible during and following each formal 
interview to record the researcher's thoughts about the interaction that had occurred. 
Where informal discussions occurred, notes were made as appropriate soon after the 
event.
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One of the problems in such longitudinal studies is that some people change roles, retire 
and so on. In this study, the situation was exasperated to a certain extent because as 
Police Officers gain seniority they often move job frequently, sometimes every twelve 
or eighteen months. This sometimes made repeat contact difficult, although fortunately, 
in all of the Police Forces the participants in the IT area remained in place throughout 
the period of the research. People moving job, retiring, losing interest in contributing to 
the research as they move on, are all factors of such longitudinal research and are a part 
of the richness of the data, although ensuring sufficiency of data always has to be a 
priority.
4.4.2. GUIDING ISSUES IN  INTERVIEWING
Our approach to interviewing in the case studies has been shaped by four particular 
issues which have been at the heart of use of this qualitative method. Firstly interviews 
are considered as conversations, where despite using a topic guide to aid the interviewer 
in a semi-structured interview format, the researcher must pay attention to both what 
they say, what they hear, and what they see in the course of the conversation. From this 
researchers can prepare their responses accordingly. The interview is a complex 
undertaking because, "interviews are invented anew each time, they can be wonderfully 
unpredictable. The person being interviewed may take control of the interview and 
change the subject, guide the tempo, or indicate the interviewer was asking the wrong 
questions. Sometimes interviewees become hostile; sometimes they become overly 
friendly, threatening, or flirtatious... Part of the skill of the qualitative researcher is in 
being able to adapt quickly to a situation that did not go as expected" (Rubin & Rubin, 
1995, p.7). Whilst in this case the researcher did not experience this range of issues, the 
degree of involvement and concentration required is easily underestimated. Not least is 
the role of the researcher as methodology user (Jayaratna, 1994) who must constantly 
endeavour to reflect upon their own role and use of methods, in keeping with the focus 
of a critical hermeneutic perspective where we reflect upon our prejudices and pre­
understanding. For all these reasons, the view of an interview constituting a simple 
question-answer-question-answer exchange is a gross over-simplification.
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Secondly, interviews involve exploring shared meanings that people develop as they 
interact, with the researcher perhaps being required to address a new vocabulary and 
taken for granted assumptions and understandings of the community being investigated. 
Hence, to help our understanding we have paid attention to the way in which people 
describe their world, in particular to stories, symbols and metaphors which people use to 
describe their experiences (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). Furthermore, we were conscious not 
to give higher recognition to any one version; because people may perceive the same 
event differently, we have had to be careful not to dismiss conflicting versions of an 
event as either true or false. We accepted that they may all have been valid 
interpretations of events, and yet different. Our role as the interpretive researcher is to 
make sense of any such contradictions (Myers, 1997). We were also attentive to the 
status accorded to the data gathered - where we sought to avoid regarding explanations 
as an absolute truth of what happened, instead acknowledging the socially embedded 
and situated nature of their accounts (Silvermann, 1993).
Thirdly, we recognised that in interviews participants are partners who share a 
conversation. While the notion of such a partnership did not always seem to be realised 
in practice, as for example, when some interviewees seem monosyllabic in their 
responses no matter how open a question appears, this idea reinforced the need to 
consider the mutual participation in any such conversation. We were also aware that we 
should not conduct interviews in directions that interested us at the expense of issues 
that the interviewees wished to discuss, as in doing this we may have substituted our ill- 
informed view for their experience based views and insights (Rubin & Rubin, 1995).
Finally, maintaining an awareness of differing agendas on the part of those spoken with 
was important given that, "depth interviewing can never involve a simplistic 'face value' 
treatment of data. We had to think beforehand, during and after the interviews about 
what was, likely to, and had affected the data obtained in the interview and the 
relationship we were involved in" (Jones, 1985, p.53). Maintaining such an awareness 
required continual reflection by the researcher throughout the research process, and a 
certain degree of suspicion about what we were hearing. This emphasised the 
requirement to look for substantiation across a range of data collected in respect of any 
one case study, and not merely to accept something as a fact because someone had said 
that was the case. For example, in one of the case studies a Police officer who had been
79
involved in the development of IT, time and time again during several hours of 
discussion on separate occasions stressed their role as the one person responsible for 
driving a project. Interviews with other people not only failed to confirm this, but 
revealed an alternative view which was substantiated by several sources of data. The 
issue was to consider why it was that this individual had articulated a view no-one else 
agreed with - were they right, were they deluding themselves, trying to mislead the 
researcher, or perhaps enjoying the opportunity to talk about an area they worked in so 
much they sought to embellish some of the detail? This highlights two points: firstly, the 
importance of we as researchers exercising our own judgement; and secondly, the 
importance of watching what is said as well as listening to what is said in order to 
interpret the data.
Recognition of these characteristics formed the basis of the conversations with people in 
our research. The research interviews have been topical (Rubin & Rubin, 1995) in that 
they have been focussed on the area of ISS formation, looking at what happened, when 
and why. Thus, the interview as a research method can be a complex method, in which 
the researcher requires a high degree of awareness, in thoughts and in practice. This 
latter point reinforces the need for reflection throughout the fieldwork as the researcher 
must look for weaknesses, omissions, and good practice that could be addressed later in 
the study.
4.4.3. PARTICIPATION A S  PART OF A CASE-BASED APPROACH
A period of participation was undertaken over a period of three months with one of the 
case organisations. This followed a request from the organisation for us to work with 
them following interviews. The period involved working within the Police Force 
undertaking a review of their existing ISS, and helping them to develop a new approach 
to IS in the Force. This enabled an immersion within the area of study which has not 
been possible by simply turning up to interview people, or even engaging in less formal 
conversations at other times.
At the commencement of the period of working with the Police Force, a swipe card pass 
and a key were provided which gave access to the headquarters building and the
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computer suite - an area restricted to IS staff. At one level this seemed to signify a 
certain degree of trust and acceptance, but at another level we were quite clearly labeled 
as an outsider by the visitor badge which we was required to wear when in the 
headquarters building. In addition to such tangible elements of belonging, the researcher 
always made it quite clear that he was an outsider who was only with the organisation to 
complete a specific task.
For the researcher ever to have considered himself as anything other than an outsider 
would in one sense be naive. In another sense though, it is important to recognise that 
the researcher can not be a totally unconnected reporter of a reality (Silvermann, 1993). 
Rather, we recognise that the researcher plays a role in constructing the perceptions of 
the process being investigated; for example simply by requesting to speak to people, or 
by asking questions of a person one is engaging in the co-construction of a social 
process which brings issues to the fore which may otherwise have not been addressed. It 
is the reflection upon our mental construct in such situations that enables these issues to 
our conscious level of thinking (Jayaratna, 1994).
As a part of this reflective process a diary was kept during the period, with notes taken 
at or shortly after most interviews. Following day-to-day contact with individuals, 
observations were recorded as appropriate. This period of working with the organisation 
required the delivery of a report which formed part of their ISS. The author was closely 
involved with organisational members as the production of this report required meeting 
with a wide range of people within the organisation and direct involvement in the ISS 
formation activity. It was important therefore to develop a sense of distance from the 
process to enable reflection upon observations and events, while remaining committed 
to delivering an end product.
4.4.4. M EANS OF ANALYSIS
The analysis of data occurred hand in hand with the fieldwork, in keeping with an 
interpretive perspective and as advised by other researchers (e.g. McCracken, 1988; 
Gummesson, 1991; Miles & Huberman, 1994). This enabled us to maintain an ongoing 
dialectic between the analysis and theoretical work.
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In analysing data, a number of works were utilised in considering how to undertake the 
analysis of data (e.g. McCracken, 1988; Silvermann, 1993; Miles & Huberman, 1994, 
Rubin & Rubin, 1995). The explicit acknowledgement of these contributions, and the 
setting out of the analytic method is seen as a necessary step in meeting the conduct of 
qualitative enquiry (Kvale, 1989).
The purpose of the analysis has been to abstract issues from the case material through 
which we can explain ISS formation across the case studies. The means of doing this 
was through the induction of themes and concepts in moving towards an overall 
explanation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Walsham, 1993, 1995), using the exercise of 
power framework discussed previously as the investigative basis. Thus, while the 
framework provided a guide, it was only a guide; we remained alive to the inductive 
emergence of other explanatory issues from the data.
The analysis was based around three areas in coding of the data, these being: 
recognising concepts, hearing stories, and hearing themes. An overview of each of these 
is set out below in Table 4.3..
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AREA ISSUES ARISING
1. Recognising 
Concepts
Ideas or concepts through which ISS formation is 
understood
There is a danger here o f researchers imposing their own 
perspective in an unreflective manner- especially in the 
assigning o f labels, for example in imposing pre­
determined analytic categories rather than seeing what is 
actually emerging from the data. Reflection upon such 
concepts can be applied to researchers as well as to those 
researched.
2. Hearing Stories In looking for underlying meanings and themes, it can be 
useful to pick out and analyse stories; i.e. "refined 
versions of events that may have been condensed or 
altered to make a point indirectly"(Rubin & Rubin, 1995, 
p. 231).
The implications o f this are that we must consider why 
such versions may have been refined or condensed: is it 
embarrassing, is it forbidden or dangerous for them? 
Therefore, we must attend to both the story itself and to 
the reason behind the telling o f the story.
3. Hearing Themes These include: Descriptions of how people do or should 
behave; provide explanations for how and why things 
happen in the practice of ISS formation.
We must be wary o f developing themes from limited 
instances within the data, or suggestions from literature. 
We can address this by remaining sensitive to this 
happening, and also by looking for themes outside o f  the 
investigative framework.
OUTCOME It is the discovery o f concepts and ultimately themes that 
we abstract in developing an explanatory theory. Our 
determination o f what seems to be important is part o f the 
process o f interpretation and is judgmental; the 
researcher's own mental construct is an important factor 
in this development and hence our attention to making 
this explicit.
Table 4.3. Coding Guide (based upon Rubin & Rubin, 1995; p.229-229)
We used the coding guide shown in Figure 4.4.. to help us focus our analysis efforts, 
and to help us move in a structured manner from data to themes that emerged from our 
analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Rubin & Rubin, 1995). In undertaking our analysis 
it was necessary to think about the difference between what happened and what people 
say happened in any given situation. Many actions may not have had any deliberation 
beforehand, although a person may retrospectively ascribe such deliberation to the 
action, in line with aims and beliefs that seem appropriate. Indeed, when the notion of 
conscious and unconsciousness, aim and beliefs, are taken into account then the
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complexity of understanding action from accounts may be understood. We consider that 
it is advisable to look at the causes of action as a complex package of factors, with 
reasons - as events rather than justifications - being only one part (Doyal & Harris, 
1986). With this in mind we note that, "since such causation is totally dependent on both 
the agents ability and willingness to infer and to act upon inferences based upon such a 
package, perhaps it is best simply to think of her/him as the cause of what they do rather 
than overemphasising the causal importance of one of the packages logical contents" 
(ibid., p. 69).
Thus, in the accounts of action given, we looked at the reasons, aims and beliefs in the 
context of the culture within which people operate, consciously or otherwise, and the 
institutional effects that may impinge upon said action. As Silvermann (1993) notes, 
what we get in such accounts is not necessarily an explanation of what happened; we 
need to acknowledge and be aware of the embedded, situated nature of such accounts, 
for example where people may seek to morally justify their own position, or where 
action may be located within a particular institutional power structure. That is, we need 
to move beyond letting peoples account, or explanation, stand as the final version of 
what happened , but to ensure that our rigorous analysis moves behind such accounts. 
Our process of enquiry into ISS formation through engaging with a framework based 
around the exercise of power provided one means of doing this, and was particularly 
useful as we began to code data by encouraging us to move beyond the explanation at 
face value to examine the rationale behind them.
The coding of data proceeded in a manner which can be described as partly an inductive 
and partly a deductive approach, although we would argue that it was largely an 
inductive process. That is, we engaged in a dialectic between literature and analysis, 
developing our thinking with regard to views of ISS formation, and following the pilot 
study utilising an investigative framework through which we could consider ISS 
formation in terms of the exercise of power. We used this framework to help us in 
interviewing and in the analytic coding. However, we were conscious to remain 
sensitive to other explanatory issues emerging from the data, and from this dual track 
approach, we inductively abstracted a series of themes which led to the development of 
our theoretic explanation.
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The coding of data was undertaken using a commercially available computer software 
package, NUD*IST, initially version 3.0.4, but later adopting version 4. NUD*IST 
provides a means of managing data, both from interview transcripts as well as from 
notes of meetings and other data collected during the case study investigation. The 
software also allowed a rigorous analysis and coding of data, followed by investigation 
of coding categories, as themes and concepts were refined and developed. The software 
allowed us to investigate the data in many ways, by using searches based upon within 
and between category criteria. For example, once we had coded interview data, as an in­
category search we could look for all the coded sections where the word power had been 
used. As an example of a between category search, we could look for instances of 
people who were working as IT professionals, who were non-police staff, and who had 
used the word strategy. During coding of the data, coding categories were set up in 
advance based upon the informing theoretical framework in terms of ISS formation and 
in terms of power. In addition, a number of themes and concepts emerged during the 
analysis which formed additional coding categories. In this way the researcher sought to 
ensure that the investigative framework did not form a straitjacket to coding, remaining 
alert to the potential of new themes and concepts emerging. Similarly, the researcher 
remained alert to the use of stories, metaphors and analogies during the coding of data. 
Preliminary analysis of all of the case organisations occurred as the fieldwork continued, 
and when data collection in terms of the fieldwork was deemed to have finished, the 
coding categories were again revised before formal analysis of the data commenced 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). A copy of the initial and the final coding categories used 
are shown in Appendix 1.
Agar (1991) and Coffey et al (1996b) have expressed concerns about the use of such 
packages in qualitative research studies because of the perception that some researchers 
were increasingly relying upon the software to do the analysis work. This arose because 
of two main concerns, the first being the ability of the software to search and undertake 
autocoding of documents and the danger that researchers would therefore not probe the 
data in any depth. The second concern was because of the possibility of researchers 
associating the use of software with methodological rigour; that is, that if they used a 
piece of software then their methods of analysis must therefore be rigorous. This latter 
view could lead to a failure to give adequate attention to methods, and hence invalidate 
results. It is stressed here that in our view the use of such a package is solely as an aid to
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the process of coding - a tool, nothing more. As Kelle (1997) notes, "we should address 
these programs (NUD*IST and similar) as software for data administration and 
archiving rather than as tools for data analysis" (p. 14, sec. 6.3). Thus, such programs are 
useful as aids in coding and retrieval, but there are dangers in seeing them as theory 
builders - that is, doing the analysis for us; such tools assist the researcher's cognitive 
processes, but can never be seen as a substitute for them.
The data analysis using NUD*IST led us through a series of iterations of the coding 
categories, from which we abstracted concepts and themes until we arrived at a level of 
understanding which explained the research domain. This led to the development of a 
conceptual framework through which we are able to explain our understanding of ISS 
formation through focussing upon the exercise of power.
4.5. SUMMARY
In this chapter we discussed the research philosophy, research methodology and 
methods adopted. The approach adopted allowed for the development of a rich 
discussion of the case studies, and the subsequent analysis of ISS formation through 
focussing upon the exercise of power saw the abstraction of a number of key themes. In 
the next Chapter we discuss the Scottish Police Service, which is where our case studies 
have been based, and evaluate the evolution of Information Technology in the Police.
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CHAPTER FIVE - THE POLICE SERVICE IN CONTEXT
5.1. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter outlined the philosophical approach that underpinned the 
empirical investigation discussed in this thesis. In this chapter we will move on to 
provide the context to the case study organisations. It is necessary to provide this 
contextual discussion as a way of adding to the richness of the description, analysis and 
understanding of the cases (Pettigrew, 1985, 1990). The investigation focused upon five 
Police Forces in Scotland, and consequently context in this instance refers not just to the 
legal framework in which and through which Police Forces operate, but also to 
acknowledge the social, political, economic, and historic issues deemed appropriate in 
this instance. The chapter is structured as follows: firstly an evaluation of the Police 
Service in terms of history and organisation structure issues, which leads us to consider 
structural forms of bureaucracy in the Police; secondly, an evaluation of information 
technology (IT) in the Police Service.
5.2. THE POLICE SERVICE - HISTORY AND STRUCTURE
This discussion provides an understanding of structure, of social and historic context, 
and of issues of relevance to the ensuing analysis of the case study Police Forces.
The Police Service as we currently understand it, as institutions comprising a uniformed, 
disciplined body of people, has been constituted for less than 200 years, although the 
concept of policing would seem to be an innate condition of any ordered society. The 
Police, "refers to a particular kind of social institution, while policing implies a set of 
processes with specific social functions" (Reiner, 1994, p. 716). Hence, here we are 
concerned with particular institutions that have been labeled as Police Forces, as 
opposed to the notion of policing as a constituent factor in the maintenance of social 
order.
In the UK there are 43 Forces in England and Wales, 8 Forces in Scotland, and 1 Force 
in Northern Ireland. In addition, there are small Forces responsible for geographic areas
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such as the Isle of Man, for particular sectors such as the railways, and for industries 
deemed in need of specific attention such as the atomic energy authority installations. 
Among what we may consider to be the main Police Forces, i.e. those covering distinct 
geographic regions, there is a commonality of purpose, although with differences in 
criminal justice systems between forces in England and Wales, and those in Scotland. 
Even within national groupings cultural differences between forces have been noted, for 
example between urban and rural forces (Shapland & Hobbs, 1989), where the style of 
policing in large urban areas differs from that in the policing of isolated rural 
communities. The range of duties undertaken by the Police is considerable, from crime- 
fighting, traffic, public order duties, to dealing with witchcraft and opening tins of pet 
food for pensioners (Dale, 1994). Given that our empirical investigation is based upon 
Scottish forces, it is necessary to address the Scottish Police Service specifically.
5.3. THE POLICE SERVICE IN SCOTLAND.
The cases presented and discussed in this thesis represent five of the eight Police Forces 
in Scotland. The eight Police Forces in Scotland have a combined strength of 14,800 
Police officers (as at 31/3/97- Scottish Office, 1997), covering over one third of the land 
mass of the UK, with a resident population of less than 6 million people. This compares 
to over 127,000 Police officers for a population of 53 million people in England and 
Wales.
The Police (Scotland) Act 1967 has provided the basic framework of modem Police 
powers and responsibilities, subject to subsequent amendment, and reflects the content 
of the Report of the 1962 Royal Commission from which the duties of the Police in 
Scotland can be summarised as follows:
• to maintain law and order and protect persons; to prevent crime.
• to detect criminals and, in the course of interrogating suspected persons, play a part 
in the early stages of the judicial process, acting under judicial restraint.
• to control road traffic and advise local authorities on traffic questions.
• to carry out certain duties on behalf of Government departments - for example, to 
conduct enquiries on applicants for British nationality.
• by long tradition, to befriend anyone who needs their help, and to cope with any 
minor or major emergency which may arise.
• in carrying out their work, Police constables work as members of a disciplined force 
under the direction of the chief constable, although each is expected to act on his or 
her own initiative and is alone accountable at law for the exercise of his authority. 
They do much of their work alone and without supervision and they must make 
decisions based on sound knowledge of the law. Constables are therefore unique in 
the nature and degree of responsibility they are required to exercise. (Royal 
Commission on the Police, 1962)
The main differences between Police Forces in Scotland and those elsewhere in the UK 
are centred upon a distinctive legal system in Scotland, with laws specific to Scotland, 
and structure based upon the Sheriffs Office, the Procurator Fiscal, and the Crown 
Office, who form the basis of the prosecution system.
5.4. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES IN THE POLICE SERVICE
The Police Act 1964 and The Police (Scotland) Act 1967 provide the basis for the 
current structure and running of policing, with the setting up of a tripartite structure. In 
this, responsibility is shared between the Secretary of State for Scotland, the local Police 
authority, and the Chief Constables. The operational running of the Force lies with the 
Chief Constable, although control can be exercised over this individual by the Secretary 
of State and the local Police authority. Chief Constables are appointed on fixed term 
contracts, normally of 5 or 7 years duration, and can be said to represent the professional 
managers and leaders of the Police Service (Horton, 1996).
The Police are a disciplined, hierarchical body with much similarity to a militaristic 
model. The rank structure in the majority of forces (The Metropolitan Police and the 
City of London Police being the main exceptions) is as follows: Chief Constable, 
Assistant Chief Constable, Superintendent, Chief Inspector, Inspector, Sergeant, 
Constable (in decreasing order of seniority). There are further distinctions to be made in 
the hierarchy, which reflect responsibility and representation. The two most senior ranks 
are commonly referred to as ACPO ranks, that is belonging to the Association of Chief 
Police Officers (Scotland has the Association of Chief Police Officers [Scotland], hence
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ACPOS) which represents the interests of all officers at that level. Superintendents, 
which effectively combines two ranks with ordinary and senior Superintendent gradings, 
have their own representation and meeting groups, centred around the Superintendents 
Association (with a separate association in Scotland). All other ranks are represented by 
the Police Federation (again, with a separate association in Scotland). Thus, not only is 
there separation in terms of ranks, but also in terms of collective identity and 
representation.
Within all Forces there is a civilian workforce. Historically, civilian personnel have 
been employed in the Police to undertake clerical tasks, although increasingly civilian 
staff have come to occupy more senior roles, particularly in specialist areas such as 
finance and IT. In some Forces, civilian personnel have come to occupy posts formerly 
taken by ACPO rank officers, for example at Lothian and Borders, where the civilian 
Director of Administrative Services post was formerly the preserve of an Assistant 
Chief Constable. Pressure to civilianise Police posts has resulted from the increased cost 
of employing Police officers (Horton, 1996), and in the form of advice for Chief 
Constables to civilianise posts from central government sources through Home Office 
Circulars (e.g. Home Office Circulars 114/83 & 105/88). By way of illustration, in the 
Scottish Police Service at 31 March 1998 there were 14,988 Police officers and 4,670 
civilian staff (excluding domestic/cleaning staff) (HMIC, 1998, sec.6.1).
Funding in Scotland is provided from a combination of local and central government, 
with a 49/51% split respectively. Traditionally, budgets have been held and managed by 
regional authorities, but in 1996 responsibility for financial management was transferred 
to Chief Constables. Following changes in the allocation of budgets in 1996, to single- 
line budgets, each Chief Constable is given a specific allocation of funds with which 
they have to manage for the year. This has been a significant change in budgeting 
procedures for the Forces, because prior to this finance would be managed by the local 
authority, with the Chief Constable applying for resources as needed. This has meant 
that the Chief Constable now has some latitude in managing resource levels.
The introduction of initiatives to introduce a professional management ethos into the 
Police (Leishman & Savage, 1993) may be hampered by the discretionary nature of 
Police activity, the reactive nature of Policing, and traditional Police culture (Horton,
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1996) Thus, the Police Service have faced a number of challenges over recent years, 
primarily driven from central government, which have had some impact upon the way 
they operate, and which have implications for our understanding of ISS formation.
5.4.1. BUREAUCRATIC TRADITIONS AND N E W  PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
Police Forces have been experiencing profound change, little of which has been of their 
own making (Johnston, 1992). This has been due to a combination of political ideology, 
economic circumstances, and establishment fears about govemability of the state (ibid.). 
In particular, the structure of Police institutions and influences from a variety of 
initiatives associated with the area labeled new public management are important in 
providing contextual detail to our considerations of ISS formation.
Police institutions are firmly rooted in the public sector; the vast bulk of their funding 
comes from public sources, and they perform a public duty in the maintenance of law 
and order and the protection of life and property. The authoritarian top-down structure 
of Police Forces has been categorised as highly bureaucratic (Loveday, 1993). Most of 
the decision making occurs at the bottom of the institutional hierarchy, which reflects 
the discretionary nature of street-level policing. (Horton, 1996), although leadership and 
operational policy is firmly the preserve of the senior ranks. The hierarchical nature of 
the Police Service, with a number of supervisory levels, reflects increasing attempts 
over the years to more closely monitor the activities of the constable - the command and 
control of Police activities (Loveday, 1993).
Police Forces have been referred to as bureaucratic (Bradley et al, 1986; Oliver, 1989; 
Terrill, 1992). For Weber (1947), the notion of ideal bureaucracy incorporated: 
hierarchy of offices; a career system denoting specific areas of competence and 
specialisation; remuneration tied to clear contracts, discipline, and control in office; 
formal rules sets and decisions controlling the administration of organisation. The 
Police Service can be seen to exhibit such characteristics, although the point of this is 
not whether or not the Police are perceived to be bureaucratic, but rather to what does 
this concept sensitise us in our analysis. Just as Weber (1947) was interested in the 
social consequences of this form of organisation, particularly as a form of social
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domination (Morgan, 1986), we too are interested in the consequences for ISS 
formation of the way in which Police institutions are organised.
Research into the Police has suggested that Police institutions constitute a mock 
bureaucracy (Gouldner, 1954). This means that the perceived formality of hierarchy and 
discipline masks aspects of informal organisation which undermined any assumptions of 
control. Others argue that the Police world is typically, "casual, lackadaisical, offhand, 
ad-hoc and lowly motivated, with a deeply entrenched informal culture of occupational 
deviance" (Punch 1983: xii, cited by Johnston, 1988, p.52). Hence, while the Police may 
appear to be a disciplined, ordered, highly structured body operating in accordance with 
a clear set of rules, there is a degree of discretion in operation which renders such 
notions meaningless - hence a mock bureaucracy.
In terms of the Police therefore we can acknowledge the view that they can be perceived 
as displaying characteristics of bureaucracy, but must then ask what this means for our 
analysis. For this we can turn to the work of Mintzberg (1979), who argues that Police 
Forces can be considered as control bureaucracies, a derivative of what he calls machine 
bureaucracy (p. 331). By this he seems to mean that the very fact that the Police are 
engaged in a form of control means that they are invariably driven towards a 
configuration that is bureaucratic. We can utilise Mintzberg's (1979) work to consider 
the nature of Police institutions, highlighting where there is congruence, and where there 
is conflict with his analysis. In Table 5.1. below we evaluate the apparent structural 
properties of policing institutions based upon empirical work with the structural 
elements of the Police Service within Mintzberg's (1979) analysis.
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Factors typically associated 
with Control Bureaucracy
Synthesised views regarding structuring of 
Police Forces
Simple and stable environments -  
predictability means that tasks can be 
routinised and standardised.
Despite the range o f  Police activities, the context in which 
they operated was up until recent decades relatively 
predictable. The Police have a well defined set o f  operating 
regulations which govern what should be done given particular 
situations. As noted above, research work has indicated that 
Police officers not only have discretion regarding action to be 
taken (or inaction), but they also exercise discretion as to 
whether to follow the regulations set down or not.
Mature organisation - has developed 
standards for operation
The Police are a mature organisation, and do have clearly laid 
down standards for operation. Despite the adage often 
expressed by Police officers (from author's conversations with 
Police officers) that they 'never know what's waiting for them 
round the comer...' or '...when the phone next rings', in fact, 
while the circumstances may vary, the nature o f  the incident 
will almost always be something the Police have dealt with 
before, and have clear procedures for dealing with.
Relatively unsophisticated technical 
systems enable routinisation & 
standardisation. Hence, no need for 
specialists to whom power may be 
delegated, and thus central control 
remains intact.
For most o f  its existence the Police have had relatively 
unsophisticated technical systems, not requiring specialist 
assistance. Increasingly, specialists are now required to run 
more sophisticated systems, for example in IT and in finance, 
with delegation being required away from centre.
External control - which refers not 
just to control by government for 
example, but also the exercise o f  
control through public accountability.
As noted, the Police have had a degree o f  autonomy in terms 
o f  operational activity within the tripartite structure. However, 
as noted already, external control has increased since the 
1980s through the activity o f  the Home Office, the Audit 
Commission, and HMIC for example. The issue o f  
accountability to the public is a subject o f  considerable debate 
(e.g. see Reiner, 1994, pp.742-752) and beyond the scope o f  
this work, except to say that in theory the Police Service are 
accountable to their communities.
It is the control orientation (internally and externally) and need 
for public accountability that Mintzberg says draws Police 
institutions towards the machine bureaucracy structure, as 
opposed to a professional bureaucracy where work is 
dependent upon the skills and knowledge o f  professionals, i.e. 
horizontal specialisation with vertical space to operate.
Provision o f  non-routine and critical 
services
In addition to patrolling, and what they term proactive policing  
duties, the Police do stand ready to respond to events, and 
hence have detailed procedures for dealing with contingencies.
Table 5.1. A Comparative Evaluation of Structural Issues in the Police Service 
(Structural factors based upon Mintzberg, 1979, pp.314-347.)
The analysis in Table 5.1. above leads us to the view that Police institutions illustrate 
many of the characteristics of a control bureaucracy in line with Mintzberg's (1979) 
assessment. From this we can reflect upon further issues which are important in 
developing our contextual sensitivity to the domain. Firstly, technological systems in the 
Police Service have become much more sophisticated over recent years, but the 
corollary of this is that the Police have been employing more and more civilian staff to
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manage these systems. In particular, systems for financial management, and systems 
utilising information technology have seen an influx of professional, skilled civilian 
staff into areas up until recently dominated by Police personnel. Whilst the reasons for 
these changes are numerous, ranging from government pressure to civilianise, to a need 
to bring in appropriate computer related skills, such changes do raise a number of issues 
that we can address. In particular, shifts in: authority, responsibility, knowledge, and 
control, are areas that will be addressed in our subsequent analysis.
Secondly, the reduction of central control over certain key areas of Police institution 
noted above can also be linked to a general trend towards decentralisation of authority 
as Forces make greater use of the local command unit structure. This involves 
responsibility and authority for Police operations in a local command unit being 
devolved from headquarters to the local commander. Thus, there may well be changes in 
decision making processes within the Forces which we may have ramifications for ISS 
formation.
Finally, we note some of the influences that the Police have been subject to, for 
example: HIMC (Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary), the Audit Commission, the 
Scottish Office. However, the Police have not been alone in receiving the attention of 
such groups, with the Police Service being seen as one of the last public sector areas to 
feel the touch of public sector reform (Taylor & Williams, 1992; Loveday, 1993).
The Police, as with other public services from the 1980s onwards, have seen a shift in 
the desires of the Government, as they have been required to become more accountable 
to those who pay for public services - notionally the public at large, but more 
specifically the Government - this representing a new public service focus (Stewart and 
Clarke, 1987; Jones & Smith, 1993). The Police Service has been subject to numerous 
Government initiatives with a view to improving the three E's of economy, efficiency, 
and effectiveness (Taylor & Williams, 1992). This has been particularly evident 
through the government's rigorous pursual of the financial management initiative, and 
drive for value for money, issues which have been at the heart of new public 
management (Jones & Smith, 1993; Barberis, 1998). These initiatives have been driven 
by government through the Scottish Office, the Home Office, aided by the interventions 
of the Audit Commission and HMIC who periodically inspect practice in Police Forces.
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Such interventions are illustrated through the comments of the HMIC, who noted in a 
recent annual report that, "Within their own communities, Police Forces are monopoly 
providers of many of the services they deliver. This makes it vitally important that the 
Police demonstrate value for money (VFM) in the way that services are provided, and, 
over the last 2 decades, forces have shown a very positive commitment to this principle. 
During inspections I see many good VFM initiatives and it is therefore doubly 
frustrating that not enough effort is made to record them and the savings made and 
realise them to the same degree throughout every force."(FIMIC, 1998, Introductory 
Remarks). Such comments can be seen as illustrative of the intervention of groups such 
as the HIMIC and the Audit Commission in policing activity, and such influences have 
increased the similarity of many aspects of Police management (Horton, 1996).
Some researchers remain sceptical of the success of new initiatives, whatever their 
source, due to a less obvious facet of Police institutional structure, namely the cop 
culture, which exhibits an anti-intellectualism with which any new initiatives must 
contend (Horton, 1996). Furthermore, the militaristic style and culture of the Police is 
not perceived to be receptive to ideas such as flexibility, service to consumers, or other 
issues associated with new managerialist initiatives, with the bulk of policing remaining 
wedded to a task and action orientation (Horton, 1996). Thus, in addition to structural 
characteristics which are pertinent to our study, we must also remain sensitive to the 
social relations between groups as well as within institutional settings. The Police 
Service are governed by statute in what they do, and are subject to scrutiny from a 
number of government bodies who seek to ensure that all Forces operate in accordance 
with best practice and to similar national standards. It is therefore of particular interest 
that in our study several Forces are seeking to develop their own ISS which may appear 
to be at odds with the quest for national standards.
Within this research, we recognise the concept of bureaucracy as a valuable label, 
remaining sensitive to the issues which are raised within discussions of bureaucracy, but 
acknowledging that the social practice of organisation demands that we engage in a 
more rounded discussion of the area of investigation. Thus, discussions of bureaucracy 
and of new public management provide a valuable contextual backdrop, and do indeed 
highlight a range of areas which will inform our analysis of the case investigations, but
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they can only be a part of the picture. We now consider another area of contextual 
significance, that being information technology in the Police Service.
5.5. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE POLICE SERVICE.
The potential for the use of IT in a strategic sense has been recognised within the Police
Service (Home Office, 1983; Home Office 1993; Hough, 1980), as the former Chief
Constable of Derbyshire highlighted:
"The Police Service is undergoing a period of radical change... The key issues in 
the future will be value for money, operational effectiveness and quality. The 
strategic importance of IT developments to all three is without parallel" 
(Newing, 1993,p.267)
We can regard the Police Service as an information intensive organisation in that they 
are dependent upon effective information systems for the delivery of their service. 
Given that information is central to the undertaking of Police activities, it is somewhat 
surprising perhaps to find that the Police Service has only come to address widespread 
use of IT from the late 1980s onwards. Indeed, concern has been expressed that use of 
IT in the Police Service is fragmented and unlikely to enhance efficiency and 
effectiveness (HMIC, 1998, Appendix - comments of the Lay Inspector.) Nonetheless, 
we note that in Scotland, as in the rest of the UK, Police spend on IT is the second 
largest source of expenditure after manpower (HMIC, 1998). The Police Service 
average spend on IT is compared with other sectors in Figure 5.1. below:
IT Spend as % of turnover 
0 2 4 6
C o m p u te r  Serv ic es  
F in a n c e  
E d u c a t io n  
U t i l i t i e s  
L o c a l G o v t .
R e ta il 
P o l ic e  
P u b l ic  A d m in .
H o u s in g  M g t.
M a n u f ic tu r in g
Figure 5.1. Police IT spend average in comparison to other sectors (Kable, 
1995, p.25)
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In Figure 5.1. above we see that Police average spend on IT at 1.6% is comparable with 
areas of the public sector, if not unexpectedly someway below sectors such as finance 
and computer services. Gross expenditure in the Scottish Police Forces for the year 
ending 31 March 1998 was £709 million (ibid.). It has been estimated that UK forces 
have an average IT spend of 0.85% of gross expenditure (Kable, 1995), which suggests 
an annual IT spend in Scotland in the region of £6 million. This figure will vary as 
additional capital is made available periodically by the Scottish Office for spending on 
IT, as has happened in the past. Despite the spend on IT within Scottish Police Forces, 
there is concern about the current situation. The HMIC has noted that recent financial 
allocations for IT will not aid the enhanced development of effective IT in Scottish 
forces (HIMC, 1998), and this is part of a general dissatisfaction concerning the level of 
funding for IT in Police Forces in Scotland compared to those in England and Wales.
In Table 5.2. we analyse the development of IT usage in Police Forces from the 1960s 
through to the 1990s. Here we highlight the socio-politico context to IT development, 
highlighting also some of the governmental and managerial impetus for IT 
developments.
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Years Political/ Public Impetus for Com puter Impact
econom ic M anagem ent Computing Solutions
environm ent Innovation
1960s Full Bureaucratic and Financial Local Cost savings;
employment; administrative Accounting; authority Management
Social emphases; Payroll mainframe and improvements
class/party Expanding management. batch in central
alignment; Mass resource base. processing; services -
production & very limited personnel &
mass remote access. finance
consumption
1970s Rising Bureaucratic and Police Separate Improvements
unemployment; administrative independence; developments in human
Social emphases; N ew  efficiency o f  Police resource
class/party de­ Professionalising; demands. computing management.
alignment; Tensions with installations;
Economic Police authorities. N ew  wide area
decline; Trade networks
union supporting
challenges. command & 
control 
systems and 
other resource 
deployment 
systems.
1980s/ Peaks in Bureaucratic and Demands for Office Development
1990s unemployment.; administrative improved automation o f  information
Industrial emphases; New efficiency and systems; and
change; New organisational effectiveness in management organisational
patterns o f groupings policy; value for information; strategies;
social unrest; emerging; money wider range o f Releasing
De-unionisation; Concern with initiative; applications human
Flexible 'customer single-line e.g. resources from
production & accountability'; budgets. HOLMES; administrative
consumption New public Some forces tasks.
patterns management. reintegrate
emerging; their
enterprise computing
culture; with local
information authorities to
economy and effect cost
information savings.
society.
Table 5.2. IT development in Police relative to socio-political context: (based upon 
Taylor & Williams, 1992, p. 49.)
The main issues that arise from Table 5.2. are that as the Police are increasingly being 
asked to make much greater use of IT, so they are also being asked to justify the use in 
terms of increased efficiency, effectiveness and economy. There are two further issues 
to be addressed here. One is that at the same time however they have found themselves 
having to take full responsibility for both the running and development of IT with the 
withdrawal of local authorities from such provision. The other is that this increased
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focus and increased responsibility has come at a time when budgetary responsibility has 
been shifted from local Police Authorities to Chief Constables. All of these issues make 
the place of ISS all the more important. The historical overview of IT issues in Figure
5.3. help situate our understanding of the context surrounding IT in the Police Service 
and from which we can now move on to an analysis of the case studies.
5.6. SUMMARY
In this chapter we have discussed some of the social, political, and technical issues that 
form part of the context to ISS formation in the case studies. We have sought to 
highlight some of the key issues which will inform our subsequent analysis, in 
particular: the way in which the Police Service is embodied and enacted through a 
legislative and regulatory framework, and within which researchers have observed 
increasing similarity between Police Forces. It is against this backdrop, that people 
within individual Police Forces are engaged in ISS formation, that is, thinking about 
strategy for their own Force. The perceived bureaucratic structure of Police Forces can 
be set against the concept of mock bureaucracy at work. Finally, we noted that the 
Police Service can be thought of as information intensive, and yet against that the 
relatively recent desire to make more widespread use of IT. It is against this backdrop of 
regulation, perceived bureaucratic structure, and relative immaturity in the widespread 
use of IT, that we investigate the concept of ISS formation, and in the next chapter we 
discuss the case studies of five Police Forces.
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CHAPTER SIX - ISS FORMATION: CASE STUDY A
6.1. CASE A POLICE FORCE
Before discussing case study A, it should be noted that Chapters Six to Eleven inclusive 
discuss specific case study findings of ISS formation in five Police Forces, and of 
practice surrounding the formation of a National ISS for the Scottish Police Service, 
which forms a sixth case study. In addition to our discussion of each case, we will 
abstract issues from each case study. At the end of each chapter we will highlight some 
key themes drawn from across the case studies. An analysis of these themes from our 
cross-case analysis and generic findings from the research will be examined in Chapter 
Twelve.
It is worth noting that in all of our case studies, the hierarchical role structure of the 
Police is as follows:
• Chief Constable
• Deputy Chief Constable (abolished in 1994 as a distinct rank, after which the 
Chief Constable appoints an assistant Chief Constable who may act as a deputy 
[Sheehy, 1994])
• Assistant Chief Constable
• Chief Superintendent
• Superintendent
• Chief Inspector
• Inspector
• Sergeant
• Constable
When we refer to these ranks throughout the case study Chapters, we will be implicitly 
reflecting their position in this hierarchical structure.
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Each of the case studies are structured as follows: Firstly, we discuss the background to 
the Police Force, and secondly we discuss ISS formation in the case study. Following 
this we will present our analysis of the case study which we have undertaken with 
reference to the theoretical issues discussed in Chapters Two and Three. Finally we will 
summarise the case study by abstracting key themes for discussion in Chapter Twelve. 
The identity of each Force has been made anonymous as far as is possible, this having 
been agreed with the individual Forces as a condition of access for fieldwork. We have 
also preserved the anonymity of individual contributors throughout as agreed with the 
participants in the research.
The fieldwork for this case study was initially focused upon the setting up and operation 
of an IS/IT Strategy Board, which was formed in 1993, and which was disbanded in 
1998. During the fieldwork we incorporated discussion of historic events associated 
with IS in the Force as it became apparent that these were important to our 
understanding of ISS formation. The Board was responsible for developing and 
overseeing IS/IT strategy in the Force, and provided a meaningful focus for our period 
of engagement, this being a prerequisite for validity in Case study research (Pettigrew, 
1985a; Yin, 1989). In the course of our research 16 different members of staff were 
interviewed, many on several occasions. This was in addition to informal discussions 
with these and other people during the period of fieldwork.
6.2. BACKGROUND TO THE CASE STUDY
Case A Police Force is one of the smaller forces in the U.K., responsible for policing an 
area of 1016 square miles in Scotland. The population of the area covered by the force 
is relatively sparse, totalling approximately 275,000, which with around 1,000 people 
per hectare making it some way below the average for Britain of 2,500 per hectare.
The Chief Constable, is responsible to both the Secretary of State for Scotland and to a 
local Joint Police Board for the running of the Force. It is the Joint Police Board and the 
Secretary of State who oversee the provision of budget which was £31 million in 1997. 
The annual budget for IT amounts to approximately 0.6% of the overall Force budget 
(Kable, 1995), although in 1997/98 a projected budget of £175,000 was reduced to zero 
because of financial pressures within the Force. The allocated IT budget has been
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supplemented on several occasions with extra money which has been made available by 
either the Joint Police Board or the Scottish Office for IT.
Policy for the Force is published each year by the Chief Constable in the form of an 
annual report, which details key aspects of policing over the preceding twelve months, 
and also sets out a public statement of purpose for the forthcoming year. This statement 
of purpose comprises a mission statement and six objectives, which remained 
unchanged from 1991 to 1998. The mission statement and objectives for Case A Police 
Force can be seen in Appendix 2. These remained in place throughout the period of the 
research.
6.3. INFORMATION SYSTEM STRATEGY FORMATION
It was in 1974 that the Force were said to have first begun to utilise computer 
technology when a link to the Police National Computer (PNC) was established. Also in 
the mid 1970s, an experiment took place with a vehicle availability computer system, 
which cost the force in the region of £30,000 and was generally regarded to have been a 
disaster. According to several senior officers, there had not been any attempt to consider 
strategy for IT at that time; the perception of Officers spoken with who had knowledge 
of the events suggested that a decision was taken to buy a computer system because 
many other Police Forces were experimenting with IT and the Chief Constable at the 
time did not wish his Force to be seen to be lagging behind. However, even during the 
1990s, the symbolism of this failed system still resonated strongly among senior 
Officers. It was not so much that the system had failed to live up to expectations that 
was the problem being expressed here, but rather the perception that being associated 
with the development of IT could have a negative impact upon an Officer’s career.
Some of the lessons of this early failure with IT were said to have been learned when in 
1978 a link was established between the Force and the local authority mainframe 
system, also in Stirling, to handle crime offence recording. This was said to be the first 
implicit consideration of ISS, although this terminology was not recognised as being 
used at that time. The approach to IT development during the 1980s was described as 
ad-hoc, and piecemeal, and while it was said that there was no explicit discussion of
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strategy at this time, equally, there was not seen to be a policy in place to guide the 
development of IS in the Force.
6.3.1. A NEW CHIEF CONSTABLE & ABC
In 1990 a new Chief Constable was appointed, and it was with the arrival of this person
that an increased emphasis was given to the potential usage of IT in the Force. The new
Chief Constable was perceived as someone who had a strong interest in IT, and this was
commented upon by all those interviewed. Senior Officers in the Force were aware that
the new Chief Constable had been responsible for introducing IT into the previous Force
with which he had worked, and presumed that the same would happen in this Force. The
arrival of the Chief Constable had an immediate impact in relation to IT, as one of the
senior officers noted:
"... and I have to say that many of us were quite shocked by some of his radical 
views on matters particularly in association with technology, and the fact that he 
conversed as someone with knowledge, which we'd never been used to, because 
we'd only been used to talking to people outside.".
The new Chief Constable had previously worked in another Scottish Police Force, 
where as a Superintendent he had been given responsibility for a project to implement a 
new control room for the Force. It was from this project that his own interest in 
computer based IS had developed, and indeed in the application of technology more 
broadly in policing. During this time, he was said to have established a relationship with 
a software firm, having run a pilot scheme with their software in his previous Force. 
This company had developed a database system which built around a free text search 
engine, and it was the ability to link and search free text that was thought by both the 
company and the Chief Constable to be particularly appropriate to a Police application.
At the time of the new Chief Constable’s arrival, the IT situation was described by 
several people as being totally uncoordinated in terms of development, purchasing, 
maintenance, and funding. Shortly after his arrival in the Force in 1990, as there was no 
policy in place for IS/IT the Chief Constable ordered a review of IS in the Force, with a 
view to developing an ISS for the Force. This review was undertaken by one the Police 
Officers responsible for IT, and when delivered one month later made a series of points, 
which were:
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• That the existing IT infrastructure had developed in a random fashion, and while
they had standardised on IBM PC’s, no standard existed for software, with many
custom built applications having been developed using a range software products.
• There were no data standards in the Force, with variance in the form in which data 
was held, and also considerable duplication of data.
• The various systems were not linked. Consequently there was no ability to share or
search data across applications (irrespective of the lack of data standards).
• Most people in the Force were unaware of either IT applications that existed or data 
that was held outside their own functional specialism (for example, in CID, Traffic 
Department, Scenes of Crime, etc.).
• There was no policy for either IT or IS.
• The conclusion was that the Force should start again with IT.
The review was submitted to the Chief Constable, who agreed with the observations, 
and with the conclusion. In February 1991 the Chief Constable asked the Officer who 
had undertaken the review to develop a strategy for a new IT infrastructure for the 
Force. The strategy was drawn up by this Officer during the next month in an approach 
that was described as "high level strategy, very conceptual". This was regarded by senior 
Officers as an ISS for the Force, and as being the first time this had been considered 
within the Force. The document was submitted to the Chief Constable in the form of a 
two page briefing report, and the main issues raised were as follows:
• The rationale for a new system was to make all data collected by the Force available 
to and searchable by operational Officers on a 24 hour basis.
• To develop a corporate database model based upon core applications that will enable
the capturing and searching of data associated with every event and person dealt 
with in the Force.
• To put in place a Force-wide IT network using established, robust technology.
• To establish Force-wide data standards.
• To train all staff in the use of the new system..
The Chief Constable agreed with this synopsis, and authorised the IT Officer to draw up 
a more detailed proposal, working in conjunction with both the Chief Constable and one 
other senior Officer, who was responsible for non-operational aspects of the Force, 
which included IT. During the next two months, discussion of the new system was
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confined to these three people, although two presentations to other senior and middle 
managers took place to communicate aspects of the proposed system. The meetings held 
in developing the new system were not minuted, and took the form of informal 
discussion between the three people, normally on a weekly basis. These were not 
described as strategy meetings, although retrospectively those involved considered 
themselves to have been involved in developing ISS during these meetings. In addition, 
the IT Officer met with the Chief Constable at irregular intervals to discuss aspects of 
the system as and when issues arose which required discussion. This represented a level 
of access to the Chief Constable beyond that apparent for other Officers. This can be 
better appreciated when we consider this in relation to the particular organisational role 
structure in place at this time, seen in Figure 6.1. below:
Chief Constable
Deputy Chief Constable
Inspector - IT Officer
Superintendent 
Technical Services
Chief Superintendent 
Management Services
Figure 6.1. Formal IS/IT Reporting Structure -1991
As a result of these discussions, it was proposed by the Chief Constable and the IT 
Officer that a relationship be established with the company with whom the Chief 
Constable had liaised when at his previous Force. The purpose of working with staff 
from the software company was to investigate the feasibility of using their free-text 
search engine technology as the basis for a corporate database system. As a part of this 
process, a group of senior Police Officers were taken to offices of the software company 
in East Kilbride, Scotland where their technology was demonstrated.
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Following discussions between the Chief Constable, the IT Officer and staff from the 
software company, in May 1991 a 4-man project team was established by the Chief 
Constable to work with the supplier company in developing a specification of a new 
system, a team which included the IT Officer. The IT Officer, in conjunction with a 
Chief Superintendent and the Chief Constable then worked for the next four months 
drawing up an outline proposal for a corporate database system. This group met 
regularly, often each week, with the meetings being informal and undocumented. In 
August 1991 a business case for the proposed system was completed, for the dual 
purpose of presenting this to senior Officers and to the local authority Police 
Committee. In addition an operational requirement was developed, in partnership with 
the software company, for a corporate database system networked throughout the Force. 
Together, the business case and the operational requirement constituted what was 
regarded as the ISS. However, the requirement was not documented within the Force, 
but rather it was left to the supplier to maintain records of the requirements.
In December 1991 an invitation to tender based upon the operational requirement
developed was published in the Official Journal of the European Union, and a contract
was awarded to the software company to supply hardware, software and a network for
the Force in May 1992. There was never any doubt amongst those involved about who
was to be the supplier of the system, given the relationship that the Chief Constable had
previously established with one particular company. The Chief Constable described the
process to adopt the chosen technology as follows:
"Well I came in with a view that we needed a database that everybody had access 
to 24 hours a day, and I was aware of the technology through my previous force 
where I'd been deputy, and I'd run a pilot scheme with [the supplier], .. and I was 
aware of it's capabilities. However, I didn't come in and say we've decided to go 
to [the supplier], I took the senior management people to East Kilbride and let 
them see it and they came back saying 'we've got to have that, we've got to have 
that'. So, we just developed on from there, and we did a competitive 
requirement, and we got a contract laid with [the supplier]."
The decision to install a new system Force-wide required additional funding to be 
obtained, as there was no provision made in the budget for such a development. The 
Chief Constable made a request to the Police Committee at one of the regular monthly 
meetings for funding from the local authority to cover the cost of the system. After a 
few weeks of deliberation, this request was granted, with the proviso that the new 
system had to be in place before the end of the financial year on 1 April 1993. This put
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in place a deadline for implementation of the system. As a result of the deadline, it was 
decided by the Chief Constable, the IT Officer in conjunction with the supplier, to 
implement the system across all of the main divisional and sub-divisional stations in the 
Force in one go.
The system went live across all the major stations in the Force at 11pm on 31st March 
1993. Other stations were added to the system over the next six months, so that by the 
end of 1993 all operational Police Officers in the Force had access to a system terminal. 
The new system was named ABC (N.B.: not the actual acronym for the system; changed 
for anonymity purposes), with a free-text searching software engine acting as a front end 
to the existing databases. The system was installed, and by mid-1993, the system 
consisted of an X25 network, a central Sun Sparcserver 670, and 4 Sparc stations. This 
supported 350 terminals, most of them dumb-terminals, across the force. By the next 
year, there were 450 terminals across the Force area, from any one of which a user could 
access the ABC system.
Initially, the ABC system encompassed 18 distinct applications, although this had risen 
to almost 40 applications by the end of 1995. The range of applications were said to 
have been derived by the project team from existing policing processes, including: the 
recording of crime, the production of crime reports (and later, the electronic 
transmission of reports to the Procurator Fiscal's office), traffic accident recording, 
information passed to the Police regarding crime or other activities, recording of 
custodies, recording of lost property, with criminal intelligence being added in August 
1993, and other applications following this.
The initial ABC system cost approximately £900,000, of which about £550,000 was for 
hardware including networking. While the bulk of this was funded by the local 
authority, in 1994 the Scottish Office made a further £500,000 available at the end of 
the financial year to assist the Force in their IT developments, which enabled the Force 
to move from text based terminals to PC's across the Force through which to run ABC. 
Between 1995 and 1997, the existing system was developed and maintained from within 
the Force IT budget, although in 1998 this budget was withheld to allow for spending on 
other commitments in the Force.
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According to several of those Officers involved in the development of the ABC system, 
the intention behind the system was to ensure, "that everyone could have access to, that 
was running 24 hours a day”, where, “everything we did would be in the corporate 
database". It was not possible to verify this with documentation, as it was claimed that
none existed; either that discussed such intentions or which set out intended strategy for\
the system. Nonetheless, the ability to capture data about all incidents that the Police
dealt with and to make that data available in a readily searchable fo at to Police 
Officers provided a facility unmatched by other Police Forces in the UK at the time.
several articles in newspapers and IT trade press (e.g. Gooding, 1993; FT 26/8/93; 
Computing 9/12/93), as well as receiving visits from many other Forces in the UK who 
wished to see the new system.
Up until the ABC system was introduced, the thinking about ISS was said to have been 
focussed upon the development and implementation of the system, with no ISS 
documentation having been produced within the Force beyond the business case and the 
operational requirement. In developing the corporate plan for the Force as a whole, all 
members of senior management, that is, those holding the ranks of superintendent and 
above, were consulted. This involved each member of senior management preparing a 
plan for their department, together with objectives, and submitting that to the centre. 
The corporate plan for the Force was drawn up following discussion of those plans with 
the senior managers. The involvement of senior management in the Force in relation to 
ISS was limited to having proposals presented to them at a meeting early in 1991. This 
approach was justified by one of the Officers developing the proposal for ABC as 
follows:
“The general thought process in this Force when we started was th a t... well, the 
general opening statement to the business case to senior management was that 
we’re going to present this thing to you, we’ll outline the concepts and the 
general business case of how we see it working out. We will take on board your 
observations, but unless those observations are reflected in the vast majority of 
the workforce, your observations will be discarded, because in five years time 
none of you, or very few of you will be here working with the system, .... it will 
be middle management, junior management that will be occupying your position 
in five years time, and what we don’t want to happen is that in five years time 
somebody says, ‘who the fuck put this in?’., ‘oh well it was so and so’... ‘where 
is he?’., ‘oh he’s retired’.... No!”
This ensured that the Force, and the Chief Constable in particular were the subject of
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Several of the senior Officers in the Force said that they perceived the proposal 
presented to them as a fait accompli. Equally they said that as it was seen as being 
driven by the Chief Constable, who was not only ‘knowledgeable about IT’ but who 
also was in command of the Force, then it would happen almost irrespective of their 
views. At the same time, this was not viewed negatively by those senior officers, who 
were quite aware of the role of the Chief Constable in deciding upon the new system:
“It’s his influence, no question about it, I mean he’s right into technology and
he’s been the driving force ... but that’s easy because if you are the Chief you can
do that. I mean it’s not difficult, there’s not a lot of consultation involved in it.
It’s one of the good things we have over industry.”
6.3.2. THE IS/IT BOARD
Following the implementation of the ABC system, in May 1993 a visit was made by the 
HMIC who was said to have commented that he was concerned at the lack of apparent 
use of any project management methods in the development of ABC. Following this, a 
meeting was said to have been held between the Chief Constable, the IT Officer and a 
Chief Superintendent to decide how to respond to the criticism of the HMIC. They 
decided to form a project board along the lines of the PRINCE method, which they had 
been advised to use by the HMIC. Three weeks after this meeting, in July 1993 an IS/IT 
Board was set up in line with the notion of a Project Board from the PRINCE project 
management method (CCTA, 1994), ostensibly to oversee the ABC project. However, 
there was also a desire amongst many senior Officers that IT developments in the Force 
needed to be monitored more closely by people separate from the ABC project. This 
resulted from two principal concerns that a number of senior officers shared: firstly, that 
there had been too little consultation by the relatively small project team with other staff 
in the development and implementation of ABC; and secondly, that the advent of ABC 
had brought about a period of change which had been unforeseen by most people, 
leaving many Officers of the view that they had tried to do too much too quickly. Whilst 
the project team regarded the ABC system as an unqualified success, most other 
Officers regarded the system as containing many flaws when implemented, which they 
spent the next two years trying to have addressed through the IS/IT Board.
The IS/IT Board comprised a small group of Police officers who were chosen by the 
Chief Constable, and was chaired by a Chief Superintendent from the senior
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management team. The membership of the IS/IT Board was kept separate from the 
membership of the ABC project team as the Chief Constable wanted the IS/IT Board to 
be seen as being independent from the development of ABC. The mandate of the IS/IT 
Board was, "To assume responsibility for monitoring and authorising all computer 
related developments in the Force for the approval of the Chief Constable" (IS/IT Board 
Minutes, July, 1993). The relative position of the reporting structure in terms of IS/IT in 
the Force can be seen in Figure 6.2. below:
Responsible to
Chief Constable
Deputy Chief Constable
Chief Superintendent 
Management Services
Chief Inspector 
Technical Services
Inspector 
IT Manager
ABC Development 
Team
IS/IT Board: 
Chaired by Detective 
Chief Superintendent
Figure 6.2. Position o f  IS/IT Board relative to IS/IT Reporting Structure - 1993/1998
All requests, suggestions, and intended developments of IT in the Force were now to go 
to the IS/IT Board, which met at three monthly intervals. In addition, at the first meeting 
of the IS/IT Board in July 1993 it was agreed that one of the responsibilities of the IS/IT 
Board would be ISS. This was not necessarily to be the drafting of an ISS, but rather to 
have responsibility for ISS in the Force. According to those present, this responsibility 
for ISS was regarded as incorporating evaluation, prioritisation and authorisation of 
developments to the ABC system. This included acting as a conduit for requests,
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overseeing acquisition, development, and delivery, and being responsible for the 
maintenance of standards. Furthermore, part of the role of the Board was to assess new 
ideas as they became apparent, and to consider the appropriateness of such 
developments for the Force, taking into account operational need and budgetary 
implication. The group were referred to in the Force as the 'is if board, and views of 
their effectiveness varied. On the one hand there were those who felt that the Board 
lacked independence as they were being fed by those with more hands-on responsibility 
for IS, namely the ABC project team and the Chief Constable. On the other hand, other 
views were expressed saying that the Board were very much responsible for developing 
ISS in the Force through a process of consultation across all Departments.
The IS/IT Board were viewed by all those spoken with as a central component in the 
development of ISS in the Force, although none had ever seen an ISS document 
published within the Force. Nonetheless, several senior Officers surmised that the 
existence of the IS/IT Board was in itself sufficient as it symbolised a commitment to IS 
to all staff in the Force. A number of senior operational Officers said that they regarded 
the IS/IT Board as merely a rubber-stamp for what the Chief Constable wanted to 
happen. The IS/IT Board continued to meet throughout 1994 and 1995, during which 
time they considered many suggestions for amendments and developments to ABC. 
Indeed, issues associated with the ABC system formed the entirety of the agenda for the 
IS/IT Board during 1994/1995. This according to those attending the meetings was 
developing and managing ISS.
During 1994, the notion of ISS was recognised by most people spoken with as 
something that the Force now had, which compared markedly with the situation before 
the new Chief Constable arrived when there was no apparent interest in IT, let alone an 
attempt to consider strategy. However, most people were unable to say what the notion 
of ISS comprised beyond being the monitoring and development of the ABC system. It 
became apparent that when people discussed ISS, what they were talking about was the 
ABC system, it's development, implementation, and operation. This view prevailed 
throughout the course of the research. Similarly, those few people who were particularly 
involved with IS discussed ISS in terms of prioritisation of applications for, and 
development of, ABC. The lack of a written ISS within the processes encompassed by 
the IS/IT Board was regarded as beneficial because of the flexibility that this allowed,
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"I mean the strategy itself, we know has to be not so much part of an iterative 
strategy but a completely flexible strategy. Part of the problem of strategies is it 
takes so long to get the bloody things in place that to try and adhere to it two 
years down the line you're cutting your arm off because you say 'I cannae use 
that 'cause it's not in the strategy and we've agreed that the strategy cannot be 
altered'. Not quite."
The common view of those spoken with was that the concept of strategy only came to be 
considered by Police Forces in the early 1990s following the publication of a series of 
Home Office circulars (e.g. Home Office, 1983, 1993) and Audit Commission papers 
(e.g. Audit Commission, 1990, 1993), together with the increased attention being given 
to issues of strategy during inspection visits by the HMIC. In particular, there was 
increasing referral during visits by the HMIC to strategy for IS as representing best 
practice, and this concept came to appear with regularity in HMIC reports (HMIC, 1992, 
1996, 1997, 1997a, 1998, 1999). The combination of these factors was referred to by 
many senior staff as a key factor in stimulating awareness of and debate about the 
concept termed strategy, not least in the area of IS given the growing recognition of the 
importance of IS, and the cost.
In 1995 several senior Officers were unhappy about the lack of a documented ISS, 
however they felt unable to do anything about it. They were particularly concerned by 
the prospect of the Chief Constable leaving to take up another post, which in their view 
would mean that the strategy would be in jeopardy should the next Chief Constable not 
approve of it. While they were pleased to have a system in place that worked, they were 
of the view that the IS/IT Board should be more proactive in developing a documented 
strategy, although they saw little sign of that happening. By this they meant that there 
was nothing written down that expressed what it was that was supposed to be being 
achieved with IS, where IS was going, or what the timetable was. Those closely 
involved in the IS developments in the force, that is on the ABC project team and on the 
IS/IT Board acknowledged that the pace of IS developments had meant that they had not 
produced an ISS plan as such, but that they preferred to maintain a verbal agreement, 
and consequently a shared understanding (as they saw it) of ISS. In August 1995 the 
ABC team became known as the IT department, and the IT Officer was officially 
designated as the computer manager.
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During 1996, the IS/IT Board continued to meet bi-monthly, although some meetings 
were postponed due to operational commitments of those involved. The meetings that 
took place were focussed upon suggested developments to the ABC system, and 
discussion of the impact of other developments, in particular the Scottish Police ISS 
(SPISS), and the Integrated Scottish Criminal Justice Information System (ISCJIS). The 
former referred to the development of a National ISS for the Police Forces in Scotland, 
while the letter referred to a Scottish Office project to encourage IS compatibility and 
communication between all elements of the criminal justice system. Development of 
both of these systems was ongoing at this time. However, as the ABC system was 
established in the Force, it was decided to wait and see what emerged at the end of the 
respective processes rather than to start attempting to alter ABC to fit in with whatever 
may be thought to be likely to emerge.
The IS/IT Board operated in the knowledge that the IT budget for the Force had been 
reduced from an expected £110,000 to £60,000. The change to a new budgeting 
procedure in all Scottish Police Forces, in 1995 meant that Chief Constables received 
their budget at the start of the year which had to cover all eventualities. In 1997, the 
intended IT budget of £150,000 was first reduced by 50%, and then cut to zero by the 
Chief Constable in consultation with the Finance Manager, as a result of financial 
pressures elsewhere in the Force, in particular the need to purchase new vehicles.
The result of these financial adjustments meant that in 1997, the IS/IT Board met less 
frequently, once a quarter, but had become largely redundant in the eyes of those 
participating, as they knew that there was no money to develop IT. ISS in the Force 
remained undocumented. In March 1997 Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary 
(HMIC) undertook an inspection of the Force. In the report which followed this 
inspection, the HMIC was highly critical of several facets of the IS operation, namely: 
the lack of a documented ISS, the failure to have a clear framework for project 
management, and the remaining presence of a Police Officer as computer manager 
(HMIC, 1997). In addition, the HMIC was surprised that there was no business plan for 
the Force. These criticisms were received by the members of the IS/IT Board and the 
ABC team with some scepticism. As far as the IS/IT Board and the ABC team were 
concerned, there was an ISS, it just was not written down. Equally, they were of the 
view that given the success that they felt they had had with the ABC system, their
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project management although not following any method must have been fairly good. 
Similarly, the criticism of the non-civilianisation of the IT manager's position was 
regarded as pointless given what they regarded as their successful implementation of the 
ABC system.
However, the IS/IT Board and the Chief Constable decided that they must be seen to be 
addressing the criticisms made by the HMIC. In 1997 October the Chief Constable 
authorised two senior officers to draw up a business plan for the Force, and the IS/IT 
Board and the IT department was asked to submit its intentions into this process. 
However, the view of this within the IT Department was that the IS could not be 
submitted until it was known what the other parts of the business intended to do. In 
April 1998, the IS/IT Board, in consultation with the IT department and the Chief 
Constable decided that no development should be undertaken of the ABC system, other 
than that required for maintenance. The reason for this was that with the ongoing 
development of SPISS, it was decided that those responsible for IT should wait to see 
what emerged from SPISS with a view to aligning future systems with it as and when 
they felt it was appropriate to do so. By July 1998 the ISS had not been documented, 
and it was at this point that the IS/IT Board was disbanded following the retirement of 
the Chief Superintendent who chaired the Board.
6.4. DISCUSSION
In seeking to understand ISS formation at Case A Police Force from the evidence that 
we have obtained in undertaking the case study we argue that we are dealing with ISS 
formation processes which are embedded in a broad stream of organisational practice 
(Mintzberg, 1978; Johnson, 1997). Whilst we have seen explicit discussion of ISS, it is 
also apparent that in addressing why, what, and how of ISS (Earl, 1989) there are a 
range of other issues which lie outside formal processes such as those of the IS/IT 
Board. We must therefore also turn our attention to these associated issues if we are to 
grasp the intricate socio-political nature of ISS formation (Waema & Walsham, 1990). 
In order to draw out themes which we have found to be important for our understanding, 
we undertake our analysis of the case in terms of our investigative framework discussed 
in Chapters Two and Three, using web model analysis (Kling, 1987) to structure the 
section.
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6.4.1. INFRASTRUCTURAL AND HISTORIC ISSUES
In this section of the analysis we focus upon technological issues; structural issues; and 
historic commitments which are embedded throughout the case. However, we are not 
just concerned with what technology is present, or what the goals are for such 
technology usage, but rather we are concerned with issues such as who the key actors 
are, what kind of things they do, what influences their actions, and what issues, 
organisational or otherwise, constrain their activities relative to ISS formation (Kling, 
1987). We can characterise the systems prior to 1990 as being: unconnected, from 
multiple vendors, lacking in standards, process specific, small in scale and scope (e.g. 
PC-based database; departmental), and relatively unsophisticated in terms of nature and 
potential for development. The lack of an integrated system together with a perceived 
under-investment in IT within the Force led several people to see these as the factors 
which were the most significant in triggering the decision by the new Chief Constable to 
review IS in the Force. This in itself is evidence of the impact that the arrival of a senior 
figure can have upon ISS, a feature which has been noted elsewhere (Walsham, 1993; 
Sillince & Mouakket, 1997).
Although frustration was voiced that those who introduced ABC had not been aware of 
the scale of organisational change, it was generally perceived that the investment in IT 
would ultimately be to the benefit of policing. Furthermore, Officers took pride from 
their perception that the Force was viewed as a leader in IS within the Police Service in 
Scotland, if not in Britain, which illustrates the symbolic nature of the system, and the 
way in which people socially construct meaning.
The symbolism attached to what was described as a disaster in purchasing a system in 
the 1970s, can be seen as a situation where IT can be seen as a subjective phenomena, 
and which also illustrates the symbolic role that IT can have in organisational situations 
(Scarborough & Corbett, 1992), whereby people socially construct meanings based upon 
their perception of events (Berger & Luckman, 1967). Such symbolism suggests that the 
impact of IT in social settings, essentially the arrival of technical artefacts, can have 
profound effects upon the meanings that people subsequently construct. This association 
of meanings with IT, or in this case the application of IT in an IS, brings to our attention 
the view that IT artefacts become active social actants (Latour, 1995) from which people
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derive meanings, meanings which in this case 'outlived' the IT. By this we mean that the
IT becomes a part of the collective social setting, and is perceived to have a history and
social consequence which becomes part and parcel of the objectified social meanings
(Berger & Luckman, 1967) of the organisational setting. This is illustrated by the views
of many of the staff who commented on the system, for example:
“it was an absolute disaster and did not work, so people got their fingers burned 
... and the then Inspector was getting most of the blame. Whether it was the 
system that was intrinsically wrong, whether he should have spotted it, whether 
it was a lack of ability of foresight I’ve no idea .... I’m just glad it wasn’t me”.
The meanings that some Police Officers socially constructed from this application of IT 
encapsulated issues surrounding negative career impact, project risk at individual and 
organisational levels, poor planning, and a lack of Police expertise in relation to IT. 
Certainly in this instance, we see IT being regarded as more than just technological 
artefacts (Latour, 1995). The development of such views form a part of the mental 
construct (Jayaratna, 1994) of those individuals, and which then becomes a part of how 
they see the world, whether at a conscious level or not (Morgan, 1986).
A further point is raised by the schema developed by Ackroyd et al. (1992) for 
classifying computer based IS in the Police service. They developed three categories, to 
which we have added a fourth as a result of the evidence of this case study, and which is 
shown below in Table 6.1.
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Classification Features Example
1. Basic record and support 
services
Technical systems which 
support basic, back-office, 
processes.
Payroll, accounts, document 
processing;
2. Work facilitation 
systems
To support specific and 
specialised aspects o f  
operation - bound to a specific 
and tightly specified task
PNC (stolen vehicles checks 
etc), SCRO (wanted, missing 
persons etc)
3. IS to manage and direct 
police activity
Hybrid systems combining 
administration and operational 
functions; often present an 
over-simplified model o f  
policing
Command & Control; crime 
reporting, resource 
Allocation
4. IS to support analysis 
and investigation
Systems which either operate 
independently or which utilise 
data across systems; support 
unspecified and unstructured 
analysis, not bound to a 
specific task
Criminal intelligence (in this 
case based upon free text 
searching); GIS (linked to 
crime recording, & to 
corporate database)
Table 6.1. Revised Classification of IS in Policing (Developed from Ackroyd et al., 
1992, p .147-8)
Table 6.1. demonstrates the perception that IT is increasingly being utilised to support 
analysis and investigation, which represents a new development from the work of 
Ackroyd et al. (1992). The ABC system was viewed as being an example of this new 
usage of IT.
While money was made available within the Force for the ABC system, with further 
unplanned funding becoming available, as when £500,000 became available at short 
notice from the Scottish Office in March 1994, the changes in budgeting arrangements 
in April 1995 led to budget cuts which had an impact upon the context within which ISS 
formation occurred. The control of finance, and withholding of budget can be 
understood as an exercise of power (Markus & Bjom-Anderson, 1987) in terms of the 
management of resources by the Chief Constable who held the budget, although people 
perceived it to be the act of the civilian Finance Officer, which caused resentment 
amongst the IT staff.
At all times through the period of study, the IT area was managed by Police Officers. At 
the same time, the position was regarded by the HMIC as being occupied by a Police
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Officer, and hence one to be civilianised irrespective of the experience of the incumbent 
(HMIC, 1997). This was reportedly a point of contention between the Chief Constable 
and the HMIC, and could be seen as a point of interaction in the mutual exercise of 
power through the management of resources.
Finally, we can note that despite having a mission statement and some objectives 
throughout the period of research, there was no documented business strategy for the 
Force during the same period. The failure to explicitly consider ISS in relation to 
business strategy was criticised by HMIC (HMIC, 1999). Not only was there said by 
those in the Force to be no documented business plan for those thinking about ISS to 
address, they also said that in their view there was no evidence of an awareness of a 
need to think through the rationale behind the application of IT; that is, consideration 
was given to what was wanted without much attention to why beyond a desire to help 
operational policing. A link between ISS and business strategy is seen as being 
important (Brady et al, 1992; Earl, 1993; Atkins, 1994; Galliers et al, 1994). However, 
we must reflect upon the relative immaturity of ISS practice in this case study, for 
example, according to most of those spoken with, the terms strategy and ISS were not 
widely used in the Force prior to the 1990s. Managers within the Police Service have 
been under increasing pressure to turn their attentions to matters of efficiency, 
effectiveness, and economy (Taylor & Williams, 1992), of which the language of 
strategy is seen as an integral part (Lynch, 1998). This brings to our attention the 
relations with agents such as the Home Office whose actions are discussed in Section 
6.4.2.4., which forms part of our discussion of social relations.
6.4.2. SOCIAL RELATIONS
In considering the impact of social relations upon the practice of ISS formation, we 
identify a shifting power configuration relative to ISS formation from Autocracy to 
Instrument (Mintzberg, 1983). We set out the facets of Instrument in Table 6.2. below.
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Characteristics: Perceived as shift: 
Autocracy to Instrument:
Evidence:
External Coalition 
(EC)
Dominating (having been 
passive)
A group of influencers operating 
through governmental remit, if not 
explicitly in concert; Increase in 
activity of HMIC, audit 
commission, SPISS; funding linked 
to initiatives (e.g. best value from 
ISS); external coalition seems to 
have become dominating after 
being passive in relation to ISS.
Internal Coalition 
(IC)
Bureaucratic, but having had 
personalised element.
Discipline based hierarchy; 
ultimate authority of Chief 
Constable. IS/IT Board set up to 
satisfy perceived bureaucratic 
expectation of external influencers.
Apparent Power 
Relationship
EC ==> IC (IC increasingly 
controlled)
IC initially dominated ISS (subject 
to funding approval), but 
eventually impact of SPISS, HMIC 
led to ISS reflecting EC.
Implications Replacement of one dominant 
influencer by another
ISS for ABC initially controlled 
from IC led by Chief Constable, 
but eventual lack of finance led to 
suspension of ISS, & over time 
perceived impact of HIMC, SPISS, 
CCJIS, led to halting ISS efforts.
Table 6.2. Power Configuration Analysis (based upon Mintzberg, 1983)
One of the primary findings of the analysis in Table 6.2. is the apparent shift over time 
which we noted in the power configuration from Autocracy to Instrument (Mintzberg's, 
1983). The internal coalition, led and personalised by the Chief Constable, was initially 
dominant, and as they led the development of ABC the external coalition could be 
described as passive. Nonetheless, funding for ABC was gained at the behest of the 
external coalition. However, after the initial system was successfully installed, ISS 
formation was perceived to have stopped in the light of limits in funding. Furthermore, 
perceptions of the role of the HMIC in commenting upon ISS, and of the increased 
support for SPISS by the Scottish Office was eventually said to have led to decision for 
ISS formation on an independent basis for the Force to stop. The implication is that 
once ISS formation becomes dominated by the external coalition, it becomes extremely
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difficult for internal coalitions to shift to another power configuration (ibid.) - even if 
they want to.
We now move on to discuss themes that have arisen from the case with regard to social 
relations, and which have developed as a result of our analysis of ISS formation
6.4.2.I. Importance o f Roles in ISS Formation
The role of the Chief Constable and the authority that this position is perceived to carry 
has been a significant factor in ISS formation, and the use of this authority is an example 
of the exercise of power (Markus & Pfeffer, 1983) through the management of 
resources. The authority of such a role can be thought of as an example of the 
objectivation of knowledge whereby "the externalised products of human activity attain 
the character of objectivity" (Berger & Luckman, 1967; p.78). This provides evidence of 
the dialectical nature of social reality, in that the products of human subjectivity can be 
accorded the status of objectivity, especially in organisational settings. However, we 
must remain aware that such objectivity does not attain a state of ontological reality, but 
instead remains an essentially social construction which will be perceived differently by 
various people. We can consider this an exercise of power through the manipulation of 
resources in relation to a position of authority, and to perceived expertise. The authority 
that the rank of Chief Constable carried with it meant that this person was able to 
manage resources in several ways to influence outcomes: in deciding budgetary 
allocations for the IS area; in obtaining funding from the Police Authority for the initial 
development of ABC; in appointing particular staff to the ABC project team, and to the 
IS/IT Board; in deciding the company that would be the lead supplier for the ABC 
system, albeit that other senior Officers were invited to go and see a demonstration of 
the software before agreeing with the decision.
In this case though, it was evident that it was not just the role, as denoted by authority 
associated with a rank, that was significant in influencing what happened, but also 
perceived levels of interest and knowledge that were factors. The authority inherent in 
the role of Chief Constable may have been why there was evidence of a reluctance on
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the part of other Police Officers to question the developments being proposed, for
example as one senior Officer observed:
"I think the Chief Constable was pushing it that much that there was a general 
fear of anyone daring to criticise wonderful ABC .. the all being all speaking 
machines. I think there was a reluctance initially, but of course you hope that 
these Officers, who are Police Officers who are developing the system, would 
have got it right in the first place. But unfortunately they didn't".
Such comments highlight not just the effect of role of the Chief Constable in influencing
the project, but also the reluctance of other senior Officers to speak out. Perceived
authority is only one aspect of what we have found in terms of role, as the interest of the
person and the perceived level of expertise also appear as factors. The perceived level of
expertise in IT of the Chief Constable, and the apparent interest that he had in IT acted
in two ways. It was not so much any actual level of expertise, but rather perceptions of
expertise that appeared to be important. For example, ".. the Chief eats, drinks, and
sleeps IT.." and, "... I have to say that many of us were quite shocked by some of his
radical views on matters particularly in association with technology, and the fact that he
conversed as someone with knowledge Thus, while the level of authority associated
with the role was unquestioned, the ability of the Chief Constable to influence what
happened should also be considered in terms of the perceived level of expertise and
level of interest. This combination of characteristics enables individuals to exercise
voice (Hirschman, 1970) - those people who actively seek to effect outcomes, which
according to Mintzberg (1983) marks out those able to act as influencers in
organisational settings. While the holder of such a role may be able to influence
changes, the role of Chief Constable is at the same time one that reinforces institutional
norms within the Police Service (Hunt & Magenau, 1993). It was noticeable though that
the Chief Constable was seen as a pivotal figure in relation to the success of the project,
which led many to fear his departure, for example:
"If the Chief Constable disappears tomorrow there'll be a void because 
increasingly [IT] has become his baby and he is evolving that in a very much 
hands on direction .. that doesn't normally happen in the Police Service may I tell 
you ."
The difference between the role of Chief Constable and that of the IT manager, also a 
Police Officer but in this case with the rank of Inspector, was noteworthy. The latter was 
also perceived as someone with expertise in IT, and for this reason was able to exercise 
power through this expertise, for example in providing expert opinion to the IS/IT Board
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on many occasions. However, the level of this person was that of middle management, 
and this person was not able to exercise authority directly over other managers within 
the Force. However, he was able to exercise authority vicariously through being closely 
associated with the Chief Constable, particularly in situations of upwards influence 
(Ansari & Kapoor, 1987). Such association can be seen in this way as a means of 
affecting perceptions of an individual's potentiality (French & Raven, 1959) - that is, the 
potential to influence. For example, in presenting the intention to develop ABC, the IT 
Manager was able to effectively ignore the more senior ranks of Officers who comprised 
the audience and to articulate the proposal which was received as an effective fait 
accompli.
6.4.2.2. Structures and Processes in Relation to Decision Making
A further aspect brought to our attention relating to the exercise of power through the 
management of resources concerns the IS/IT Board. This Board constituted a 
membership which varied between six and eight people of varying ranks, but mostly 
from middle and senior management, and which was chaired by a Chief Superintendent. 
The IS/IT Board was vested with authority to decide what happened with IS, and where 
money was to be spent on IT - they were given the task of managing ISS. At the same 
time, whilst they did this, many other Officers perceived that the IS/IT Board was fed by 
the Chief Constable and the IT Manager. If we consider the exercise of power through 
the management of processes, this would seem to be evidence of such an exercise, with 
the process surrounding ISS being managed through the setting up of the Board. Whilst 
the members of the IS/IT Board were adamant that they were independent in the 
execution of their tasks, the perception of many of those spoken with was contrary to 
this. We see here the management of access to and participation in decision making 
processes (Hardy, 1994). In addition, the IS/IT board could be seen as exercising power 
through the authority given to them by the Chief Constable, by allocating funds, and 
through taking decisions about IS developments.
In considering the exercise of power through the management of processes the role of 
senior management in the Force is worthy of further consideration. The arrival of a new 
Chief Constable represented a change in one figure in the senior management team.
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Other members of this team expressed the view that whilst the drive for IT came 
exclusively from the Chief Constable, there was concern that while there was some 
opportunity for debate, few of the senior Officers were prepared to engage in debate. 
Other views expressed were that the senior management were effectively presented with 
a fait accompli, that they had little choice but to accept the proposals put forward. The 
reasoning behind this was that there was a desire that the IS should reflect the views of 
those staff who would be working with the system, and not those likely to be retired 
before, or shortly after, the system is in place. One reading of this situation would seem 
to be that such people were likely to hamper IS developments, or at best have little to 
offer in terms of informing development as they may have left the Service before the 
system is fully implemented. On the other hand, the effective by-passing of many of the 
senior Officers may have marked a desire to not allow their opinions to be taken account 
of in the decision process. Either way, in 1992 and 1993 the management of decision 
making processes surrounding the ABC project could be seen to be continued in the 
lifetime of the IS/IT Board whereby decision making was managed within the confines 
of the IS/IT Board. We also have to bear in mind the possibility that the most visible 
decision makers are not necessarily the most powerful (Hardy, 1996), and in this case 
we were told that the members of the IS/IT Board were appointed by the Chief 
Constable.
6.4.2.3. Perception and Meaning
At all times we are concerned with perception, as it is this that is central to the views 
that we have of what we take to be social reality. However, we can also think about the 
manipulation of perception as a means of bringing to our attention further aspects salient 
to ISS formation (Clegg, 1975; Chaffee, 1985). For example, in 1997 the Chief 
Constable argued in a public document that there was a positive relationship between 
the improvement in crime figures, detection rates, and the increased spend on IT from 
the early 1990s (Case A Annual Report, 1997). This can be seen as a means of 
legitimating the spending on IS within the Force, both for an audience external to the 
Force as well as internally. The way in which groups can seek to legitimise their 
demands through the manipulation of perception has been noted by Pettigrew (1979). 
This use of a symbol can also be thought of as a means by which the Force executive 
could endeavour to legitimise their request for increased funding from the Scottish
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Office following an unfavourable budget allocation in the preceding year. It is 
interesting to note that the detection rate in fact rose from 45% in 1990/91 to 55% in 
1991/92 which was actually before the major investment in IT.
We have already mentioned the symbolism surrounding the IT disaster of the 1970s, 
although we should note that in this instance symbolic meaning developed over time 
without the active participation of anyone in seeking to render symbolic meaning to that 
event. In the case of another example of symbolism related to ISS formation however, 
we see that the appointment of the Chief Superintendent to lead the IS/IT Board was 
done deliberately to show that symbolically not only was ISS being taken seriously 
within the Force, but that also that the process was not being driven solely by the Chief 
Constable. This was decided by the Chief Constable in concert with two other senior 
Officers and the IT manager in an effort to signify the importance being attached to IS in 
the Force, but was also an attempt to illustrate that senior Officers were closely involved 
in the ISS focus. Equally, this act was also an attempt to demonstrate to the HMIC that 
ISS was being addressed within the Force. Similarly, we found that people perceived the 
Force to be a leader in IT, which could be seen as rendering a subjective, symbolic 
aspect to IT. We can consider the exercise of power in terms of the manipulation of 
perception where such symbolism is made use of in the actions of people, for example 
where the Chief Constable uses the symbolism of a Force that is advanced in the use of 
IT with reduction in crime figures.
This brings us to another aspect of manipulation of perception, which concerns the use 
of language. None of the interviewees thought that the word strategy was even a part of 
the vocabulary used within the Force prior to 1992. Language can be viewed as an 
important aspect of the manipulation of perception (Morgan, 1986; Choo, 1998), and 
has also been recognised in relation to ISS (Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992; Jones, 1995). 
The introduction of language that used the term strategy in relation to IS was seen as 
being an attempt to demonstrate the seriousness with which IS was now being 
addressed. In this case, the role of senior officers was considered to be influential in 
shaping a degree of interest within the organisation in developing IS, and in particular in 
affecting the perceptions of other people where senior management were seen to 
actively engage with IS (Levine & Rossmoore, 1995).
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6.4.2.4. Relations with other Agents
A number of people recounted that the notion of strategy in the organisation at large was 
a relatively new concept in the early 1990s, and while it represented a new terminology, 
it was in their view merely new terms for what they had always been doing, namely, 
forward planning. The perception was that they were now expected to use the 
terminology of strategy as a result of pressures from other sources. This leads us to 
reflect upon this use of language in another way, as an exercise of power through 
manipulating perceptions of agents external to the Force. Such agents are in turn 
brought to our attention when we consider the exercise of power through the power of 
the system. For example, the HMIC, the Audit Commission, the Home Office and the 
Scottish Office were consistently mentioned as driving a desire to talk about strategy in 
the Force. It was not so much that they felt that they were being told to talk about 
strategy, but rather that there were pressures to be more business-like in the operations 
and management practices. The concept of strategy was seen as being part and parcel of 
being more business-like. The following view expressed in 1995 was echoed by several 
senior Officers,
"Its no different to things that have happened in the past... And like every other 
good business, what we're being forced to do now which we weren't before is 
measure our effectiveness at the end. I rather suspected that there were strategies 
formed before but nobody ever revisited them to say well that was successful 
wasn't it, or by Christ that one went right down the tubes, but why? It might 
have been mentally thought through when you're lying in your bed, you know 
just those few fleeting moments when you went to sleep but you never actually 
committed it to paper later on... others can learn from that."
In 1997/98, the development of strategy was still being raised by the HMIC during 
inspections as something that senior management should be addressing, in relation to IS 
as well as to the business at large. Hence, throughout the period of IS development in 
relation to the ABC system, there was an increasing awareness of ISS in a conceptual 
sense amongst the people involved, rather than in terms of detailed plans. This was not 
so much reflected in documentation, but rather it was reflected in discussion and action 
as the project was developed, ISS formation as a pattern in a stream of decisions and 
actions (Mintzberg & McHugh, 1985).
The combined presence of what were seen as governmental groups, such as the Home 
Office, the Scottish Office, and the Audit Commission, was instrumental in shaping the
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views of senior Officers regarding the concept of strategy. Continual reference was 
made to these bodies in discussions about strategy, and ISS in particular. The role of the 
HMIC in conducting and reporting upon inspections was another key factor. The role of 
these bodies can be considered in terms of the exercise of power through the 
manipulation of perception (see Table 3.1). We can see the visits from the HMIC as a 
ritual, through which norms of best practice are encouraged, as demonstrated for 
example in the declarations of written ISS, and the use of project management methods 
as being best practice (HMIC, 1999). The establishment of such cultural norms should 
not be seen as a one off event (Pettigrew, 1985a), but rather a part of an ongoing process 
of construction and reconstruction of social practice in organisational settings (Berger & 
Luckman, 1967; Giddens, 1984; Reed, 1992). This applies also, if less frequently, to the 
Home Office, Scottish Office, and Audit Commission. The release of Papers and 
Circulars can also be seen as a part of the ritual of the shaping of practice, the exercise 
of power through the manipulation of perception.
In addition, we can also understand the actions of these groups through the exercise of 
power in terms of the manipulation of perception, through the use of language, in this 
case the use of the language of strategy in relation to ISS (Audit Commission, 1993; 
Home Office, 1993, 1994; HMIC, 1993, 1998, 1999). Many of those people spoken 
with referred to the change in the use of language that had occurred following the 
release of papers and circulars from the above agents.
In considering what happened in terms of the exercise of power through the power of 
the system, a number of aspects relevant to our understanding of ISS formation in this 
Case are evident. The organisational actions and decisions with which we have been 
concerned took place against a backdrop of culturally accepted norms and political 
power relations which were being exercised irrespective of the actions of those in the 
Force. For example, the series of inspections by the HMIC, the reports of the Audit 
Commission, the issuing of Home Office Circulars (referred to above) were all part of 
the cultural traditions and structures within which the people in the Force operated, and 
which appeared to be accepted by all those spoken with. Nonetheless, such structures 
influenced the progress and nature of ISS formation. For example, the IS/IT Board was 
set up with a view to being able to illustrate to the HMIC that ISS was being addressed.
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Equally, the statement regarding crime figures and IT were to reinforce a case being 
made to the Scottish Office for extra funding.
Finally, we noted earlier the acceptance of structures of authority in the Police Force.
Such culturally specific norms and values can be seen as a part of the system of power
relations (Foucault, 1980; Clegg, 1989) against which ISS formation took place. For
example, it can be seen as the acceptance of such norms that indicated that when the
Chief Constable is said to have suggested that something should happen in a certain
way, it did, as with the choice of the supplier. Similarly, the development of ABC
continued apparently unquestioned because there were said to be only Police Officers
involved who had been appointed by the Chief Constable, as was noted,
".. and it was taken for granted that because these people were police officers, 
put there by the chief, and because they were computer aware, that they would 
resolve the situation, and the danger was ...it was the emperor's new clothes".
Such views were evident of the acceptance of certain cultural norms, in this case that 
fellow Police Officers would sort ABC out, and that if the Chief put them in place they 
would do a good job. The acceptance of such views represented a further aspect of 
power that influenced ISS formation, but in this case the exercise of such power cannot 
be traced to a relational situation, except the relationships that people are embedded in 
by participating in the social world (Hardy, 1994).
6.5. SUMMARY
In this case study, ISS formation was perceived to be closely related to the ABC system, 
which was successfully developed and installed. While applications arising from ISS 
formation were regarded to have slowed after 1995, we have highlighted the increased 
domination by the external coalition, and we have categorised ISS formation in terms of 
a shifting power configuration from Autocracy to Instrument (Mintzberg, 1983). The 
implications of this are a diminishing role for internal influencers on ISS and an 
increasing external influence. That said, we have also discussed four themes which we 
have identified as being important in our undrstanding of the generative forces affecting 
ISS formation, and in particular the analysis has discussed the exercise of power in 
relation to all four conceptualisations outlined in Table 3.1.. We now move on to 
discuss case study B.
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CHAPTER SEVEN - ISS FORMATION: CASE B
7.1. CASE B POLICE FORCE
The fieldwork for this case study was initially focused upon the practice surrounding the 
strategic decision to develop a Force-wide system from scratch, a system subsequently 
known as the JKL system (N.B.: not the actual acronym for the system; changed for 
anonymity purposes). The practice surrounding the decision to implement the system 
was notionally completed in 1995, although the project itself was not completed until 
1998. As with all of the case studies, we have investigated historic events associated 
with IS in the Force as it became apparent that these were important to our 
understanding of ISS formation. The development of the JKL project provided the focus 
for our period of engagement, this being a prerequisite for validity in Case study 
research (Pettigrew, 1985a; Yin, 1989). In the course of our research 15 different 
members of staff were interviewed, many on several occasions between 1994 and 1998. 
This was in addition to informal discussions with these and other people during the 
period of fieldwork.
7.2. BACKGROUND TO CASE STUDY
Case B Police Force is situated in Scotland, centred upon a major city which is where 
the headquarters is located. To undertake Policing duties, the Force has a budget of £62 
million (for 1997/98, compared to £50 million in 1992/93). During 1997/98 there was 
an authorised staff establishment of 2,065 people, 1,222 of these being Police officers, 
for a population in the area of just over 514,000.
The annual budget allocated to IT grew from £300,000 (just over 0.5% of the total 
budget) in 1991/92, to £1.2 million in 1993/94 (over 2% of budget) - the bulk of which 
was provision for capital expenditure, before falling again to just over £400,000 in 
1997/98.
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Policy for the Force is published each year by the Chief Constable in the form of an 
annual report, which details key aspects of policing over the preceding twelve months, 
and also sets out a public statement of priorities for the forthcoming year. There was no 
published mission statement or series of objectives, but the published priorities to which 
efforts were to be targeted remained the same between 1994 and 1997, and these were: 
Domestic Housebreakings; Drug Abuse; Road Traffic Accidents (Case B Police Force, 
1994, 1995, 1996, 1997).
7.3. INFORMATION SYSTEM STRATEGY FORMATION
Up until the early 1980s, the only computerisation in the Force was the use of the PNC 
and a crime recording facility linked to the regional authority mainframe. In 1983 an 
investment was made in what was termed a command and control system (known as 
CAPS - Computer Assisted Policing System) - essentially a system for incident and 
resource management. This was a mainframe based system which also provided a 
message switching facility for the Force. While perceived as a successful use of IT for 
the Force, it was generally felt that the acquisition of the CAPS system represented a 
desire for the Force to be seen to be using IT, although there was no policy as such for 
either acquiring or using IT. This system remained in use for incident logging and the 
management and deployment of policing resources up until 1996.
The CAPS system was said to have been acquired and implemented by a team of six 
Police Officers led by a Superintendent, although the general perception was that the 
system had been the choice of the Superintendent alone, someone who had been seen as 
a dominating personality and a keen exponent of the use of IT. One of the comments 
made by many staff in relation to that system was that the system had been implemented 
without sufficient attention being given to what was required, and that as a consequence 
the system had never provided what was really required. A common metaphor used was 
that the tail was wagging the dog in that the system was shaping operations rather than 
being driven by, and fitting with, operations. One of the reasons for this was said to be 
that too little, if any, attention had been given to considering the business case for the 
system. Instead, there had been a desire by the Superintendent leading the team to 'go 
out and get a command & control system' and implement it, which is what happened.
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At the same time as the CAPS system was introduced, the Force employed the first 
civilian member of staff to work in the IT area, as the senior systems analyst, 
responsible for designing a network and maintaining the CAPS system. In 1987, this 
individual became designated as the IT manager, and was joined by two other civilian IT 
staff.
Aside from the use of IT to link to the Scottish criminal records office in the mid-1980s, 
computing was not developed much further. By 1991, the IT staff had implemented 20 
stand-alone personal computers which were located in various stations around the Force. 
These PC's had been distributed in response to requests by Officers around the Force - 
there was no policy guiding these developments.
In March 1991 a Police Officer was appointed to a position in the Management 
Development Unit, but with a partial responsibility for IS in the Force. This person 
expressed the opinion that at this time, following the adoption of the command and 
control system in 1983 there had been a level of stagnation in the use of IS which 
needed to be addressed. He submitted a brief report to the Chief Officers setting out two 
main proposals for IS in the Force, which were:
• To develop an integrated Force-wide computer network
• To study the feasibility of developing Force-wide computer applications to assist 
operational Policing
Following discussion by the senior management group, the Chief Constable, Deputy and 
Assistant Chief Constable, authorisation was given to develop a network over a three 
year period, although it was specified that no computer applications were to be 
developed during this time. The reasons for the decision not to develop applications 
were not made clear, although one particular interpretation was evident amongst the 
people spoken with which was that the senior Officers in place at the time were not 
interested in IT Whatever the case, the point being made was that at that time in the 
early 1990s, there was a perception expressed that no-one at senior levels was 
particularly interested in IS, and hence little happened. There is some evidence to the 
contrary though, in that resources in the form of Police personnel were appointed to the 
IS area, and authorisation was given for a network development.
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Just prior to this, in November 1990, evidence of a lack of co-ordination in the IS area 
was made apparent when one Chief Superintendent, not connected with the IS area, 
commenced a project using thirty hand-held computers. The Officer said that he made 
the decision because he was frustrated that the Force seemed to be getting left behind in 
the use of IT. This can be said to reflect a concern for improving Policing in the Force 
through the use of IT, and also a desire to affect the perception of the use of IT in the 
Force relative to other Police Forces. After three years of little use, the hand-held 
devices was abandoned following consultation with the deputy Chief Constable who 
favoured investigating the use of mobile data terminals in vehicles.
In January 1991, the same senior officer who originated the idea for hand-held 
computers then started a pilot scheme to allow some officers to telephone in the details 
of road accidents to a central point for input onto the mainframe system which was 
being used for the CAPS system. While this saved Officers completing a paper report, 
the system represented the idea of one individual who was in a position of authority as 
opposed to a developed policy of any kind. A bespoke application was written that 
allowed for the recording and analysis of road accident data, and this remained in use 
until 1996.
By the start of 1993, a specification for the new network had been drawn up with the 
assistance of consultants. In April 1993, while the network project was ongoing, a new 
appointment was made to the Force senior management group, at the level of Deputy 
Chief Constable. This individual came to the Force with a reputation as someone with a 
keen interest in IT having been associated with an IT Department in his previous Force. 
Following announcement of the appointment, but prior to his commencement of duty, at 
his request an overview of IS was sent to him. This overview was carried out by a Chief 
Inspector who oversaw the IT Department. Upon arrival in the Force, the Deputy Chief 
Constable's changed the timescale for the installation of the network, reducing it from 
three years to one year. In addition, at the end of May 1993 the Deputy Chief Constable 
ordered the IT Department to prepare a specification to acquire a range of IT 
applications with a view to transforming the IS capability of the Force. The aim was to 
acquire off the shelf applications as far as was possible in order to reduce delay in
131
implementation, and cost, as far as was possible. At this time the organisational role 
structure pertaining to the reporting structure for IS/IT is as shown in Figure 7.1. below:
Deputy Chief Constable Assistant Chief Constable
Chief Constable
Computer Manager
Superintendent
Admin/Comms
Chief Superintendent 
Headquarters
Inspector 
Computer Services
Chief Inspector 
Communications
Figure 7.1. IS/IT Reporting Structure - 1993/1997
As we can see from Figure 7.1, in effect the IT department, which although having a 
civilian computer manager was in fact managed by a Police Chief Inspector, was 
separated from the senior executive level of management by three Police ranks.
At the meeting in May 1993, the Deputy Chief Constable was said to have referred to 
the need to have a strategy for IS in the Force. The development of an operational 
requirement for a new system was seen by those involved as just that, the development 
of a strategy. An operational requirement was drawn up by a group consisting of the 
Chief Inspector Communications, the Inspector Computer Services, and the Computer 
Manager. This group were in continual contact with the deputy Chief Constable, both 
through formal fortnightly meetings, but also through informal discussion on a
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sometimes daily basis. This informal communication took place more frequently
between the Deputy Chief Constable, the Inspector and the computer manager, and it
was these three people who were perceived to be the main people responsible for
developing the specification, which was termed within the Force as an operational
requirement. This operational requirement was nonetheless couched in broad terms, and
did not give detailed requirements beyond the application title. The rationale behind this
was expressed as follows:
"give the expert the problem and let him come up with the solution, don't give 
the expert the solution because you will get what you asked for."
The operational requirement was a three page document, and contained the following 
information (Case B Police Force Computer Applications Operational Requirement,
1994):
• A Summary of the limited extent of existing computer systems; this included a 
statement that installation of the new system would be expected to commence by 
mid-March 1994
• The Applications Required; namely: crime recording, custody handling, crime 
intelligence, crime pattern analysis, personnel, duty rostering, productions, stores 
admin., mobile data, "various small database applications", firearms admin., 
traffic accident recording, command & control, property, MIS, GIS, forms 
handling, PNC interface
• Priorities for the new system, which included the installation of the first four 
applications in the above list, the personnel system and the command and control 
system.
• A review of the existing system and network
• A statement of Strategic Requirements, as follows:
• Presentation - a GUI interface with common look & feel across applications
• Performance - response time to critical transactions of under 2 seconds
• Availability - Maximum availability for year round service; minimum
housekeeping with no impact upon performance; resilience against failure
• Platform - UNIX; must be possible to enhance systems, share data, access 
multiple applications on one terminal.
• Network - TCP/IP
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• Standards - incorporate de facto 8c de jure industry standards, and data standards 
of Scottish Criminal Justice System
• Commodity products - off the shelf rather than bespoke.
• Finance - lease basis over 5 years, with first milestone being 15/3/94 to allow the 
first payment in the financial year
In August, the operational requirement was finalised and published in the form of an 
Request for Expressions of Interest in the European Journal. This formed the basis for 
what was to be termed the JKL project.
7.3.1. THE JKL PROJECT
After notifications of interest from 14 companies, a shortlist of two companies was
developed by the four people who had worked on the operational requirement.
Following a final series of discussions and presentations during November and
December 1993, a partnership agreement was reached with a supplier, who in February
1994 were appointed as the lead supplier for the JKL project. The nature of the contract
requires some explaining, because this was seen as being a contributing factor to these
delays. When in 1993 the decision was taken to acquire a comprehensive IS, the
operational requirement set out the current situation in the Force together with what was
required in broad terms. As one person involved in this process commented,
"we deliberately left it open so that when we are in the phase of the project 
where we are ready to look at what personnel system, we can then say 'right, 
what is the best that is round just now', and not say 'well four years ago we 
signed up to get that and really it has been overtaken .. so we tried to keep our 
options as flexible as we possibly can .. not without heartache because the 
industry has found it difficult, they want to speak about deliverables and signing 
off parts of the contract".
In their final presentation the chosen supplier stated that they would provide Best of 
Breed systems in each of the application areas specified on the operational requirement. 
While the documentation from the unsuccessful bidder clearly specified the systems that 
would be supplied in detail, that from the other bidder did not. So while the 
documentation from one bidder was preferred by the Police team to that of the other, on 
an overall assessment of the marking criteria used, the latter narrowly won the contract.
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The criteria used had been developed by the Police team, and included:
• Cost and mode of financing
• Range of applications able to supply (from existing off the shelf, from other 
parties, from new development)
• Nature of applications
• Documentation
• Timescales
• Expertise
• Experience & track record
The outcome of this decision was to prove interesting however; because in using the 
term best of breed, and not specifying in detail the systems to be supplied, the supplier 
provided the Police team with an area for debate - which is what they did. Thus, rather 
than specifying what was required in precise terms, the agreement specified broad 
classes of application which were to be decided upon as and when the time to choose 
came along, with system flexibility being seen as the guiding principle by the Police 
staff Hence, during 1995 and 1996, as applications came to be considered, the Police 
team demanded best of breed systems at that point in time, and not what was best of 
breed when the contract was signed in February 1994. This was regarded as beneficial 
and as problematic in equal measure by the Police team: on the one hand they would 
have liked to have a detailed specification of what they were going to get, but on the 
other hand they were able to negotiate for improvements based upon the supplier’s use 
of the term best of breed.
At the same time however, the IT budget represented a relatively fixed percentage of the 
overall Force budget and left little scope for any increase. This led to a pressing need on 
the part of the Police Officers working on the project to obtain a best value solution 
within the originally specified contract price, and this added a further dimension to the 
discussions with the supplier through the life of the project. This pressure was 
accentuated after April 1995 when the Chief Constable became responsible for a set 
budget which meant that there was no possibility of gaining extra funding for the IT 
budget. Those negotiating with the supplier were primarily the Deputy Chief Constable 
and the Inspector together with the Computer Manager. The disputes continued in the 
meetings between the Police Officers and with the representatives from the supplier
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throughout 1994, 1995, and 1996. The disagreements about the applications resulted in 
changes being made to some of the specified applications, such as criminal intelligence - 
where a Windows version became available just before implementation was due, and 
the STORM application which had to be redeveloped to run on Windows NT after the 
police staff decided to standardise the Force control room on NT. The reason for this 
decision was not clear, although it was argued that a judgement was made that NT "was 
the right way to go" to future-proof the system. This decision was taken by the Police 
staff, and communicated to the IT Department through an informal meeting between the 
Inspector and the Computer Manager. Similarly, when the Personnel system came to be 
discussed, the Police Officers demanded, and eventually got a system that had only just 
been developed for another Force, rather than the one originally discussed.
The term JKL had been developed by the Inspector and the Computer manager, and 
approved by the Deputy Chief Constable. The acronym was perceived by those outside 
of this team to symbolise a major project, and was taken to illustrate that the Force was 
engaged in a large scale investment in IT. While the people who devised the term had 
just wanted to come up with "something snappy", the acronym was perceived to have 
become firmly established in the language of those in the Force quite quickly - JKL was 
seen as "the Deputy's IT project" . The JKL project amounted to a considerable 
investment in IT for the Force. Initially, the cost of installing the network amounted to 
approximately £800,000, while by mid-1995 the force had spent £1.5million on 
applications. The main application for funding was presented to the Police Board with a 
report on progress to date, in November 1993. Initially it was felt that this deadline 
would be missed due to the volume of work, and that they should wait for the next 
meting of the Police Board. However, the Chief Inspector and the Inspector producing 
the documentation for the funding bid were concerned that the Deputy Chief Constable 
may leave before the next meeting as it was known that he was applying for a vacancy 
that had arisen. They therefore ensured that the documentation was presented in time for 
the meeting in November, although in the event the Deputy Chief Constable did not 
leave the Force at this time.
The JKL project formed the basis for IS development in the Force over the next four 
years. While most of those most closely involved were of the view that JKL was the 
ISS, views amongst other senior Officers varied. Several people observed that there was
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not a written ISS as such, rather that there was a shopping list of applications, progress 
towards which had in their view been determined and driven by the deputy Chief 
Constable. However, as one of the Officers involved in developing the operational 
requirement commented when considering ISS,
"it's all in our heads, we don't have time to sit down and write a strategy".
Another member of that group observed that,
"the strategy is really a hybrid. I think like everything else we had an idea that 
we would like to write down exactly where we were going ... we don't have as 
such a strategy document that we can hand out, we are working to the
philosophy of strategy rather than to the word of it So .. the documentation,
there isn't a lot of it, we tend to be working by 'hmmm that sounds a good idea 
let's try it and see', .. so I don't know how close that runs to what we should be 
doing but, that's how we did it and it seemed to work".
The JKL project was supported from the Police side by a team of three Police officers, 
together with support when required from the IT department. The Police Officers were 
chosen by the Chief Inspector in charge of communications in liaison with the Deputy 
Chief Constable. Although the civilian computer manager was notionally in charge of 
the Force's IT, the JKL project was led by throughout by Police Officers. These Officers 
were chosen based upon perceptions of the operational expertise as Police Officers 
combined with perceptions that they had some interest in IT. In 1994 the IT department 
comprised six staff members, although by this was acknowledged by the senior 
management to be some way below what was required given the volume of work and by 
comparison with similar organisations. Over the next three years this slowly increased to 
eleven members of civilian staff, but nonetheless, the staff in the IT department were 
never closely involved in the development of the JKL project. Instead, they were 
expected to maintain the existing IT infrastructure, and to assist the installation and 
maintenance of the new applications as and when they arrived.
By mid-1995, three hundred personal computers had been distributed around the Force 
wide area network, all running Microsoft Windows 3.1, and initially providing only 
word processing as a means of encouraging use of the system by staff. After a few 
months, the first JKL application was delivered, this being crime reporting. By the end 
of 1995, four further applications had been implemented, these being: criminal 
intelligence, custody, personnel, and command and control. The command and control
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system is of interest in that despite the operational requirement stating the desire to 
avoid bespoke software, the command and control system (known by the acronym 
STORM) was written by the supplier for Case B Police Force. This followed discussion 
at monthly formal meetings throughout 1994 between representatives of the supplier, 
the Chief Inspector communications, the Deputy Chief Constable and the Officers 
appointed as part of the JKL project team. It was decided that existing systems did not 
meet the requirements of the Force, particularly in allowing for the sharing of data 
across applications, and the use of a GUI interface. Furthermore, it was said to have 
been argued by the supplier that the financial cost to the Force would be greater if they 
had to source the system from outside rather than develop it in-house. This was said to 
have been agreed by the Deputy Chief Constable, and the development of STORM 
continued. Of the other applications mentioned above, only the criminal intelligence 
system was obtained from outside, this being sourced from the same company that had 
provided a complete system to Case A Police Force.
During 1996 and 1997, all of the remaining applications from the original operational 
requirement were delivered, although the project ran into a series of difficulties which 
meant that delays occurred in the implementation. The reasons for these delays included 
technical difficulties in trying to implement applications, for example, in switching from 
UNIX to Windows NT for STORM, and then integrating this into the rest of the JKL 
System. Applications were also subject to delay following periods of heated negotiation 
between the internal staff and the suppliers regarding the nature of applications in line 
with disputes about the contract discussed above. By June 1997, the following 
applications had been delivered: crime reporting & management system; criminal 
intelligence system; command & control system (STORM); custody management 
system; crime pattern analysis; personnel system; traffic accident recording; duty 
rostering; stores administrative system. During 1998, a majority of the originally 
intended applications had been delivered, and the JKL project was generally regarded as 
having been completed. The only applications that had not been implemented were 
applications for productions, for property, and geographic information systems, although 
this was being used in a limited number of locations. One of the applications that had 
not been developed was a management information system, and the lack of this 
application was of concern to senior management who perceived an ever greater need 
for up to date information to aid management of the Force. Priority had been given by
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the project team to systems that had an impact upon operational policing, and the 
management information system was not seen in this light by them. However, there was 
no one at a senior level now driving the development of these systems, and the contact 
with the supplier had become less frequent after the departure of the previous Deputy 
Chief Constable in 1996. In fact this system was now regarded as something separate 
from JKL, and it was scheduled to be introduced before 2001, although a specification 
for it had yet to be produced.
In January 1994, a structure was put in place to oversee the management of the JKL 
project using a cut down form of the PRINCE project management method. Just before 
the project supplier was chosen, a project board, a project assurance team, and a project 
team was set up. The project board constituted the deputy Chief Constable, the Chief 
Superintendent who was head of Police operations and the Chief Superintendent who 
was head of CID. The project assurance team comprised a Superintendent and two 
middle ranking officers who were chosen by the Deputy Chief Constable. The project 
team consisted of three Police Sergeants, although they worked closely with the 
Inspector and the Computer Manager in the IT Department. The project team provided 
reports on an approximately weekly basis to the project board, although what this meant 
was that the reports were sent to the Deputy Chief Constable, and to the project 
assurance team. Whilst some informal consultation occurred between these parties as 
the project took shape and was implemented, very few formal meetings took place 
during the course of the project. The Project Board met every six months during 1994 
and 1995, while the project assurance team also met every six months during 1994 
1995, and 1996. While the fact that such meetings took place was recorded, neither set 
of meetings was minuted, and nor was any documentation produced to support the 
project management. The Project Board reviewed what had happened, and was led by 
the Deputy Chief Constable, the meeting stopping after he left the Force, just before he 
left the Force in 1996. One member of the group commented, echoing the views of 
others,
"we were supposed to be looking at following PRINCE, but it is very much in
name only, we're certainly not doing all the documentation  We don't have
any methodology really, we just have to get on with it".
The desire to use PRINCE, albeit it in a customised form, reflected a concern that the 
Force did not have a strong track record in project delivery prior to the JKL project.
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However, despite this project structure, there was concern that during the project, and 
particularly in the earlier stages, very little was known about the IS developments, let 
alone about ISS, outside of the small group immediately involved in the project. 
Communication amongst those Police Officers and IT staff associated with the project 
tended to be quite ad hoc, in so far as meetings were often unscheduled, and 
communication between various people tended to bypass what would be regarded as the 
normal procedures. This meant was that the project team had direct access to the deputy 
Chief Constable who took a strong interest in the project, whereas in other situations 
such communication would be expected to be channeled through a 'chain of command'.
The communication with the supplier was conducted more formally, and was 
undertaken by either the Deputy Chief Constable, when available, and the Inspector and 
Computer Manager from the IT department. On several occasions, the Chief Inspector 
also attended these meetings. The meetings were not minuted, although a review of 
agreed decisions and actions was provided by the supplier as appropriate following each 
meeting.
The nature of the process surrounding the project led some senior officers to voice the 
concern that the entire policy and development associated with IS had been too isolated 
from other senior people in the Force. Specifically, the hands-on approach of the deputy 
Chief Constable caused some concern to a number of people within the Force. During 
the first couple of years of the project, 1994 and 1995, there was a concern that not only 
did very few people either know what was happening or have opportunity to comment 
upon it, but that should the deputy Chief Constable leave the Force on promotion for 
example, that there would then be a void left in the IS area in particular. Another view 
was that given that the Force was perceived as being so far behind other Police Forces in 
their use of IT that without such a senior person to drive the project from the outset it 
would never have happened. In May 1996 the deputy Chief Constable did leave the 
Force on secondment for two years, although he continued to keep in touch with the 
progress of the project informally by speaking with the Computer Manager and the 
Chief Inspector.
By 1996, not only the network but also several of the larger applications had been 
implemented, and the view of all those involved was that it was too late for anyone to
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turn the clock back, even if they had wanted to. This referred to a perception that the 
Chief Constable was not interested in IT, and that were a new Deputy Chief Constable 
to be appointed who was unenthusiastic about IT, that this could see a reverse in 
priorities for the JKL project. As it transpired, an internal appointment was made to the 
position of Deputy Chief Constable, and while this person was an overt enthusiast for 
IT, he was nonetheless content to allow the IT department to continue developing JKL. 
At the end of the two year secondment of the former Deputy Chief Constable in 1998, 
that officer did not return to the Force, moving to a new role elsewhere in the Police 
Service. In May 1998, a new Chief Constable was appointed to the Force, which meant 
that there was now a new group of people at executive management level compared to 
when JKL had commenced. The perception amongst staff involved with IS was that the 
new executive was not particularly interested in IS, although this was by no means seen 
as a problem. It was felt that such a management team would give the IS area a chance 
to consolidate upon the developments in the JKL project after a number of years of 
continual change. Indeed, it was commented upon that one of the consequences of 
ongoing changes at senior officer levels, caused by transfer, promotions, and retirals, 
was that periods of intense change and periods of consolidation tended to follow 
cyclically.
7.3.2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A N  IT  STRATEGY DOCUMENT
Throughout the period of the project, all those spoken with considered that there had
been a shift in thinking during the early 1990s in relation to the issue of strategy, or at
least an awareness amongst many senior officers that strategy was something that should
be considered. As discussed in Chapter Five, the setting of objectives had come to play
an important role in policing during the 1980s, and this had continued in the 1990s. In
terms of the concept of strategy within Police Forces in general, it was commented that:
"... we always had objectives, but our objectives were things you put on the wall, 
and after three months they didn't have a great deal o f .. sort of rationale behind 
why you did them in the first place. But nowadays people do plan long term, we 
are looking at where we are going to get to in a few years time, they're looking at 
all the threats and doing various SWOT analyses and all the techniques are 
brought into play to look at what is in the future."
This view was reiterated by other senior staff, and indicated an awareness at senior 
levels to consider strategy as a something that affected thinking processes as opposed to
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being an outcome to be produced. During the mid to late 1990s, the corporate strategy 
group for the Force consisted of the three ACPOS rank officers, that being the Chief 
Constable, deputy and assistant, together with the divisional commanders, who 
generally hold the rank of chief superintendent. These officers met to determine what 
the plan should be for the year, which included identifiable policing priorities, which 
were then published (see for example Appendix 3). Departments were then expected to 
identify how their activities for the coming year would support the attainment of those 
priorities, and to develop their own plans around that. While some wondered about the 
amount of consultation that actually occurred at the policy level, there was an 
identifiable structure in place through which strategy was considered. Each year, an 
annual plan was published for the Force, and was subject to comment not only 
internally, but also by bodies such as the Police authority and the HMIC, and was also 
put into the public domain in the form of the Chief Constable's annual report (e.g. Case 
B Police Force 1994-1997). The common view of those spoken with was that the 
concept of strategy only came to be considered by Police Forces in the early 1990s 
following the publication of a series of Home Office circulars (e.g. Home Office, 1983, 
1993) and Audit Commission papers (e.g. Audit Commission, 1990, 1993), together 
with the increased attention being given to issues of strategy during inspection visits by 
the HMIC. In particular, there was increasing referral during visits by the HMIC to 
strategy for IS as representing best practice, and this concept came to appear with 
regularity in HMIC reports (HMIC, 1992, 1996, 1997, 1997a, 1998, 1999). The 
combination of these factors was said to have brought to the attention of many senior 
staff the concept termed strategy, not least in the area of IS given the growing 
recognition of the importance of IS, and the cost.
It was not however until 1997 that the first ISS was published, which sought to set out 
the current situation of IS in the Force, some consideration of the short, medium and 
long term future, together with intentions for IS. However, despite not having a 
documented ISS, those involved in the JKL developments from 1993 onwards were 
confident that there was an ISS - it was just that it was not written down. By contrast, 
the common perception of those Officers not involved in the JKL project was that there 
was no strategy, that the development was perhaps rather ad-hoc, and that it was 
dominated by the Deputy Chief Constable.
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After all of the developments in the JKL project, it was in October 1997 that an IT 
strategy document was produced in the Force, and this was done as a result of adverse 
criticism by the HMIC in an inspection eight months earlier. The IT strategy document 
for the Force was a five-year strategy, and was written solely by the Chief Inspector who 
was then overseeing the IT department. The rationale behind this document was to put 
in writing the aims of the IT department, so that a link could be seen between IT and the 
Force policing plan (as shown in Appendix 3).
The IT strategy document was drawn up following some limited consultation within the 
IT department with the Computer Manager, and sets out plans to continue the work set 
in motion during the years 1994 to 1997, that is, during the completion of the JKL 
project. The focus of the IT strategy document is upon IT as opposed to IS, and 
comprises 13 pages which review existing use of IT, environmental factors, and 
proposed future developments. An executive summary of this document is reproduced 
in Appendix 4. The document goes sets out an assessment of current local and national 
implications for IT operations, together with an outline of issues related to future IT 
operations and an outline of intended work with associated costs. The main issues 
arising form the IT Strategy Document are:
• A desire to link all IT development to demonstrable benefits that support the 
Force's strategic aims;
• The need to monitor the Scottish Police IS Strategy which may mean an end to 
locally developed applications;
• A possible need to decide and then separate out those IT developments and 
services which are so important to the Force that they must be retained in-house, 
and not subjected to compulsory competitive tendering or market testing;
• A need for future systems to be discussed in terms of the business process(es) or 
business problems which they will assist/address;
• The need for a user-led approach, and the identification of project champions;
• A desire to maximise existing assets in the IS/IT area through which to support 
the achievement of the Force's strategic priorities.
On the whole, the IT strategy document does not say what they aim to do in the future, 
focussing more upon what they have done to date. Where the future is discussed, this is 
done in terms of very broad desires in relation to the Force's aims, and in terms of
143
upgrades to the IT base. Although the initial statement in the document does identify 
that this is a strategy for information systems and information technology, information 
systems per se are not discussed.
In April 1998, the development of the IT strategy document was highlighted as an 
example of good practice during a visit by the HMIC (HMIC, 1998). Despite this 
endorsement, the HMIC expressed concern that the Force should move beyond 
documented statements of intent, in relation to improving project management for 
example, and that these should be translated into practice. In addition, and interestingly 
given the stated awareness of PRINCE in the earlier stages of the JKL project, the 
HMIC was critical of the Force's failure to follow PRINCE in IT projects, and as the 
HMIC commented,
"There was a perception of systems being rushed into use without a full
appreciation of the consequences" (HMIC, 1998).
As we have seen, in developing the JKL project, what was referred to by the staff 
involved as a shopping list of applications was procured and implemented, and it was 
after more than half of the applications had been implemented that the concept of 
strategy was directly addressed in relation to a consideration of a business case for IS 
developments.
While a documented IT strategy did not emerge until 1997, this had not prevented 
several other IS issues being addressed in addition to the JKL project. In 1995 e-mail 
was implemented across the area using a software package called CC-MAIL. This was 
implemented by the IT department after informal discussion between the Deputy Chief 
Constable and the computer manager towards the end of 1994. Following personal 
interest by the computer manager and one other member of the civilian IT staff, during 
1997 a world wide web site was established, and in 1998 an intranet was implemented. 
Both developments arose out of the IT department, and while the web site provided 
general information about the Force, the intranet made a variety of previously paper 
based data available - such as procedure guidelines, telephone directory - and also 
provided access to more dynamic data such as recent crime figures. Neither 
development was part of a written strategy, but were ideas developed either following 
informal discussion in the case of e-mail, or through development as a result of personal 
interest in the case of the Web page and the intranet.
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During a period of four years the Force had moved from a position of having a very 
limited exposure to computer based IS to having a comprehensive, integrated IS. It is 
worth therefore moving on to consider the concept of strategy in relation to these 
developments, as this discussion will enable us to explore a variety of issues associated 
with the predominantly technology based description in this section.
7.4. DISCUSSION
In seeking to understand ISS formation at Case B Police Force a number of key issues 
have become apparent to us from our analysis. Whilst we have seen explicit discussion 
of ISS, it is also apparent that in addressing ISS there are a range of other issues which 
are embedded in a broad stream of organisational practice (Mintzberg, 1978; Johnson, 
1997). We must therefore also turn our attention to these associated issues if we are to 
grasp the intricate socio-political nature of ISS formation (Waema & Walsham, 1990). 
In order to draw out themes which we have found to be important for our understanding, 
we will concentrate our analysis of the case in terms of our investigative framework 
discussed in Chapters Two and Three, in particular we will structure the sections based 
upon web analysis (Kling, 1987).
7.4.1. INFRASTRUCTURAL AND HISTORIC ISSUES
The infrastructure at Case B Police Force was generally regarded as poor, and as having 
been starved of development following the installation of the CAPS system in 1983. 
Staff in the Force had access to the national systems, such as PNC, SCRO, and 
HOLMES, but otherwise were dependent upon either stand-alone PC based systems, for 
example for personnel, or paper based systems, for example in dealing with people in 
custody, and for recording lost or stolen property. As with the previous study, we can 
utilise our typology set out in Figure 6.3.. Prior to 1993, the systems in place reflected 
categories 2 and 3. With the implementation of the JKL related applications, by 1997 
the systems in place reflected all four of the categories. Indeed, it was the development 
of systems such as those that we have categorised as Systems to Support Analysis and 
Investigation (category 4, Figure 6.3.) that were seen by those closely involved in the
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project as being the systems which would be most welcomed "by the troops on the 
streets" - that is, it was the development of these applications that was often used to 
justify the JKL project to those outside of the development group.
While the nature of the systems prior to 1993 was a cause of concern to several senior 
Officers, the reasons for this lack of development were seen to lie with the executive 
level Officers, who were perceived not to be interested in developing IS in the Force 
through investing in IT. Such perceived disinterest is regarded as problematic for ISS 
(Levine & Rossmoore, 1995).
In addition to this, there was some resentment amongst operational Officers that the 
CAPS system for example had been imposed upon them without consultation, and had 
altered they way they operated. For example, operational Police Officers have a 
considerable amount of discretion in the way they work (Banton, 1964; Holdaway, 
1979) and the arrival of the CAPS system was perceived to negatively affect the way 
they had traditionally operated by requiring them to constantly update their status and 
position. This was this referred to numerous times as being as a case of the IT tail 
wagging the operational dog. This perception of the CAPS system was symbolic of a 
general sense of scepticism amongst those spoken with, who were not directly involved 
in the development of JKL, regarding the role of IT in contributing to the policing of the 
area. This was acknowledged by those developing ISS in the form of the JKL project, in 
that they perceived a need to deliver, "applications that the troops on the ground would 
want to use" as a priority, although at the same time there was a perceived sense of 
urgency to "recover lost ground" in the use of IT.
This latter desire to recover lost ground had led one senior Officer to drive the 
development of handheld computers in 1991. This effort had been seen as a disaster by 
most people spoken with, and as a waste of money. The reasons for this were regarded 
as stemming from the disinterest in IT by the executive level management at the time, 
which allowed the Officer to develop the opportunity - illustrating the exercise of power 
through the manipulation of resources (Hardy, 1996), in this case through a position of 
authority, which results from
"the existence of a balance of power in the hands of an individual who initiates
actions and gets results" (Zaleznik, 1970, p.51).
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After three years this trial was stopped by the Deputy Chief Constable after he decided 
that it did not have any part to play in the JKL system, although the fact that that system 
was barely being used was also an influential factor. Nonetheless, the ability of one 
senior Officer to influence the use of IT was also perceived to have occurred because of 
a lack of ISS, because there was no plan for IS in place - or even in consideration at that 
time. Weatheritt (1986) concludes that this sort of muddling through approach to 
developing IT, in addition to many other areas of policing, is endemic in Police 
organisations. The reasons for this include the way in which Officers are required to 
gain experience in many areas before promotion, becoming proficient in none, coupled 
with the need for them to make an impact, ideally without too much risk to their career 
(Ackroyd et al, 1992), before moving on to the next posting (Reiner, 1994). It was such 
examples of the historic use of IT and the nature of the infrastructure that were brought 
to the attention of the new Deputy Chief Constable by the Chief Inspector 
communications when he arrived. It was this situation that formed the basis for the 
decision to do something about it in redeveloping IS across the Force.
7.4.2. SOCIAL RELATIONS
In considering the impact of social relations upon the practice of ISS formation, as with 
the preceding case study perceive a shifting power configuration relative to ISS 
formation from Autocracy to Instrument (Mintzberg, 1983). This is set out in Table 7.1. 
below.
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Characteristics: Perceived as shifting: 
Autocracy to Instrument'.
Evidence:
External Coalition 
(EC)
Dominating (having been 
passive)
A group of influencers operating 
through governmental remit, if not 
explicitly in concert; Increase in 
activity of HMIC, audit 
commission, SPISS; funding linked 
to initiatives (e.g. best value from 
ISS); external coalition seems to 
have become dominating after 
being passive in relation to ISS.
Internal Coalition 
(IC)
Bureaucratic (but mock 
bureaucracy [Gouldner, 1954] 
evident; also having been 
personalised through 
dominant internal influencer)
Discipline based hierarchy; 
authority of Deputy Chief 
Constable (DCC) important for 
ISS. Project Board set up to satisfy 
perceived bureaucratic expectation 
of external influencers, but not 
seen to be influential for ISS.
Apparent Power 
Relationship
EC ==> IC (IC increasingly 
controlled)
IC dominated ISS (subject to 
funding approval), but eventually 
departure of DCC & impact of 
SPISS, HMIC was followed by ISS 
reflecting EC.
Implications Replacement of one dominant 
influencer by another
ISS initially controlled from IC led 
by DCC. DCC left, & IT staff said 
that ISS would reflect SPISS, 
acknowledging perceived impact of 
HIMC, SPISS, CCJIS, on ISS.
Table 7.1. Power Configuration Analysis (based upon Mintzberg, 1983)
As with the preceding case study, one of the findings of the analysis in Table 7.1. is the 
apparent shift over time which we noted in the power configuration (Mintzberg's, 1983). 
The internal coalition, viewed as being led by the Deputy Chief Constable (DCC) was 
initially dominant as ISS formation revolved around JKL. The external coalition could 
be described as passive. Following the departure of the DCC, and after the majority of 
JKL applications were installed, ISS formation was perceived to have slowed. In 
addition, ISS formation was seen as increasingly focussing on SPISS, with perceptions 
of the role of the HMIC in commenting upon ISS, and of the increased support for 
SPISS by the Scottish Office being said to lead to a recognition that ISS formation on an
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independent basis for the Force would stop. While the external coalition could be seen 
to be becoming more dominant, the internal coalition was driven by the DCC, and 
achieved the installation of JKL. Once the DCC left, the internal coalition could be said 
to have become less dominant vis-a-vis the external coalition. The implication of the 
analysis is that once ISS formation becomes dominated by the external coalition, it 
becomes extremely difficult for internal coalitions to a shift to another power 
configuration (ibid.) - even if they wanted to.
We now move on to discuss themes that have arisen from the case with regard to social 
relations, and which have developed as a result of our analysis of ISS formation
7.4.2.1.The Importance of Roles
We have already noted the role of senior Officers in positions of authority (see section 
7.4.1 above) which can be considered in relation to the exercise of power through the 
manipulation of resources (see Table 3.1.). This same exercise of power is evident more 
specifically in relation to ISS formation from 1993 onwards, and which can be 
examined in relation to particular roles. We can see in the role of the Deputy Chief 
Constable the apparent exercise of power through the manipulation of resources in terms 
of a position of authority. This enabled him to request a review of existing systems, and 
to authorise the initiation of the JKL project. The Deputy Chief Constable was 
recognised amongst all who were spoken with as a leading figure in developing and 
driving the JKL project. However, we would argue that the position of authority alone 
does not explain this perceived ability to influence aspects of ISS formation; if this were 
the case then previous incumbents might also have been expected to be influential. Of 
course, we can contend that previous figures in such senior positions were influential, 
but in a negative sense, in this case in not stimulating ISS formation. The role of senior 
people in preventing or hindering ISS can be considerable, particularly where they are 
seen to be disinterested or where they abdicate responsibility for ISS formation (Levine 
& Rossmoore, 1995). More than just authority, we see in this case study evidence of a 
perceived high level of knowledgability about IT, in addition to a perception as someone 
who is very interested in IT. For example, someone of "immense enthusiasm, who 
provided a great push for IT at a very senior level in the Force", and as someone "who's
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very much 'let's go for it'... too much so at times .. we can't keep up!". This perception of 
interest in and knowledgability of IT reflected facets of the individual's own mental 
construct (Jayaratna, 1994), as well as those of the perceiver, but were coupled with a 
position of authority in the organisational hierarchy which enabled action to be taken.
That said, there were other people in influential roles in relation to ISS formation in this 
case study. The Inspector in the IT Department and the Computer Manager were both 
interested in IT, and in particularly in the case of the latter had considerable expertise in 
the area. In their respective positions they were able to work on a day to day basis on the 
JKL project, although they lacked the authority within the organisational setting that the 
Deputy Chief Constable had. However, these individuals were able as a consequence of 
their knowledgability to influence ISS, for example in developing the operational 
requirement which led to the JKL project, in working as part with the project team, and 
in negotiating with the supplier. That said, this was an intrinsic part of their respective 
roles at that point in time; they could be said to have had these roles because of their 
respective interest and knowledgability as much as they exhibited these characteristics 
in the roles. However, in terms of Police Officers, a role does not necessarily have 
anything to do with interest and knowledgability, as was demonstrated when in 1995 a 
new Chief Inspector was appointed with responsibility for the IT department. The 
individual appointed was regarded as someone who had no knowledge of IT and no 
interest in it. The Officer was posted into the position by the Deputy Chef Constable to 
gain career experience.
In our view based upon the evidence in the case study, the role that the Deputy Chief 
Constable was perceived to have had in ISS formation, as someone with knowledge and 
interest in IT in a senior position of authority, required the people in complementary 
roles, in this case the Inspector and the Computer Manager, who had both interest and 
expertise. In this case, a project champion was instrumental in ISS formation, as 
Walsham (1993) found, but not just in terms of authority, also in terms of knowledge 
and interest.
150
7.4.2.2. Structures and Processes in relation to Decision Making
The decision making processes throughout the development of the JKL project, in 
particular from 1993 to when the Deputy Chief Constable left in 1996, revealed a 
number of issues of note.
First amongst these was the apparent exercise of power which we see in relation to the 
manipulation of processes (see Table 3.1.) in terms of the assembling and operation of 
the various groups under the PRINCE method. All of the appointments were made by 
the Deputy Chief Constable, and the operation of the groups was effectively determined 
by him. The project team which was closely involved in the development of the JKL 
project met regularly, and communicated with him regularly. In contrast the other two 
groups, which were set up to monitor the progress and nature of the project rarely met, 
despite the fact that the Deputy Chief Constable chaired the Project Board. This mean 
that that project was largely free from scrutiny by anyone in the Force.
Another aspect concerns the apparent contrast in decision making and reporting 
structures. The Police Officers operate within a clear organisational rank hierarchy (see 
section 6.1.) which together with organisational structure determines reporting channels, 
as we have shown for the IT department in Figure 7.1.. The essence of the Police service 
as constituting a uniformed, disciplined group of people is embodied in notions of 
bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1979) and formalism in decision making (Loveday, 1993). We 
see on paper a formal reporting channel for the IT department, and indeed in practice 
this is evident for some aspects of the work, such as for transfer or leave requests. 
However, in relation to ISS formation, in particular in relation to the JKL project, as we 
have seen, the discussions between the Inspector, the Computer Manager, and the 
Deputy Chief Constable bypassed this formal structure completely. The discussions 
between these people were held informally, usually on an ad-hoc basis. This could be 
seen as reflecting what Gouldner (1954) observed, and which he termed mock 
bureaucracy; namely, the informality of the reporting structures and decision making 
processes that for the most part lay behind the facade of formal bureaucratic structures.
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7.4.2.3. Perception and Meaning
When we consider the exercise of power through the manipulation of perception (see 
Table 3.1.), our attention is drawn to the use of language. Those closely involved with 
the JKL project could be seen to share an IT related language that excluded other, in 
particular other senior Officers who were not conversant with that language. This use of 
IT related language as a means of excluding others had been noted elsewhere 
(Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992; Jones, 1995), although the degree to which this is a 
consequence of role rather than a deliberate ploy is less easy to gauge. This use of IT 
related language can also be seen as constituting a part of the shared relevance structures 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1967) through which the participants engage in the construction 
and reconstruction of social reality. That the individuals engaged in the JKL project 
participated in the creation and sustaining of a shared view of that endeavour is founded 
upon the concept of shared relevance structures which enable them to engage in 
constructing their version of reality.
The use of language can also be considered in terms of the title of the project - the JKL 
project. The development of what was perceived to be a bold new IT initiative was in 
part based upon the acronym, and in particular upon the swift emergence of this term 
into the language of staff in the Force outside of the project group. The use of this term 
was said to have had the effect of creating a certain sense of expectation, if not to say 
awe of the systems to come. The acceptance and usage of the term by non-IT related 
staff also implied that the money being spent by the Force was being spent on something 
significant. Thus, the development for use of this term can be said to be symbolic, and 
to represent the manipulation of perception.
Symbolically we see in this case study, as with case study A, the perception on the part 
of numerous staff that an investment in IT has been a disaster. While the role of the 
individual in this has been discussed, the symbolic aspect of this mean that staff in the 
organisation setting were wary of money being spent on IT that was not being done in 
accordance with a carefully thought through strategy. Again, the use of the JKL acronym 
could be seen to be of value in allaying peoples fears through affecting their perceptions 
of the proposed system.
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With this in mind, we find the lack of a written ISS interesting. While those involved 
claimed that they had a strategy, and that
"it's all in our heads; we haven't got time to sit down a write a strategy", 
it was not until the HMIC commented adversely upon the lack of a documented ISS that 
something was produced. The production of the documented IT strategy can also be 
considered in terms of the exercise of power through the manipulation of perception. 
We can see that this document represented a symbol that the management within the IT 
Department took notice of what the HMIC said, and this was at least as much for 
internal audiences as it was for the HMIC, not least because of the demands on budget 
that IT made. In addition, the production of the document was seen to symbolise the 
professionalism of the IT department in the eyes of those who produced it - hence, the 
desire to manipulate perception. A number of senior Officer spoken with were worried 
that the IT Department had been driven along by the Deputy Chief Constable, and that 
without him they were "lost"; the production of the strategy document was intended to 
reassure them that the Department knew what it was doing. It is notable that the 
symbolic aspects of such IS or IT strategy documents is noted by some authors (e.g. 
Knights & Murray, 1994), whilst being wholly ignored by others (e.g. Ward & Griffiths, 
1996).
7.4.2.4. Relations with other Agents
The relations with agents such as the Home Office, the Scottish Office, and the Audit 
Commission, were seen as being important factors in ISS formation according to those 
interviewed. Similarly the work of the HMIC was also perceived as a factor which 
influenced the development of ISS. The role of these bodies can be considered in terms 
of the exercise of power through the manipulation of perception (see Table 3.1). We can 
see the visits from the HMIC as a ritual, through which norms of best practice are 
encouraged, as demonstrated for example in the declarations of written ISS, and the use 
of project management methods as being best practice (HMIC, 1999). In our view, the 
establishment of such cultural norms should not be seen as a one off event (Pettigrew, 
1985a), but rather a part of an ongoing process of construction and reconstruction of 
social practice in organisational settings (Berger & Luckman, 1967; Giddens, 1984; 
Reed, 1992). In addition, we can also understand the actions of these groups through 
the exercise of power in terms of the manipulation of perception, through the use of
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language, in this case the use of the language of strategy in relation to ISS (Audit 
Commission, 1993; Home Office, 1993, 1994; HMIC, 1993, 1998, 1999).
Other agents who affected ISS formation were the supplier for the JKL project. The 
nature of the contractual agreement between the supplier and the Force influenced the 
nature of the systems delivered. Here, the perceived flexibility in the use of the term best 
of breed in the contract meant that the eventual system was seen as a reflection of the 
process of development and negotiation that took place, and could be viewed as a 
constituent part of the respective constructing and reconstructing of social reality that 
cans be said to have taken place through the interaction of both parties. This highlights 
to us the important place that such ongoing interactions between the Force and agents, 
such as in this instance the supplier, have in influencing outcomes.
7.5. SUMMARY
In this case study, ISS formation was perceived to be closely related to the JKL system, 
which was successfully developed and installed. While ISS formation was regarded to 
have slowed considerably after the departure of the DCC, we have highlighted the 
increased domination by the external coalition, and we have categorised ISS formation 
in relation to a shifting power configuration from Autocracy to Instrument (Mintzberg, 
1983). That said, we have also discussed four themes which we have identified as being 
important in our understanding of the generative forces affecting ISS formation, and in 
particular the analysis has discussed the exercise of power in relation to all four 
conceptualisations outlined in Table 3.1.. We now move on to discuss case study C.
154
CHAPTER EIGHT - ISS FORMATION: CASE STUDY C
8.1. CASE C POLICE FORCE
The fieldwork for this case study was initially focused upon the practice surrounding the 
strategic decision to develop a new Force-wide IS leading up to the expiry of the lease 
for the existing mainframe based system in April 1995. The practice surrounding ISS 
formation included the decision to purchase a system, although delays meant extending 
the lease on the existing system until 1997. In the event, five key applications were 
implemented by 1998, although a further five smaller applications were not due to be 
completed until 2001. In this case study we conducted fieldwork during the period 1994 
to 1998.
We faced a problem in this case study of which the reader should be aware: it was that 
we were not allowed to keep copies of documentation generated within the Force. Thus, 
while we saw ISS documentation, we were not allowed to keep copies of it. For this 
reason, we have focussed our discussion here upon social practice surrounding ISS 
formation, and not upon the content of the ISS documentation although mentioning the 
existence of such documentation in passing. The reasons for not allowing us to keep 
copies of such documentation seemed to us to result from a combination of two areas: 
uncertainty, because no one from outside of the Police had ever asked to see, let alone to 
keep such documentation before; a cultural tendency towards secrecy, which has been 
noted by others who have sought to research the Police (Shapland & Hobbs, 1989; Hills,
1995). However, it is notable that this was the only one of the case studies in which we 
encountered such problems, which lends credence to the view that senior Police Officers 
are gradually becoming more accommodating of research into the Police (Reiner, 1989).
As with all of the case studies, we have investigated historic events associated with IS in 
the Force as it became apparent that these were important to our understanding of ISS 
formation. The development of ISS and subsequent implementation of a system to 
replace the existing mainframe system provided the focus for our period of engagement, 
this being a prerequisite for validity in case study research (Pettigrew, 1985a; Yin,
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1989). In the course of our research 17 different members of staff were interviewed, 
many on several occasions between 1994 and 1998. This was in addition to informal 
discussions with these and other people during the period of fieldwork.
8.2. BACKGROUND TO CASE STUDY
Case C Police Force covers an area of 2,500 square miles, which includes a city, and has 
a resident population of over 800,000 people. To police this area the Force has an 
authorised establishment of 3,700 personnel, of which 2,600 are Police officers. The 
budget allocation had increased gradually during the 1990s, having been just under £110 
million in 1992/93, and with the Chief Constable receiving a budget of £128 million for 
1997/98. Most of the resources are concentrated upon the city, where the largest number 
of the 71,407 recorded crimes occurred during 1997/98, with detection rate of 35% for 
the Force as a whole (HMIC, 1998c).
The structure of the Force changed during the 1990s, both in terms of people in senior 
positions, and in terms of organisational structure. Of particular significance in terms of 
IS, a new deputy Chief Constable was appointed in 1994, with responsibility for IS, and 
a new Chief Constable was appointed in 1996, someone perceived to have a strong 
interest in IS. In 1994, the organisational structure was changed to devolve management 
responsibility, and to improve communication across the Force. This restructuring of the 
Force resulted in a new structure centred upon six territorial divisions, and also led to 
the redesignation of several hundred staff as departments and responsibilities changed. 
At the same time, people in the IT department were thinking about ISS in preparation 
for replacing their existing systems.
8.3. INFORMATION SYSTEM STRATEGY FORMATION
The first substantive experience with computerisation within the Force was in the mid- 
1970s with the link to the PNC. In 1981 the Force implemented a computer based IS for 
the recording of crimes committed in the area, a system which remained in use for the 
next 15 years. One problem that became apparent with this system over the years was 
that it was extremely difficult to extract data from the system, something which became
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increasingly important during the 1990s as Police managers were required to report 
upon a range of performance indicators, the importance of which had increased across 
the Police Service as a whole (HMIC, 1992). This was one factor which led to an 
increasing sense of frustration with the existing systems amongst Police managers.
A number of individual IS application were developed across the Force over the next 
few years, although there was no strategy for IS within the Force. Many Divisions were 
said to have obtained personal computers, again on a stand alone basis, for basic office 
functions such as word processing and spreadsheets. By 1993 there were approximately 
(although no one knew the exact figure) 200 personal computers in the Force, all being 
used independently, except for those on a local area network in the headquarters 
building.
In the early 1990s, the IS department in the organisation was staffed by 17 civilian 
personnel, including the IS Manager, who reported through a three tier hierarchy of 
Police Officers to the Executive level within the Force. This reporting structure is 
shown in Figure 8.1. below:
Deputy Chief Constable
Chief Constable
Superintendent 
IS Dept.
Computer Manager
Assistant Chief Constable 
Management Services
Chief Inspector 
IS Dept.
Chief Superintendent 
IS Dept.
Figure 8.1. IS/IT Reporting Structure 1990-1994
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As we can see, the IS Manager was overseen by three senior Police Officers within the 
IS Department, and this formed the communication channel to the Force executive.
The common view of those spoken with was that the concept of strategy only came to be 
considered by Police Forces in the early 1990s following the publication of a series of 
Home Office circulars (e.g. Home Office, 1983, 1993) and Audit Commission papers 
(e.g. Audit Commission, 1990, 1993), together with the increased attention being given 
to issues of strategy during inspection visits by the HMIC. In particular, there was 
increasing referral during visits by the HMIC to strategy for IS as representing best 
practice, and this concept came to appear with regularity in HMIC reports (HMIC, 1992, 
1996, 1997, 1997a, 1998, 1999). The combination of these factors was said to have 
"concentrated the mind" of many senior staff on this concept termed strategy, not least 
in the area of IS given the growing recognition of the importance of IS, and the cost.
In 1993, the IS Manager suggested that they should consider developing an ISS for the
next few years, something which they had not documented previously. As one of the
Officers in the Department noted,
"we never had a strategy that has been documented and stated in the past, it 
evolved through a series of separate developments and it is only now that we are 
trying to pull them together"
It was said to have been agreed within the IS department that ISS should be developed 
in view of the ending of the lease in April 1995 for the mainframe which supported the 
command and control and the crime recording systems. The contract for the mainframe 
system was held with Honeywell Bull, who indicated that they would not support the 
systems after the current lease expired. In addition to this, the systems mentioned were 
written in the COBOL programming language, which the Force could not support 
internally, and were not millenium complaint. Viewed in combination, these factors 
were said to have highlighted to the senior staff in the IS department that they had begin 
to prepare for a new system, and to do this it was decided that they needed to develop an 
ISS.
Indeed, the need to do something with IS was not in dispute so far as a number of senior 
managers were concerned. By 1994, while the systems in place were said to have a lot 
of functionality, the IS situation was a cause of concern amongst many senior staff given
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that there was only one year to go before the mainframe lease expired. The following
comments from a senior officer reflect the views expressed by many others,
"you only have to look at the hotchpotch of different computer systems that 
we've got, that we've built up over the years to realise that this is how to build up 
an information gathering system when you hadn't really thought about what you 
want to achieve in the first place. I mean, it's a dogs breakfast, and I mean I 
remember how we got to be the way we are and it was all to do with money 
being available, money being available quickly .. 'we've got to spend that money, 
let's get something on board here' ... pressures from persuasive personalities 
within the organisation can result in them having some sort of stand alone 
computer system which doesn't merge in with the strategy that we're operating 
on, and yes we've got a dogs breakfast when it comes to information systems".
These views reflected several issues that many senior staff articulated. Firstly, was a 
concern that ISS was not being thought about in a professional manner, because of the 
presence of so many Police Officers in senior positions in the IT department. There was 
a strong feeling that civilian experts should be running IT. Secondly, there was a 
concern that without proper planning, the Force would not be able to budget 
appropriately, which was seen as being a potential problem once the Force moved to 
having responsibility for a fixed budget after 1995. Thirdly, the historic approach to IS 
development was symbolic, in that it appeared to most people to have been ad-hoc, 
funded by windfalls of money from the Scottish Office primarily, which was spent 
quickly and without reference to any strategy. Hence the overall perception that "IT is in 
a mess", and that "we've really got get our act together in using computers".
By and large, a concern with the IS systems was shared by those officers with more 
direct involvement in IS, and in particular there was a desire to instigate a more 
coordinated approach to development than had been undertaken in the past with a view 
to providing a corporate approach to data management.
The departure of the IS Manager in 1993 coincided with the promotion of one of the 
Assistant Chief Constable to the post of Deputy Chief Constables in the Force. The new 
Deputy Chief Constable had overall responsibility for IT, and was aware of the high 
level of discontent with the existing systems in the Force. Furthermore, despite not 
having much exposure to IT personally, he was sure that IT could be of use in the Force, 
but was less convinced that the existing IS department was best placed to deliver it. The 
reasons behind this view were the historic failure to develop IT effectively, his view that
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civilian expertise should be employed wherever possible, and a concern that it was not 
appropriate for Police Officers to remain for too long in the same post, particularly in 
something regarded as a non-operational posting, such as IT. In the IS department the 
shortest period of time that a senior Officer had been in-post was six years. He 
instigated a recruitment search exercise to recruit somebody who had experience in 
developing and implementing large, integrated systems. This resulted, in March 1994, in 
a new IS Manager being appointed from the private sector, with a specific remit to 
develop and implement an ISS for the Force.
Up until 1993, IS was developed under the auspices of the IS department, and as one
senior member of staff in the department commented,
" .. we've had a strategy, it's just not been written down, it's not been called a 
strategy".
Whether or not there was a strategy, development of IS across the force was regarded as 
uncoordinated and ad-hoc, resulting in a range of systems that were variously described 
as piecemeal, a mish-mash, and a dogs breakfast. In 1990, the then IS Manager put 
forward the idea of developing a set of data requirements and a data model for the 
Force, an idea that was accepted by the Police hierarchy in the IS department. It was 
decided by the Police Officers in the IS Department and the IS Manager to employ 
Oracle, as they were recognised as a leading company in managing data. One of the 
senior Police officers involved emphasised the process of consultation that had taken 
place,
"we employed the Oracle corporation to come in and along with our own 
operational staff, the Police officer staff within IT, we went round every 
department virtually in the force speaking across ranks, saying 'what do you see 
as the main issues, what would you like to see in the way of a systems strategy', 
forget the IS strategy that can come later,., and throughout that process which 
has gone on over several years there has been consultation, consultation, 
consultation".
While senior managers outside of the IS department acknowledged that there had been 
consultation exercises, they were not happy that nothing seemed to have resulted from 
those exercises.
In April 1993, following the decision to address ISS, it was suggested by the IS Manager 
that they should have a project structure of some kind. This followed a comment by the
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HMIC during a visit in 1992 regarding the absence of project management in the IS 
developments to date in the Force. The HMIC also stated that it was desirable, and good 
practice, for those within the Police Service to adopt the PRINCE project management 
method for all IS developments. The Police Officers in the IS department agreed that a 
project management method should be adopted, and after a few weeks they decided to 
set up a structure based upon the PRINCE project management method. Initially, in July 
1993, a User Assurance Committee was formed, in-line as the Police IS staff saw things 
with a loose version of the PRINCE project management method. It was viewed as a 
loose version of PRINCE because while they wanted to have some structure to the 
project, the PRINCE method was perceived as requiring too many resources and too 
much documentation. The user assurance committee was seen as a useful means of 
having input on the IS project work from staff outside the IS department.
One year later, a Project Board was also formed. Up until this point, the executive level 
managers had not been persuaded that such a Board was necessary, and certainly not 
that they should sit on it. Following the appointment of the new IS Manager and the 
Deputy Chief Constable, it was decided by these two people that such a Board would be 
a useful means to maintain communication between the IS developments and the 
executive level management. This reflected a concern that the existing IS departmental 
structure was not the best way to ensure clear communication both up and down the 
hierarchy. From the perspective of the IS Department staff, the reason for requesting that 
a Project Board be set up was that within the IS department there was a feeling that the 
ISS efforts were too much a bottom-up effort, with little success in generating interest 
from the top levels of management. Some of the problems at this time were commented 
upon by one senior member of IS staff who observed that,
"there were stages when we produced reports [for the executive] and they just
disappeared".
Initially the board comprised the Deputy Chief Constable, two senior officers from the 
IS Department together with a Police divisional commander of Chief Superintendent 
rank. The project board met a few times during 1994, in April, June and in September, 
to consider interim reports on IS that were delivered by the IS Manager.
Following the arrival of the IS Manager in March 1994, the Deputy Chief Constable 
employed the services of the IS/IT consulting firm KPMG to monitor the development
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of ISS. This was described by those inside the IS Department as a helpful step, as it gave 
credence to the view that what they were doing was good. However, this had not been 
the motivating factor behind the appointment of KPMG, who were appointed with a 
view to making sure the IS Department got things right. Again, this was based upon the 
perception that historically the evidence showed that they had not developed IT 
properly. The work on the ISS was undertaken largely by the IS Manager working with 
KPMG. Once this was completed, the interim findings were presented to the project 
board in June 1994. In reviewing the ISS the IS Manager suggested that they expand the 
numbers on the user assurance committee to enable a detailed analysis of system 
requirements for the applications identified in the ISS and subsequent prioritisation. 
During the period July and August 1994, a specification of requirements was drawn up 
following three one-day workshops around the Force, conducted with staff nominated 
by their Divisional Commanders. These workshops were conducted by the IS Manager 
together with the Superintendent and Chief Inspector from the IS department. From this 
they identified twelve application areas, and a revised ISS was prepared for submission 
to the Project Board. While nothing had happened with the data requirements and data 
model developed by Oracle up until this point, this document was used to help identify 
likely required application areas. The ISS document, which was six pages in length, set 
out the following main issues:
• Current situation - including: the problems with the existing system; the expiry 
of the lease
• Other Factors - including: changes in technology, for example in considering 
whether to adopt UNIX or NT; client server computing -v- mainframe systems; 
demand levels for applications, and usage levels (in command & control and 
crime recording) based upon trends in usage of existing systems.
• Desired Option - including: the likely need to negotiate an extension to the 
mainframe lease; the desired option for client server, UNIX based system, 
utilising off-the-shelf or tailored software rather than bespoke development; data 
to be entered once only, and for interrogation of data across Force-wide system
• Proposed Application areas - Command & Control, crime recording, crime 
reporting, custody, criminal intelligence, personnel, firearms, licensing, property, 
GIS, crime analysis, accident recording.
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This proposal was accepted by the project board, and was then forwarded to a meeting 
of the Force executive in September for final approval, which was granted. The Project 
Board membership was also amended, on the instigation of the Deputy Chief Constable, 
and now comprised the Deputy Chief Constable, the IS Manager, three senior officers 
from the IS department, a senior officer from operational command duties, a partner and 
a consultant from KPMG. It was hoped by the IS Manager that an IS steering committee 
could be set up with responsibility for looking at IS at large, with the Project Board left 
to concentrate upon particular developments, although this did not actually happen until 
after the appointment of a new Chief Constable in 1996.
The role of the project board was to approve, or reject, submissions to it in respect of the
ISS. In 1994, it was generally agreed that for an ISS to be accepted, there must be a
strong emphasis upon assisting operational officers. One senior officer on the project
board summed up what he was seeking,
"you build up your IT strategy by saying 'what is the bloody strategy of the 
Police Force, what actually are we here for', We're here, I think, to lock up bad 
people, look after good people, and keep order on the street. We do that by 
getting the maximum resources employed at the sharp end by keeping paperwork 
and bureaucracy to a minimum, by using civilians at every possible post we have 
and by denying Police officers every excuse you can find to come in out the rain 
and that sort of thing. You then develop your IT strategy around that 
philosophy".
Following the acceptance of the ISS document, the Project Board met again in 
September and approved the desired option, authorising the senior members of the IS 
department to develop a request for expressions of interest in providing such a system. 
They were also authorised to negotiate an extension to the mainframe lease, which they 
did, buying a two year extension to April 1997.
In September 1994, as part of the ongoing organisational changes within the Force, a 
new strategy and development department had been created, and it was to this area that 
responsibility was given for ISS. The reporting structure for ISS was now as shown in 
Figure 8.2. below:
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Deputy Chief Constable
Chief Constable
Computer Manager
Chief Inspector 
Strateev & Develoom ent
Superintendent 
Strateev & Develooment
Chief Superintendent 
Strategy & Development
Assistant Chief 
Constable 
Management Services
Figure 8.2. ISS Reporting Structure 1994-1997
In practice, although the IS Manager now reported directly to the executive level of 
management in the form of the Assistant Chief Constable Management Services, in 
practice ISS was controlled by the Strategy & Development Department where the 
Police Officers from the IS department had been moved to. The aim of this move, 
instigated by the Deputy Chief Constable was to remove Police Officers from working 
in the IS area. However, the outcome was that in practice, although the IS Manager had 
a major role in leading the ISS work, ISS was managed by Police Officers from the 
Strategy & Development department. This proved to be a frustrating period for those 
working on ISS, as whilst the IS Manager was able to report directly to the Assistant 
Chief Constable regarding IS Department matters, for ISS the reporting structure 
reverted to a three tier hierarchy between the IS Manager and the executive level.
At this point, members of the Project Board envisaged the ISS as a five year plan,
although as was noted,
"I would think that every year you would want to stop and reassess your .. not 
change direction but perhaps the course, because perhaps what someone asks for 
now is not technically feasible but in two years time it may well be, so you've got 
to have the flexibility in the strategy to deal with that".
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The perception by members of the Project Board was that the new system would be in 
place before 1998. However, the IS Manager tried to scale down their expectations in 
terms of time. He stated that while he hoped that most of the main applications would 
be installed between October 1996 and April 1997, he did not think that either the 
hardware or the software would be the problem should delays occur; instead he felt that 
the training commitment was so large for so many applications across the entire Force, 
that it would be this area that slowed implementation.
In November 1994 a request for expressions of interest was sent out, and during the 
tendering process, KPMG continued to act as consultants to the Project Board, although 
meetings of this Board became very infrequent after September 1994. The next meeting 
of the Board was May 1995, with meetings held at six-monthly intervals after that. 
Views of KPMG's role varied; some Police officers felt that the role of KPMG was 
useful in confirming that the IS department had been doing the right thing in developing 
ISS over the preceding 18 months. On the other hand, others felt that the consultants 
were useful in providing reassurance about the work of the IS department, particularly 
prior to the appointment of the new IS Manager. This latter point arose from a number 
of senior Police officers who expressed concern about the abilities of the department to 
deliver what was required, based on previous experiences. However, by 1995, most 
people were reassured that the ISS had been thoroughly thought through, and that it 
reflected trends in industry. Following submissions from 12 companies, a shortlist of 
three possible suppliers was drawn up by the IS Manager, in collaboration KPMG, and 
from the Police Officers in the Strategy and Development Department. A series of 
meetings were conducted between members of the Project Board and the shortlisted 
companies during May and June 1995. Following this, a firm were appointed as the lead 
supplier with contract negotiations continuing until September 1995 when a contract 
was signed for the delivery of ten applications and a new data network. The ten 
applications were: Command & Control, crime recording, crime reporting, criminal 
intelligence, custody, GIS, personnel, firearms, GIS, accident recording. The budget for 
hardware and software was £3.3 million, with a further £500,000 being allocated for the 
network.
1996 and 1997 were spent working with the suppliers in developing the new 
applications and preparing or implementation. Responsibility for liaising with the lead
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supplier rested with the IS Manager, and on occasion senior Officers from the Strategy 
and development Department. However, the attention give to other areas of IS were 
minimal, and the IS Manager found it increasingly difficult to gain acceptance for the 
view that IS development needed to be monitored on an ongoing basis. In the view of 
senior managers, once a contract had been signed with the supplier, it was a question of 
sitting back and waiting for the system to arrive. During this time, periodic updates were 
submitted to the Project Board by the IS Manager, although the meetings were seen as 
uneventful and unproductive.
In May 1996 a new Chief Constable was appointed to the Force. This individual was 
perceived as someone with a strong interest in IS, as this individual had chaired the 
ACPOS computer policy committee for several years. In the February following the 
appointment of the new Chief Constable, a number of senior members of staff 
commented that, "there is a much higher visibility for IT now, and a stronger 
commitment to IT in the Force". In December 1996, an IT steering committee was set 
up, chaired by the Chief Constable and with the other three members of the executive 
amongst the members. The remit of this group was to maintain an overview of IS 
developments in the Force, while leaving Project Boards to concentrate upon particular 
projects. Thus, a series of project boards were set up for individual IT projects, each 
board being chaired by a member of the Force executive. In addition, the IS Manager 
was given responsibility for ISS, with a reporting route via the IS Steering Committee. 
The Senior Officers who had previously been in the Strategy and Development 
Department were redeployed to operational postings. This reflected a log held view by 
many senior Officers that there was no need for Police Officers to be actively involved 
in managing the development of ISS, although up until this point nothing had been done 
to stop it. The removal of Police Officers from the reporting structure between the IS 
Manager and the executive level was regarded by all those involved as being beneficial 
to the process of decision making. Prior to this, there had been a considerable amount of 
frustration that decision making processes about IS were handicapped by a long 
reporting structure through a tier of Police Officers. Furthermore, several staff 
commented that the fact that it was Police Officers feeding back to the executive on IS 
matters served to complicate the issues because of the lack of expert knowledge by both 
parties.
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Other IS projects began to be recognised as important following the instigation of the IS 
Steering Committee. In particular, there was acknowledgement to actively participate in 
an ongoing project to integrate Police IS applications with other elements of the 
criminal justice system, such as the Procurator Fiscal, and the prison service, as part of 
the ISCJIS (Integrated Scottish Criminal Justice Information System) project. Another 
project commenced in 1997 was a collaborative venture with the Scottish Office and the 
tourist board to develop multimedia kiosks using old Police boxes in the city. The first 
of these went live in July 1998.
Although the IS Manager was now solely responsible for IS matters, including ISS, a 
Police presence in the department was maintained, with a Police Inspector seconded for 
three years. Indeed, during May 1997, responsibility at executive level for the IS 
department had been moved from the Deputy Chief Constable to the civilian director of 
corporate affairs. This was the culmination of a policy to completely remove Police 
Officers from management of the non-core areas of policing, or as some saw it, from 
interfering in an area in which they had limited knowledge.
Between the May 1996 and July 1998, five software applications had been implemented 
in the Force as part of the ISS, these being crime recording, crime reporting, criminal 
intelligence, personnel, and command & control. In addition to a new wide area 
network, approximately 700 personal computers had been installed across the Force. A 
corporate database was running using Oracle, while the criminal intelligence package 
made use of the Textract system from Memex, as used in case studies A and B. The 
Command and Control application had been due to be implemented by February 1997, 
although eventually was implemented in March 1998. The delays to this application 
were due to development problems at the lead supplier, but this meant that the IS 
Manager had to arrange another extension to the mainframe support contract, this time 
until April 1998. This delay had severe knock on consequences within the Force, 
because the training that was scheduled for all staff in the use of the application 
coincided with planning for a major operational event in 1997, meant that all aspects of 
the project were running between six and ten months behind schedule by mid-1998. It 
was not anticipated that the outstanding applications would be implemented before the 
end of 2001.
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8.4. DISCUSSION
In seeking to understand ISS formation at Case C Police Force we have identified 
several issues which have emerged from our analysis of the case study. In addressing 
ISS there are a range of other issues which are embedded in a broad stream of 
organisational practice (Mintzberg, 1978; Johnson, 1997) which we must examine if we 
are to grasp the intricate socio-political nature of ISS formation (Waema & Walsham, 
1990). In order to draw out themes which we have found to be important for our 
understanding, we will concentrate our analysis of the case in terms of our investigative 
framework discussed in Chapters Two and Three, using web model analysis (Kling, 
1987) to structure the section.
8.4.1. INFRASTRUCTURAL AND HISTORIC ISSUES
The technological infrastructure in 1993 was seen as a significant factor in spurring the 
development of ISS, in that the lease for the mainframe based system was due to expire 
in 1995 after some 15 years of usage. It was said by most people there that the feeling 
amongst the civilian IS staff and the Police staff in the IS department at the time was 
that they had to start thinking about what systems were going to replace the mainframe. 
Outside of the IS department, there was also an awareness that the mainframe lease was 
due to expire, but also there was a high level of discontent regarding the systems in the 
Force. The people with influence over ISS in 1993 comprised a small group of people 
within the IS Department: the IS Manager, and the senior police Officers (as illustrated 
in Figure 8.2.). The Officers at the executive level were not perceived as displaying 
much interest in IS, and the lack of a champion for IS at executive level was something 
that those involved with IS bemoaned until the arrival of the new Chief Constable in 
1996.
ISS formation in this case study, between 1994 and 1998, took place against a backdrop 
of a series of continual changes within the Force, both at a strategic level and at an 
operational level. At a strategic level, during 1994 and 1995 there were a series of 
changes in the structuring of the Force, which resulted in changing the number and 
coverage of Divisions, as well as job changes for several hundred people. Again, in 
1997 and 1998, following a review by the newly appointed Chief Constable, more
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restructuring took place, again changing Divisions and jobs. In the first series of 
changes, what no-one outside the IS department took account of was that these changes 
had implications for the information systems in use, for example where some areas 
became the responsibility of new Police stations, or where the personnel systems had to 
be updated to show several hundred role changes, as well as the changes to Divisional 
structures. These changes resulted in the IS staff being inundated with work, and the 
changes being delayed once the implications became apparent in 1995. This was just the 
sort of issue that the IS Manager felt would be addressed by an IS Steering Committee, 
which was set up in 1996. When the second series of changes took place, the IS 
implications had been recognised.
These strategic changes had direct implications for ISS when the Police staff in the IS 
department were relocated to a Strategy and development Department, taking 
responsibility for ISS with them, despite the fact that it was the IS Manager who was 
doing most of the work in developing the ISS.
At an operational level, there were continual staffing changes, particularly amongst 
Police staff, as they moved around on promotion. This was particularly the case at the 
most senior levels, where between 1994 and 1998 all of the senior Managers shown in 
Figures 6.5 and 6.6 either changed role or left the Force. In addition, the IS Department 
faced some difficulty in retaining and recruiting staff, given that they were doing so in a 
city where good IS staff were in great demand from industry.
8.4.2. SOCIAL RELATIONS
In considering the impact of social relations upon the practice of ISS formation, as with 
the preceding case study identify a shift in power configuration relative to ISS formation 
from Closed System to Meritocracy (Mintzberg, 1983), as set out in Table 8.1. below.
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Characteristics Perceived as Shifting: 
Closed System to 
Meritocracy
Evidence:
External 
Coalition (EC)
Passive (in relation to 
ISS formation, but 
elements of increasing 
domination)
The role of influencers operating 
through governmental remit, was 
recognised, but they were not perceived 
to be dominating ISS; the role of SPISS 
was taken account of in relation to 
aligning IT standards; future funding 
was perceived to be linked to initiatives 
(e.g. best value from ISS); external 
coalition seems to be passive, but 
elements of increasing domination in 
relation to ISS.
Internal 
Coalition (IC)
Bureaucratic, shifting to 
becoming Professional,
Discipline based hierarchy; authority of 
Deputy Chief Constable (DCC) 
important for ISS. Project Board set up 
to satisfy perceived bureaucratic 
expectation of external influencers, and 
operated for ISS. Professional experts 
given increasing control of ISS as Police 
staff are moved out.
Apparent Power 
Relationship
IC controlling, but 
some influence from 
EC
IC dominated ISS (subject to funding 
approval), but eventually departure of 
DCC & impact of SPISS, HMIC was 
followed by ISS reflecting EC.
Implications Rise of external 
dependency, potentially, 
but influencers are 
increasingly 
professional experts: 
hence, skills & 
knowledge for complex 
IS work.
Forces affecting ISS formation have 
been perceived to come from within, but 
with influence from some external 
influencers. EC perceived to be largely 
passive for ISS formation, but internal 
coalition seeing professionals as 
influencers
Table 8.1. Power Configuration Analysis (based upon Mintzberg, 1983)
In contrast with the preceding case studies, one of the findings of the analysis in Table
8.1. is the more limited nature of any apparent shift over time which was noted in the 
power configuration (Mintzberg, 1983). The internal coalition, led by the Deputy Chief 
Constable (DCC) remained dominant as ISS formation developed. The external 
coalition could be described as passive during the period of research. The role of SPISS 
as part of an external coalition was acknowledged by those involved in ISS formation 
practice, but otherwise elements of an external coalition were not accorded as dominant 
a position as in the previous case studies. The implication of the analysis if we follow
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Mintzberg's (1983) argument is that there has been an increasing dependency upon the 
professionalism of IS staff within the internal coalition as the configuration shifts to 
Meritocracy. We also note however, that increased political pressures upon the Police 
(Taylor & Williams, 1992; Reiner, 1994; Savage & Leishman, 1996) may suggest that 
Instrument would be an option were it not for the role of professional experts.
We now move on to discuss themes that have arisen from the case with regard to social 
relations, and which have developed as a result of our analysis of ISS formation
8.4.2.I. The Importance of Roles
Several aspects of Roles are important in our understanding of ISS formation in this 
case study. When the idea of ISS was first muted by the then IS Manager in 1993, the 
roles of influence for IS were clear: they were, the Chief Superintendent and 
Superintendent in the IS Department, and the IS Manager, in that order. While the senior 
Police Officers had authority within their own Department, in the Force as a whole, IS 
was not regarded with any importance. There was no one in an executive position with 
any interest, or knowledgability about IS who expressed any wish to develop the area. 
As a consequence, the IS staff saw their own positions of being ones that were 
constantly acting in bottom-up policy fashion, whereby they were developing and 
sending ideas upwards, whereas they would have preferred to receive some top-down 
impetus for IS.
This situation changed to an extent with the appointment of a new Deputy Chief 
Constable, who had responsibility for the IS area. This person brought a combination in 
the role of interest and authority, although the interest was focussed upon seeing the IS 
department improve upon what was regarded as a poor record in developing IS. The 
Deputy Chief Constable recognised his own lack of knowledgability in the IS area, and 
there was some concern among senior staff that the same could be said of the Officers in 
the IS Department; hence, KPMG were recruited as a way of bringing expertise in. This 
combination then played a central role in the ISS processes. The appointment of KPMG 
can be seen in terms of an exercise of power through the manipulation of resources, in 
that the authority of the Deputy Chief Constable enabled him to appoint KPMG to a key 
position to develop ISS.
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In addition, we can also consider this same appointment in terms of an exercise of 
power through the manipulation of perception, which rests "in the ability to persuade 
others to enact realities that further the interests one wishes to pursue" (Morgan, 1986, 
p. 176). The deputy Chief Constable was concerned that the development of ISS should 
be seen to be done with expert help, and the role of KPMG could be seen partially as a 
symbolic act to the Force as a whole. In addition though, the appointment of KPMG was 
also seen to symbolise disquiet regarding the abilities of the IS department (prior to the 
appointment of the new IS manager) to develop ISS.
The recruitment of a new IS Manager was seen as a positive step by all concerned, and 
at the time this role combined both expertise and interest in the area. However, initially 
the role lacked authority in itself to develop ISS in the way that the IS Manager hoped, 
and in addition, the lack of a champion meant that the IS Manager role was not 
supported by someone in a role with authority and interest in IS per se. This changed 
gradually, when for example the IS Manager was given more authority following the 
removal of Police staff from the IS department to the Strategy and development 
Department. At the same time, this was undermined by the retaining of control of ISS by 
the Strategy and development Department. The expert knowledge that the IS Manager 
was recognised as having was not of itself sufficient to enable the exercise of power in 
relation to Police Officers, particularly those also concerned with ISS. It was not until 
after the new Chief Constable who arrived in 1996 instigated further changes in 
structure that the IS Manager was given authority over ISS. At the same time, this 
authority this was buttressed by the position of a champion for IT in the form of the 
Chief Constable, who combined both interest, authority and knowledgability. It should 
be noted that a civilian member of staff, no matter how senior, is not viewed as having 
authority over a Police Officer of any rank, although the apparent support of a senior 
Police figure is perceived as lending a certain weight to their position.
8.4.2.2. Relations with other Agents
Throughout the course of ISS formation, relations with several agents were found to be 
important. The combined presence of what were seen as governmental groups, such as 
the Home Office, the Scottish Office, and the Audit Commission, was instrumental in
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shaping the views of senior Officers regarding the concept of strategy. Continual 
reference was made to these bodies in discussions about strategy, and ISS in particular. 
The role of the HMIC in conducting and reporting upon inspections was another key 
factor. The role of these bodies can be considered in terms of the exercise of power 
through the manipulation of perception (see Table 3.1). We can argue that the visits 
from the HMIC were seen as a ritual, through which norms of best practice are 
encouraged, as demonstrated for example in the declarations of written ISS, and the use 
of project management methods as being best practice (HMIC, 1999). The establishment 
of such cultural norms should not be seen as a one off event (Pettigrew, 1985a), but 
rather a part of an ongoing process of construction and reconstruction of social practice 
in organisational settings (Berger & Luckman, 1967; Giddens, 1984; Reed, 1992). This 
applies also, if less frequently, to the Home Office, Scottish Office, and Audit 
Commission. The release of Papers and Circulars can also be seen as a part of the ritual 
of the shaping of practice, the exercise of power throughout the manipulation of 
perception.
In addition, we can also understand the actions of these groups through the exercise of 
power in terms of the manipulation of perception, through the use of language, in this 
case the use of the language of strategy in relation to ISS (e.g.: Audit Commission, 
1993; Home Office, 1993, 1994; HMIC, 1993, 1998, 1999). Many of those people 
spoken with referred to the change in the use of language that had occurred following 
the release of papers and circulars from the above agents.
We can also think of these agents in terms of the exercise of power through the power of 
the system, in that there is a sense of acceptance that these agents are part and parcel of 
the system, the web of relations within which the reality of organisational practice is 
constructed and reconstructed. The operation of these agents is out of the control of any 
of the people in the organisational setting, but should not be thought of as being in the 
hands of others either. Instead, it is the position and operation of these institutions of 
practice relative to one another through which a web of power relations can be 
considered operational.
The role of KPMG, brought in as consultants by the Deputy Chief Constable can be 
seen as a symbol that the IS staff needed to be monitored, and that the level of expertise
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for ISS based upon past performance was potentially inadequate. This is in effect a 
further exercise of power, understood in terms of the manipulation of perception. Thus 
we see the use of consultants by managers to both bring in expert knowledge, whilst 
also acting as a symbolic message to those in place.
8.4.2.3. Structures and Processes in relation to Decision Making
In this case study the decision making processes between those developing ISS and 
those responsible for authorising this development, and the allocation of resources 
surrounding ISS were conducted through formal means, for example as evidenced by 
the Project Board. While the project team, which included the IS Manager and the 
Superintendent from the Strategy and Development Department were able to develop 
ISS, there was no evidence of informal decision making processes between them and the 
executive level, which contrasted with the position in the Cases A and B.
It could be argued that this a reflection of the size of the Force in terms of manpower. 
We are not persuaded by that, as all of the key actors are located within two floors of the 
Headquarters building. Instead, we find that this formality can be seen as a reflection of 
the exercise of power through the management of process. The use of formal processes 
of decision making in relation to ISS enabled the Deputy Chief Constable to maintain 
control of the agenda for ISS, and to manage the levels of access and participation to 
ISS formation. There was a determination amongst those spoken with that those who 
had previously developed IS were not allowed to control the development of ISS away 
from the view of the executive and other senior Officers. The presence of KPMG on the 
Project Board also added to the sense of managed formality.
This represents a divorce between those with expert knowledge, although as we have 
said for some of those involved in developing ISS this was disputed, who were actively 
engaged in the practice of ISS formation, and those making decisions that would 
ultimately shape ISS formation. That said, given the periods of strategic change which 
we have identified, informal decision making processes would have been subject to 
disruption as staff were moved to other Departments and other Divisions. The formality 
within the process ensured a certain degree of continuity through these times of change, 
something which has been noted as desirable in relation to strategy practice during
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periods of organisational change (Chaffee, 1985; Pettigrew et al, 1992; McLoughlin & 
Clark, 1994).
8.5. SUMMARY
In this case study, ISS formation was perceived to be related to the acquiral of a system, 
with several applications having been installed and with further applications still to be 
installed at the time of writing. While ISS formation was regarded to have halted, we 
have highlighted the domination by an internal coalition, and relative passivity of an 
external coalition leading us to categorise ISS formation in terms of a Meritocracy 
power configuration (Mintzberg, 1983). That said, we have also discussed four themes 
which we have identified as being important in our understanding of the generative 
forces affecting ISS formation, and in particular the analysis has discussed the exercise 
of power in relation to all four conceptualisations outlined in Table 3.1.. We now move 
on to discuss case study D.
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CHAPTER NINE - ISS FORMATION: CASE STUDY D
9.1. CASE D POLICE FORCE
The fieldwork for this case study was initially focused upon the practice surrounding the 
strategic decision to implement the PQR system (N.B.: not the actual acronym for the 
system; changed for anonymity purposes), which formed the heart of ISS within the 
Force between 1993 and 1998. In this case study we conducted fieldwork during the 
period 1995 to 1998, with an intensive period of study being conducted during July, 
August and September 1996. In all, we interviewed 117 people in the Force, some on 
several occasions over the period of research. A large number of the people interviewed 
were seen during the intensive period of fieldwork in 1996. This was in addition to 
informal discussions with these and other people during the period of fieldwork.
We have investigated historic events associated with IS in the Force as it became 
apparent that these were important to our understanding of ISS formation. The 
development of ISS and subsequent implementation of the PQR system provided the 
focus for our period of engagement, this being a prerequisite for validity in case study 
research (Pettigrew, 1985a; Yin, 1989).
9.2. BACKGROUND TO CASE STUDY
Case D Police Force is responsible for a population of just under 280,000 which inhabits 
an area covering over 12,000 square miles. To Police the area, an authorised 
establishment of 648 Police officers and 260 civilian staff are provided, and a budget of 
£35 million (Case D Police Force, 1997). Like others, this Force faced budgetary 
challenges since Chief Constables were given sole responsibility for the budget from 
April 1996. For example, this resulted in the Chief Constable having to find £990,000 of 
savings across the Force following the 1996/97 budget allocation (Case D Police Force, 
1997). Force expenditure on IT normally amounted to around 1% of gross expenditure, 
with the IS department receiving a revenue budget of £210,000 in 1997/98, having
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asked for £280,000 to meet its plans. This compares with £279,000 in 1994/5, £249,000 
in 1995/96, and £238,000 in 1996/97.
In terms of structure the reporting structure of IT within the Force is shown in Figure
9.1. below:
Deputy Chief Constable
Chief Constable
Chief Inspector 
Head o f  IT
Chief Superintendent 
Headquarters
IT Manager 
Police Inspector (-93) 
Civilian (93-)
Figure 9.1. IT Reporting Structure 1990-1998
9.3. INFORMATION SYSTEMS STRATEGY FORMATION
Case D Police Force’s earliest exposure to computer based IS was through a link to the 
Police national computer (PNC) which was established in the mid-1970s, and then a 
link to the Scottish criminal records office (SCRO) in the mid-1980s. During 1986 and 
1987 a collaborative development was said to have taken place with the computer 
company ICL and Lancashire Constabulary, following a personal contact that a senior 
officer had with ICL. Having spent £60,000, in 1988 the Force ended up with a 
mainframe based system which did not operate effectively, said to be because the 
system was slow, and the process for recording crime bore little relation to the existing 
processes. This experience was generally regarded as an expensive disaster for the 
Force. In 1990, the first PC's were bought for the Force by one of the two Police officers
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in the Research and Development Unit who dealt with IT, and distributed to 
headquarters department and to divisional stations.
The common view of those spoken with was that the concept of strategy only came to be 
considered by Police Forces in the early 1990s following the publication of a series of 
Home Office circulars (e.g. Home Office, 1983, 1993) and Audit Commission papers 
(e.g. Audit Commission, 1990, 1993), together with the increased attention being given 
to issues of strategy during inspection visits by the HMIC. In particular, there was 
increasing referral during visits by the HMIC to strategy for IS as representing best 
practice, and this concept came to appear with regularity in HMIC reports (HMIC, 1992, 
1996, 1997, 1997a, 1998, 1999). The combination of these factors was said to have 
brought the concept of strategy to the attention of many senior staff, not least in the area 
of IS given the growing recognition of the importance of IS, and the cost.
Within Case D Police Force the idea of strategic planning had been in evidence in the
form of five year development plans, the first of which was produced in 1975. In 1988,
having had a major IT development in the Force which proved to be what was later
described as a disaster, it was recognised by senior officers that,
"with the increasing scope, complexity and financial implications associated 
with information technology, it has been realised that a project by project 
reactive style of approach is no longer suitable" (Case D Police Force, 1990, 
chp.8).
As a result of this, a Research and Development unit was set up in June 1988 with 
responsibility for IT. The staff comprised one Inspector and two Sergeants whose duties 
were to oversee all IT development. In August 1988 the Inspector overseeing IT 
requested a Computer Development Survey by a firm called Knowledge Technology (a 
representative of whom was known to one of the senior Officers) who were asked to 
make recommendations regarding future use of IT. This firm recommended that:
• A local area network be established in the main urban area, with a wide area 
network throughout the Force
• A standardisation on personal computers
• An increase in staffing of at least 6 further people
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To address these recommendations, a computer strategy group was formed, chaired by 
the Chief Constable, with a range of senior officers and heads of department 
represented, and one of their first actions was to authorise the development of a network 
for the Force, with the work to be undertaken by the Research and Development unit. 
The group was to meet once every four to six months, which they did up until 1992, 
when they stopped meeting. Why they stopped meeting never became clear, it just 
seems that they did. The strategy group set out to provide:
■ A statement of direction from top management
■ Identification of the major requirements for resources and investment
■ A framework for setting priorities, concentrating resources in key areas and 
allocating responsibilities
■ Ground rules and standards to create the environment for taking decisions on 
individual projects (Case D Police Force, 1990).
The establishment of the network proved to be so onerous a task that the Inspector in 
charge of the unit insisted that a review of staffing be undertaken. In 1990 the computer 
strategy group granted a request for the National Computing Centre (NCC) to be 
allowed to audit and make recommendations regarding the staffing of IT in the Force.
The NCC made several recommendations (NCC, 1990), which were:
• That the Research and Development and Communications section be merged to 
form the Information Technology Department
• That the Information Technology Department consists of civilian staff and 
management reporting to a senior Officer in the Force
• That the Force carry out an IT strategy review
• That the establishment of 21 posts be approved. This establishment would 
replace the current 14 posts currently in the Communications, Research and 
Development Units, and the WARC Implementation team
• That a suitable standby agreement is approved for those civilian posts required to 
provide out of hours support.
Following the NCC report, an ISS planning process (as shown in Figure 9.2. below) was 
adopted from the NCC by the computer strategy group, and was stated as being a
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process that was intended to serve the Force until 1995 (Case D Police Force, 1990, 
Sec.8).
D iscussion
Initiation Verification
Technology
review
Force Aims
Information
requirement Analysis o f options
Information 
system study
Assess existing 
systems
Strategy &
strategic
planning
Figure 9.2. IS Strategic Planning Process (Case D Police Force, 1990, sec. 8)
In fact, so far as those involved with the group, as well as those observing its actions, 
this strategic planning process was no more than a paper based illustration, and by no 
means represented what actually happened. Most people commenting upon the 
operation of the strategy group at this time were of the opinion that it was not so much
ineffectual, as just "didn't happen ... ever" according to members of that group. Most
people were of the view that it was thanks to this group that the Force ended up with 
what he referred to as a hotchpotch and ad-hoc development of systems.
In addition to setting out the Strategic Planning Process, the development plan for the 
Force specified the ISS for the next five years, this being (in brief):
■ To replace ICL equipment with personal computers
■ To introduce new applications including: message switching; crime reporting; liquor 
licensing; custody recording
■ To install PNC2
■ To train staff as necessary
■ To keep abreast of new technology (Case D Police Force, 1990)
This group continued to meet about once every six months from 1988 until 1992. At this 
time the IT area was being managed, and principally run by Police officers, and the 
drive to consider strategy came principally from the officer leading the section.
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However, despite the setting out of the strategic planning process the strategy group was 
seen by other staff as too operationally oriented, acting more as a checkpoint team 
ticking projects off rather than as a group thinking about strategy. By 1992 a range of IT 
was in place, and a relationship had been established with a company (who we shall 
term XYZ Ltd. from hereon) as a supplier of systems software. It was with this company 
that the CCRS (Computerised Crime Reporting System - later known as PQR) system 
was developed and implemented, the system that formed the basis of IT developments 
in the Force throughout the 1990s. Given this, it is interesting to note that despite the 
documented IS Strategic Planning Process as laid out in Fig.9.2., the IT developments in 
the Force were according to several people led not by the computer strategy group but 
by the Police officer leading the IT department. Indeed, as noted in a previous section, 
for a number of senior officers it seemed that the supplier, XYZ Ltd., was providing 
much of the impetus for IS direction in the Force up until the mid-1990s.
In November 1990 and April 1991, following the report by the NCC, a couple of 
meetings of the computer strategy group were held in which specific technological 
developments were considered. The Chief Constable chaired the group, and present 
were the IT manager together with representatives from several operational and support 
departments. This group however was generally regarded as one that became far to 
immersed in technical detail without taking time to consider higher level aspects of 
direction - or strategy. However, in principal the recommendations of the NCC report 
were accepted, although only two extra posts were agreed. It was also agreed at the 
second of these meetings that an IT strategy review should be carried out by the newly 
formed IT department.
9.3.1. ISS  FORMA TION & THE PQR SYSTEM
During 1990 and 1991 an alliance was formed between a senior police Officer and XYZ 
Ltd. which was to be instrumental in the development of systems during the remainder 
of the 1990s. The Research and Development unit had instigated the purchase of a 
custody office application and a crime recording system from XYZ Ltd. after seeing the 
systems demonstrated in an English Police Force. The Officer in charge of the IT
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department became aware of this development, this person becoming the principle 
contact between the company and Case D Police Force.
In 1992 an IT strategy document was produced by the Officer in charge of the IT
department. Within this document, strategy is described as,
'simply a plan for building a bridge between what information is available now 
in the Force and what is likely to be required in the future and the most cost 
effective use of technology to implement the plan.' (Case D Police Force, 1992, 
p.l).
The objective expressed within the document is to,
'develop a strategy that is clear, achievable, financially viable, which 
encompasses the annual objectives and which will be fully endorsed by the Chief 
Constable's Computer strategy Group' (Case D Police Force, 1992, p.l).
The document referred to objectives (see Appendix 5) which were to be encompassed in 
the Strategy, and which had been submitted earlier that year as a part of the annual 
development of Departmental and Force objectives. The IT Strategy document sets out a 
review of the existing systems together with a plan to develop and implement a suite of 
applications from XYZ Ltd. over the next two years. No other firms are considered in 
this document, and no suggestion is made that a tender should be placed in order to 
attract interest from other suppliers. The strategy document also suggests the 
implementation of PRINCE as a project management method through which the project 
could be managed, although in fact nothing further happened in respect of PRINCE at 
this time. The document is primarily an overview of what had been delivered 
technologically, and what was planned in the short to medium term. The document 
addresses how this is to be done to a limited degree in relation to the objectives which 
are set out in Appendix 5, but the question of why this should be done is not considered. 
The IT strategy document was a report upon activity in progress in relation to what was 
to become known as the PQR system, and which was to form the basis of IT 
development in the Force throughout the 1990s.
The principal thrust of this development was the CCRS/PQR system in association with 
XYZ Ltd., and a PRINCE project management structure was outlined as providing the 
means of overseeing the strategy. It was at around this time that the strategy group
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ceased to meet, this coinciding with the departure of the officer leading the IT 
department on secondment.
The ISS set out in the Fourth Development Plan in 1990 and the IT strategy document 
of 1992 were similar in that neither set out a business case for the specified 
developments, and neither sought to articulate how they would link to the strategy being 
pursued within the Force overall.
An agreement was reached with XYZ Ltd. by the IT Department acting on behalf of the 
executive for the development of a suite of applications for Case D Police Force, 
initially relating to custody recording, crime reporting and road accident data recording. 
These applications had arisen from discussions between the head of the IT department 
and XYZ Ltd.. This suite of applications was the precursor to a system that was to be 
known as the PQR system within the Force. The nature of the agreement between the 
Force and XYZ Ltd. was described as a developmental relationship (Case D Police 
Force, 1993) whereby a quarterly fee was paid to XYZ Ltd. for development of systems, 
the intention being that XYZ Ltd. could then sell these systems on to other Police 
Forces. There was no contractual agreement between the Force and XYZ Ltd., and 
consequently no contractual deadline or penalty clauses for example. The exact nature 
of the agreement between the Force and XYZ Ltd. was to cause concern throughout the 
life of the project, although one of the key benefits alluded to in project documentation 
was a cost saving relative to other Police Forces amounting to "hundreds of thousands 
of pounds" (Case D Police Force, 1993). Interestingly, the exact manner in which the 
relationship between XYZ Ltd. and the Force was forged was something that no-one, 
and for that matter no documentation, seemed able to shed any light upon, and nor were 
any savings ever identified.
From 1992 onwards was described as a time of crisis management in relation to IT, as 
frustration with the CCRS system led to numerous meetings which were held to decide 
whether to abandon the project. Three years after the recommendation by NCC, a 
civilian IT manager was appointed in October 1993. However, the CCRS/PQR project 
was kept separate from the IT department, with control residing with two Police officers 
in the project team, and this provided a source of ongoing tension between the two 
areas. This was never resolved, and only ended when the project team was eventually
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disbanded in 1995, although this then meant that the staff in the IT department felt that 
they then had the PQR system dumped on them.
The IT manager then sought to establish a group to address strategic issues associated 
with IT, although this took some time to set up. It was not until March 1995 that a new 
IT related strategy group convened, with the group meeting approximately every two 
months for the next couple of years. The IT strategy group was initially responsible for 
looking at all areas of IT in the Force with the exception of the PQR project. There 
existed a couple of project groups sitting under the IT strategy group, looking at issues 
associated with the development of e-mail, and a communications project. However, the 
PQR project sat outside the responsibility of the IT strategy group, and was instead 
overseen by a separate project board, albeit that one member of the strategy group sat on 
this project board as well. The Police officer who had overall responsibility for the IT 
department at this time was eventually able to persuade senior officers that the PQR 
project should be under the remit of the IT strategy group, and not separate from it. It 
was not until January 1996 that this happened, at the same time that the project board 
and the project team were disbanded, with responsibility for PQR being passed to the IT 
strategy group and the IT department respectively. The reason for the disbandment of 
the project team was that with Phase One of the project at an end, the officers should be 
allowed to return to other duties having been seconded to the team for over three years, 
and particularly to allow one of the Police officers to broaden his experience with a view 
to gaining promotion. The decisions, regarding the disbandment of the project team, and 
the notional end of phase one were decided by two senior Police officers who were 
members of the project board.
The establishment of a new strategy group at that time was described by a senior
member of staff, who said that as there was,
"no strategic direction for anything .. It would probably have been more difficult 
to change if that old [strategy] group had been in existence, because it wasn’t 
there and there was nothing it was really quite easy".
The strategy group comprised a chief superintendent chairing the group, an area 
commander, the superintendent operational support, a sergeant representing users, the IT 
manager, the communications manager, the force finance officer, and the data protection 
officer.
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The operation of the strategy group in 1995 was described by one of its members thus,
"Well, we make some statements about what we are going to be doing. For 
instance at the last but one meeting it was formally decided that we would 
extend our data network to these one-man stations. So th a t.. so that’s a one line 
statement of strategy that we decided upon. You’d probably find that two 
meetings ago there was another one about something else, and you could 
probably crawl through the minutes of this group which you could piece together 
and produce a page or two of where we’re going. So, another thing that that 
group does is commission projects. It does that with .. because it hasn’t got this 
formal framework of a strategy to refer back to it has a sort of sub-conscious 
idea of what the strategy is, and hence kicks them off in relation to that."
This sub-conscious idea of strategy was alluded to by all of the senior staff involved in
the strategy group. Since the published IT strategy in 1992, nothing further had been
published as an IT strategy for the Force, although each member of the group said that
they felt that each of others would agree with them as to what the strategy was for IS,
even though they had never set it out it formally. One of the reasons for this given by
one member of the group was that no business plan had been produced for the Force,
and hence it made it very difficult for an ISS to be produced in support of something
that was not there. As one senior member of the IT strategy group commented,
"we haven't yet at a senior level managed to get that message across, that there's 
no point us writing an IS/IT strategy that sets the agenda for the next five years if 
it conflicts with the business plan. Just on a .... basically, if we have a strategy 
which says, the data-network will go to these places, and in two years time 
they're going to close these places down ... I mean, so. One, the IT strategy needs 
to have a business plan, but we haven't got a business plan ... in any formal 
sense, so it's difficult for us to have a formal IT strategy".
In 1995, an IT strategy document was drafted for circulation amongst the strategy group, 
and set out what was currently happening in respect of IS together with a stated 
intention to continue this development. The development referred to was the PQR 
system. This discussion document was never formalised however, and just lay in a file 
following the resignation of the IT manager from the Force in June 1996. The 
document's main point is that without any business strategy available for the Force it is 
hard to develop a meaningful IT Strategy as this involves guessing operational 
requirements. Beyond this, the document sets out a review of current and likely future 
needs in terms of software, hardware, networks, and staffing.
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While the PQR system continued to be developed, a lot of the work of the strategy 
group was concerned with addressing the problems being experienced with PQR. 1996 
and 1997 saw IT developments continue, as outlined previously, while strategy was 
driven by circumstance, in particular, the need to ensure that PQR and the HOLMES 
system were both year 2000 compliant. Throughout 1996 and 1997 the IT strategy group 
continued to meet every three to four months, although no formal strategy was 
produced. Following a meeting between of an IT users group in July 1997, a meeting of 
the IT strategy group in September of that year agreed that the PQR system was 
inadequate for the needs of the Force, and develop a new ISS
In May 1997 an inspection by the HIMC led to a couple of recommendations regarding 
strategy in the Force. One recommendation was that a corporate business plan for the 
Force should be produced as soon as possible. Linked to this was another 
recommendation which said that an ISS should be produced as soon as possible, taking 
into account the corporate business plan of the Force (HMIC, 1997a, Recommendations 
2 & 5). Despite this, an ISS was not produced. Once again the IT staff said that the 
development of the new ISS had to await the release of a new business strategy for the 
Force. Unfortunately, the production of the latter was delayed until September 1998, 
which meant that it was not expected that the ISS document was not likely to be 
produced until the early part of 1999. This meant that the Force continued to operate 
without a formal ISS. By mid-1998 the IT staff were of the view that PQR would be 
retained after all, and would probably remain as the main IS for at least another five 
years until applications from the National ISS (SPISS) became available.
Most of the IT staff commented in mid-1998 that the IT department responded to a
series of initiatives as they arose rather than moving in pursuance of any particular
strategic aims. The ISS amounted to a concept of maintaining PQR until such time as
application modules became available from the Scottish Police ISS This continuing
lack of formal strategy was commented upon by the HMIC in a follow-up visit, noting
the pressures upon the I.T staff as a consequence of this situation, whereby,
"without a published force IS/IT strategy, the Information Technology 
Department is requiring to continually explain and link departmental proposals 
to a concept, rather than to a hard copy document which the rest of the force is 
aware of and committed to." (HMIC, 1998d, Sec.4).
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This situation had by and large existed for the majority of the decade, during which time 
the PQR system had formed the basis of IS development in the Force. Nonetheless, 
throughout this period, senior staff were satisfied that there was a clear ISS, albeit not 
formalised in documentation. It is at this point we can look at the PQR system in more 
detail, given that this formed the focus for ISS during the 1990s.
9.3.2. DEVELOPMENTS IN  THE PQR SYSTEM
Initially, the applications from XYZ Ltd. were absorbed within what was known as the 
CCRS project, which was principally intended as a facility for recording crimes, 
interrogation of data (referred to as criminal intelligence), and for producing related 
reports as necessary. In addition, a custody recording application from XYZ Ltd. was 
introduced into the Force. These modules were piloted at a Police station in Aviemore, 
going live in January 1992. While the system was had been intended as a means of 
managing the reporting and processing of crimes, the systems was being used in practice 
as a means of recording all incidents with which the Police dealt. It was later recognised 
that this unintended usage was at the root of the main problems that were being 
experienced in the pilot scheme, in that the system became extremely slow to operate, 
and crashed frequently. However, what was not clear was how this unintended usage 
had come about: it seemed that in deciding to take the system from XYZ Ltd. based 
upon its usage in an English Force, the actual usage in that Force compared to the 
intended usage at Case D Police Force had not been considered.
In February 1993 a debate about the future of the system was ongoing when the Police 
officer who was managing the IT department was seconded away from the Force for a 
three year period, and another Police officer was appointed to manage the IT 
department, this time coming from the training department. This secondment in itself 
caused some resentment amongst officers, as it meant a promotion to the rank of 
Superintendent for an officer who had only recently reached the rank of Chief Inspector, 
and who had risen through the ranks working with IT. For whatever reason, it was said 
that this caused some senior officers to resent the CCRS project even more.
Consideration was given by the Chief Inspector who took control of the IT Department 
to abandoning the system completely, and waiting for the emergence of national IS
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applications in several years time. However, in the event he was persuaded to stick with 
it after assurances from technical staff and from XYZ Ltd. that the problems were 
teething problems only. Following this, it was recognised by the Chief Inspector who 
was now responsible for the IT department that project management needed to be 
rethought. One of the reasons for this was that the supplier, XYZ Ltd., was running 
virtually all aspects of the project, with little control by the client -  Case D Police Force. 
A request was made to appoint a senior Police officer, of Superintendent rank or above, 
to lead the project, although in the event a junior ranking officer, a sergeant, was 
appointed to lead the project team, together with a Police constable.
The project team commissioned a series of new applications to be developed by XYZ
Ltd., and work on these continued during 1993 and 1994, following publication of the
PID by the project team in September 1993. One of statements given particular
emphasis within this document was that in order to repeat past problems with IT,
"the philosophy to be adopted therefore, to prevent history repeating itself, must 
be: UNDER-PROMISE and OVER-DELIVER at all times" (Case D Police 
Force, 1993, p.3; original emphasis.)
As time progressed, most staff spoken within the course of this research considered that
the project had achieved the exact opposite of this statement. Part of the reason for this
was attributed to the dominance of the supplier, the apparent remoteness of the project
team from both the IT department and from users in the Force, and a failure to put in
place an adequate technological infrastructure. In this respect, a comment of one
member of the executive in 1996 was perhaps instructive; in reflecting upon the
continued problems with the system he said,
"the problem with PQR was that we tried to do it on the cheap .. that was the 
problem".
No-one spoken with provided an assessment which contradicted this view.
During 1994 and 1995 all of the applications piloted at Aviemore were gradually 
implemented across the Force area, with the final two command areas going live in July 
1995, with the exception of an application for producing crime reports. The project team 
continued to work with XYZ Ltd. further developing the applications within PQR, and 
gradually implementing these upgraded applications across the Force area. Although by 
mid-1995, PQR had been installed in all of the main Police stations in the Force,
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performance of the system was causing considerable concern to those using the system, 
and to the IT department who were receiving the brunt of complaints. The system had 
become slower and slower. An example of the seriousness of the situation was that an 
area commander of the busiest division in the Force refused to allow the system to be 
used for crime recording and the preparation of crime reports. The reason for this refusal 
was that he, and his staff, were concerned that the poor reliability and slowness of the 
system would negatively affect the ability of the Police officers and civilian staff to 
produce reports for the Procurator Fiscal.
One issue that caused frustration for IT staff who were faced with trying to improve the 
performance of the system throughout the life of the PQR project was the absence of a 
data model for the system. This also caused them problems when trying to access data 
from the system, as they had no idea of the underlying data structure. Despite repeated 
requests for such a model, once the IT staff became aware that there was no documented 
model, XYZ Ltd. varied in their response from saying that they could have one, to 
saying that one was being produced, to finally saying in 1998 that they could not have 
one as a matter of principle - shortly before the company collapsed. Allied to this was 
the absence of any formal documentation pertaining to the system, except for the 
aforementioned PID which was produced almost two years after the project started.
9.3.3. ISS  AND MANAGEMENT CHANGES
On the IT management front, in the latter part of 1994 the Police post as IT manager had 
been redesignated to have responsibility for a range of management services 
departments in addition to IT, and hence, the civilian IT manager assumed sole 
responsible for IT, on paper at least. Indeed, in practice too this was the case as the 
Police officer with overall responsibility was content to allow the IT manager to assume 
the management of the department. However, other Police officers in the Force were 
said to operate as if the Police Officer was still in charge of IT, which was seen as a 
source of frustration to both.
In September 1995, the officer who had originally been leading the I.T department up 
until 1992 returned from secondment to take up his post in management services, which 
now incorporated responsibility for IT amongst other duties. This officer was recognised
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as having a more hands-on approach to IT, which caused some resentment amongst 
some of the IT staff who felt that they were again being directed by the Police officer 
rather than managed by the IT manager. During the first half of 1996 six of the ten 
civilian IT staff resigned, including the IT manager. The small number of staff in the 
department had necessitated a considerable degree of specialism amongst staff, and the 
loss of so many staff placed an additional workload on those remaining. At the end of 
1995, the project team were disbanded, with the two team member returning to other 
duties. In January 1996 Sole responsibility for PQR was then transferred to the IT 
department, although up until this point the IT staff had had comparatively little 
involvement in much of the development of the PQR system.
The members of the PQR project board decided towards the end of 1995 that Phase one 
of the project was coming to an end, and that the project team and the project board 
should be disbanded, which they were in December 1995. At the same time, the IT 
strategy group,were given responsibility for the PQR project. It was then decided by the 
Police Officer with responsibility for IT that a review of PQR should be carried out with 
a view to developing what was being called phase two. While some senior officers were 
concerned that they should get the basic PQR system working before developing it even 
further, the review was aimed at both improvement and enhancement. The Phase two 
review occurred between July and September 1996. The report was not seen as being 
well received by the officer in charge of IT because of the critical comment made 
regarding PQR, and the wide range of developments recommended.
During August 1996, a new Chief Constable was appointed to the Force, this person 
having come from leading a Force that was perceived to be quite advanced in the use of 
IT. Consequently, many staff viewed the appointment as an opportunity for the 
enhancement of IT in the Force, a view reinforced after the appointment of a new IT 
manager in September 1996. Following the PQR Phase 2 report, a meeting was held 
between the Police officer overseeing IT, ex-members of the project team and selected 
staff from the Force. Discussion of the system followed with a closing message that 
further development of the system was ongoing. The nature of the relationship with 
XYZ Ltd. had by this time changed, whereby a seven year contract had been signed with 
XYZ Ltd. for development and maintenance of the system. The signing of this contract 
had not been subject to discussion with the IT staff, and indeed was there was little
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awareness of the nature of the relationship with XYZ Ltd. amongst senior staff in the 
Force.
In 1997 two further IT staff left after a review into the terms and conditions of civilian 
staff had failed to affect their gradings, bringing the staff turnover during the preceding 
twelve months to 80%. Consequently, 1997 proved to be a difficult time as new staff 
were brought in to a department that was facing major demands. Not least amongst 
these was preparation for the year 2000, as the PQR system and the HOLMES system 
required to be updated. In addition, the staff were working towards the implementation 
of e-mail for the transmission of reports to the procurator fiscal which had a deadline of 
September 1997. In 1996 XYZ Ltd. had been awarded a contract by the Police officer 
overseeing the IT department to implement the necessary e-mail functionality to allow 
such transmission. By mid-1997, the IT manager was informed that XYZ Ltd. were not 
after all going to implement the required e-mail functionality, but only a part of it. This 
meant that the deadline was missed, and that further costs had to be incurred in setting 
up the e-mail service, which was not implemented until 1998.
During 1997, little further progress was made in developing new applications for the 
PQR system, although some enhancements were made to features within the system. 
These changes were viewed positively by the users of the system, given that they 
addressed in particular the considerable problems surrounding the entry and 
manipulation of large amounts of text. In July 1997, a meeting was held between senior 
members of the IT staff, various other staff from around the Force area who used PQR, 
including various senior Police officers including the Chief Constable. At this meeting, 
a number of presentations were made in which continuing problems with PQR were 
made clear, reiterating the findings of the 1996 study. One of the issues raised at this 
meeting was with regard to the lengthy contract which had been awarded to XYZ Ltd. 
by the Superintendent overseeing the IT Department. The view was put forward from 
the Police officer overseeing IT that this contract could be changed in favour of the 
Force. A few weeks later, at a meeting of the ISS group in September 1997, it was 
accepted that the rather than develop PQR further, a new system should be considered, 
and a working party was formed to develop this. This group only met twice however 
before a further change occurred.
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During the early part of 1998, a change occurred in the Police management of the IT 
area, with a new officer coming into the management services post. This person was 
seen as someone who less inclined to have such a hands-on approach to IT as the 
previous incumbent, a move that was welcomed in the IT department. By this time, 
thoughts of abandoning the PQR system had been put to one side in the light of the 
developing national strategy for IS in Scotland. However, the Force were still dependent 
upon XYZ Ltd. for maintenance of software, although this was put in some jeopardy 
when the firm ceased trading in May 1998. Within a short space of time it transpired 
that XYZ Ltd.'s business was being taken over by another organisation, Zedan, who 
would continue to provide support for the PQR system. Further hardware upgrades 
occurred at the end of 1997 and early in 1998 which had seen system response and 
reliability improve considerably. By mid-1998 it was anticipated within the IT 
department that the PQR system would remain in usage for at least another 5 years, with 
the gradual replacement of application modules by those emerging from the National 
ISS
Throughout 1997 and 1998 the nature of management of the IT area remained an area of 
concern to the HMIC. The HMIC had commented upon the lack of a direct line of 
communication between the computer manager and the executive level in 1997 (HMIC, 
1997a). Upon inspecting the Force again in 1998 the HMIC was disappointed to find 
that the situation had not changed, with a Police officer still reporting on behalf of the 
computer manager to the executive level, although it did seem that the computer 
manager's views were being heard at the highest management levels (HMIC, 1998d).
9.4. DISCUSSION
In seeking to understand ISS formation at Case D Police Force we have identified 
several issues which have emerged from our analysis of the case study. In addressing 
ISS there are a range of other issues which are embedded in a broad stream of 
organisational practice (Mintzberg, 1978; Johnson, 1997) which we must examine if we 
are to grasp the intricate socio-political nature of ISS formation (Waema & Walsham, 
1990). In order to draw out themes which we have found to be important for our 
understanding, we will concentrate our analysis of the case in terms of our investigative 
framework discussed in Chapters Two and Three.
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9.4.1. INFRASTRUCTURAL AND HISTORIC ISSUES
There was a history of developing five year plans within the Force, the first having been 
produced in 1975 by the then Chief Constable. Subsequent plans had been produced, not 
always for five years and sometimes with gaps between the expiry of one and the 
creation of the next, and generally they had been produced by a small group of the most 
senior managers. Thus the Policy Forum continued a tradition of policy making, but 
one that represented an approach that sought to be more inclusive in policy setting. 
Except for the production of an IT strategy document in 1992, and a draft discussion 
strategy in 1995, IS was developed without a formal strategy, described as subconscious 
strategy by members of the strategy group. Ironically, while the focus of IS efforts in the 
Force were centred upon the development of PQR, responsibility for PQR was kept 
separate from the IT strategy group until January 1996, some years after the project had 
commenced.
The technical infrastructure in 1993 was seen as uncoordinated, and had been developed 
in a haphazard manner. Applications had been developed in isolation, and indeed little 
IT existed in the Force outside of the main urban area. The systems reflected types 1 and 
2 in our classification of IS in Policing, (Table 6.1.). While this lack of IT maturity 
(Galliers & Sutherland, 1991) relative to other sectors presented an opportunity to utilise 
IT in many areas of Policing (Home Office, 1993), it also presented an opportunity to 
some staff to influence this development, and to make a positive impression for their 
own career advantage (Weatheritt, 1986; Ackroyd et al, 1992). While Galliers & 
Sutherland (1991) make the presumption that professional IT staff will be involved in 
developing ISS and IS services, no matter what the stage of development, in this Case, it 
was Police Officers alone who acted as the developers of IT. This can be seen as 
representative of a cultural facet of the Police service, people who like to see themselves 
as pragmatists who will just get on and do whatever needs doing (Holdaway, 1989; 
Reiner, 1994), whether they have been trained for it or not. That aspect of culture is 
changing with increasing the civilianisation of specialist positions (Savage & Leishman, 
1996).
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The IT that was in place reflected the work of the Police Officers in the Research and 
Development unit, and can be seen in terms of the exercise of power through the 
manipulation of resources, in particular expert knowledge in and control of IT. We 
qualify use of the term expert as these people were trained Police Officers, not IT 
professionals. It was this position that enabled them to buy-in network technology which 
was subsequently seen as handicapping the Force through use of proprietary network 
and terminal protocols, rather than industry standard. These protocols had been acquired 
at the recommendation of the supplier, something which tends to reinforce the view of 
other senior Officers that the Police are naive when dealing with suppliers.
The ability of staff to control IT development in this way can be seen as a consequence 
not just of a lack of ISS, but also as a result of the withdrawal of the most senior 
management from involvement with IS. While the Chief Constable sat occasionally on 
the computer strategy group, in practice this did not discuss strategy, but particular 
technical issues. Hence, this discussion tended to go unchallenged. The Chief Constable, 
and Deputy Chief Constable were generally seen as disinterested in IT personally, and 
willing to leave the development of IS completely in the hands of whoever was leading 
the IT department. The effect of this, rightly or not, was for this to be regarded as a 
withdrawal by senior management from the ISS process, something which can leave a 
vacuum for others to fill (Levine & Rossmoore, 1995).
The changes in structure throughout the duration of our fieldwork were continuous. 
While structural change at a strategic level took place just before PQR emerged, in 
1991/92, and later in 1997/98, there were ongoing operational changes. The senior 
police Officer leading the IT Department changed in 1994, reverting back in 1996. The 
person leading the IT unit up to 1994 and after 1996 was seen as someone who was very 
much hands-on, and with a strong interest in, and perceived knowledge of, IT. This style 
of operation was not appreciated by the civilian IT staff, both because of the way in 
which this person dominated both strategic and operational activity. Following the 
return of this person in 1996, 7 out of the 10 IT staff left the Force, which in itself 
caused problems, given the specialist knowledge which each had. The second Officer 
who took charge of the IT department was regarded as someone with a more hands-off 
approach, who while interested in making the systems work, was content to leave the 
operation of IT to the IT staff.
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The senior management team also changed during 1996 and 1997, with a new Chief 
Constable and Deputy Chief Constable. The new Chief Constable was seen as someone 
with a keen interest in IT, and was regarded as something of a champion for the IT 
department following what was seen as years of exclusion from the senior levels. 
Nonetheless, the IT manager was still not included in senior management discussion, a 
fact which drew criticism from the HMIC (HMIC, 1998d).
In addition, the ongoing tension due to the structuring of responsibilities for the PQR 
project, between the Project team and the IT Department, only added to the feeling that 
IS was developing against a background of mistrust and change. Historically, the 
purchase of a system in the 1980s that was regarded as a disaster by many people was 
reflected in their comments regarding problems that arose with PQR - it was perceived 
in terms of, "...oh no, here we go again!", which demonstrates the view of IT as 
subjective phenomena, as social actant (Latour, 1995).
In relation to strategy, we note that an attempt was made in the 1992 IT strategy 
document to take account of the Force objectives by referencing the objectives of the IT 
department, which had themselves been developed as part of the Force strategy process 
earlier in 1992. However, this was perceived as a token gesture, as the Fourth 
Development Plan had been published two years earlier (Case D Police Force, 1990) 
and the IT strategy document makes no reference to this plan. The lack of linkage 
between ISS and what the business wants to do is generally regarded as a problem 
(Atkins, 1994; Galliers et al, 1994a; Auer & Reponen, 1997).
9.4.2. SOCIAL RELATIONS
In considering the impact of social relations upon the practice of ISS formation, we tend 
towards suggesting a shifting power configuration relative to ISS formation from 
Political Arena to Instrument (Mintzberg, 1983), although the way in which an internal 
coalition is perceived differs from the first two case studies. This is shown in Table 9.1. 
below.
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Characteristics Perceived as 
shifting : 
Political Arena 
to Instrument:
Evidence:
External 
Coalition (EC)
Dominating 
(having been 
passive)
A group of influencers operating through 
governmental remit, if not explicitly in concert; 
Increase in activity of HMIC, audit 
commission, SPISS; funding linked to 
initiatives (e.g. best value from ISS); external 
coalition seems to have become dominating 
after being passive in relation to ISS.
Internal 
Coalition (IC)
Politicized Discipline based hierarchy; power vacuum at 
executive level re: ISS; focus of power for ISS 
around senior officer, with expert roles filled by 
appointed staff; these roles face challenge 
following civilian expertise and change in 
senior staff. ISS stagnation. Project Board set 
up to satisfy perceived bureaucratic expectation 
of external influencers, but not seen to be 
influential for ISS.
Apparent Power 
Relationship
EC ==> IC (IC
increasingly
controlled)
IC dominated ISS, & impact of SPISS, HMIC 
was followed by ISS reflecting EC.
Implications Eventual 
replacement of 
one dominant 
influencer by 
another
ISS for PQR initially controlled from IC. 
Following stagnation in ISS formation, 
increased acknowledgement of perceived 
impact of HIMC, SPISS, CCJIS, on ISS.
Table 9.1. Power Configuration Analysis (based upon Mintzberg, 1983)
One of the findings of the analysis in Table 9.1. is the apparent shift over time which we 
noted in the power configuration (Mintzberg, 1983). Although we tend towards viewing 
a shifting power configuration, from Political Arena to Instrument, the internal 
coalition, led by one influencer, was initially dominant as ISS formation revolved 
around PQR. The external coalition could be described as passive. Following the 
departure of, and after the majority of PQR applications were installed, ISS formation 
was perceived to have slowed. Following stagnation in ISS, and a perceived level of 
dissatisfaction with the performance of PQR, an external coalition became increasingly 
dominant. ISS formation was seen as increasingly focussing on SPISS, with perceptions 
of the role of the HMIC in commenting upon ISS, and of the increased support for 
SPISS by the Scottish Office being said to lead to a recognition that ISS formation on an
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independent basis for the Force would stop. As in the previous case studies, the 
implication of the analysis is that once ISS formation becomes dominated by the 
external coalition, it becomes extremely difficult for internal coalitions to a shift to 
another power configuration (ibid.) - even if they wanted to.
We now move on to discuss themes that have arisen from the case with regard to social 
relations, and which have developed as a result of our analysis of ISS formation
9.4.2.I. The Importance of Roles
The exercise of power through the manipulation of resources continues to be a useful 
means of understanding the role of the Officer leading the IT Department from 1992 to 
1994, and from 1996 until 1998. The person in this role had been a member of the 
Research and Development unit responsible for IT, before moving to lead the newly 
formed IT Department. This person demonstrated a combination of interest in IT, was 
perceived as having a high level of knowledge about IT, and also had authority to 
develop IT. Unlike the other Cases, this person had authority over IT because the 
management levels above were not interested in taking responsibility for IT. The Chief 
Constable was effectively appointed to lead the Computer Strategy group by this 
Officer, although in addition to attending less than three of the meetings, the Chief 
Constable made it clear the IT was the responsibility of the Officer heading that 
department. Persuading the Chief Constable to agree to chair the Computer Strategy 
Group can be seen as an exercise of power by the Police Officer leading IT, in that this 
was possible through the Officer’s perceived knowledge of IT which gave credence to 
his insistence that the Chief Constable chair the group. The appointment of the Chief 
Constable to the group was to add a symbolic weight to the role of IT in the Force, and 
also to demonstrate to outside bodies such as the HMIC that IT was being taken 
seriously. This latter point can be seen in the light of the exercise of power through the 
manipulation of perception, in this case manipulating symbols for internal and external 
consumption.
The appointment of a civilian IT manager in 1993 could also be seen in terms of 
symbolism, in this case for the benefit of the HMIC that a civilian was now leading IT, 
and for internal staff that there was now an expert in place. However, in practice, the
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appointment of this person again demonstrated the exercise of power through the 
manipulation of resources, in this case in terms of authority, and also in dominating 
decision making processes. The IT manager was actively managed by the Police Officer 
leading the IT department, which caused tension between the two people. This was 
because the IT manager had been recruited to lead IT but found he was being expected 
to take orders from the Police Officer heading IT, and also because the Police Officer 
heading IT now found someone who had expert knowledge in the area which was a 
challenge to his own position.
In addition, in terms of exercising power by controlling decision making processes, the 
Police Officer leading the IT area was able to filter materials coming into the IT 
department, so that he was able to control responses and actions, passing on material as 
he deemed appropriate to the IT manager. This element of control did little to foster a 
sense of having authority to match the responsibility for IT which other Officers in the 
Force took the IT department to have. This sense of authority not residing with the IT 
experts was exasperated by the influx of problems that were occurring with the 
CCRS/PQR system - which everyone took to be the responsibility of the IT staff.
Between 1994 and 1996 the situation for the IT Manager changed when the Officer 
leading IT took a secondment with the Police Advisory Group on IT (PAGIT) in 
London. The Chief Inspector who took his place encouraged the IT manager to take 
authority and responsibility for IT, and to attend meetings with other senior managers in 
the Force, which had not happened previously. This also demonstrates an exercise of 
power through the use of authority, but in a positive sense - the exercise of power as 
emancipation rather than as oppression (Clegg, 1989; Hardy, 1996). The return of the 
Officer from secondment in 1996 saw the IT manager leave the Force. A new IT 
manager was recruited and worked under a similar relationship to the first civilian IT 
manager.
9.4.2.2. Relations with other Agents
We find in this section that the comments that we made in Section 8.4.3 are entirely 
appropriate here also, in that throughout the course of ISS formation, relations with
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several agents were found to be important. Without repeating the argument made there, 
we would just highlight that the combined presence of what were seen as governmental 
groups, such as the Home Office, the Scottish Office, and the Audit Commission, were 
again important in shaping the views of senior Officers regarding the concept of 
strategy. Continual reference was made to these bodies in discussions about strategy, 
and ISS in particular.
Similarly, the comments made in Section 5.3.3.4 regarding the HMIC are also 
appropriate in this case study. One of the surprising aspects here is that despite criticism 
by the HMIC (1994, 1997) regarding the lack of an up to date ISS, the problems with 
PQR, and in 1997 in particular, the limited role given to the IT Manager, is that very 
little was done to address these concerns. By 1998, there was still no ISS, it was decided 
that PQR would remain in place until SPISS applications became available, and the role 
of the IT manager was "under consideration". Whilst our argument that we can think of 
the relations with the HMIC in terms of the exercise of power through the manipulation 
of resources, this is not a one way relationship by any means. If, as in this case staff in 
the Force did not do anything to respond to the comments, this is less a demonstration of 
perversity on the part of the Force, but rather an indication of the dialectical nature of 
such relations.
The relations with XYZ Ltd. were interesting. This relationship, although officially a 
supplier / customer relationship between XYZ Ltd. and the Force, the consensus view 
was that the relationship was conducted on a personal basis between the Officer leading 
IT and the owner of XYZ Ltd.. The lack of formality in the relationship, can be seen in 
relation to the exercise of power through the manipulation of resources, as XYZ Ltd. 
were able to utilise their control of development of and project management for the PQR 
system to influence the relationship in their favour. This was evidenced by their ability 
to secure a seven year maintenance contract in 1996, a decision which seemed odd given 
the continual problems with PQR and the impending arrival of applications for SPISS. 
There was not contract specifying what XYZ Ltd. would deliver, although there was 
what was termed a developers contract, although what would be developed remained 
unspecified. The nature of this relationship, and the level at which it was undertaken, 
without formality in negotiations or project managing on behalf of the Force, meant that 
XYZ Ltd. played a key role in influencing what happened with PQR. We can see here
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evidence of the exercise of power through the management of resources, for example 
where XYZ Ltd. kept control of the data model, where they did not issue documentation 
for PQR, and where they controlled project management through their expertise. Given 
that both the PQR system and the relationship with XYZ Ltd. was subject to criticism 
from many senior staff in the Force, the ability of XYZ Ltd. to sustain the relationship 
can be seen to rest predominantly with the authority of the Officer leading IT, a further 
exercise of power through the management of resources, namely his authority as a 
senior Police Officer, but also through perceptions of expertise in relation to IT.
Finally, again as with Section 8.4.3. we can also think of these agents in terms of the 
exercise of power through the power of the system, in that there is a sense of acceptance 
that these agents are part and parcel of the system, the web of relations within which the 
reality of organisational practice is constructed and reconstructed. The operation of these 
agents is out of the control of any of the people in the organisational setting, but should 
not be thought of as being in the hands of others either. Instead, it is the position and 
operation of these institutions of practice relative to one another through which a web of 
power relations can be considered operational.
9.4.2.3. Structures and Processes in Relation to Decision Making
We have already commented upon the role of the Officer leading the IT Department in 
controlling decision making processes within the IT Department. However, we can see 
the exercise of power in relation to the manipulation of decision making processes more 
generally regarding ISS. Initially, the IT strategy in 1992 was written solely by the 
Officer leading IT. After this, and particularly following the reports from Knowledge 
Technology and the NCC, the structuring of formal committees and groups was enacted 
officially for the development of ISS. These groups acted as rubber stamping groups to 
proposals put forward by the Officer leading the IT department, together with the project 
team.
In practice, decision making was undertaken at informal meetings between the two 
Officers in the project team, and the Officer leading IT, although it was this Officer who 
also sought to set up formal decision making processes for ISS. While final 
authorisation for decision in relation to ISS took place through the formal structure, the
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decisions regarding the nature of ISS, in practice through the development of PQR, had 
already been taken. ISS was thus dominated by a small group of people, in particular 
from 1993 to 1995, the project team and the head of IT, where decision making was 
largely informal, albeit that most of the same people participated in formal decision 
making structures. The setting up of formal processes can be seen in relation to the 
exercise of power through the management of process, whereby the actions of the 
Officer leading IT can be seen as having influenced ISS by managing the access to the 
processes, as well as the process itself. This supports a political view of strategic 
decision making (Pettigrew, 1977; Mintzberg, 1978), and can be viewed as 
demonstrating the problem of formal rational views of participation and consensus in 
decision making.
In addition, the management of these processes, with informal and formal processes in 
operation, can be seen as a means of providing an illusion of formality for the benefit of 
both senior managers, and the HMIC, which suggests the exercise of power through the 
manipulation of perception. Here, we can see the use of formality to mask the actual 
decision processes, highlighting what Gouldner (1954) termed mock bureaucracy.
These decision processes were opened up to wider debate after the arrival of the new 
Chief Constable in September 1996 as this senior officer took an active interest in IT, 
and in ISS. That said, aside from decisions surrounding attempts to try and improve the 
performance of the PQR system, the only other strategic decision taken before 1998 was 
to stop developing PQR and to await the arrival of new applications from SPISS. This 
decision was taken by the Chief Constable, at a series of three meetings to review ISS 
with the IT manager two of the IT staff, and four senior Police Officers.
9.4.2.4. Perception and Meaning
At all times we are concerned with perception, as it is this that is central to the views 
that we have of what we take to be social reality. However, we can also think about the 
manipulation of perception as a means of bringing to our attention further aspects salient 
to ISS formation (Clegg, 1975; Chaffee, 1985). For example, the use of consultants in 
1988 and 1990 to report on IT in the Force could be seen as a means of seeking to 
increase the legitimacy of IT (Brown, 1998), that is, seeking to manipulate the
201
perceptions of senior officers. This could be viewed as a means of securing spending on 
IS within the Force, both for an audience external to the Force as well as internally. The 
way in which groups can seek to legitimise their demands through the manipulation of 
perception has been noted by Pettigrew (1979).
There was perceived symbolism surrounding the IT disaster of the 1980s, with symbolic 
perception developing over time without the active participation of anyone in seeking to 
render symbolic meaning to that event. The use of consultants was viewed as an attempt 
to demonstrate to the HMIC that ISS was being addressed within the Force. Similarly, 
we found that people perceived the Force to be lagging in use of IT, which could be seen 
as rendering a subjective, symbolic aspect to IT.
It is interesting that the interviewees said that the word strategy was not a part of the 
vocabulary used within the Force prior to 1990. Language can be viewed as an 
important aspect of the manipulation of perception (Morgan, 1986; Choo, 1998), and 
has also been recognised in relation to ISS (Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992; Jones, 1995). 
The introduction of language that used the term strategy in relation to IS was seen as 
being an attempt to demonstrate the seriousness with which IS was now being 
addressed. In this case, the role of senior officers was considered to be influential in 
shaping a degree of interest within the organisation in developing IS, and in particular in 
affecting the perceptions of other people where senior management were seen to 
actively engage with IS (Levine & Rossmoore, 1995).
9.5. SUMMARY
In this case study, ISS formation was perceived to be closely related to the PQR system, 
which was developed and installed. While ISS formation was regarded to have stagnated 
after 1996, we have highlighted the increased domination by the external coalition, 
categorising ISS formation as shifting from Political Arena to Instrument (Mintzberg, 
1983). That said, we have also discussed four themes which we have identified as being 
important in our understanding of the generative forces affecting ISS formation, and in 
particular the analysis has discussed the exercise of power in relation to all four 
conceptualisations outlined in Table 3.1.. We now move on to discuss case study E.
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CHAPTER TEN - ISS FORMATION: CASE STUDY E
10.1. CASE E POLICE FORCE
The fieldwork for this case study was initially focused upon the practice surrounding the 
strategic decision to implement the Crime Management System, which formed the heart 
of an Office Automation Project within the Force, between 1994 and 1998. In this case 
study we conducted fieldwork during the period 1994 to 1998. In all, we interviewed 16 
people in the Force, some on several occasions over the period of research. This was in 
addition to informal discussions with these and other people during the period of 
fieldwork.
We have investigated historic events associated with IS in the Force as it became 
apparent that these were important to our understanding of ISS formation. The 
development of ISS and subsequent implementation of a system provided the focus for 
our period of engagement, this being a prerequisite for validity in case study research 
(Pettigrew, 1985a; Yin, 1989).
10.2. BACKGROUND TO CASE STUDY
Case E Police Force is a large Force, with a Headquarters in a city, and having an 
authorised strength of 7,352 Police officers together with 2,115 civilian staff. For the 
year ending 31 March 1998, gross expenditure for the Force was £350 million. This 
compares to a figure of £300 million in 1993/94. It is a matter of concern to the HMIC 
(e.g. HMIC, 1998b) as well to those interviewed within the Force that the Force appears 
to be under-funded for capital expenditure. For example, the capital budget for IT for 
1998/99 has remained constant from the previous year at £2.34 million, which the 
HMIC regarded as a considerable under-resourcing of IT given the size of the force 
(HMIC, 1998b). The total spend on IT, at 0.1% of gross expenditure, has been recorded 
as being the lowest as a percentage of revenue of all Police Forces in Britain (Kable, 
1995). By comparison, similar size forces in England have been recorded as spending
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more than five times as much of their revenue on IT as has been spent in Case E Police
Force(ibid.). These figures go some way to explaining why despite being one of the
largest Police Forces in Scotland, staff within the Force considered that IT had remained
less developed than in other Scottish Police Forces. A report into Case E Police Force
by the HMIC in 1998 observed that,
"IT continued to be under-resourced, both in staffing levels and in revenue and 
capital funding. Research carried out during 1997 by the Force Inspectorate and 
the head of Communications and IT, in respect of the disparity of IT funding 
between [Case E Police Force] and other members in the family of forces 
(British forces of a similar size to [Case E Police Force]), showed the force to 
have half the number of IT staff of comparable forces. Total revenue and capital 
expenditure on IT (excluding telecommunications) was around one third of the 
level found in the same family of forces over the last 5 years" (HMIC, 1998b, 
Sec.4.2.).
That said, the opinion of those working in the IT area felt that in terms of funding, the 
Department had received a fair allocation of the resources available to the Force, and 
that funding issues were a reflection of funding made available to the Force as a whole, 
and not a reflection of internal funding arrangements.
10.3. INFORMATION SYSTEMS STRATEGY FORMATION
10.3.1. INITIAL STAGES: THE OFFICE AUTOMATION PROJECT
When the Force was formed in 1975, it incorporated a city Police Force who had a 
command and control computer system in place which was based upon mainframe 
hardware. This system had been designed to service seven territorial Divisions in the 
city, but following amalgamation it was expected to deal with the new structure which 
incorporated nineteen Divisions. This structure remained in place until the early 1990s 
when restructuring saw the number of divisions fall to fifteen. The formation of the 
Force in the mid 1970s coincided with a time of a severely limited budget which saw the 
organisation carrying almost 800 vacancies in an effort to balance budgets in the 
Region. Consequently, funding for IT was limited. During the 1980s, a personnel 
computer system was acquired, and a limited number of micro-computers for word 
processing were introduced at the Force Headquarters. These systems were introduced 
by local commanders and were not perceived to form part of a strategy of any kind. In
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1987 the Chief Constable instigated a review of Force structure with a view to
increasing the availability of Police officers for operational duties (Case E Police Force,
1987). This review was based upon a key policy statement prepared by the Chief
Constable, which was,
"In order to accomplish the prime objective of maintaining as many officers as 
possible on operational duties, reviews of the organisational structures, methods 
and procedures will be undertaken to streamline administration and identify 
opportunities for civilianisation and the introduction of new technology" (Chief 
Constable's Policy Statement to the Police Committee, December, 1987).
Following from this, in 1988, at the instigation of the then Deputy Chief Constable, a
business case was developed with the assistance of staff from the Police Requirements
Support Unit (PRSU) at the Home Office for what was termed an Office Automation
Project. The then Deputy Chief Constable was said to be enthusiastic that any IT project
was seen to be clearly linked to the business objectives of the Force, and for this reason
the documentation includes reference to those objectives in three separate places, on
pages 1, 2, and 6. The aim expressed in the documentation for the office automation
project was described as,
"to exploit information technology in the management of administration, 
relieving operational officers of time-consuming repetitive tasks and simplifying 
reporting procedures so as to concentrate resources on operational duties" (Case 
E Police Force, 1988).
The project was seen as representing an ambitious IT strategy for the Force providing a 
basis for IT development into the 21st Century (Brett, 1988), and had three broad thrusts 
to it:
• The development of a force-wide communications network
• The procurement of a new command and control system
• The development and installation of an office automation project
The business case was presented as being dependent upon a 12% saving in 
administrative overheads by freeing Police officers from excessive paperwork, with over 
700 forms in use in the Force at the time.
The office automation project incorporated a number of applications, which included:
• word processing
• an electronic link to the Procurator Fiscal
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• custody recording
• criminal intelligence
• crime pattern analysis
• a crime management system
An apparent difficulty with all of these projected applications, was said to be the 
continuing lack of finance. The Deputy Chief Constable who had instigated the project 
sought, but failed to get, funding from government sources. A communications network 
was established, with the X25 network system upon which it was based forming a 
backbone for later developments with electronic mail. Design started on a new 
command and control system, which it was envisaged would be implemented in 1991, 
In the end, the command and control system was implemented in 1992, following delays 
in software programming.
These developments were overseen by the Research and Development Department in 
the Force, which had responsibility for IT. They made use of IT services from the 
regional authority as necessary during this period, and were involved themselves in 
installing elements of the office automation project. In 1989, the Police officers in the 
department decided to buy and install four Bull DPS6 mini-computers in Divisions, 
although while they were doing this they became aware of developments in the use of 
PCs and network technologies which they felt were becoming more widely used. The 
development of an e-mail link between the Force and the Procurator Fiscal's office for 
the electronic transmission of documentation was seen as key aspect of the office 
automation project, to alleviate the production and distribution of paper based reports 
for the Procurator Fiscal.
During this period the computer developments in the Force were undertaken by the 
Research and Development department, which was staffed predominantly by Police 
officers. The department also had a programmer on secondment from the regional 
authority, and a member of civilian staff from the typing pool who had shown some 
interest in the use of IT was also working full time on the projects. In addition there was 
a small computer section in the communications department who oversaw the running 
of the command and control system and the HOLMES system. This consisted of four
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Police officers and five civilian computer operators who were responsible for the 
maintenance of the existing systems.
When new developments were undertaken, the Research and Development department 
was able to turn to the regional authority's IT unit to provide assistance. In April 1990 a 
member of the regional authority's IT department was recruited into the Force as 
Principal IT Officer to work with the Research and Development department in 
reviewing current systems and to address the future strategy for IS in the Force.
10.3.2. DEVELOPING INFORMATION SYSTEM  STRATEGY
The decision to develop the concept of office automation in the late 1980s cannot be 
seen in isolation from the serious shortages in Police officers that was being 
experienced. As a consequence of this, IT was seen as one means through which Police 
officers could be released from both an administrative burden, and also in many cases 
released from desk jobs for operational duties. Thus, while the documentation 
mentioned in the preceding section did not lead to the hoped for funding from central 
government, it did nonetheless form the basis of IT developments in the Force for the 
next ten years. However, while major projects were being suggested, and initiated, 
nobody in the Force had any responsibility for the concept of IS/IT strategy.
In April 1990 the then Principal IT Officer was appointed with an express remit to 
develop an IS/IT strategy, although he recognised this could not be undertaken in 
isolation from what was already happening. What this meant was that bulk of the IT 
strategy was already decided given that the Force was committed to a new command 
and control system, and the office automation project. He was told to spend the first few 
months of his appointment going round the Force area, speaking to as many staff as 
possible, familiarising himself with Police operations, gauging what was happening with 
IT at that time, and considering what they should do in the future. Consultation was 
generally regarded as appropriate, but the raising of expectations where finance was 
limited and no infrastructure for development existed was a problem according to one of 
the senior Police staff,
"if you go to a Division and say what would you like from your technology,
they'll give you a list as long as your arm and they'll take it tomorrow".
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After six months the Principal IT officer had produced an ISS document for a five year 
period, although as he recognised, it did not have the level of detailed analysis initially 
hoped for given that the Force was so large and that something had to be put on paper in 
a reasonable amount of time. Within the IS/IT strategy it was stated that a main 
intention was to support the mission of the Force, namely: To deliver the highest 
possible standards of policing, addressing community needs, expectations and concerns 
in a professional, caring, and sensitive manner.
The key recommendations of the IS/IT strategy were (Case E Police Force, 1991):
• To continue to develop the Office Automation Project; the main application 
areas identified as constituting the Office Automation Project should be:
• Command and Control (as a basis for both the Force's operational requirements 
and for Office Automation)
• Crime Recording
• Crime Management
• Custody Recording
• Case Management
• Enquiry Handling
• Property
• Licensing
• Warrants
• To establish a robust network across the Force, with a Division based structure, 
utilising emerging industry standards based upon PCs and LANs
• To standardise hardware and software on agreed industry standards across the 
Force
• To adopt a modular approach to development of applications
• To enforce common data standards across the Force
• To see single entry of data as the goal of Office Automation
• To take account of developments in other Police Forces, and to encourage 
cooperation between Case E Police Force and these Forces as appropriate
• To establish forthwith an IT Department, and to seek authorisation from the 
Regional Council for an increase in IT establishment of 10 as soon as possible
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As noted above, the ISS took account broadly of what had already been considered, that 
being the commitment to a new command and control system, and the office automation 
project. However, the way in which the latter was to be implemented was changed 
significantly in the IS/IT strategy from that originally envisaged.
In the event, 8 new staff were recruited to begin developing applications under the office 
automation project. The IT strategy had made a series of recommendations concerning 
resourcing IT support and development, and in 1992 IT resources were consolidated 
from the Research and Development department and the communications department 
into an IT unit with the former principal IT officer now designated as IT manager. 
Another part of the strategy had been to request funding requirements of £900,000 for 
the years 1991/92, 92/93, and 93/94. What had not been anticipated by the IT Manager 
was that this funding would be made available almost straight away in 1991, which 
meant that the funding had to be spent before the anticipated IT department existed. 
Consequently, as a senior member of staff associated with the IT developments 
acknowledged, they
"hurtled £900,000 worth of technology out into the Force, without most people
having any idea of what it was to be used for".
This process was said to have continued in the next year although by this time an 
embryonic IT department was beginning to start work. Nonetheless, apart from the 
command and control system which was delivered in 1992, there were no legacy 
systems in place and they had no long term contracts to be paid for.
The newly formed IT unit reported to a Chief Superintendent in the Research and 
Development department, and gradually staff within the IT unit took over more and 
more of the IT tasks allowing Police officers to return to other duties in Research and 
Development. After eighteen months, the IT unit was involved in restructuring within 
the Force, which saw it being amalgamated with the radio communications section and 
with telecommunications. This also saw a new post created, that of IT & 
Communications Manager, a post which was filled by the existing IT manager. This 
post was said to be equivalent to a Chief Superintendent, and was the first time in a 
Scottish Police Force that an IT post had been given such a senior status.
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The development of the initial IS/IT strategy was seen as being the work of IT Officer
alone, and was recognised by those staff who worked with IT at the time said to have
taken account of some of the earlier work in developing the office automation project.
The work was also said to have been subject to scrutiny by the executive level
management group. While the Deputy Chief Constable was perceived by many of those
spoken with as the champion of the concept for office automation in 1988, at the time
of the IS/IT strategy development, the assistant Chief Constable overseeing management
services was seen as being someone particularly interested in the potential of IT. Indeed,
this person went on to take up posts as Chief Constable in two other Scottish Police
Forces. Upon leaving Case E Police Force in 1994, another senior officer replaced him
and he also was seen as having a keen interest in IT. Those people spoken with observed
that having someone at the most senior levels acting as a champion for IT was
important. As one senior officer involved in the project observed,
"if you get one individual driving it who maybe has a wee bit more vision and 
clarity of thought about where we should be going in the future .... and if he can 
sell it to his peers or policy group or whatever, and obviously provide some 
evidence for, 'well what are we going to get out of this .. there are benefits to be 
had here'... that can greatly affect how an organisation goes".
The common view of those spoken with was that the concept of strategy only came to be 
considered by Police Forces in the early 1990s following the publication of a series of 
Home Office circulars (e.g. Home Office, 1983, 1993) and Audit Commission papers 
(e.g. Audit Commission, 1990, 1993), together with the increased attention being given 
to issues of strategy during inspection visits by the HMIC. In particular, there was 
increasing referral during visits by the HMIC to strategy for IS as representing best 
practice, and this concept came to appear with regularity in HMIC reports (HMIC, 1992, 
1996, 1997, 1997a, 1998, 1999). The combination of these factors was said to have 
alerted many senior staff to the concept termed strategy, not least in the area of IS given 
the growing recognition of the importance of IS, and the cost.
While all those spoken to reflected upon the role of the most senior policy making group 
in the Force, they were not certain that the policy group had provided any input into the 
IS/IT strategy other than approving it. On the other hand, there was unanimity that the 
head of the IT and communications department, formerly the principal IT officer, had 
been instrumental in moving the Force forward in terms of developing and 
implementing IS/IT strategy.
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As major developments slowed down or halted for whatever reason, staff in the IT 
department would work on smaller projects that they judged to be priorities at that 
particular time, or which fitted in with the amount of time and resources they felt were 
available. Hence, IT staff recognised that a lot of the smaller developments that had 
taken place had not been in the ISS. One example of such a development was the 
development of a notebook PC application that contained a dataset from the criminal 
records office to enable officers to check for stolen property whilst out on operational 
duties. This application was developed at short notice in response to a major anti-crime 
initiative in the Force in 1995. This also represented the first time that a member of the 
IT department had been invited to sit in on a steering group for a major policy initiative. 
Such smaller applications were developed at various times during the 1990s, although in 
general the ISS only reflected the larger developments, which were concerned with the 
office automation project.
The next major review of the IS/IT strategy occurred in 1995. Here, the head of the IT & 
Communications department together with the IT manager and the communications 
manager reviewed progress against the 1991 strategy document. They decided that 
overall the earlier strategy had been appropriate, and remained so, allowing for a few 
adjustments to timescale, resourcing, and specific technologies. The revised IS/IT 
strategy also took account of forthcoming developments that would impact upon IS, 
such as local government reorganisation, compulsory competitive tendering (CCT), and 
the introduction of a revised national HOLMES 2 system.
The IS/IT strategy in 1995 was said to reflect a desire on the part of the two managers 
responsible for IT to separate out dealing with operational issues from thinking about 
strategy; they considered it vital to create time to think about where they may be going 
with IS, and what the resource implications would be of any particular actions. At the 
same time however, this work was fairly restricted to the IT Departments sphere of 
activity, and was not able to take that much account of business strategy for the future - 
principally because there was no strategy.
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There was a recognition by those involved with the ISS that in many ways what they had 
been working with was a strategy in name only, as one member of staff commented in 
1996,
"I would like to say that the strategy comes out of a strategic process, but it 
didn't, it didn't come out of a process of the Force sitting down and deciding its 
strategy, and [us] then doing an IT strategy in support of that strategy, it didn't 
come out that way. I think we're beginning to recognise the need for that type of 
thing".
However, to some extent this view was both being reinforced, and at the same time 
undermined by other activities. During 1997, the IT Department was the subject of five 
separate audits, by internal inspection teams and by the HMIC, some of which were 
looking at the Force as a whole, and some of which were concentrated upon IT. A factor 
in this was that the IT managers were being asked for more strategy documentation, and 
in particular the HMIC were keen to see the IS/IT strategy containing detail down to the 
level of full SSADM analysis and PRINCE project management data. Staff in the 
department reflected that the extra effort required to produce such documentation 
seemed to be justified by the very production of documentation, rather than through any 
examination of strategic processes and/or strategic thinking, or even whether the 
proposed strategy was appropriate or not. One analogy used by the IT Manager was that 
IS/IT strategy seemed to be perceived by the inspection teams as a document based 
outcome rather than being seen as a process of value in its own right. By mid-1998, the 
senior IT staff said that they were awaiting the publication of the Scottish Police ISS 
(SPISS), having now completed the implementation of the applications outlined in the 
1991 ISS. The IT staff felt that they had a good idea what was going to be in SPISS 
having been closely involved in the production of it, and they felt that this would be the 
guide to their own strategic developments within Force. So far as the IT staff were 
concerned, the SPISS would be a reflection of Case E Police Force’s view of ISS.
10.3.3. IMPLEMENTING OFFICE AUTOMATION AND CRIME M ANAGEMENT
The Office Automation Project, and as a key part of that the Crime Management 
System, were seen by the IT staff, the Research and Development Department, and the 
senior managers in the Force as constituting the heart of the IS/IT strategy in the Force 
for the 1990s. The efforts of IT staff at this time was directed towards connecting the
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various LANs across the Force as more and more installations took place, gradually 
building up a WAN throughout the Force, and through which force-wide computer 
applications could be delivered. The concerted effort to install personal computers in the 
Force meant that from 1992 onwards these were being installed at the rate of 
approximately 200 to 250 each year initially, a rate that increased from the mid-1990s. 
By mid 1998 there were 2,000 PCs in the Force.
In addition to the installation of PCs, a number of systems began to be developed for use 
in the Force. An early system was a crime pattern analysis system, written over a period 
of three months in 1992 using FoxPro software. This system was developed quickly 
when it was recognised that data from the new command and control system could be 
used in a limited fashion. Despite the fact that this set the crime management system 
back several months, the senior IT staff realised that if they did not develop such a 
system, then Police officers would have to wait several years to get one based upon the 
planned crime management system. This was a reflection of a desire to give the 
operational Police officers some IT that did something useful for them, in line with the 
expressed wishes of the then Chief Constable who wanted IT to help the Police officers 
on the streets.
In 1994, a computerised custody recording system was implemented by the IT 
Department staff, who had also written the application in-house. With this sort of work 
to be delivered, the number of staff in the department had been increased following 
requests to senior management by the IT Manager. By June 1995, the IT & 
Communications department had 85 staff, 35 of whom were dedicated to IT. All 
applications were being developed in-house, and there were almost 1,000 PCs 
distributed across the Force. The reasons for the IT & Communications Manager having 
originally decided to standardise on PCs had according to him been driven by pragmatic 
concerns; namely, that as funding was such a problem for the Force, they wanted to 
standardise on something that they could easily buy as and when money became 
available. In addition, as a standard product, maintenance and replacement were not 
viewed as likely problems, and it was thought that they could be outsourced, as 
happened from 1995 onwards. However, this development was seen to have brought its 
own problems, as a senior member of the IT staff noted,
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"we're now going into what I would call a more mature phase where we've built
all this, and now we've got to maintain it all The snag is that to go into this
more highly developed stage will probably require us to come up to the level of 
expenditure of other forces and the other forces we're comparing with they have 
had IT all through the 80's, and are now building on top of that ... they're at a 
level of expenditure .. we ... I would guess i f .. that we would be 51st out of the 
51 forces in the British Isles when it comes to that".
The problem of limited finance in comparison with similarly sized Police Forces 
elsewhere was recognised by both Police and non-Police staff alike as a major problem 
for the development of IT in the Force. However, it was seen by them to be compounded 
by other pressures upon the Force in the mid-1990s. One of those mentioned was the 
need to prepare for CCT which was seen as a subject of ongoing debate between the 
Chief Constables and government regarding the advisability of subjecting Police use of 
IT to CCT. Another central government inspired issue that was considered to be of 
interest to the IT department in particular was local government reorganisation in 
Scotland together with changes in budgeting for Police Forces which would begin at the 
same time. The IT department staff said that they were particularly interested in the 
consequences of local government reorganisation as they had a large proportion of staff 
on secondment from the regional authority, which was due to be abolished in 1996 and 
replaced by new unitary authorities. This meant that while they were trying to develop 
new applications, they did not know who, or how many staff, they would have after 
reorganisation. Furthermore, they were aware that once the Chief Constable assumed 
complete responsibility for the Force budget, this would mean increasingly difficult 
choices between capital expenditure on IT versus patrol cars for example, or perhaps 
between new IT and extra officers on patrol. On a processual side, the IT department 
managers knew that they would also have to assume responsibility for IT procurement, 
something that they had never had to address previously. All in all, in 1995/1996, the 
senior staff in the IT department recognised that they faced a range of uncertainties, 
while it was trying to develop the applications identified in the original office 
automation project.
The Crime Management System was seen by all of the staff involved as the central 
aspect of the Office Automation Project. The aim of the Crime Management System 
was documented as being (Case E Police Force, 1994):
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• to automate all activities associated with the recording and searching of reported 
crime
• to enable single data entry
• to seamlessly integrate with the custody system and the case management 
system
The decision by the Force executive in 1994 to adopt the Crime Management System
resulted in a decision by the Research and Development Department to instigate
organisational change in tandem with the implementation of the crime management
system. In 1995, a pilot was commenced in what was then N Division. According to a
member of the project team, the Crime Management System was making them rethink
the way they worked,
"a lot of the English forces have gone for what they call a crime information 
system. We are looking to put a wee bit more on top of that. It's not just a 
computer system, we're changing management processes throughout the division 
and throughout the Force, and we feel that that's an integral part of the computer 
system. The computer system is driving us, or allowing us the focus to make the 
changes to sort of reengineer the processes that go on out there, which are as 
important as the computer ... the computer's only the tool, its only the sort of 
number cruncher and the data handling part of it, the rest are the changes in 
procedure so that we can get the best results to maximise the use of the 
resources".
The pilot system in N Division consisted of 42 personal computers networked around a 
database server, with an e-mail link to the Procurator Fiscal incorporated. The 
introduction of the crime management system was said to represent a large commitment 
by the Force to both technology and to organisational change. While the development of 
the project was seen as being led from within the Research and Development 
Department, staff in the IT Department said that they worked closely with the project 
team as they were responsible for the technological development and implementation. 
Consequently, it was argued that when the IT department experienced something of an 
upheaval in 1996 as a result of local government reorganisation, this had a knock-on 
effect to the office automation project, and the crime management system in particular. 
When the regional authority was abolished in 1996 the IT department had just over fifty 
staff, a third of whom were on secondment from the Regional Authority. When the 
Authority was disbanded, some of the seconded staff opted to stay with the Force, while 
the Force also received several additional staff from the old Authority. By the end of
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1996, most of the ex-Authority staff had left, both those who had opted to stay and those 
who had been transferred - including the IT manager, leaving the IT department with a 
shortfall of between 10 and 12 staff for the next year. The remaining staff said that they 
felt under great pressure as they endeavoured to manage the workload. It was felt that as 
a consequence, the crime management project had experienced delays of approximately 
10 months to the schedule for implementation into other Divisions around the Force. It 
was not until the end of 1997 that the Department was able to recruit more staff, after 
which the staffing situation stabilised. By mid-1998 the IT Department had 68 staff, and 
it was expected that this would increase by several more by early 1999.
During the period 1996 to 1998, the crime management system was implemented in all 
Divisions across the Force area. By the time it had been installed the cost had risen 
above the anticipated £2 million (an exact figure was unobtainable, although it was said 
by the IT staff to have doubled), and the system incorporated a range of features, 
including: computerised recording of crime, crime pattern analysis, criminal 
intelligence, and case load allocation & management. However, the system was seen to 
have problems. As the system had been implemented on a Division by Division basis, 
using file-servers located in Divisions, the systems tended to be oriented towards the 
Division in which they were located. This meant that not only was it not possible for 
officers from one Division to interrogate the data of another Division through a terminal 
in the former's station, but that the system was particularly sensitive to any restructuring 
of Divisions. When in 1997 plans were introduced to restructure Divisions, both to 
reflect changes in local government and to flatten the command hierarchy, the newly 
installed Crime Management System was perceived to pose a considerable overhead in 
terms of additional work to update the system. Further changes in Divisional structure 
were still in hand at the time of writing, but the consequences of a reduction in the 
number of Divisions from 14 to 9 means that the staff in the IT Department perceived 
that they would faces a significant workload in updating the systems to take account of 
these changes.
By mid-1998, no further new development work was being undertaken upon 
applications solely for the Force, as any new work was to be related to the developing 
National ISS. A senior member of staff noted that while in the future the Force’s IT
216
development would follow the national ISS, in fact the national strategy was a reflection 
of their own Force’s approach anyway.
10.4. DISCUSSION
In seeking to understand ISS formation at Case E Police Force we have identified 
several issues which have emerged from our analysis of the case study. In addressing 
ISS there are a range of other issues which are embedded in a broad stream of 
organisational practice (Mintzberg, 1978; Johnson, 1997) which we must examine if we 
are to grasp the intricate socio-political nature of ISS formation (Waema & Walsham, 
1990). In order to draw out themes which we have found to be important for our 
understanding, we will concentrate our discussion of the case in terms of our 
investigative framework discussed in Chapters Two and Three, structuring the sections 
in terms of web model analysis (Kling, 1987).
10.4.1. INFRASTRUCTURAL AND HISTORIC ISSUES
The initiation of thinking about IT strategy in the late 1980s had been seen as a 
combination of forward thinking by the senior Officers at the time, influenced by the 
Home Office circulars (e.g. Home Office, 1983), and the need to do something about the 
severe funding crisis which the Force was perceived to be facing. IT was said to have 
been seen as a way of improving efficiency thereby releasing Officers for patrol, and 
potentially as a means of gaining funds from Government by being seen to be proactive 
users of IT. In the event, these extra funds were not forthcoming. That said, the work 
done was perceived to have paved the way for the ISS of the 1990s by specifying the 
Office Automation project.
The limited existing technology infrastructure around the Force in 1990, meant that the 
new IT Officer was seen to be starting with a "clean slate" with which to work. In 
practice however, we can see that with the public commitment having been made to the 
Office Automation Project, the ISS which was developed would have had difficulty in 
abandoning the idea upon which the Chief Constable had staked the future of the Force,
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"... a project which should be viewed as a starter project in a long term 
programme of IT Development stretching into the 21st century" (Brett, 1988,
p.6).
The commitment to what came to be seen as a high profile project by senior 
management was difficult for a new member of staff to ignore, given the perceptions by 
many other senior members of staff that this was ".. the way the Force was going with 
IT".
The financial situation which was recognised by all spoken with as being a constant 
feature in the life of Force, can also be seen as a factor in respect of ISS. The IT Officer 
recognised the lack of finance, and came to realise that there may be a sporadic nature to 
the allocation of such monies. This factor was said to be influential in the decision to 
standardise on PCs and LANs.
Similarly, we note that while many authors give the impression that ISS develops from 
an understanding of business strategy (Lederer & Salmela, 1996; Earl, 1999), we see 
here that while a written statement may indeed be made acknowledging aspects of the 
business strategy, ISS should be seen as something intimately interwoven into both the 
context of the time, but also into the perceptual construction, or mental construct 
(Jayaratna, 1994) of those concerned.
Such interwoveness is demonstrated elsewhere in the case study, when it was recognised 
by staff that in introducing the pilot of the Crime Management System, they were also 
affecting the processes by which work was done. This affected the future development 
and implementation of the system, and hence for ISS formation. This recognition, was a 
consequence of context, of time, and particularly therefore of mental construct at that 
time given perception of that context. This can also be seen as an example of strategy 
evolving (Mintzberg, 1990).
10.4.2. SOCIAL RELATIONS
In considering the impact of social relations upon the practice of ISS formation, we 
perceive a power configuration relative to ISS formation in line with Meritocracy 
(Mintzberg, 1983). This is discussed in Table 10.1. below.
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Characteristics: Perceived as: Meritocracy Evidence:
External Coalition 
(EC)
Passive (but increasing 
dominance)
A group of influencers operating 
through governmental remit, if not 
explicitly in concert; Increase in 
activity of HMIC, audit 
commission, SPISS; funding linked 
to initiatives (e.g. best value from 
ISS); external coalition seems to 
becoming more dominant after 
being passive in relation to ISS.
Internal Coalition 
(IC)
Professional (constrained by 
bureaucratic norms)
Discipline based hierarchy; Strong 
professional IS expertise who lead 
internal ISS, and influence external 
coalition in terms of SPISS
Apparent Power 
Relationship
EC <==> IC IC dominated ISS (subject to 
funding approval), IC also 
dominating SPISS aspect of EC. 
Influence of HMIC, audit 
commission increasing dominance 
of EC.
Implications Well placed to deal with 
complex work, especially in 
relation to ISS. Potential 
rationalisation of expertise in 
presence of focussed external 
influence should there be a 
shift to Instrument.
Strong professional expertise in IS 
area able to provide support for 
complex work. SPISS could lead to 
rationalisation, but scale of Force 
suggests this is unlikely.
Table 10.1. Power Configuration Analysis (based upon Mintzberg, 1983)
One of the findings of the analysis in Figure 10.1. is the perceived Meritocracy power 
configuration (Mintzberg, 1983). This intimates a group of professional expertise that is 
well placed to handle complex work, particularly in relation to technology, in this case 
IS. ISS formation has been led by an internal coalition based upon professional 
expertise, albeit within the bounds of professional standards and bureaucratic norms of 
the organisation. The external coalition could be described as passive, although the 
internal coalition were perceived to be influential in relation to SPISS, which was seen 
as forming part of the external coalition. While ISS formation was seen as increasingly 
focussing on SPISS, the size of the Force suggests that rationalisation of professional
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staff is unlikely for some time. However, there are perceptions that the role of the HMIC 
is having an increased influence upon ISS by demanding formality in processes. While 
the external coalition could be seen to be becoming more dominant, the internal 
coalition based upon professionalism renders this passive. The implication of the 
analysis is that if ISS formation remains dominated by the internal coalition, it is 
suggested that the staff would be well placed to handle complex work (ibid.), related to 
IS.
We now move on to discuss themes that have arisen from the case with regard to social 
relations, and which have developed as a result of our analysis of ISS formation
10.4.2.1. The Importance of Roles
The role of the person brought in as IT Officer, and who subsequently took the post as 
IT and Communications Manager can be seen to have been influential in ISS formation. 
This person, through a combination of expert knowledge, interest and authority vested 
in the role, developed ISS, albeit following the broad thrust of the 1988 initiative. In 
addition however, this individual was central to maintaining progress in developing and 
implementing the office automation projects, in collaboration with the Research and 
development Department. One aspect of this role of note is that the person in his role 
was the only person in the Force who was associated with the projects throughout the 
1990s. All the police staff either moved on to other posts or retired after at most 2 or 3 
years. This lent further weight to the position of authority that this person had given that 
no one else in the Force had the knowledge that he did.
In tandem with this role, at Assistant Chief Constable level throughout the 1990s there 
was at least one officer who was regarded as enthusiastic about IT usage. This meant it 
was perceived by those people interviewed that at the executive level there was always 
at least one person who spoke with enthusiasm for IT. While we were not able to verify 
this directly at such meetings, nor were we able to gauge from people whether this had 
any effect in terms of ISS. However, most were of the view that the battles for budget 
were such that without a voice at the executive level, funding for IT would have been 
reduced even further such was the pressure upon resources in the Force.
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10.4.2.2. Relations with other Agents
Again in this case study we have found that the combined presence of the Home Office, 
the Scottish Office, and the Audit Commission, was perceived to be important in 
shaping the views of senior staff regarding the concept of strategy. Continual reference 
was made to these bodies in discussions about strategy, and to ISS documentation in 
particular. Namely, that the continued reference to the need for Forces to have strategy 
was seen as indicating a requirement to produce a document. The role of the HMIC in 
conducting and reporting upon inspections was seen as another key factor regarding ISS 
documentation. It was reported by staff that they found the insistence of the HMIC that 
ISS documentation should be available extremely frustrating because they felt that so 
long as there was a document then the HMIC would be satisfied. So far as the senior IT 
staff were concerned, they felt that it was more important to think about strategy and to 
do something, than to merely produce a document. Nonetheless, the role of these bodies 
can be considered in terms of the exercise of power through the manipulation of 
perception (see Table 3.1). We can see the visits from the HMIC as a ritual, through 
which norms of best practice are encouraged, as demonstrated for example in the 
declarations of written ISS, and the use of project management methods as being best 
practice (HMIC, 1999). The establishment of such cultural norms should not be seen as 
a one off event (Pettigrew, 1985a), but rather a part of an ongoing process of 
construction and reconstruction of social practice in organisational settings (Berger & 
Luckman, 1967; Giddens, 1984; Reed, 1992). This applies also, if less frequently, to the 
Home Office, Scottish Office, and Audit Commission. The release of Papers and 
Circulars can also be seen as a part of the ritual of the shaping of practice, the exercise 
of power through the manipulation of perception.
In addition, we can also understand the actions of these groups through the exercise of 
power in terms of the manipulation of perception, through the use of language, in this 
case the use of the language of strategy in relation to ISS (Audit Commission, 1993; 
Home Office, 1993, 1994; HMIC, 1993, 1998, 1999). Many of those people spoken 
with referred to the change in the use of language that had occurred following the 
release of papers and circulars from the above agents.
221
The relation with the regional council can also be seen as a factor for ISS. As all of the 
staff, except for the IT manager, were employed by the regional council, when the 
break-up of municipal councils came in 1996, this was said to have proven to be a 
period of great instability for the IT department. The consequence of this was seen as 
stalling the development and implementation of systems by almost one year. This was 
said to because by a mixture of the uncertainty that people felt about their jobs, for up to 
one year before the change, and the effects of 18 staff leaving for jobs with the new 
authorities after the change.
We can also think of these agents in terms of the exercise of power through the power of 
the system, in that there is a sense of acceptance that these agents are part and parcel of 
the system, the web of relations within which the reality of organisational practice is 
constructed and reconstructed. The operation of these agents is out of the control of any 
of the people in the organisational setting, but should not be thought of as being in the 
hands of others either. Instead, it is the position and operation of these institutions of 
practice relative to one another through which a web of power relations can be 
considered operational.
Finally, we should note relations with SPISS. In this case, the relations with SPISS were 
of interest as the IT Manager was one of the people most closely involved in the 
development of the National ISS. After the mid-1990s it was generally accepted by the 
more senior IT staff that SPISS applications would replace the existing systems. Indeed, 
staff at Case E Police Force were developing the first SPISS application, for firearms, in 
1998. They planned to implement this in the Force after which it would gradually be 
adopted by other Forces in Scotland. The relatively high number of IT staff compared to 
other Forces in Scotland meant that the staff at Case E Police Force saw themselves as 
most likely to be developing national applications. For staff in this Force, it was not 
seen as a case of stopping what they were doing to await SPISS applications; instead 
they perceived that what they were doing were going to be SPISS applications, and 
hence that their efforts were all the more valuable.
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10.5. SUMMARY
In this case study, ISS formation was closely related to what was termed the Office 
Automation Project, a large proportion of which was successfully developed and 
installed. We have highlighted the increased domination by the external coalition, and 
we have categorised ISS formation in terms of a Meritocracy power configuration 
(Mintzberg, 1983). A particular facet of this configuration is the way in which 
professional experts have acted both as influencers of an internal coalition and as 
influencers of elements of an external coalition in the form of SPISS. That said, we have 
also discussed four themes which we have identified as being important in our 
understanding of the generative forces affecting ISS formation, and in particular the 
analysis has discussed the exercise of power in relation to all four conceptualisations 
outlined in Table 3.1.. We now move on to discuss case study F.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN - ISS FORMATION: CASE STUDY F
11.1. CASE F - A NATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEM 
STRATEGY
While we regard this as a case study, it is not what may typically be conceived of as an 
organisational setting, but does represent an area of social practice associated with the 
development of a National ISS for the Scottish Police Forces, which is termed the 
Scottish Police ISS (SPISS). People are employed to work exclusively developing 
SPISS, being employed by the Scottish Office, although ostensibly they are working for 
the Scottish Police service as a whole. The fieldwork was focused upon ISS formation 
for SPISS, using the period from the recruitment of a Project Manager to develop SPISS 
in 1995 through to the writing of the first SPISS application in 1997. This provided the 
focus for our period of engagement, this being a prerequisite for validity in case study 
research (Pettigrew, 1985a; Yin, 1989).
We interviewed the SPISS project manager several times, but in addition we spoke with 
people in each of the case studies already reported upon about SPISS, as some of the 
people in these case studies were very closely involved in practice surrounding ISS 
formation for SPISS. At the same time, many other people knew of SPISS and were 
keen to speak about it as they felt that it marked a major, and long awaited period of 
cooperation in the development of Police IS. However, we have limited our discussion 
here to those people interviewed who were closely involved in ISS formation for SPISS. 
We have investigated historic events associated with SPISS as it became apparent that 
these were important to our understanding of ISS formation.
11.2. BACKGROUND TO SPISS
National computer applications for the Police started with the Police National 
Computer, which had spread throughout all Forces in Britain by the mid-1970s. The 
next major development in national computer systems came with the development of
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the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES) system, adopted in Forces 
from around 1982 onwards. A couple of points are worthy of note with regard to the 
HOLMES application. Firstly, the reason HOLMES was initiated was as a result of 
increasing frustration, in Police and Government circles, that not only could Police 
Forces’ existing systems not share data, but that within major investigations within 
individual Police Forces data was not being shared to the degree one would have 
assumed. The second point of interest, is that Police Forces were allowed to purchase 
their HOLMES systems from different suppliers, whose implementations of the 
HOLMES design were incompatible. Thus, it was often the case that adjoining Police 
Forces had HOLMES systems that could not be linked because they were from different 
suppliers. This is exactly what happened for example following the Lockerbie air 
disaster in 1988, when the Strathclyde Police HOLMES system being used as the main 
system for the investigation was incompatible with the adjoining Force's HOLMES 
system at Lothian and Borders Police . This situation with the incompatibility of 
HOLMES systems from different suppliers was universally acknowledged by Police 
officers interviewed during this research as wholly inappropriate.
In Scotland, another national application was implemented in the mid-1980s in the form 
of the Scottish Criminal Records Office (SCRO) system, which gave all Police Forces 
access to a national database of criminal records. A system similar to the SCRO system 
was not repeated in England and Wales until 1995.
That the implementation of the HOLMES system had not been exactly what had been 
planned, had not gone unnoticed amongst many Police Forces and as well as in relevant 
Government departments. For example, in Scotland a report by a representative of the 
Home Office's Police Requirements Support Unit in 1988 had highlighted the 
desirability in the area of IS of having,
". .a coherent strategy .. for linking the Police Service to other agencies in the 
criminal justice system and for the setting of national standards." (Brett, 1988, 
p.5).
Similarly, at a national level in Britain there had been a number of Home Office 
circulars and Audit Commission reports that had pointed to the desirability and
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economy of having nationally specified systems in the Police Service (Taylor & 
Williams, 1992; Audit Commission, 1990; Home Office, 1993.).
The impetus for co-operation between Police Forces was said to stem from Home Office 
Circular 114/1983, Manpower, Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Police Service (Home 
Office, 1983). This circular not only drew attention to the need for much greater co­
operation between Police Forces, but also linked this need for greater co-operation quite 
explicitly to the receipt of budget in the future. In effect, if the Police wanted more 
money, then they would have to show that they were making most efficient use of what 
they already had.
As these pressures continued into the 1990s the implications for IS became clearer as
one chief officer noted in 1995,
"until now I think you will find that most people have viewed the provision of 
IS/IT services as being very much an internal driven operation and you will find 
that they have developed things within their own circles or by specifying a 
system, going out and buying it from a manufacturer and then living and running
with it themselves .. in the future I think that is likely to change the change
is going to be driven by the fact that forces are now going on to single line 
budgets, and that means the government will come along with a bag of money 
and say, 'right there you are chief, get on with it, you can have as many cars and 
as many officers as you like but don't come back and ask for any more money' .. 
so that is obviously going to focus attention on every nook and cranny of the 
operation and one of these of course is the high spending departments of comms. 
and computer departments .. so they will undoubtedly be examined quite closely 
in the future"
Despite this view, all eight Police Forces in Scotland, together with the forty three in the 
rest of Britain, continued developing their own systems throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
The reasons given to explain this situation varied, but the most common view expressed 
was that Chief Constables as a group were both autonomous, and individualistic, in the 
way that they managed their Forces. Hence, it was felt that not only was it difficult to 
get them to agree that what someone else did in another Force could work in theirs, but 
also that they had a vested interest as Chief Constables of separate Forces in being seen 
to be independent. However, it was said to be in the early 1990s that things began to 
change in Scotland with a move towards developing a National ISS.
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11.3. INFORMATION SYSTEMS STRATEGY FORMATION - SPISS
In 1992, the Computer Policy sub-committee, a part of the ACPOS standing committee 
on communications, tasked a working party with developing an ISS for the Scottish 
Police Forces. This was said to have come about because of one or all of a number of 
reasons given by participants:
• that the committee had been thinking of doing so for some time;
• that one of the members was from Case E Police Force where an ISS had been 
developed;
• that a group was working on an ISS in England and Wales;
• that various Governmental and inspection bodies were suggesting that it might 
be a good idea;
• that senior Police officers who had a good understanding of IT were coming into 
ACPOS.
If there is one particular reason it is not clear, but it seems more likely that it was a 
combination of these various reasons that stimulated the desire to develop a national ISS
It is worth stopping at this point to refer to the work that was undertaken in England and 
Wales. In 1991 what was described as an ISS scoping study report had been 
commissioned by the Home Office, in conjunction with the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO), in which it was recommended in May 1992 that a full ISS study 
should be undertaken. In July 1993, a working party comprising Police officers, civil 
servants, IT consultants from Touche Ross, and a number of Force IT managers began 
developing a national ISS. The rationale for such a strategy study was that as 
information, together with people, and finance, formed the core resources of policing, it 
was essential to ensure "the smooth flow and effective analysis of information in 
support of the tasks and objectives of the Police Service" (Home Office, 1994, p.6). 
Furthermore, Police Forces were seen as performing the same basic functions, so that it 
was not considered "to make economic sense for each to develop separately its own IT
systems to support these functions On Grounds of economy and effectiveness there
was a clear case for a National Strategy for Police Information Systems" (ibid.).
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This group presented the strategy report in November 1994, and while this was seen as 
forming the basis for ISS related work in England and Wales for the rest of the decade 
no applications had been produced at the time of writing.
It was not seen as being the case that Scottish Forces were simply excluded from the 
process, as in fact ACPOS had a member of their Standing Committee on 
Communications as an observer on the Strategy Steering Committee in England and 
Wales. It was thought that with Scotland having a different criminal justice system than 
England and Wales, with different methods of funding and with a history of separate IS 
developments it was decided that England and Wales would produce their own ISS. 
This was not seen as spurring ACPOS to have their own strategy; on the contrary it was 
perceived that there was an interest to see what happened with the England and Wales 
effort with a view to adopting it in Scotland if appropriate.
In Scotland, a working party was set up after discussion at a meeting of the ACPOS 
computer policy sub-committee. The working party included the secretary of that 
committee, who was a Superintendent, and two civilian IT managers. They developed 
an overview ISS document which was delivered in the autumn of 1993. The main 
feature of this document was seen as the setting out of ten stages (shown in Appendix 6) 
which it was felt needed to be addressed in order to develop the ISS. These stages were 
written by the IT manager from Case E Police Force, in collaboration with a Police 
Officer from Case C Police Force. As can be seen, in this view of ISS, the stages seek to 
build upon the definition of common entities, relationships and data attributes from the 
existing systems across Scotland. It is also noticeable that the inference is (from stage 8 
- see Appendix 6) that IT and IS are one and the same. We found that generally people 
did make a distinction between IT and IS, and indeed, the 1994 ISS document, discussed 
in due course, does distinguish between IS, as the systems, and IT as the technological 
means which the systems use.
It was decided by the computer policy sub-committee that in view of the fact that the 
English and Welsh strategy group were due to report in January 1994, that they would 
wait until the delivery of that report before proceeding further. The English and Welsh 
strategy was not delivered as scheduled, so in March 1994, another working party was 
set up, this time to proceed with an ISS study in Scotland. The working party comprised
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three Police officers and two civilian IT managers, all from different Forces, and all 
chosen by the Computer Policy Sub-Committee.
The brief given to the working party set up in March 1994 was said to have been to 
develop a national ISS for the Police Service in Scotland, and they proceeded to work 
through the ten steps outlined in the earlier ISS report. After applying to the Scottish 
Office for funding, the working party received a sum of £10,000 to buy in assistance 
from consultants, in this case, from IBM. In May and June 1994, three two-day work 
shops were held at the Scottish Police College in Tulliallan, during which application 
requirements were discussed.
As one member of the working party noted when commenting on the outcome from the 
workshops,
"at the end of the day it demonstrated that no force has systems that are radically
different from any other".
The workshops involved members of the working party together with representatives 
from all of the Scottish Police Forces, assisted by staff from IBM. After establishing 
data requirements, the working party reviewed the existing and required technical 
infrastructure. In November 1994 EWISS was published (Home Office, 1994), and after 
consideration by the Working party together with the Computer Policy Sub-committee, 
it was decided that the technical specification in EWISS would be adopted in Scotland. 
The working party then went on to examine application requirements, identifying sixty 
one separate application areas (shown in Appendix 7). The development of these 
applications was seen as representing a detailed understanding of what applications 
Forces currently had, which was then seen as the basis for what they would get in the 
future. The working party decided that their application areas were not that different 
from those in EWISS, and any differences were explained by the differences in the 
criminal justice systems. A number of senior Officers wondered why Scotland did not 
just implement EWISS, as one said,
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"I happen to think that the documentation that has come from south of the border 
is very good indeed, and we should subscribe to any application effort that goes 
in south of the border. That's a personal view ... there are some strong political 
views in Scotland that says 'we're different and we're answerable to the Secretary
of State for Scotland rather than through the Home Office' .....  'if it comes
through the Home Office it'll never work' and all the rest of it you know, but I 
happen to believe that the applications are so similar that we needn't bother 
whether it is developed in Scotland or not."
This view that Scotland was different and should therefore have its own set of 
applications based upon its own ISS persisted, and was accepted by the Computer 
Policy Sub-Committee.
Following this, in September 1994 an IS/IT Strategy document was published giving 
details of recommendations for ISS, and details of information requirements and 
technical architecture.
This document set out key findings (ACPOS, 1994):
• That there was recognition across the Police service of the need for a coherent
and common ISS, which was perceived to offer benefits:
• consistency of data
• close links between Forces & Other Criminal Justice Agencies
• an efficient backbone network to facilitate communications
• That individual Forces have requirements specific to them which must not be 
overlooked
Following this the IS/IT strategy document set out 4 recommendations:
1. That the Scottish Police forces continue to develop an IS/IT strategy using outside 
assistance to provide the necessary experience and resources to complete the work
2. That the Scottish Police Forces appoint a central advisory and support group to 
assist with the common aspects of further IS/IT strategy work and individual forces 
in their development and migration towards the agreed strategy.
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3. That the Scottish Police forces should take into account the following:
• Common industry standards
• Available standard police applications
• Available force applications
• Individual Force’s current IT position
• The England and Wales strategy
4. That the Scottish Police Forces consider the following recommendations in the next
stages of the IS/IT strategy work:
• Common procurement strategy
• Training strategy
• Integrated criminal justice system
• Joint developments
After the recommendations of this publication had been agreed by the Computer Policy 
Sub-Committee, it was decided by the working party that the work could no longer be 
done on a part-time basis. The work undertaken by the members of the working party 
was done in addition to the members full-time jobs in their own Forces. By the start of 
1995, the working group said that having established a basis for the proposed ISS, they 
realised that the strategy required full-time attention. With this in mind they applied to 
the Scottish Office for funding of £100,000 to hire staff to complete SPISS. This figure 
compares to £1 million given by the Home Office to fund EWIS. The funding was 
received for SPISS, and in April 1995 a full-time project manager was recruited to the 
project on a one year contract, which was subsequently renewed for a further year. The 
recruitment followed a national advertisement and interviews by the Chief Constable of 
Case A Police Force, the Deputy Chief Constable of Case B, and the IT Manager from 
Case E. The person appointed had experience in ISS development in the Health Service 
as well as several private sector organisations.
Shortly after this appointment the project manager suggested the establishment of a 
project structure, including a Project Board comprising the two chief officers and senior 
civilian IT manager who had formed the interview panel. This proposal was accepted by 
the Computer Policy Sub-Committee. The project manager, together with an assistant, 
then spent the next two years developing a detailed data model, and in seeking to
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establish the business requirements for the Police Service. This required them travelling 
to the different Forces’, speaking with the IT staff and with the Senior Police Officers to 
try and establish what was required. The Project manager was surprised to find that most 
civilian IT staff were convinced that the Chief Officers would not want to talk about 
business requirements, whereas in practice the project manager found that they did. He 
commented that most of the Chief Officers reflected that this was the first time they had 
ever been asked for such requirements. This he found interesting, given that in almost 
all of the Forces the IT staff claimed to have developed ISS without knowing the 
business requirements of the most senior managers.
During this period regular reports were made to the project board, and to the ACPOS 
computer policy sub committee. In May 1997, with the ISS yet to be completed the 
project manager was given a five year contract, and early in 1998 £2.5 million was made 
available by the Scottish Office to support the ongoing development of the ISS. By 
August 1998 the ISS report was nearing completion, with a few interviews still to be 
conducted with various senior staff to clarify certain areas.
With SPISS, they decided that rather than adopt the common-database model of EWISS, 
they would adopt a corporate database approach. This was said to mean that all 
applications were to be based upon a single, corporate, database model, and hence 
would be able to exchange data both between and within applications classes. During 
1997 the project staff said that they had begun to consider adopting an object oriented 
approach, and it was decided by them in 1998 to develop applications using Java. This 
followed a decision by the project staff, together with representatives from IT 
departments in each Force to use DB2 as the database for all of the Scottish Forces.
After these decisions, it was estimated by the project staff that the first applications 
would be available in January 1999, although they considered that it would be another 
ten years before all of the proposed applications were developed. The exact model for 
development of applications had not been decided, although it was intended that the 
Police Forces would maintain ownership of any software produced.
By mid-1998, the SPISS team had grown to five members of staff, with a few more staff 
to be appointed. This was seen by senior Police Officers as forming a centralised
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national IT capability, and while some thought this was needed, some others thought it
worrying in that it could be seen to be a step towards a national Police Force. Several
senior Officers said that in their view SPISS would go some way to addressing the
current problems with individual Force's ISS, which did not in their view reflect
business strategy. As one officer put it,
"There's a problem nationally where policy for forces is being presented which is 
actually the work of Inspectors and Sergeants, and not the senior policy team. 
This is because the of the senior officers lack of knowledge about IT, .. so they 
pass on any request about IT down to those who deal with it .. invariably 
Inspectors or Sergeants, and then present the result as the force policy. The 
problem here then is how does that IT policy fit with the organisation strategy .. 
indeed can those who put the policy together have a strategic perspective, and 
indeed can they be expected to? This is a considerable problem."
Having a Nationally co-ordinated ISS was seen by them as one way of moving towards 
ensuring both better systems, but also systems that was aligned to what they felt was the 
Police services core activities. Up until this point they thought that this just had not 
happened. The reasons for this they said were a combination of having:
• Police Officers actually developing ISS
• Senior Officers and some IT staff not really understanding what strategy was
• Some Senior Officers wanting to be seen to be different
• Poor communication channels between IT staff and Chief Officers
They were very optimistic that SPISS would go some way to addressing these problems, 
by eventually removing ISS from the control of individual Forces.
11.4. DISCUSSION
In seeking to understand ISS formation for SPISS we have identified several issues 
which have emerged from our analysis of the case study. In addressing ISS there are a 
range of other issues which are embedded in a broad stream of organisational practice 
(Mintzberg, 1978; Johnson, 1997) which we must examine if we are to grasp the 
intricate socio-political nature of ISS formation (Waema & Walsham, 1990). In order to 
draw out themes which we have found to be important for our understanding, we will 
concentrate our discussion of the case in terms of our investigative framework discussed
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in Chapters Two and Three, structuring this section in terms of web model analysis 
(Kling, 1987).
11.4.1. INFRASTRUCTURAL & HISTORIC ISSUES
In this case study, a discussion of technological infrastructure refers to the infrastructure 
of the 8 Police Forces, as that is the technical base for SPISS. At the same time, 
acknowledging that leads us to consider the location of SPISS. SPISS was developed, 
was documented, gave rise to applications which are in the process of being 
implemented - however, it is relevant to consider where SPISS was located, because this 
leads us to consider the location of the concept of strategy itself. In each of the Police 
Forces that we have researched staff have claimed to be engaged in ISS. With SPISS, 
several staff within those Forces said they were involved, but made it apparent that 
when referring to SPISS they were referring to some process that took place away from 
their own Force - SPISS certainly did not reside in their own Force. On the other hand, 
while the SPISS project manager was based in an office at the Scottish Police College, 
he traveled to the Forces regularly as part of the development of ISS. Where therefore 
should we consider SPISS to be located, or is this even an issue? We argue that this is 
an issue, as SPISS was considered to have important ramifications for the Police Service 
as we will discuss in a moment. When we think about SPISS, and where we may find it, 
we would argue that the concept of SPISS was located with the people involved; for any 
of the people involved, SPISS can be considered to be a facet of their own mental 
constructs (Jayaratna, 1994).
By this concept of mental construct we are referring to the
"characteristics [that] influence our own sense-making and decision making 
activities", which ".. interact in a dynamic way to form the 'mental construct' to 
help us make sense of the situations, to manage our relationships with others, to 
take action and to identify and to solve problems" (Jayaratna, 1994, p.70).
In our view it is our mental construct that helps us to make sense of what we experience 
and to modify our behaviour in terms of the interpretations that we make (March & 
Olsen, 1976). However, in our view the way in which people make sense of what they 
experience is problematic because,
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"the information about the environment is ambivalent, and therefore subject to 
multiple interpretations. Selecting an appropriate interpretation is hard because 
each person sees different parts of the environment as interesting, depending 
upon the individual's values, history, and experience" (Choo, 1998, p.67)
Therefore, we consider that what people experience, what they interpret as a result of 
their respective mental construct's, will vary. When the SPISS working party gather to 
discuss SPISS, the view of each will differ in some respects as a consequence of their 
differing mental constructs and hence the differences that will result from their 
processes of sense making. SPISS therefore in our view can be seen as being located in 
the amalgam of these collective sense making processes; when we think of SPISS we 
can think of it being located in the history of social practice surrounding the actions of 
those involved, but more specifically we argue that we can consider SPISS as a 
reflection of the interaction of sense making processes of those involved. If SPISS can 
be considered to be anything, in our view it is the embodiment of these interactions. We 
as the researcher, are also therefore a party to that interaction when we seek to 
investigate the phenomena.
We also see in this case study an interconnectedness between factors, which are in 
themselves constitutive of the experience which individuals endeavour to interpret. The 
factors which we consider to be important in this case study are:
• The paradox perceived by many of those spoken with that while a national 
strategy was being developed each of the Forces researched was also developing 
their own ISS.
• This was seen as being linked to the independence of Forces, who had 
historically operated as entirely independent institutions. Hence, the Forces were 
perceived to be just carrying on as normal in developing their own ISS, acting in 
accordance with the systems of values, norms, and beliefs that can be seen as 
constituting an exercise of power in terms of the power of the system (Table
3.1). At the same time it was acknowledged that pressure was growing from 
governmental bodies for a more cooperative approach. This can be seen in terms 
of the exercise of power through the manipulation of perception (Table 3.1)
• This was seen as being linked to pressures coming from the Home Office (e.g. 
1983, 1993), the Audit Commission (e.g. 1990, 1993), and the HMIC (e.g. 1992,
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1999). The three Es of effectiveness, efficiency, and economy (Taylor & 
Williams, 1992) were factors referred to by many senior Officers in relation to 
reasons why they considered ISS to be important. We can think of these factors 
as evidence of the exercise of power; both in terms of the manipulation of 
perception (Table 3.1), but also in altering the values and cultural norms 
surrounding Policing, namely, in terms of the power of the system (Table 3.1)
• This was seen as being linked to an increasing awareness by Chief Officers of
the need to be more business like in the management of their Forces (Loveday,
1993), which was seen as a consequence of education processes through the 
senior command courses that all such Officers attended, the changes in 
budgeting for Forces, and the employment of Chief Officers on what were 
normally 5 year contracts. Yet again, we can think of this as the exercise of 
power in terms of the manipulation of perception of these Officers, but also in 
terms of the power of resources using the authority of government to employ 
Chief Officers on 5 year contracts - one way for the employers to endeavour to 
affect the independence of these Officers (Reiner, 1994).
• This was seen as being linked to the need to be seen to cooperate with other
Forces in order to seek economies of scale, but at the same time Chief Officers
were it was felt required to be seen to be "making an impression" in their own 
Force, and providing clear direction - something that most senior Officers 
viewed as being driven by the process of inspection by the HMIC, who was seen 
as "being obsessed with strategy ... thanks to people like the HMIC the Police 
Service has got strategyitis". Again, we would argue that this can be considered 
in terms of the exercise of power in terms of the power of the system, in 
affecting the cultural norms and beliefs. Also we can consider this as the 
exercise of power through the manipulation of perception by the HMIC in 
increasingly asking to see a strategy (HMIC, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 1999).
Each of the above has been found by us to be an issue arising from the views of those 
interviewed, and in our view, these factors are evidence of the interconnectedness of so 
many issues associated with ISS formation.
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11.4.2. SOCIAL RELATIONS
A discussion of this case study in terms of power configurations highlights part of the 
difficulty with trying to isolate internal and external coalitions (Mintzberg, 1983). 
SPISS, which we can regard as an organisational setting of social practice, presents 
some difficulty in determining whether it is internal to the Police Forces give that 
several of their staff work on SPISS at various times, or external to them. We regard 
SPISS as external to the Police Forces discussed in the preceding case studies for the 
following reasons: People are employed to work solely on SPISS; SPISS is funded as a 
distinct project; SPISS is regarded by all those spoken with as external to the case study 
Police Forces.
In considering the impact of social relations upon the practice of ISS formation, we can 
perceive a power configuration relative to ISS formation in line with Meritocracy 
(Mintzberg, 1983), which is set out in Table 11.1. below.
Characteristics: Perceived as Meritocracy: Evidence:
External Coalition 
(EC)
Passive External coalition comprising 
Police Forces co-operate with 
SPISS, with a small group of Chief 
Officers on Project Board. While 
Scottish Office provide funding, 
influence is limited beyond desire 
to integrate with SCJIS.
Internal Coalition 
(IC)
Professional Professional expertise employed to 
work on SPISS are influencers.
Apparent Power 
Relationship
EC <==> IC IC dominated ISS, although 
approval required from Forces who 
to varying extents are influencers 
of SPISS. Scottish Office provide 
funding based upon progress.
Implications Accommodates needs for 
complex skills and 
knowledge.
SPISS influenced by professional 
experts; SPISS seen as a project, 
but the end of SPISS is not 
predetermined. Need for complex 
skills & knowledge may remain or 
increase.
Table 11.1. Power Configuration Analysis (based upon Mintzberg, 1983)
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As reflected in Table 11.1, we perceive in this case study a Meritocracy power 
configuration (Mintzberg, 1983). The internal coalition of professional experts would 
seem to operate in a balanced power relationship with external influencers. The external 
coalition could be seen to be passive, although this does not mean that they do not 
express considerable interest in the outcome. The implication of the analysis is that 
SPISS is well served for complex work (ibid.), although what happens with SPISS in 
the future, after the development of the applications currently envisaged, was often a 
matter of speculation amongst those spoken with. Some of those spoken with suggested 
that the SPISS project may evolve into a centrally coordinated ISS group for the Scottish 
Police service. If so, a Meritocracy configuration would appear to offer a strong 
professional basis.
We now move on to discuss themes that have arisen from the case with regard to social 
relations, and which have developed as a result of our analysis of ISS formation
11.4.2.1. The Importance of Roles
In this Case the changing nature of Roles has been found to be of importance. The 
ACPOS Computer Policy Sub-committee had been formed in 1987. While the three 
senior Police Officers said that they had been thinking about ISS from the late 1980s, as 
a means of "getting out of the mess police systems were in", it was not until 1992 that 
the concept was officially addressed. This coincided with closer liaison between this 
committee and the computer managers forum, comprising civilian IT managers, which 
had just started. While the Chief Constable of Case A Police Force, and the Deputy 
Chief Constable of Case B were seen as people driving the desire for SPISS, it was the 
IT manager of Case E together with a Police Officer from Case C who initially 
undertook the development work in the formation of SPISS. We see here a combination 
of interest in IT by all parties, perceived knowledgability about IT on the part of all 
parties, and authority at Chief Officer level for two of the people. The presence of the IT 
manager from Case E Police Force was seen as adding expert knowledge to the process.
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After the decision to recruit a project manager, the two Chief Officers were perceived to 
have used their authority to gain the necessary resources. Meanwhile, the expertise of 
the IT manager and the new project manager were seen as central to ISS formation for 
SPISS. Through the project, the combination of people in roles most closely associated 
with SPISS, who were perceived as interested in IT, knowledgeable about IT, 
particularly the senior Police Officers, and expertise has been found to be important in 
ISS formation. In the views of those interviewed, it was this combination in a small 
team that saw SPISS develop from idea to applications.
11.4.2.2. Relations with other Agents
We have already implicitly discussed many elements of relations in Section 11.4.1. 
above. However, it is important to state that we have found that it was not the mere 
presence of such relations that was important, but rather we have found that we can 
think of these relations as an ongoing interaction between the agents. The notion of 
relations between agents is important, but it is the interaction, the dynamism in such 
relations that we must remain sensitive to. For example, the relationship with the HMIC 
was not seen as a one way event. While the HMIC encouraged best practice (1993, 
1998, 1999), the incidence of best practice discussed came from practice found in 
Forces. Similarly, the relation between Forces, those involved in SPISS, and the Scottish 
Office was not seen as a one way or static relation. On the contrary, officials from the 
Scottish Office attended several of the meetings of the SPISS working groups with the 
stated intention of feeding the developments into other areas of the criminal justice 
system. Such interaction over time can be seen as a part of the ongoing construction of 
reality regarding ISS (Berger & Luckman, 1967), that is, a continual process of 
construction and reconstruction. Thus, relations we have found to be important (see sec.
6.6.3.1), but we have found that it is the dynamism of relations that is central to our 
understanding of what happened with SPISS.
239
11.4.2.3. Perceptions and Meanings
In terms of SPISS, perception was seen as all important by those interviewed, with the 
level of cooperation given by Chief Officers being seen as linked to the way in which 
they perceived SPISS.
In the views of the majority of Police Officers spoken with, SPISS was perceived as 
being concerned with achieving value for money from IS through common development 
of systems. In addition, SPISS was perceived as having a potential impact upon crime 
fighting by allowing communication between the systems of different Forces. They felt 
that such views were crucial for SPISS to be accepted by senior Officers. We have 
referred above (Sec 11.4.1.) to the inter-connectedness of factors, and amongst these we 
noted the pressures that Chief Officers in particular were seen to be under regarding the 
three Es (Taylor & Williams, 1992), which was seen as leading them towards 
cooperation in ISS. At the same time we noted the need for Chief Officers to be seen to 
be giving direction to their Force, which was seen to lead them towards a need to be 
independent. In the midst of such pressures, the way in which such systems were 
perceived was seen as being important to the degree of cooperation given. For some 
senior Officers, SPISS was perceived as an attempt at centralisation, influenced by the 
Scottish Office, and as potentially representing one step on the road towards a national 
police force. Indeed, the comment by one of the senior people working on SPISS was 
that the aim of SPISS was "to take IS out of the political equation for good", the 
perception being that different IS across Forces was a barrier to further amalgamation of 
Forces.
SPISS was according to many senior Officers seen as symbolising a move towards the 
efficient and effective use of IS, after years of what they saw as misuse. This misuse was 
based in their view upon the use of limited resources within Forces to replicate what had 
been, or was being done with IS in another Force. The symbolism attached to such 
phenomena as ISS constitutes a part of the way in which we attribute meaning (Morgan, 
1986) to what we experience, the way in which people attribute such meaning being a 
part of the perceptual process (Jayaratna, 1994) within their mental construct.
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The acceptance or otherwise of SPISS was seen as resting upon the perceptions 
accorded to it, and the perceptual process can be seen as an important component of a 
person's mental construct (Jayaratna, 1994), a part of the way in which they make sense 
of what they experience (Choo, 1998), and from which they may determine their 
response. Perceptions, and symbolism, we found to be an intrinsic part of how people 
made sense of SPISS.
11.5. SUMMARY
In this case study, ISS formation was perceived to be closely related to the SPISS 
project, which was judged to have progressed successfully through to development of 
applications. We have categorised ISS formation in terms of a Meritocracy power 
configuration (Mintzberg, 1983). That said, we have also discussed four themes which 
we have identified as being important in our understanding of the generative forces 
affecting ISS formation, and in particular the analysis has discussed the exercise of 
power in relation to all four conceptualisations outlined in Table 3.1..
In Chapters Six to Eleven we have presented our case studies, in which we have 
outlined ISS formation in five Scottish Police Forces over several years, and ISS 
formation for SPISS. The discussion had centred upon outlining what happened in each 
Force, followed by a discussion of each case study where we have abstracted the key 
issues. One of the issues that has arisen in considering the Forces, is the change in 
apparent power configurations, and in particular the differences. We illustrate this in 
Figure 11.2. below.
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Case Study Power Configuration (including any 
perceived shift) during ISS formation
Case A From Autocracy to Instrument (fig.6.4.)
Case B From Autocracy to Instrument (fig.7.2.)
Case C From Closed System to Meritocracy (fig. 8.3.)
Case D From Political Arena to Instrument (fig. 9.3.)
Case E Meritocracy (fig. 10.1.)
Case F Meritocracy (fig. 11.1.)
Table 11.2. Power Configurations in ISS Formation - 6 Case Studies
The implications of Figure 11.2. are discussed further in the next chapter, although at 
this stage we draw attention to the differences which are apparent across ISS formation 
practices which on the surface may appear very similar. This highlights to us the 
possibility that we must be wary in making assumptions about ISS formation without 
investigating the nature of the practice in depth.
Also in our analysis, we found that certain groupings of issues emerged from the data 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Silverman, 1993), and that a number of different power 
configurations were suggested. We have used these thematic groupings to form sub­
headings for the discussion of issues, which are:
• Infrastructural and Historic Issues
• The Importance of Roles
• Structures and Processes in relation to Decision Making
• Perception and Meaning
• Relations with other Agents
We now take the issues which we have abstracted from these case studies, and 
incorporate them in a synthesis of the findings from this research in the next Chapter.
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CHAPTER TWELVE - SYNTHESIS
12.1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to make a contribution to knowledge regarding ISS 
formation, and this chapter synthesises our analysis as a basis for the contribution. In the 
previous chapter we discussed the case studies organisations, and from our analysis we 
abstracted a series of issues which were grouped under the following headings:
• Infrastructural and Historic Issues
• The Importance of Roles
• Structures and Processes in relation to Decision Making
• Perception and Meaning
• Relations with other Agents
From our discussion of these issues we have abstracted five themes as the basis for a 
model. The discussion of the model, together with the implications for our view of ISS 
formation, forms the basis of our contribution to knowledge in the form of an analytic 
proposition to theory (Yin, 1989; Walsham, 1995; Cavaye, 1996).
The structure of the chapter is as follows:
1. Firstly, we discuss the themes which we identify in Chapters Six to Eleven, in which 
the dynamic mental construct (Jayaratna, 1994) is a central concept.
2. Secondly, we discuss our model, where we argue that ISS formation can be viewed 
in terms of a process of social construction and reconstruction based upon the 
mental constructs of those involved.
3. Finally, we evaluate the implications of this view in the light of existing theory on ISS 
formation.
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12.2. FIVE THEMES ARISING FROM OUR CROSS-CASE 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Having undertaken fieldwork in the Police Service, we are aware of the potential sectoral 
distinctiveness in relation to our findings. However, as we have argued, we have not 
sought to develop generalisations to a wider population of organisational settings, but 
instead have focussed upon developing analytic propositions to a wider body of theory 
(Burawoy, 1985; Yin, 1989; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Walsham, 1995). We argue that 
our findings have implications for our understanding of theory on ISS formation more 
widely. An analysis of the issues discussed in relation to the case studies has led us to the 
identification of five themes which in our view are significant for our understanding of 
ISS formation. These themes are:
1. The multifaceted nature o f IT: as artefact; as terminology; as subjective 
phenomenon
2. Shared relevance structures as a key aspect in delineating roles in ISS formation
3. The interaction between informality & formality in decision making processes
4. The dynamic nature o f relations in ISS formation practice
5. mental constructs as guiding the practice of ISS formation
We will now discuss each of these, before moving on to discuss the implications for our 
view of ISS formation practice.
12.2.1. THE MULTIFACETED NATURE OF IT: A S  ARTEFACT; A S  
TERMINOLOGY; A S  SUBJECTIVE PHENOMENON
Perhaps unsurprisingly given our discussion in Chapter Two, we have found that in ISS 
formation the concept of IT is important; however, our findings indicate that 
acknowledging the multifaceted nature of the concept of IT is important for ISS 
formation. In this theme we argue that the effect the concept of IT has on ISS formation 
can be thought of in the following terms: of IT as constituting artefacts; as being used as 
terminology; and as being seen as a subjective phenomenon.
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We find that it is important to consider the way in which people think about IT as an 
artefact when developing ISS. For example we found examples of ISS being developed 
in expectation of the expiry of a lease for a mainframe system, and being developed in 
what was said to be a response to problems acquiring data from another mainframe 
system. In such circumstances we find that perceptions concerning the nature of IT as 
artefacts is viewed as an influential factor. However, in many contributions to ISS 
formation literature, IT is often viewed solely in terms of artefacts (e.g. Earl, 1989; 
Andreu et al, 1994; Ward & Griffiths, 1996). These authors view IT solely in terms of 
technology which is used to implement ISS, which from what we have found is only part 
of the picture.
As Latour (1995) argues, IT can be thought of as more than just artefact, as we can also 
think of IT as social actant (ibid.) whereby the concept of IT can be viewed as influential 
in the construction of meaning, that is, the sense-making processes (Choo, 1998) of 
those involved in ISS formation. We have demonstrated this in relation to the way in 
which people use the terminology of IT as a means of enhancing their own career 
possibilities, and the way in which people are perceived as knowledgeable about IT 
through their use of such terminology. The use of such terminology as a part of 
discourse (Foucault, 1980) surrounding ISS (Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992; Knights & 
Murray, 1994) can be considered as a further way in which meaning in relation to ISS 
formation is constructed. The use of IT as terminology to give the impression of 
expertise (Brown, 1998) can be viewed in terms of a relational exercise of power 
through the management of resources (Hardy, 1994), where the actions of people in 
using IT terminology may be perceived as expertise and influence the perceptions, and 
possibly the actions of others.
Finally, another way of thinking about the concept of IT which we have found to be 
important is that of IT as a subjective phenomenon. By this we are referring to the way in 
which IT can be perceived as subjective phenomenon, even some time after the IT 
artefact has been removed from the situation of interest. For example, when IT is 
perceived in terms of shared instances of disasters, or as indications of a Force lagging 
behind others or being a leader, illustrate the symbolic role that IT can have in 
organisational settings (Hirschheim & Newman, 1991; Scarborough, 1998). Such
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symbolic aspects of IT can be considered in a subjective sense as one of the means 
through which people construct meaning (Morgan, 1986) about ISS.
Thus we argue that IT, while often thought about in IS related literature as technological 
entities (Kling, 1987), can instead be considered in terms of a multifaceted phenomenon 
which influences the way in which people construct their understanding of ISS, and 
hence informs the way they engage in associated practice.
12.2.2. SHARED RELEVANCE STRUCTURES A S  A M EANS OF 
UNDERSTANDING ROLES IN  ISS  FORMATION
Understanding the nature of roles in organisations that people have is important in 
relation to ISS formation. We argue that we can think more broadly about roles than is 
suggested by the job titles given to people. In doing this we have a means of better 
understanding perceived levels of involvement and perceived levels of influence of the 
people involved in ISS formation practice. This theme argues that we can think about 
roles in ISS formation in terms of the levels of authority, interest, and knowledge that 
people are perceived to have. In addition, the concept of relevance structures (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967) is pertinent as a way of understanding some of the interaction between 
people in ISS formation practice. However we choose to understand roles, our findings 
show that the exercise of power (e.g. Sec. 6.4.2.1; 7.4.2.1; 8.4.2.1; 9.4.2.1; 10.4.2.1.
11.4.2.1), particularly when viewed in terms of either of the first three dimensions 
illustrated in Table 3.1., is a factor in our understanding of roles and authority.
A role can be thought of as more than just a particular task oriented activity, or a relative 
position in an organisational hierarchy, either of which may be considered to carry with 
them expectations which are defined occupationally or even legally (Handy, 1985). That 
is not to say that this way of thinking about role is invalid; on the contrary, as we found 
in our case studies, roles were both occupationally and legally defined for all Police 
Officers. It is necessary to address the apparent roles that people perceive others to have 
relative to themselves, and in our findings people often do this in terms of relative 
hierarchical status. For example, given the discipline based nature of Police organisations 
such perceptions of authority are seen as important. There is no denying that in a rank
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structure such as the Police, a higher rank is viewed as having greater authority than one 
below it, although such a view is narrow as it ignores the cultural and political reality of 
organisational settings, where for example some people in senior roles may be ignored 
for political reasons (Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995). Hence, in considering the nature of 
the roles that people have in ISS formation practice, the forces which influence those 
roles and the way roles interact, our findings have indicated that we need to look beyond 
roles based on apparent job title or position in a hierarchy.
Therefore, while Goldsmith (1991) argues that the role of senior management is 
important in ISS, and while Auer and Reponen (1997) concentrate their attention on the 
roles of IS professionals and of management in ISS formation, neither set of authors 
explores the notion of role beyond the taken for granted expectations associated with the 
titles used. We find these views limited, as a means of expressing the differing ways in 
which we have found that people perceive of roles in relation to ISS formation.
From our research we can usefully think of Roles in relation to ISS formation in terms of 
authority, interest, and knowledge. We find that these factors are valuable in helping us 
to understand the roles that individuals are seen as having, the way in which they are 
viewed as able to influence ISS formation, and they way in which they work in 
combination.
The first of the factors is that of authority. Here we find that levels of perceived authority 
depend upon a person's position relative to a hierarchy as one way in which people 
consider roles, but also that any authority a person is perceived to have can also be 
considered in relation to perceptions of their ability to influence the ongoing practice of 
ISS formation. These perceptions of authority can be linked to a person's apparent access 
to decision making processes, formal or otherwise (e.g. Sec. 6.4.2.1., 7.4.2.1.).
Another factor in understanding roles in ISS formation practice is that of perceived level 
of interest in ISS. Here we refer to the level of interest in ISS, or in IT, that a person is 
perceived to have. Some people are viewed as being interested in IT, and are brought in 
to an influential ISS role (e.g. Sec.9.4.2.1.), while others may be excluded because of a 
perceived lack of interest in ISS (e.g. Sec.8.4.2.2.). Similarly, in terms of knowledge, we 
are referring to the level of knowledge of IS/IT that a person is perceived to have. Thus,
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people may have a role in ISS formation practices because of perceptions of their 
knowledge (e.g. Sec.6.4.2.1., 7.4.2.1., 8.4.2.1, 10.4.2.1., 11.4.2.1.). We note a link 
between perceptions of levels of knowledge and perceptions of levels of authority, in that 
someone perceived to have a high level of knowledge of ISS could consequently be 
accorded a higher level of authority - being seen as someone who could influence ISS 
formation. However, we find that the distinction between perceived levels of knowledge 
and perceived levels of authority is made by those involved and is required.
When we consider knowledge, we see interaction between the roles that people have in 
ISS formation in terms of relevance structures (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Here we are 
referring to the way in which "knowledge of everyday life is structured in terms of 
relevances. Some of these are determined by immediate pragmatic interests .., others by 
[the] general situation" (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p .59). For example, for those who 
wish to be seen as specialists in the area of ISS, then what is viewed as of relevance to 
that person will be structured differently from what another person needs to know to 
operate in a different area of organisational practice (Schamber, 1994). In other words, 
we could assume that people who engage in ISS formation practice, "will need to know 
whatever is deemed necessary for the fulfillment of a particular task" (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967, p .95). We find that it is at the intersection of these relevance 
structures, the point at which people have meaningful things to say to one another (ibid.) 
about ISS, that can influence the way people engage with others in ISS formation 
practice.
However, we see this as being only partially useful in understanding roles. This is 
because people may be in roles involved in ISS formation practice as a result of their 
perceived level of authority, or through interest, but not have any knowledge in the areas 
of ISS (e.g. 9.4.2.1., 8.4.2.1.). Nonetheless, relevance structures are considered useful in 
helping us understand aspects of interaction in ISS formation. Thus, likely perceptions of 
relevance structures of the self vis-a-vis others, perceptions of interest, and perceptions 
of authority may be considered influential in determining the roles that people seek, or 
accept, in ISS formation practice.
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12.2.3. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN INFORM ALITY & FORM ALITY IN  
DECISIONMAKING PROCESSES
In this theme we argue that the influence of decision making processes in ISS formation 
practice can be thought of in terms of perceived political interaction between two levels - 
formality and informality. With decision making processes, that is "all those steps taken 
from the time a stimulus for an action is perceived until the time the commitment to the 
action is made" (Mintzberg, 1979), we find that while both informal and formal 
processes are evident in relation to ISS formation, it is not in our view a case of either 
formality or informality being dominant. Instead we argue for a view of decision making 
in ISS formation practice which operates in terms of an ongoing interaction between 
practices of formality and informality.
Aspects of formality and informality have been widely recognised in decision making 
processes (Simon, 1957, March, 1989). The importance of political behaviour in ISS 
decision-making has been illustrated by researchers (Davies, 1991; Walsham, 1993; 
Jones, 1995; Sillince & Mouakket, 1997), and our findings support this view. For 
example, we note people being excluded or ignored from both formal and informal 
decision processes, or outcomes being decided informally before formal decision making 
processes occur. This conforms with what Gouldner (1954) terms mock bureaucracy; 
namely, the informality of the reporting structures and decision making processes that for 
the most part lie behind the facade of formal bureaucratic structures. Thus, while formal 
meeting processes may be in place, decisions are often made by smaller groups away 
from such formal meetings. Such practices can be understood in terms of the exercise of 
power through the management of process where decision agendas, and participation are 
managed (for example: Sec. 6.4.2.2.; 7.4.2.2.; 8.4.2.3.; 9.4.2.3.).
In addition however, we find that it is not just that there are informal processes in 
operation as well as formal processes, but that apparently informal processes can be 
viewed as representing the exercise of power through the management of processes 
(Clegg, 1989; Hardy, 1994, 1996). Here the interaction between both formal and 
informal processes was influenced by some of those forming an internal coalition 
(Mintzberg, 1983). The point of this resides in the apparent purpose of both forms of 
decision making, and here we find our analysis of the exercise of power to be valuable. In
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our view it is the way in which the processes are perceived to be used that is important 
to our understanding. By this we mean the way in which some people appear to seek to 
influence ISS formation by managing informal decision making processes for ISS 
decisions, while at the same time managing a formal process of decision making with a 
view to providing legitimacy for their actions. This managing of formal processes can 
act as a symbolic means of giving the impression that there are formal procedures for 
ISS, this being seen as an exercise of power in relation to both colleagues and external 
coalition members (e.g. Sec. 6.4.2.4.; 7.4.2.4., 11.4.2.2.). This can be conceived in terms 
of the exercise of power through the manipulation of perception (Morgan, 1986), that is, 
there is an attempt to influence how those forming an external coalition perceive what is 
happening with ISS. Therefore, the interaction to which we refer can be considered in 
terms of the perceived dualistic nature of, and apparent purpose for, decision making 
processes in relation to ISS formation.
12.2.4. THE DYNAMIC NATURE OF RELATIONS BETW EEN COALITIONS IN  
ISS  FORMATION PRACTICE
In this theme we argue that the effect of relations between coalitions (Mintzberg, 1983) 
in ISS formation can be thought of in terms of a process of dynamism based upon 
actions, and what people take to be significant from those actions through their 
perceptual processes (Jayaratna, 1994). The concept of relations between coalitions does 
imply a degree of intention in our view, that is, where the people concerned have some 
intentional association with ISS formation. With this theme we refer to our finding that 
the interaction between internal and external coalitions (Mintzberg, 1983) can be thought 
of in terms of an ongoing dynamic process of interaction. This dynamic process of 
interaction is concerned with the relational exercise of power, particularly when we 
consider power in terms of the manipulation of perception and as a web of power 
relations (See Table 3.1.).
Understanding action alone is insufficient to understand relations, as we must also 
consider how people actually perceived such actions in relation to ISS. Instead we argue 
that to understand the dynamic of relations between coalitions, actions must be 
considered in terms of the way in which they are perceived by others, and in terms of the
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web of power relations in which they are embedded (Knights & Murray, 1994). We 
contend that our understanding of the effects that the perceptions of these actions has in 
terms of ISS formation is important. For example, we find that while some agents engage 
in actions such as holding meetings, writing documents, and undertaking monitoring 
inspections, these actions are not in our view simply a one way process of intervention so 
far as ISS formation is concerned. The action must also be seen in terms of the sense that 
people make of those actions (Weick, 1995) before they take a course of action, and it is 
this process of action -/- sense-making -/- action that forms the essence of the dynamic 
to which we refer.
Sense-making involves individuals in processes of enactment (ibid., p.30) for example 
where they give meaning to events in their own mind. In addition, sense-making can be 
seen as an ongoing social process that is focussed upon cues which surround people and 
from which "they develop a larger sense of what may be occurring" (ibid., p.50). Thus, 
the way in which people make sense of the actions arising from relations between 
coalitions can vary considerably from person to person, a variance that can be viewed as 
a key problem in sense-making in organisational settings, where shared meanings are 
considered important for collective action (Choo, 1998). Considering power in terms of 
a web of relations is therefore useful in such analysis, because of the way in which such 
analysis draws our attention to the “historically constituted configurations of practices” 
(Knights & Vurdubakis, 1994, p. 172). In this sense, we can reflect upon the historic as 
well as current relations between coalitions, relative to a wider sphere of influence - or 
web of relations - where communicative, political, economic, cultural and social 
relationships are "simultaneously conditions for, and outcomes of, power" (Introna, 
1997, p. 128). These aspects form part of a web of power relations within which the 
coalitions and the way they interact are embedded, and which always affect and are 
always affected by such interactions (Foucault, 1980; Introna, 1997).
Equally, we observe that the dynamic of relations between coalitions is an area in which 
the exercise of power understood in terms of the manipulation of perception was of 
interest (e.g.: Sec. 6.4.2.3; 7.4.2.3; 9.4.2.4; 11.4.2.3). Here the impact upon symbols, 
rituals, values and cultural norms (Pettigrew, 1985a) can be seen as a part of an ongoing 
process of construction and reconstruction of meaning (Berger & Luckman, 1967; Reed, 
1992) regarding the social practice of ISS formation.
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In addition, the actions of some coalition members can be viewed as an exercise of 
power in terms of the manipulation of perception in ISS formation, through the use of 
language (Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992; Knights & Murray, 1994; Brown, 1992), in this 
case the use of the language of ISS (e.g.: Audit Commission, 1993; Home Office, 1993, 
1994; HMIC, 1993, 1998, 1999). For example, perceived changes in the use of language 
and concepts relating to ISS in the release of papers and circulars from coalition 
members could be seen as influencing language use and practice, symbolising an implicit 
instruction to adapt.
Thus, we see discussions held and documents issued which are perceived to affect the 
way people make sense of the expectations regarding the concept of ISS. In addition, the 
action people take in calling meetings and in talking about IT is perceived to affect the 
way people make sense of the control being exercised over ISS. It is interesting in view 
of our earlier discussion regarding the use of IT terminology (Sec. 12.2.1.) to note that 
Weick (1995) considers the use of language in conversation to be of particular 
importance in the dynamic process of sense-making, a point reinforced elsewhere 
regarding ISS formation (Walsham, 1993). We would add to this the importance that we 
find to be attached to the perceptions of use of language in written communication also 
an intrinsic part of discourse (Foucault, 1980) related to relations between coalitions in 
ISS formation.
12.2.5. MENTAL CONSTRUCTS A S  GUIDING THE PRACTICE OF ISS  
FORMATION
In this final theme we argue that mental constructs (Jayaratna, 1994) can be thought of in 
terms of a conceptual means of representing the differing characteristics which 
individuals bring to bear on ISS formation. This means that the people involved have 
differing values/ethics, motives and prejudices, reasoning ability, experiences, skills and 
knowledge sets, structuring process, roles, models and frameworks for action (Jayaratna, 
194, p.64). Thus, people express differing motives, can be seen to have differing 
relevance structures, and are perceived to differ in terms of level of interest, expertise 
and authority. In addition, we note that people have different experiences, are perceived
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to differ in the values that they have, and we can surmise will have differing views as a 
result of their individual sense-making processes (Weick, 1995; Choo, 1998). We can 
therefore infer that they will all differ in their mental constructs.
We define the concept of mental construct in terms of the characteristics that help to 
shape the process of "selecting] some elements of the action world as relevant, 
significant and useful while dismissing others" as being of less use, less significant, and 
less useful (Jayaratna, 1994, p.64). Peoples mental constructs will develop and alter over 
time as they engage in a dialectical process of externalisation, objectivation, and 
internalisation (Berger & Luckmann, 1967) in constructing their view of social reality. 
We note that, "the identified elements interact in a dynamic way to form the mental 
construct to help us make sense of the situations, to manage our relationships with 
others, to take action and to identify and solve problems" (Jayaratna, 1994, p.70). Thus, 
what people do, and the way that they perceive what they and others do, will in our view 
not only result from their mental construct but will also then play a role in the future 
development of their mental construct - hence the dynamic. In our view it is here that the 
concept of ISS becomes meaningful for the individual, and we argue it is from this 
development of meaning that further action results.
Therefore, if we view practice associated with ISS formation as involving people, then as 
the theme indicates, it is our contention that what ISS formation is taken to be results 
from the interaction of the combined mental constructs of those involved in ISS 
formation. Furthermore, this interaction of dynamic mental constructs can be seen as an 
ongoing process of construction and reconstruction of reality (Berger & Luckmann, 
1967; Knights & Murray, 1994) for those involved in ISS formation.
There is one more facet of the dynamic mental construct that we wish to mention, and 
that concerns the concept of power. In each of the other themes we have highlighted the 
exercise of power, based upon our analysis, as an important consideration in the way in 
which we can understand the themes. Power is also a factor in thinking about the 
concept of the dynamic mental construct, because we contend it is at this level that an 
exercise of power will be recognised as such (Jayaratna, 1994), either prior to, during, or 
after some action that is deemed an exercise of power. This is not saying that every 
exercise of power will be recognised as such, nor that everything that happens will be
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viewed as an exercise of power. Rather, we are saying that as and when an exercise of 
power is recognised as such, then it is at the level of mental construct that it acquires 
meaning which may then influence action.
12.3. THE CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE:- THE 
CONSTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF ISS FORMATION
Taking all of the above into consideration, we see ISS formation practice in terms of 
micro-political activity, which is based upon the social and political interaction of people 
which results from their socially constructed view of reality. This constructed view of 
reality, together with any action taken, is in turn based upon the person's dynamic mental 
construct. This construction should not in our view be thought of as a one-off event; 
instead we argue that ISS formation reflects an ongoing process of construction and 
reconstruction of social reality (Berger & Luckman, 1967). We can now see the dynamic 
properties of the themes we have discussed as important parts of this continual dynamism 
between a person's mental construct and what they perceive around them. Thus, the 
themes discussed can be seen as forces influencing a persons mental construct, which in 
turn guides that person in constructing and reconstructing what they take to be ISS 
formation at any point in time. As a consequence, any action they take will in our view 
be based upon their constructed view at that point in time.
At the same time, in line with our discussion above, understanding the exercise of power 
has been an important factor in each of the themes. As we have argued (Sec. 12.2.5.) it is 
at the level of the mental construct that the exercise of power will in our view be 
considered. We have also argued that in each of the other four themes, the exercise of 
power has been important to our understanding of what happens. For this reason 
therefore, it is at the point of interaction with the dynamic mental construct, or rather at 
the point of perception and interpretation of each theme that many power relations will 
have any meaning (This does not mean that every exercise of power will be perceived, let 
alone interpreted as such). If we accept that ISS formation practice can be viewed as 
embedded in a web of power relations, the interaction between the dynamic mental 
construct and the themes we identify can be viewed as pivotal in understanding the 
exercise of power relations. This is because it is at the level of interaction in forming the
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mental construct that we find help in deciding upon action (Jayaratna, 1994). Thus, the 
ongoing construction and reconstruction of reality will reflect power relations, those that 
are recognised at the level of mental construct, and those that are not recognised but 
which are implicitly part of a web of power relations (Foucault, 1980; Introna, 1997). 
We can therefore argue that ISS formation practice, based upon constructed and 
reconstructed social realities, will be a reflection of power relations at that point in time. 
This makes our ability to understand such relations all the more important.
The themes which we have identified as influential are important for ISS formation 
practice because we believe that they affect not only the way in which people perceive of 
ISS formation, but also any action they may take in practice. From this it follows that we 
do not believe that there is something out there called ISS formation which awaits our 
participation or investigation, but rather what we and others take to be ISS formation 
will depend upon our constructed view of social reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1967), and 
the actions that we take, both individually and collectively form the basis of ISS 
formation practice within an organisational setting.
The themes that we have discussed can now be brought together as shown below in 
Figure 12.1..
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THEME - IT.: as artefact; 
as subjective phenomena; 
as terminology
The Ex ercise of Power 
as a backdrop to the 
construction & 
reconstruction of the 
mental construct
THEME - Dynamic 
nature cf relations
THEME 
Mental 
Construct: 
Guiding ISS 
formation
THEME - 
Rdes: 
Shared 
relevance 
structures
THEME - Irformality &  
Formality in decision making 
processes
Figure 12.1. Social Reality of ISS Formation Constructed and Reconstructed
There are a number of points which arise from Figure 12.1.. The first of these points is 
our view that the themes represent factors which are important in an ongoing 
development of peoples dynamic mental constructs relative to ISS formation; that is, 
that as people make sense of the elements of social practice in the organisational settings 
they are engaged in, we argue that these themes impact upon the meanings they 
construct, and in turn any action that they then take. A second point is that we see the 
themes that we have identified as important in a dualistic sense, that is, interaction that 
leads to the ongoing construction and reconstruction (Berger & Luckmann, 1967) of 
what people perceive to be social reality of ISS formation. We are not suggesting that 
each person involved in ISS formation practice will stop to consider each of the themes 
before undertaking some action. Instead we argue that the themes are implicit (to greater 
or lesser extents at an individual level) as part of ongoing interaction between people, 
and that some or all of the themes are influential factors in the sense-making process of 
perception and interpretation by different people at various times.
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This view that people socially construct what they take to be social reality in relation to 
ISS is supported by others (Knights & Murray, 1994; Scarborough, 1998). Indeed, 
utilising Scarborough's (1998) argument, we are not saying that people make up the idea 
of ISS formation, which would be seen as a "crude form of idealism, that is, of 
suggesting that ideas alone shape the world" (ibid., p.22). Instead we argue that the 
themes that we have identified are important in understanding the way in which people 
make sense of, and engage in practice that is termed ISS formation. Thus, while we 
argue that ISS as such does not exist out in the world - it cannot be touched - at the 
same time we are not suggesting that ISS formation is solely made up of thoughts. 
People work together utilising their expertise and knowledge, they often do produce ISS 
documentation of some form, and they do in our view often have some shared 
understanding of what is happening with ISS. While one person's socially constructed 
view of ISS may well differ from another's view of ISS, then the action that they 
undertake in ISS formation practice may well differ as a consequence. It is in the 
conglomeration of such varied activity that practice associated with ISS formation rests. 
One way of viewing this is as a pattern in a stream o f practice (to paraphrase Mintzberg, 
1978) in developing ISS. Following Smirisch and Stubbart (1985) we can see this as 
contributing to organisation making, that is, a part of the ongoing, everyday social 
practice that forms an important part of what we come to know as ISS formation in an 
organisational setting.
Another point regarding influence of the mental construct for ISS formation lies both 
with the way in which people perceive the exercise of power from the activities around 
them, and also with the way in which we can perceive of a web of power relations 
(Foucault, 1980; Hardy, 1994) forming a backdrop to the ongoing construction and 
reconstruction of ISS formation. It is at the conceptual level of mental construct that we 
can consider the exercise of power in ISS formation in a micro-analytic sense. On the 
one hand, as has been argued (Clegg, 1989; Jayaratna, 1994; Introna, 1997) we do not 
believe that it is necessarily the case that people will be aware of the exercise of power 
when it affects them. However, we have found that we can valuably consider the exercise 
of a web of power relations (Clegg, 1989; Hardy; 1994; Phillips, 1996) which can be 
perceived to act as "the backdrop against which all organisational actions and decisions 
take place" (Hardy, 1996). We see the exercise of power as a factor in the construction 
and reconstruction of mental constructs, in influencing the values, traditions, cultural
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norms which become implicit in the mental construct (Jayaratna, 1994). It is this 
backdrop which adds the final dimension to Figure 12.1, those facets of a web of power 
relations within which the interactions between the themes and the mental construct are 
embedded.
In considering power configurations (Mintzberg, 1983), the practices and influence of 
both internal and external coalitions reflects the interaction of people. In any such 
process of interaction the perspectives of ISS formation will be constructed and 
reconstructed in line with influences upon the dynamic mental constructs of those 
involved as a result of relations between the coalitions. Thus, the relations implicit in 
power configurations influence and are influenced by the model shown in Figure 12.1., 
which provides us with a link between power configurations at a macro level of analysis 
and mental construct at a micro level in seeking to understand ISS formation.
We can now evaluate the implications of our findings for existing theory and for practice.
12.4. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY & FOR PRACTICE
In this section we will discuss the implications of our research for existing theory on ISS 
formation as a means of further elaborating our contribution to knowledge.
Our work supports other authors (e.g. Davies, 1991; Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992; 
Walsham, 1993; Jones, 1995) in highlighting the social and political aspects of ISS 
formation. Our findings contribute to this work by providing a new model (Figure 12.1.) 
through which we can investigate and endeavour to understand ISS formation practice.
Our model highlights the limitations of functionalist views of ISS formation (Galliers, 
1991, Knights & Murray, 1994), what we termed a Classical perspective in Chapter 
Two. Our work demonstrates the limitations of views which do not address the political 
nature of ISS formation (e.g. Moynihan, 1990; Flynn & Goleniewska, 1993; Brown, 
1994; Ward & Griffiths, 1996). For example, such views do not take account of the 
surprises, shift in preferences, political action and agendas that can occur in ISS
258
formation (Ciborra, 1994). We are also critical of this work because of the underlying 
assumption that ISS formation is a defined activity to which people contribute, and that 
this process proceeds systematically through stages (e.g. Flynn & Goleniewska, 1993; 
Andreu et al, 1994; Lederer & Salmela, 1996; Ward & Griffiths, 1996). In our view it is 
important to consider that individuals will vary in the way in which the themes that we 
have identified impact upon their mental constructs (Jayaratna, 1994), their sense-making 
processes (Weick, 1995), and in turn their actions. Hence, from our perspective the way 
in which they construct and reconstruct their views of social reality of ISS formation will 
affect what they do. As a result, ISS formation practice will from this perspective be 
subject to considerable variety, which is indeed what we have found in our research; 
where similar organisational settings, with similar contextual conditions, had considerable 
variance in the practice of ISS formation. Our model in Figure 12.1. suggest that an 
explanation of this variance lies particularly with the interaction of themes and mental 
constructs, and we argue that thinking about the socially constructed and reconstructed 
realities informing ISS formation practice is a valuable, and necessary step. Furthermore, 
our work highlights that we should not look at the themes we have identified in isolation 
or as static, but rather that we should recognise a dynamic, dualistic element to the 
interaction of these themes in influencing ISS formation.
This brings us to a further point, which concerns the use of our model. We would argue 
against using our model as a direct representation of an organisational situation, or as a 
model to be implemented in some way. Instead we would argue that we should use the 
model at an epistemological level, that is, as a way of thinking about and a means of 
understanding the complexity of a situation.
A further implication lies with the concept of power. We have found that considering the 
exercise of power in terms of four dimensions (Hardy, 1994, 1996; Phillips, 1997) has 
highlighted the importance of the concept of a web of power relations (Foucault, 1980; 
Hardy, 1994), which can be thought of as acting as a backdrop to ISS formation. In 
addition, we have found it valuable to consider the exercise of power in terms of the 
other three dimensions, as a way of understanding the actions of those involved. We 
discussed numerous instances where the exercise of power was evident in affecting what 
happened (e.g. sections: 6.1.3.4., 7.3.4., 8.3.4.). This highlights the limitations of views 
of ISS formation that have not addressed power as an issue at all (e.g. Earl, 1989;
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Peppard, 1993; Neumann, 1994; Andreu et al, 1994; Robson, 1997), as we find that 
addressing the exercise of power in a relational sense gives us a necessary insight into 
social practice of ISS formation.
We can also reflect upon the concept of power configurations (Mintzberg, 1983), which 
we find to be a useful way of thinking about coalitions and power relations between 
them. However, our findings suggest that we need to guard against seeing such 
coalitions as fixed, or in assuming that all people involved in ISS formation will share an 
understanding of who else may or may not be within any such coalition. While Mintzberg 
(1983) does not suggest that the coalitions, or indeed configurations should be used in 
anything other than a conceptual manner, he displays a tendency towards making 
prescriptive observations (e.g. chp.24). Our findings suggest that it is very difficult to 
make assumptions about how such configurations may act. As our analysis suggests (see 
Figure 11.2), there can be considerable differences in apparent power configurations 
related to ISS formation in organisational settings that on the surface look similar. The 
reason for this we would argue can be better understood when we reflect upon our 
model shown in Figure 12.1.. Here we have provided a means of linking the actions of, 
and relations between, coalitions at a macro level with the actions, or more precisely the 
mental constructs of individuals at a micro level. The role of the dynamic mental 
construct (Jayaratna, 1994) is central to our findings therefore, as a means of 
conceptualising both the way in which individuals construct their own view of ISS 
formation, and also the way in which peoples interactions are founded upon these unique 
constructions.
Our findings also have implications for the views of ISS formation which we discussed in 
Chapter Two based upon Whittington's (1993) classificatory schema (Figure 2.1.). 
Whittington's perspective does not in our view take account of the possibility of there 
being more than one view of strategy, and hence does not allow for a constructionist 
view of ISS (Scarborough, 1998) where there may be multiple views. We have argued 
(Section 2.4.1.) that while we are sympathetic to the sentiment expressed within the 
systemic perspective, we have reservations about Whittington's use of the terms 
systemic. Our findings support our initial view, although we now argue that the term 
systemic is most appropriately considered in an epistemological sense (Jayaratna, 1994), 
rather than the ontological sense which Whittington expresses. Our reason for saying this
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rests upon our view that a person's view of ISS formation will be socially constructed 
and reconstructed based upon their mental construct in the light of varying aspects of the 
themes we identify. Hence amongst a group of people, views of ISS formation will differ, 
as will notions of environment, and as will views of goals. From this standpoint, a 
systemic perspective (Whittington, 1993) of ISS is most appropriately perceived in an 
epistemological sense.
Having evaluated the implications of our findings for theory, we now consider the 
implications of our findings for practice. We continue to see work published which 
argues that existing approaches to ISS formation are not working and that more research 
is needed that looks at what is actually happening (Auer & Reponen, 1997; Hatten & 
Hatten, 1997; Earl, 1999; Pant & Hsu, 1999). An implication of such work is that we do 
not know enough about ISS formation - despite the large volume of work published in 
the area. Not only does much of the published work on ISS seek to tell practitioners (and 
practitioners to be) what to do, although not how (e.g. Earl, 1989; Ward Griffiths & 
Whitmore, 1990; Robson, 1997), but worse, very few authors acknowledge the 
existence, let alone importance, of mico-political activity which has been highlighted in 
our findings. The implications of our findings are that the interaction between the 
dynamic mental construct of those involved in the construction and reconstruction of ISS 
formation requires acknowledgement, and further attention - particularly in relation to 
the themes we have identified in our explanatory model (Fig. 12.1). We do not intend 
that our model is taken and used as a means of instructing practitioners what and how to 
do ISS formation. However, it does provide a means for those interested in practice to 
reflect upon the nature of ISS formation, their own activities and the activities of others, 
with a view to improving their understanding and ultimately, practice.
12.5. SUMMARY
In this chapter we have set out and discussed five themes which we have abstracted from 
our cross-case analysis of issues arising from Chapters Six to Eleven. This led to a 
discussion of our contribution to knowledge, based upon our findings that ISS formation 
can be conceived in terms of an ongoing process of construction and reconstruction of 
social reality, based upon individual mental constructs, which in turn are influenced by
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the themes identified. We have represented this in a model (Figure 12.1.), although we 
have argued that our model should be considered as an epistemological device to aid our 
thinking about ISS formation, rather than as representation of how an ISS formation 
process is. We have also argued that ISS formation be considered as a reflection of 
power relations, hence heightening the importance of our preparedness to, and ability to 
understand the micro-political activity within which ISS formation is enmeshed. We 
ended by discussing the implications of our findings for existing knowledge.
From this we now move on to Chapter Thirteen, where we evaluate the learning that we 
have derived from this thesis, and consider future research arising from our work.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN - CRITICAL EVALUATION AND 
FURTHER RESEARCH
13.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter critically evaluates the programme of research and learning that has taken 
place. This evaluation focuses upon the following areas: the field of research; the 
research method; the researcher. This structure is based upon the NIMSAD framework 
(Jayaratna, 1986, 1994) which provides a means of structuring our thinking about our 
action in problem situations.
Following this evaluation we identify areas for further work.
13.2. NIMSAD: A FRAMEWORK FOR CRITICAL EVALUATION
In order to critically evaluate the work undertaken in this thesis, a number of approaches 
were considered as a means of structuring our thinking. Firstly, Checkland (1991) argues 
that explicitly considering the interaction of F/M/A (Framework of Ideas /Method/Area 
of Application) provides us with a means of deriving learning from our interventions in 
any purposeful human action. In our view, this is helpful in drawing attention to key 
elements in a cycle of research, although we would argue that one element missing from 
this account is an explicit focus upon the researcher. The NIMSAD (Normative 
Information Model-based Systems Analysis and Design) framework builds upon the 
F/M/A view by explicitly incorporating the role of the researcher as an element for 
consideration. NIMSAD has been developed from experience gained through 
interventions in organisations as a means of evaluating methodologies (Jayaratna, 1994). 
There are three elements which are described (ibid.) as being essential to the NIMSAD 
framework, these being: the problem situation, the intended problem solver, and the 
problem solving process. It is the evaluation of these three elements that enables us to 
reflect upon and learn from action in the problem situation. The NIMSAD framework is 
illustrated in Figure 13.1 below.
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intended probkmsolver
Figure 13.1. Essential elements of the NIMSAD Framework 
(Jayaratna, 1994, p.53)
Figure 13.1. illustrates the interrelationship between the three elements of the problem 
situation, each of which is linked through a process of evaluation. Research involving a 
contribution to knowledge, as opposed to a review or a description, in an organisational 
setting is concerned with problems. Hence, we can utilise the NIMSAD framework to 
reflect upon and learn from our activity as researchers in the research arena, that is, the 
problem situation. This process of critical self reflection is advocated as a means through 
which we undertake learning (Argyris, 1982; Schon, 1983; Checkland, 1991). Our 
amended wording based upon the NIMSAD framework is illustrated in Figure 13.2. 
below.
The Researcher The Field o f  Rese
(intende<h)foblem solver) (problem situatidh)
'  /
t
The Research, 
Method 
(probiqni solving 
probass)
Figure 13.2. Evaluation of Research using the NIMSAD 
Framework (based upon Jayaratna, 1994, p.53)
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By substituting terminology we argue that we can adapt the wording of the framework 
without undermining what we perceive to be the rationale of the framework. Therefore, 
the researcher can be substituted for the intended problem solver, the research method 
can be substituted for the problem solving process, and the field of research can be 
substituted for the problem situation. We have utilised these categories as a basis for our 
reflective evaluation of the thesis, and we now move on to consider the learning which 
has been derived from this process.
13.3. LEARNING DERIVED FROM THE THESIS
Several areas of learning which have been derived from this thesis, relating to the 
outcomes of the research programme, the use of research methods, and to the role of the 
researcher. Specifically, the areas of learning concern:
• Confronting micro-politics in ISS research
• Questioning the bases of differing perspectives in ISS research
• Maintaining a critical dialectic between theory and research practice
• Evaluating issues of validity in interpretive research methods
• Assessing the influence of pre-understanding
We see a practical outlet for this learning being in the form of advice to inexperienced 
researchers in the IS field, in addition to contributing to understanding for more 
experienced researchers.
13.3.1. CONFRONTING MICRO-POLITICS IN  ISS  RESEARCH
The view that ISS formation practice can be considered in terms of a social constructivist 
perspective has been a key feature of our learning. Rather than seeing ISS formation as a 
distinct process that is viewed consistently by all those involved, our view is that as a 
consequence of the varied ways in which people socially construct their views of reality, 
views of what ISS formation is will also vary. Indeed, our argument has been that what 
ISS formation is taken to be by those involved will be based upon a process of ongoing 
construction and reconstruction. This involves a dualistic process between the mental
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constructs of those involved, and the themes which we present in our explanatory model 
(Figure 12.1.). While in our view people construct what they take to be a social reality of 
ISS formation at an individual level, the effect of collectively constructing realities while 
working with others will lead to areas of common agreement and understanding. The 
construction of such realities, together with the influencing of practices takes place at a 
micro level of activity, and it is here that consideration of the exercise of power is 
appropriate.
We are of the view that exploring ISS formation in terms of the role of power is 
important because of the pervasive nature of power in organisational practices (Clegg, 
1989; Knights & Wilmott, 1999). There is however a danger that if we look for power 
then we will see power and vice versa, although this is not by any means confined to the 
concept of power alone - it is one of the problematic realities of research that we have to 
guard against (Silverman, 1993; Coffey & Atkinson, 1996). However, we would argue 
that if we ignore the role of power then we are ignoring a pervasive relational 
phenomenon, which can be conceived of as a web of relations (Clegg, 1989; Fincham, 
1992) within which ISS formation practice takes place. The social and political nature of 
many IS related activities has been noted for some time (Pettigrew, 1973; Checkland, 
1981; Markus, 1983; Markus & Bjorn Anderson, 1987) and it is in our view important to 
examine power as a key aspect of political activity. The critical examination of the social 
practice of ISS formation has brought to our attention facets of ISS practice that may 
otherwise have been overlooked, with the multi-dimensional conceptualisation of power 
(Hardy, 1994, 1996; Phillips, 1997) adopted here being useful. With reference to our 
framework for considering the exercise of power (Table 3.1.), we argue that to consider 
the exercise of power in one or more of the first three categories would miss a key aspect 
for a critical account (Knights & Vurdubakis, 1994), that being power of the system 
(Hardy, 1994). Talking about power of the system as though there is a single, identifiable 
system evident to all is in our view a limiting perspective. Instead we argue that we 
should conceive of system in an sense that recognises that different people may regard 
what the system is in different ways. We should therefore conceive of the term system in 
an epistemological sense (Jayaratna, 1994) - that is, as any set of activities deemed 
relevant by those perceiving them rather than an absolute, fixed set of activities.
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If we accept that those engaged in ISS formation are forever embedded in a web of 
power relations, then every action, or inaction, relative to another person could be 
considered in terms of an exercise of power. It then becomes almost impossible to 
disregard power from any relationship. The point is, that we have found that researching 
power is not at all straightforward, and perhaps we should have heeded Walsham's 
(1993) warning that there are simpler ways of doing research and getting articles 
published than through trying to address power issues. However, this seems to be the 
very point, that power is a very difficult concept to research precisely because of its all 
pervading nature (Introna, 1997; Knights & Wilmott, 1999). In our view this is not a 
good enough reason to avoid researching the concept in view of both the numerous 
references to power as an issue in ISS formation (Davies, 1991; Walsham, 1993; Knights 
& Murray, 1994; Auer & Reponen, 1997; Sillince & Mouakketl997) as well as the 
findings of this thesis.
13.3.2. QUESTIONING THE BASES OF DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES IN  ISS  
RESEARCH
One of the consequences of our findings is that they highlight problems in perceiving ISS 
formation as a distinct formal, rational process, in which people work cooperatively 
towards a uniformly recognised goal. These areas are problematic because if we accept 
the view of ISS formation as a socially constructed reality that is influenced by the 
themes that we have identified, then we cannot make any assumptions about the nature 
of ISS as a distinct process, and equally we cannot make any assumptions about people 
sharing a common recognition of goals, or working towards them. This makes the work 
on ISS formation that inhabits the classical, evolutionary, and processual perspectives in 
Whittington's (1993) framework, discussed in Chapter Two, seem less than satisfactory. 
Our work supports the view of authors who have argued that ISS formation should be 
seen in terms of complex social activity (Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992; Jones, 1995; Auer 
& Reponen, 1997), a view that is more appropriately considered in relation to the 
systemic perspective advocated by Whittington (1993).
While work which reflects the systemic perspective suggests that ISS will be a 
consequence of the social situation in which formation takes place, this does not in our 
view mean that such work is also more likely to provide opportunities for enhancing
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practice. Our findings have suggested a weakness in Whittington's (1993) discussion of 
the systemic perspective, namely the ontological use of the concepts of strategy and 
system. Our findings show that what people take to be ISS formation will depend upon 
their perspective which in turn will be based upon their dynamic mental construct. This 
highlights to us the need for epistemological thinking (Jayaratna, 1994) in respect of the 
concepts strategy and system. Instead of suggesting that there is one system of interest, 
in this case a set of activities comprising ISS formation, we should be prepared to 
consider that any set of activities may be viewed as a system denoting ISS formation - it 
will depend upon the perception of the individual. It is this combination of factors, the 
complex social practice of ISS formation as well an apparent opportunity for 
epistemological thinking about ISS, that may account for a disparity between what is 
found through empirical study and what is suggested in much ISS formation literature 
which exhibits a classical perspective.
One final area has been important in our learning, and this has been related to the 
concept of the mental construct (Jayaratna, 1994). In our view, one of the reasons why 
we had difficulty in reconciling what we read about ISS formation with what we had 
experienced in practice, became clearer when we considered the notion of the mental 
construct. We are of the view that if we accept that the way in which people act (which 
includes them deciding not to act) can be thought of as being a consequence of their 
individual mental construct, then we should not be surprised when we see variation in 
ISS formation practice. In our view, if we accept that what people take to be ISS 
formation is seen as a consequence of a socially constructed reality, then it is also helpful 
to recognise that the way in which people construct that social reality will reflect their 
mental construct at that point in time. Thus, the concept of the mental construct has 
provided us with a means of thinking about the variance in thinking that underlie 
differences in social practice, as reflected in Figure 12.1..
13.3.3. MAINTAINING A CRITICAL DIALECTIC BETW EEN THEORY AND  
RESEARCH PRACTICE
We argue that within a perspective which may be labeled as critical hermeneutics (Myers, 
1997) we find elements which are in our view essential to interpretive IS research, and 
indeed we can speculate, to IS research in general. Specifically, we are referring to the
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need to maintain a critical dialectic between literature based theory and the research 
practice throughout the research process. The maintenance of this dialectic is vital in 
assisting the researcher to reflect upon practice in the light of relevant theory, and also to 
evaluate theory in the light of the developing research findings. We have found such a 
dialectical process to be invaluable in developing a critical appreciation of the data. At 
the same time, we found this process to be of value in the ongoing critique of theory as 
our thinking developed in a reflective manner through exposure to the fieldwork context 
and resultant empirical data. Given that the essence of an interpretivist perspective is in 
our view to defend our interpretation of what has happened in terms of logical 
consistency, subjectivity, and adequacy (see Table 4.1.), the maintenance of an ongoing 
critical evaluation of theory would seem to us to be central to a defence of adequacy. We 
regard this as an essential characteristic of IS work conducted from an interpretive 
perspective.
13.3.4. CONFRONTING ISSUES OF VALIDITY IN  INTERPRETIVE RESEARCH  
METHODS
When we evaluate our use of research methods, one of our main areas of learning has 
centred upon the nature and validity of research methods for ISS. As a result of our 
research activities, we have come to question the nature of what we can and what we do 
gain from our research methods.
Our findings that people are engaged in the construction and reconstruction of social 
realities based upon their mental construct has not undermined the research methods that 
we chose; on the contrary, we are adamant that interpretive case studies are entirely 
appropriate as a valuable means of developing our understanding of ISS formation. 
However, we also recognise some limitations in the methods. For example, if relying 
solely on interviews we cannot be certain how representative of what actually happened 
an interviewees accounts are. Furthermore, even where we endeavour to get data from 
multiple sources as a means of strengthening the validity of the analysis (Kvale, 1989; 
Silverman, 1993), in our view we can never fully know a person's socially constructed 
view beyond their own account - which may itself be based upon their own post-hoc 
formulation (McKracken, 1988).
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That said, we argue that an interpretive, longitudinal, comparative approach as adopted 
here is valuable as a means developing our understanding of ISS formation and the 
underlying phenomena (Walsham, 1995; Myers, 1997). Within that process, there is a 
need to recognise interviews for what they are - conversations between people at a 
particular historic juncture, rather than 'absolute truth' representations of the events and 
thought processes surrounding the situation of interest. This is not in our view 
problematic as long as we recognise the limitations of interviews, although it does 
highlight the need to have multiple sources of data, both from interviews and from 
documentary sources for example, when developing case studies.
Allied to the above discussion is a further area of learning, which pertains to the mental 
construct of the researcher in using research methods. We have come to appreciate the 
importance of the researcher reflecting upon their own mental constructs, and 
recognising that their mental construct will influence what they see, what they hear, and 
what they think. Therefore, we must guard against the notion that we as researchers can 
enter a research domain as unbiased observers of phenomena. It is this element of 
learning which leads us to agree with Spinelli (1989) who argues that we must not ignore 
the effect that any observer inevitably brings to the situation through language, 
experience, and perceptual influences.
This discussion highlights two clear issues for this researcher. The first issue concerns the 
fallacy of the independent, isolated observer, who clinically reports the truth of a 
situation in an institutional setting, accessed through the accounts of actions and of 
meanings ascribed to actions by those spoken with. What we report upon are either our 
own interpretations, expressed as best we can through language, or our interpretations of 
other peoples interpretations of what they think they did or said. In either case we have 
double the problem of linguistic expression to deal with (Geertz,1973). This leads to the 
second issue, which is the necessity for researchers to be as explicit as possible about 
their research methods in order to give the reader some means of evaluating the validity 
of the material they are presented with. This is particularly important when researching 
IS issues, which are inherently social and hence subjective (Kling, 1980; Nissen, 1985; 
Galliers, 1992; Land, 1992).
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13.3.5. ASSESSING THE INFLUENCE OFPRE-UNDERSTANDING
Pre-understanding refers to the prior experience that a researcher may have of a domain, 
which we would argue forms a part of the mental construct of the researcher. 
Specifically, we argue that we must acknowledge the experience, or pre-understanding 
that we may bring to the process, in the form of influence upon our values, judgements, 
understanding of language, symbols, and associated practice based phenomena. In this 
instance, the researcher had several years of experience in the sector of interest, and it is 
this we wish to address. On the one hand we view such experience as beneficial as we 
regard it as having been very useful in helping us to understand aspects of the workings, 
both formally and informally, of the Police Service that may have remained hidden to 
others. Furthermore, this pre-understanding was useful in aiding the researcher in getting 
access to the research organisations in the first place. On the other hand though, we 
became aware of the potential bias that our experience could engender upon our ability 
to interpret what we saw and heard. The important point that arises is that we cannot 
deny our experience, and nor should we ignore it; instead, we should be explicit in 
acknowledging our experience, and reflect upon the implications that it may have for 
what we do, and what we find.
13.4. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER WORK
As a result of evaluating this programme of research, we have identified several 
opportunities for further research.
There continue to be calls for improved understanding of ISS formation, the perception 
being that existing approaches to ISS are not working in organisations (Auer & 
Reponen, 1997; Hatten & Hatten, 1997; Earl, 1999; Pant & Hsu, 1999). We have argued 
that ISS formation, far from being a distinct, formal, rational process, can instead be 
understood as a phenomenon of organisational practice that is socially constructed and 
reconstructed. We have developed an analytic proposition to theory (Miles & Huberman, 
1994; Walsham, 1995) in the form of an explanatory conceptual framework (Fig. 12.1) 
for considering the complex forces which act upon ISS formation as. However, our 
research has been conducted in the Police Service, and having now developed the
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explanatory framework we see a clear opportunity to undertake research in other sectors 
to test the applicability of the framework, and to develop it accordingly. The study could 
be extended to cover other areas of the public sector, for example in the health service, 
but the research could also be repeated in private sector organisations. This latter area 
would be particularly interesting from a comparative perspective as a means of 
considering whether the themes we have identified are common across sectors.
Another opportunity is to undertake further research to develop the main results and 
findings in our thesis. In particular, Weick's (1995) view of belief driven and action 
driven processes provides a possible means of addressing how practitioners in ISS 
formation link their thoughts and perceptions together so that some form of collective 
action is possible. In addition, we find the concept of the dynamic mental construct to be 
important in the social construction and reconstruction of ISS formation. Similarly, we 
find that examining the role of power is usefully understood in a relational sense, and that 
this is a valuable means of helping us to further our understanding. However, whilst we 
have argued that we can conceive of power in the form of a web of power relations 
within which social practice takes place, at the same time we have found it valuable to 
explore power relations in terms of resources, processes, manipulation of perception 
(See Fig.3.1). There is scope for further investigation of both the role and nature of the 
dynamic mental construct in ISS formation, as well as to further explore the nature and 
effects of various forms of power relations. Further research in these areas will continue 
to develop our understanding of an area where so much attention has been given to 
formal, rational modes of thinking about ISS formation (e.g. Lederer & Sethi, 1992; 
Fidler & Rogerson, 1996; Ward & Griffiths, 1996), a view which we have argued is 
limited.
This leads us to consider another potential area for research, which concerns the use of 
research methods. We would like to see the further studies that we have called for above 
to be undertaken utilising the methods that we have used. It is our opinion that the 
continued use of interpretive, longitudinal case studies provides a valid means of 
developing an accumulated body of knowledge about ISS formation in various sectors 
which would then form a basis for comparative analysis. In addition, having argued in 
Chapter Four that action research, though valuable for IS research in general 
(Checkland, 1991; Baskerville & Wood-Harper, 1998), was not appropriate in this
272
instance we do nonetheless see action research as providing an opportunity for further 
research. We have noted the limitations inherent in using interviews as a research 
method, and would suggest that research is undertaken using our findings on ISS 
formation which are explored through studies that adopt an action research approach. 
Not only would this provide further learning regarding ISS formation, it would also 
provide a useful opportunity for comparative learning regarding action research and 
interpretive case studies. Of course there are limitations to such learning, not least the 
problems of reconciling the findings arising from the use of different methods in different 
studies, and the variation in the experience and perception of researchers undertaking the 
studies. Nonetheless, it would be valuable to reflect upon the level of understanding 
possible from direct involvement through an action research approach in comparison 
with the understanding gained through interviews.
In conclusion, both theory and practice related to ISS formation will in our view need to 
be more sophisticated for two reasons in particular. The first of these is that the social 
practice that gives rise to particular organisational settings is being undertaken in ever 
more complex circumstances, with success often hinging upon the effectiveness of IS 
(Earl, 1999) - and the Police service are certainly no different in this respect. The second 
reason is that the rapid changes in the nature of information technologies will continue to 
have effects that will emerge through the social practice within which their use is 
immersed (Klein & Myers, 1999). For these reasons, ISS will continue to be important to 
those working in organisations who are concerned with making effective use of IS and 
with making best use of emerging information technologies. Therefore, it will be 
necessary for both researchers and practitioners to have an improved understanding of 
the social practice of ISS formation, and it is to this area that our findings have made a 
contribution.
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APPENDIX 1
Coding categories used (versions: first & final) 
C O DING  CATEG ORIES (first version)
1. P O W E R 3. ST R A T G Y
1. Power o f  resources 1. Strategy in force
1. Nature o f  Resources usage 1. nature o f
1. Information 2. drivers
2. Expertise 3. process
3. A ccess 4. problems
4. Credibility 2. IT strategy in force
5. Control o f  Finance 1. nature o f
6. Stature/prestige 2. drivers
7. other 3. process
2. Control o f  resources 4. problems
3. Instances o f  resource 
manipulation
3. National strategy
4. D ecision making 1. nature o f
2. Power o f  processes 2. drivers
1. nature o f  process 3. process
2. involved 4. problems
3. not involved 4. R E L A T IO N SH IPS
4. control o f  access 1. Betw een people
3. Power o f  meaning 1. police -v- police
1. symbols 2. police -v- civilian
2. vocabuary/language 3. civilian -v- civilian
3. culture 2. Betw een force and 'other'
4. rituals 3. Related to technology
4. Power o f  the system 4. Related to management style
1. Influence o f
institutions/practce
5. Inclusion/exclusion
2. powerlessness 6. Organisational Worth
5. Power (other) 5. A R E A S
2. P E O P L E 1. Concepts
1. Police 2. Stories
1. v iew  o f  own role 3. Them es
2. view s o f  IT civilians 4. Time
3. view s o f  civilians per se 5. good quotes
4. relationship with civilians 6. F O R C E S
5. view s o f  IT 1. Case A
2. Civilian 2. Case B
1. v iew  o f  se lf  in force 3. Case C
2. v iew  o f  police 4. Case D
3. relationship with police 5. Case E
4. view s o f  IT 6. Case F
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Coding Categories (final version)
( 1 ) /forces ( 5 ) /areas
(1 1 ) /forces/case A (5 1) /areas/concepts
( 1 2 )  /forces/case B (5 2 ) /areas/stories
( 1 3 )  /forces/case C (5 3) /areas/themes
(1 4 ) /forces/case D (5 3 1) /decision making process
(1 5 ) /forces/case E (5 3 1 1) /driven from the top
( 1 6 )  /forces/case F (5 3 1 2 )  /problems making decisions
(5 3 1 3 )  /informality; ad hoc approach to IT
(5 3 1 4 )  /formality
(2) /people (5 3 2 ) /it's about IT
(2 1) /people/police (5 3 2 2 ) /subiecivity; & IT disasters
(2 1 1 )  /people/police/CC& DCC (5 3 2 3) Aalking about' IT
(2 2 ) /people/civilian (5 3 2 4 ) /differing levels o f  IT 
understanding/meaning
(2 3) /people/relationships with (5 3 2 5) /the IT as IT
(2 3 1) /police (5 3 4 ) /its about interaction in & betw een organisation
(2 3 2 ) /civilians (5 3 4 1) /efficiency
(2 3 3) /IT people (5 3 4 2 ) /nature o f  policing
(2 3 4 ) /community (5 3 4 2  1) /bureaucracy
(2 3 5) /HMI (5 3 4 2 2 )  /changes & IS
(2 3 6) /govt (5 3 4 2  3) /pressures to change IS
(2 3 7) /other (5 3 4 2 4 )  /effects
(3) /strategy (5 3 5) /roles & influence
(3 1) /strategy/ISS force (5 3 5 1) /roles in authority
(3 1 1 )  /process (5 3 5 1 1) /Chiefs& ACPOS
(3 1 2 ) /good&bad (5 3 5 1 4 ) /being 'in control'
(3 1 3 )  /influences o n (5 3 5 2 ) /positions o f  influence - knowledge
(3 2) /strategy/national ISS (5 3 5 3) /interest in ISS
(3 2 1) /process (5 5) /areas/good quotes
(3 2 2) /good&bad (5 6) /areas/m etaphors
(3 2 3) /influences on (5 6 1) /IT related
(3 3) /strategy/view o f  strategy (5 6 2 ) /process
(4) /pow er (5 6 2 1) /control o f
(4 1) /power/resources (5 6 2 2 ) /changing
(4 2 ) /power/processes (5 6 3) /strategy
(4 3) /power/meaning (5 6 4 ) /organisation
(4 4 ) /power/system (5 7) /areas/h istory  & structure
(4 5) /power/other (5 7 1) /non-it
(5 7 2 ) /IT
(5 7 3) /technology in policing
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APPENDIX 2
CASE A POLICE FORCE
Mission Statement 1991-1998
[Case A Police Force] at all levels is committed to upholding the rule of law throughout 
[Case A Police Force]area and to exercising the policing function efficiently and with 
courtesy, integrity and fairness, thereby maintaining and improving the quality of life for 
all citizens. It will constantly strive to foster good relations with the public which it exists 
to serve, to respond positively to local needs and, by adapting innovative policies, to 
improve the quality of service provided. As an employer, it undertakes to maintain a 
caring attitude to all personnel and to provide them with equality of opportunity to 
enable each one of them to achieve their maximum potential.
Focus of Objectives:
• Quality of service
• Crime reduction
• Road safety
• Community safety
• Victims of crime
• Personal performance
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APPENDIX 3
CASE B POLICE FORCE - FORCE POLICING PLAN  
Policing Plan
[Case B Police Force] aims to provide an efficient, professional service that creates a 
safer environment for the people of [this area of] Scotland. To focus on priorities, the 
Force consulted local communities in a planning process which has produced a clear 
vision for policing through the millennium. The plans - strategic, forcewide and local - 
call for a continued high level of activity and response from [Case B Police Force] in 
partnership with other agencies and with the co-operation of local people.
Strategic Aims 1997-2001
• Community Safety - create Safer Communities through partnerships
• Crime - prevention, detection and education to reduce crime
• Drugs - stifle supply through enforcement, education, awareness and diversion
• Roads Policing - educate, encourage, engineer and enforce for safer roads
• Operational Delivery - respond professionally through training, systems and 
structures
Policing Priorities 1997-2001
• reduce road casualties
• combat drugs misuse
• tackle local issues
• meet call response targets
• communicate with our customers
• create a safe environment for millennium celebrations
• improve support staff structures
• expand crime and assistance desks
• use police buildings effectively
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APPENDIX 4
CASE B POLICE FORCE IT STRA TEGY1997-2001
Executive Summary
The Information Technology Department of [Case B Police Force], seeks to provide high 
quality information and telephony services designed to meet the needs of all sections of 
the Force whilst recognising the strategies for information systems and information 
technologies developed by the Scottish Police Service.
Our IT strategy reflects the objectives and priorities outlined in the Force corporate plan. 
To do this the strategy demands that:
• All proposed investments in information technology are supported by a business 
case in the agreed format;
• Any investment will include consideration of the real benefits to the force and 
these benefits will clearly reflect the Force's strategic aims;
• Regular liaison will take place between the Force executive, Divisional 
Commanders, other Senior Managers and the IT Department.
The IT strategy of [Case B Police Force] cannot be viewed in isolation. There will be a 
close monitoring of the external environment for events which are outwith our control but 
which affect our direction. Such factors will include systems which form part of National 
Strategies and tend to drive towards centralised control with a reduced emphasis on local 
research and development.
The strategy recognises and addresses:
• The convergence of technologies, especially in the areas of computing and 
communications;
• The exponential growth of the desktop PC, both in terms of absolute numbers and 
power;
• The increasing total cost of IT ownership.
Within the strategy there will at all times be a bias towards market testing, with careful 
consideration of which services should or could be tested and those which, in the interests 
of operational policing, must be retained in-house.
The strategy is based on a policy of exploiting our existing assets whilst recognising 
future opportunities which may emerge from the developing National and Scottish Police 
IS/IT Strategies.
It follows that [Case B Police Force] will:
• Resist the development of further tailor made application;
• Resist the development of small systems which are not accompanied by a fully 
argued business case;
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• Avoid implementing technology which is not mainstream;
• Decline to implement technical solutions which do not fall within the broad 
principles of the strategy
• Exploit to our maximum advantage any opportunities which develop from the 
National and the Scottish IS/IT Strategies;
• Ensure that all system implementations have an involvement of a product 
champion from the sponsoring division/department, and that the development 
follows established project management protocols;
• Provide customer support which deals with faults and enhancements in a prompt 
and efficient manner;
• Ensure that systems meet the user's needs;
• That the service we provide is available throughout the Force.
The adoption of the policies detailed above will assist [Case B Police Force] to plan 
towards a coherent and considered strategy implementation, having consideration to the 
short, medium and long term requirements of the Force. In this case, the forthcoming 
financial year should, at all times be regarded as the short term; the medium term, years 
two and three and the long terms, years four and five. In the field of information 
technology it is difficult to be prescriptive in the long term. Accordingly the drop-off in 
the project programme should not be regarded as being indicative of a reduction in 
demand but more the difficulty of forecasting the unknown.
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APPENDIX 5
CASE D POLICE FORCE: IT STRA TEGY1992-1994, OBJECTIVES.
The following gives details of the objectives for the computer section as shown in the IT 
strategy document, and a description of'strategy' which is shown under each objective in 
the document.
Objective 1
To introduce the Force crime recording system as a pilot system in the [area] sub­
division and thereafter at [area] sub-division and to evaluate the results including 
training implications, in order that a specification can be prepared to implement 
the system Force wide on a Unix based processor in 1993 
Strategy
The first part of the objective has been met in as much as the pilot system is 
currently under way at [area].
Constant evaluation is taking place between [area] and the IT staff and a Sgt is 
acting as liaison between both parties.
A full scale evaluation exercise if planned to take place in March. The remainder 
of the objective will very much depend on the outcome of the March meeting.
Objective 2
To review the current mainframe application software in use within the Force and 
propose alternative systems in terms of hardware and software.
Strategy
To discuss the feasibility or otherwise of exporting current mainframe 
applications to a Unix based platform with relevant software houses and 
departmental staff.
Objective 3
To complete necessary software changes on the Force Personnel computer system 
and thereafter make the systems available over the wide area network with 
restricted read only access.
Strategy
To liase with [supplier] and Personnel staff in order that current software 
problems be resolved and thereafter in consultation with [consultants] implement 
WAN access.
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Objective 4
To replace the existing computer systems in the Force Typing Pool with personal 
computers and a facility for Free Text retrieval in respect of Force Orders. 
Strategy
Consultation on going with HRC staff and IT staff with a view to provide a test 
system in the first quarter of the year using ICL DRS 300 equipment and ICL 
PC's.
Thereafter, dependent on test results, implement system in typing pool.
Objective 5
With the proviso that Capital Funding becomes available implement hardware 
enhancements to the Wide Area network to provide greater resilience to the 
system.
Strategy
This objective has been discussed with [consultants]and is purely dependent on 
capital finance being available.
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APPENDIX 6
SCOTTISH POLICE IS  STRATEGY (SPISS) - THE 10 STAGES FOR 
DEVELOPMENT OF SPISS
1. Complete the work of the working party in respect of information sets and entities
2. Produce information flow diagrams and volume projections for each of the key areas 
and to formulate the potential developments that need to form part of the 
technological strategy
3. Produce a full Information Strategy setting out the needs of the Service, the areas 
where developments are required and the relevant standards
4. Review fully and from a technological view point current and planned systems within 
Forces and Nationally
5. Based on the requirements identified in stage 3 work up a series of technical options 
in each area. Options could include a mixture of local, distributed and central systems 
and varying degrees of integration of data
6. Carry out an incremental cost benefit analysis to find the combination of projects that 
provides the greatest overall benefit from the available finance AND provide a 
sensible development path. Such an exercise will include various options for each 
project
7. Work up a network strategy for Scotland in combination with PNN to provide for the 
future needs of the IS programme. Networking standards and availability will be 
crucial to the success of the Strategy and will represent a major element of the costs 
involved
8. Complete an Information technology (or Systems) Strategy setting out a proposed 
programme of work and requirements in respect of the then current industry and 
national standards for data, hardware, communications, etc.
9. Mechanisms need to be established through which Forces can exchange ideas and 
share development work in respect of Local systems
10. Consideration may well need to be given to co-operation in respect of procurement 
hardware and software particularly if the joint purchasing arrangements with local 
authorities use by some Forces come to an end.
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APPENDIX 7
SCOTTISH POLICE IS STRATEGY - APPLICATION AREAS
BROAD APPLICATION AREA DETAILED APPLICATION AREA
Command & Control Casualty Bureau
Command & Control
Geographic Information
Incident recording
Messaging/Data exchange
Operations Planning
Police Firearms
Premises Register
Resource Allocation
Resource Register
Road/Weather Conditions
Crime (Specialist) Cheques and Credit cards
Crime Invest/Enquiry Mgt.
Crime Pattern Analysis
Crime: Major enquiry mgt.
Fingerprints
Geographic Information
Handwriting Register
Intelligence
Intelligence Analysis
Stolen/lost/found property
Vehicles
Crime (general) Crime Invest/Enquiry Mgt.
Crime Pattern Analysis
Crime prevention
Crime recording
Fingerprints
Geographic Information
Handwriting Register
Intelligence
Intelligence analysis
Stolen/lost/found property
Vehicles
Traffic Escort Planning
Fleet management
Geographic Information
Road Accidents
Road/Weather Conditions
Traffic management
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Finance & Administration Accounting (debtors etc.)
Accounting (management)
Civil Claims
Contract management
Force reference database
Information/research database
Inspection
Office Automation
Payroll
Property/Energy Mgt.
Public Relations
Stolen/lost/found property
Superannuation/Pensions
Supplies
Personnel & Training Complaints & Discipline
Payroll
Personnel
Police Firearms
Resource Allocation
Resource Register
Sickness/Occup. Health
Training Administration
Legal Case Preparation
Citations
Custody recording
Fingerprints
Handwriting register
Legal database
Messaging/Data exchange
Names/criminal history
Productions
Warrants
Licensing & Registration Alien registration
DNA register
Laboratory/I.B. Mgt.
Licensing (Firearms/Shotguns)
Licensing (General)
Photograph Library
Premises register
Shooting sites register
Tape Library (Audio, Video, etc.)
Weapons Register
285
REFERENCES
Ackroyd S., Harper R., Hughes J.A.., Shapiro D ., Soothill K. (1992) New Technology and Practical Police 
Work; Open University Press, Buckingham.
Agar, M. (1991) The Right Brain Strikes Back; in: Lee, R., Fielding, N. (editors); Using Computers in 
Qualitative Research; Sage, London.
Aldrich H.E. (1992) Incommensurable Paradigms? Vital Signs from Three Perspectives; in  Reed M., 
Hughes M., Rethinking Organisation; Sage, London.
Allison G.T. (1971) Essence o f Decision; Little Brown, Boston.
Andreu R , Ricart J.E., Valor J. (1992) Information Systems Strategic Planning; NCC Blackwell, Oxford.
Angell I.O., Straub B.H. (1993) Viewpoint: Though this be madness, yet there be method in't; Journal o f  
Strategic Information Systems, vol.2, 1, 5-14.
Ansari M., Kapoor A. (1987) Organisational Context and Upwards Influence Tactics; Organisational 
Behaviour and Human D ecision Processes', vol.40, 39-49.
Ansofif H.I (1965) Corporate Strategy: an analytic approach to business policy for growth and expansion; 
McGraw-Hill, London.
Argyris C (1982) Reasoning, Learning and Action: Individual and Organisational; Jossey-Bass, US.
Asch D, Bowman C (1989) Readings in Strategic Management; Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Atkins, M.H. (1994) Information Technology and Information Systems Perspectives on Business 
Strategies, Journal o f  S trategic Information Systems, 3, 2, 123-135.
Audit Commission (1990) Calling all Forces: Improving Police Communication Rooms; Police P aper  
No.5., June.
Audit Commission (1993) Helping with enquiries: tackling crime effectively; P olice P aper 12., London,
H.M.S.O..
Auer T, Reponen T. (1997) Information Systems Strategy Formation Embedded into a Continuous 
Organisational Learning Process; Information resources M anagem ent Journal', Spring, 32-43.
Bachrach, S., Lawler, E. (1980) Power and Politics in Organisations; Jossey Bass, London.
Badri, M.A. (1992) Critical Issues in Information Systems Management: An International perspective, 
International Journal o f  Information Management, 12, 179-191.
Baets W (1992) A ligning information systems with business strategy; Journal o f  S trategic Information  
Systems; v o ll, 4, 205-213.
Banton M. (1964) The Policeman in the Community, L ondon , Tavistock.
Barberis P (1998) The New Public Management; Public Administration; vol. 76, 3, pg.471-488.
Baskerville R, Wood-Harper AT (1998) Diversity in information systems action research methods; 
European Journal o f  Information Systems; vol.7, 90-107.
Benbasat I., Goldstein D.K., Mead M. (1987) The Case Research Strategy in Studies o f Information 
Systems; M IS Quarterly; 11, 3, 369-386.
Benjamin R, Rockart J, Scott-Morton M, Wyman J (1984) Information Technology: A  Strategic 
Opportunity; Sloan M anagement Review; Spring, pg. 3-10.
Berger P.L., Luckman T (1967) The Social Construction o f Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology o f  
Knowledge; Penguin Books, London.
Blau P.M. (1974) On the Nature o f Organisations; Wiley, New York.
Bloomfield B.P., Coombs R (1992) Information Technology, Control and Power: The Centralisation and 
Decentralisation Debate Revisited; Journal o f  M anagem ent Studies; vol.29, 4, pg.459-484.
286
Boland R.J. (1985) Phenomenology: A  Preferred Approach to Research on Information Systems; in: 
M um ford e t al, Research M ethods in Information Systems, E lsevier North Holland, Amsterdam.
Boland R.J. (1987) The In-Formation o f Information Systems; in: Boland R.J., Hirschheim R.A.; Critical 
Issues in Information Systems Research; John Wiley & Sons.
Boynton, A.C., Zmud, R.W. (1987) Information Technology Planning in the 1990's; Directions for 
Practice and Research; M IS Quarterly, 11, 1, 59-71.
Brady T, Cameron R, Targett, D, Beaumont C (1992) Strategic IT Issues: The Views o f Some Major IT 
Investors, Journal o f  S trategic Information Systems, 1, 4, 183-189.
Breen S. (1995) Police warned o f risk to standards; The Scotsman, 2 June, pg. 8.
Brett R. (1988) Case E Police Force Office Automation project: A  Business Case; December, Police 
Requirements Support Unit, Home Office.
Brown A  (1993) Getting Value from an Integrated IS Strategy; European Journal o f  Information Systems', 
vol.3, 2, 155-165.
Brown A  (1998) Narrative, Politics and Legitimacy in an IT Implementation; Journal o f  M anagement 
Studies', vol.35, 1, 35-58.
Burawoy M  (1985) The Politics o f Production: Factory Regimes under Capitalism; Verso Books, London.
Burrell G; Morgan G (1979) Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis; Heinemann, London.
Cavaye A.L.M. (1996) Case Study Approach: A  Multi-Faceted Research Approach for IS. Information 
System s Journal, 6, 227-242.
Cavaye A.L.M ., Christiansen J.K (1996) Understanding IS Implementation by estimating Power o f  
Subunits; European Journal o f  Information Systems', vol.5, 222-232.
CCTA (1994) PRINCE Project Evaluation, HMSO, London.
Case A  Police Force (1997) Chief Constable's Annual Report.
Case A  Police Force (1998) Chief Constable's Annual Report.
Chaffee E.E (1985) Three Models of Strategy; A cadem y o f  M anagem ent Review , vol. 10, 1, 89-98. 
Checkland P.B. (1981) Systems Thinking Systems Practice; Wiley, Chichester.
Checkland P.B. (1988) Information Systems and Systems Thinking: Time to Unite; International Journal 
o f  Information Management', 8, pg. 239-248.
Checkland P.B. (1991) From Framework through Experience to Learning: the essential nature o f Action 
Research; in: Nissen H-E, Klein H.K., Hirschheim R.A.; Information System s Research: Contemporary 
Approaches a d  Em ergent Traditions; E lsevier Science, North Holland.
Checkland P.B., Holwell S (1993) Information Management and Organisational Process: An Approach 
through Soft Systems Methodology; Jrnl O f  Information Systems, 3, 1, 3-16.
Checkland PB, Holwell S (1998) Information, Systems and Information Systems; Wiley, Chichester.
Child J, Smith C (1987) The Context and Process o f Organisational Transformation o f  Cadbury Limited in  
its Sector; Jrnl o f  M anagement Studies', vol. 24, 6, pg.565-593.
Choo C.W. (1998) The Knowing Organisation: How Organisatons Use Information to Construct Meaning, 
Create Knowledge, and Make Decisions; Oxford University Press, New York.
Ciborra C (1994) The Grassroots o f IT and Strategy; in: Ciborra C, Jelassi T; S trategic Information  
Systems: A European Perspective; John Wiley & Sons, Chichester.
Clegg, S.R. (1989) Frameworks of Power, Sage, London.
Clemons E.K.; Row M.C. (1991) Sustaining IT Advantage: The role o f  structural differences; M IS  
Quarterly, vol. 15, 3, pg.275-292.
Coffey A., Atkinson P. (1996) Making Sense o f Qualitative Data; Sage, Thousand Oaks.
287
Coffey, A., Holbrook, B., Atkinson, P. (1996) Qualitative Data Analysis: Technologies and 
Representations; Sociological Research Online; 1,1;
<http: //www. socresonline. org.uk/socresonline/1/1/4. html>
Collingridge, D., Margetts, H. (1994) Can Government Information Systems be Inflexible technology? The 
Operational Strategy Revisited; Public Administration', 72, (Spring), 55-72.
Collins (1986) Dictionary o f the English Language; 2nd Edition, Collins, London.
Collins D (1998) A  Sociological Approach to Organisational Change; Routledge, London.
Coombs R., Knights D ., Wilmott C. (1992) Culture, Control and Competition: Towards a Conceptual 
Framework for the Study o f Information Technology in Organisations; Organisation Studies, vol. 13, 1, 51- 
72.
Cunningham C, Tynan C (1993) Electronic T rading, Inter-organisational Systems and the Nature of 
Buyer-Seller Relationships; International Journal o f  Information M anagement, vol. 13, pg.3-28.
Dahl R.A. (1957) The Concept o f Power; Behavioural Science; vol.2, 201-215.
Dale A. (1994) A  Philosophy o f Policing; The Police Journal, vol. 67, 1, pg. 19-25.
Darke P, Shanks G, Broadbent M  (1998) Successfully completing case study research: combining rigour, 
relevance and pragmatism; Information Systems Journal, vol.8, pg. 257-272.
Datta Y  (1980) New  Directions for Research in Business Strategy; Journal o f  G eneral Management', vol.6, 
1, 48-60.
Davies, L.J. (1991) Researching the Organisational Culture Contexts o f Information Systems Strategy: A  
case study o f the British Army, in: Nissen H.E., Klien H.K., Hirschheim R., Information Systems 
Research: Contemporary Approaches and Emergent Traditions, Elsevier Science, North-Holland.
Doolin B (1996) Alternative Views o f Case Research in Information Systems; Australian Journal o f  
Information Systems; vol.3, 2, pg.21-29.
Doyal L.; Harris R. (1986) Empiricism, Explanation and Rationality; Routledge, London.
Earl, M.J. (1989) Management Strategies for Information Technology; Prentice Hall, Hemel Hempstead.
Earl, M.J. (1993) Experiences in Strategic Information Systems Planning, M IS Quarterly, 17, 1, 1-25.
Earl M.J. (1999) Approaches to Information Systems Planning; in: G alliers R.D., Leidner D.E., Baker 
B.S.H.; Strategic Information Management; 2nd Edition; Butterworth Heinemann, London.
Easterby-Smith M.; Thorpe R.; Lowe A  (1991) Management Research: An Introduction; Sage, London.
Eden, C (1992) Strategy Development as a Social Process; Journal o f  M anagem ent Studies; 9, 6, 799-811.
Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989) Building Theories from Case Study Research; The A cadem y o f  M anagem ent 
Review; 14, 532-550.
Fielding N.G., Fielding J.L. (1986) Linking Data; Sage, Thousand Oaks.
Fidler C., Rogerson S. (1996) Strategic Management Support Systems; Pitman, London.
Fincham, R. (1992) Perspectives on Power: Processual, Institutional and 'Internal' Forms o f Organisational 
Power; Journal o f  M anagement Studies; 29, 6, 741-759.
Flynn D.J., Goeniewska E (1993) A Survey o f the Use o f Strategic Information System Planning 
Approaches in UK Organisations; Jrnl o f  S trategic Information Systems; vol.2, 4, 292-319.
Foucault M  (1980) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, E dited  by: Gordon, C., 
Harvester press, Brighton.
Franz C.R., Robey D. (1987) Strategies for research on Information Systems in organisations: A  critical 
analysis o f research purpose and time frame; in: Boland R.J., Hirschheim R.A.; C ritical Issues in 
Information Systems Research; John Wiley & Son, Chichester.
Fray L.L. (1993) Focus on Information to Generate Strategy; Information Strategy: The Executives 
Journal; Fall, 42-50.
288
French J.R.P., Raven B. (1959) The Bases o f Social Power: in. Cartwright D; Studies in Social Power; 
University o f  M ichigan Press, Ann Arbor.
Galliers, R.D. (1991) Strategic Information Systems Planning: Myths, Reality and Guidelines For 
Successful Implementation, European Journal o f  Information Systems, 1,1,  55-64.
Galliers RD (1991a) Choosing Appropriate Information Systems Research Approaches: A  revised 
taxonomy; in: Nissen H-E, Klein HK, Hirschheim R; Information System s Research: Contemporary 
Approaches and Em ergent Traditions; E lsevier Science, North Holland.
Galliers, R.D. (1992) Choosing Information Systems Research Approaches; in -.Galliers, R.D.; Information 
Systems Research - Issues, M ethods and Practice Guidelines; pg. 144-162; Blackwell; Oxford.
Galliers R.D., Sutherland A.R (1991) Information Systems Management and Strategy Formulation: The 
Stages o f Growth Model Revisited; Journal o f  Information Systems, 1, 2, 89-114.
Galliers, R.D., Merali, Y ., Spearing, L. (1994) Coping with Information Technology? How British  
Executives Perceive the Key Issues in the mid-1990's; Journal o f  Information Technology; 9.
Geertz C (1973) The Interpretation o f Cultures; Basic Books, New York.
Giddens, A  (1976) N ew  Rules o f Sociological Method: A  Positive Critique o f  Interpretive Sociologies; 
Hutchinson, London.
Giddens, A  (1984) The Constitution o f Society: Outline o f a Theory o f Structuration; Polity Press, 
Cambridge.
Gill J, Johnson P (1997) Research Methods for Managers; Paul Chapman Publishing, London.
Glaser D.G., Strauss A.L. (1967) The Discovery o f Grounded Theory Strategies for Qualitative Research; 
Aldine, New York.
Goldsmith N  (1991) Linking IT Strategy to Business Planning; Long Range Planning, 24, 6, 67-77. 
Gooding C. (1993) Detectives o f the Database; Financial Times, 26 August, pg. 12.
Gouldner A  (1954) Patterns o f Industrial Bureaucracy ; Routledge, London.
Case B Police Force (1994) Annual report; Case B Police Force.
Case B Police Force (1995) Annual report; Case B Police Force.
Case B Police Force (1996) Annual report; Case B Police Force.
Case B Police Force (1997) Annual report; Case B Police Force.
Gummesson, E. (1991) Qualitative Methods in Management Research; Sage, Newbury Park, CA.
Hammersley, M., Atkinson, P. (1983) Ethnography: Principles in Practice; Tavistock, London.
Handy C (1985) Understanding Organisations, 3rd edition, Penguin Books, London.
Hanseth, O (1991) Integrating Information Systems: The Importance o f Contexts; in: Stam per R.K.,
K erola P., Lee E., Lyytinen K.; Collaborative work, Social Communications and Information Systems; 
Elsevier Science, North-Holland. 133-156.
Hardy, C (1994) Power and Politics in Organisations, in: Hardy, C; M anaging Strategic Action, Sage, 
London.
Hardy, C (1996) Understanding Power: Bringing about Strategic Change. British Journal o f  M anagement; 
7, Special Issue, pg..S3-S16.
Hardy, C., Clegg, S.R. (1996) Some Dare Call it Power, in C legg SR, H ardy C, N ord  WR, H andbook o f  
Organisation Studies, Sage, London. Pg..622-641.
Hardy, C., Dougherty D (1997) Powering Product Innovation; European M anagem ent Journal. 15, 1, 
pg.. 16-27.
Hardy, C., Redivo, F. ( 1994) Power and Organisational Development: A  Framework for Organisational 
Change; Journal o f  General Management; 20, 2, 29-41.
Hatten ML, Hatten KJ (1997) Information Systems Strategy: Long Overdue - and still not here; Long  
Range Planning, vol.30, 2, 254-266.
289
Henderson B.D. (1989) The Origin o f Strategy; Harvard Business Review; N ov.-Dec., 139-143.
Hickey G (1993) Strategic IS/IT Planning; in: P eppardJ; IT  Strategy fo r  Business; Pitman, Oxford.
Hickson, D.J., Hinings, C.R., Lee, C.A., Schneck, R.E., Pennings, J.M. (1971) A  Strategic Contingencies 
Theory o f Intra-organisational Power; Adm inistrative Science Quarterly, 16, 216-229.
Hills A. (1995) Miltant Tendencies: Paramilitarism in the British Police; British Journal o f  Criminology, 
v.35, 3, 450-458.
Hirschheim R. A. (1992) Information Systems Epistemology: An Historical Perspective; in: G alliers R.D.; 
Information Systems Research, B asil Blackwell, London.
Hirschheim R.A., Newman M (1988) Information Systems and user resistance: theory and practice; 
Computer Journal, 31, 398-407.
Hirschheim R . A . , Klein H.K. (1989) Four Paradigms o f Information Systems Development; 
Communications o f  the ACM , vol.32, 10, 1199-1216.
Hirschheim R.A., Newman M  (1991) Symbolism and Information Systems Development: myth, metaphor 
and magic; Information Systems research ; 2, 1, 29-62.
Hirschman A.O. (1970) Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisationa, and 
States; Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
HMIC (Her Majesty's Chief Inspector o f Constabulary) (1992) Quality o f Service Issues Within the 
Scottish Police Service; Scottish Office.
HMIC (Her Majesty's Chief Inspector o f Constabulary) {1993) Annual Report, London, HMSO.
HMIC (Her Majesty's Chief Inspector o f Constabulary) (1994) Report on Case D Police Force; Scottish 
Office.
HMIC (Her Majesty's Chief Inspector o f Constabulary) (1996) Report on Case B Police Force; Scottish 
Office.
HMIC (Her Majesty's Chief Inspector o f Constabulary) (1997) Report on Case A  Police Force; Scottish 
Office.
HMIC (Her Majesty's Chief Inspector o f Constabulary) (1997a) Report on Case D Police Force; Scottish 
Office.
HMIC (Her Majesty's Chief Inspector o f Constabulary) (1998) Annual Report, Edinburgh; Scottish Office.
HMIC (Her Majesty's Chief Inspector o f Constabulary) (1998a) Report on Case B Police Force; Scottish 
Office.
HMIC (Her Majesty's Chief Inspector o f Constabulary) (1998b) Case E Police Force - Review Inspection; 
Scottish Office.
HMIC (Her Majesty's Chief Inspector o f Constabulary) (1998c) Annual Report; Scottish Office.
HMIC (Her Majesty's Chief Inspector o f Constabulary) (1998d) Case D Police Force - Review Inspection; 
Scottish Office.
HMIC (Her Majesty's Chief Inspector o f Constabulary), (1998€) Annual R eport, Edinburgh, The 
Stationery Office.
HMIC (Her Majesty's Chief Inspector o f Constabulary) (1999) Getting IT Right: A Thematic Report on
I.T.; Scottish Office.
Holdaway S. (1979) The British P olice; London, Edward Arnold.
Holdaway S. (1989) Discovering Structure: Studies o f the British Police Occupational culture; in: 
Weatheritt M., Police Research: Some Future Prospects', Aldershot, Avebury.
Home Office (1983) Manpower, Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Police Service; Home Office Circular 
No. 114; HMSO, London.
Home Office (1993) Police Reform: A Police Service for the 21st Century; White Paper, June, CM2281, 
HMSO.
290
Home Office (1994) The National Strategy For Police Information Systems: Strategy Report; November.
Hopper M  (1990) Rattling SABRE - New Ways To Compete On Information; H arvard Business Review, 
May/June, pg. 118-125.
Horton S. (1996) The Police; in: Famham D., Horton S., M anaging People in the P ublic Services; 
Basingstoke, Macmillan.
Hough S.M. (1980) Uniformed Police Patrol Work and Management Technology; Home Office Research 
Unit, Research Paper N o .l; HMSO, London.
Hunt R.G., Magenau J.M. (1993) Power and the Police Chief: An Institutional and Organisational 
Analysis; Sage, Newbury Park, CA.
Introna, L.D. (1997) Management, Information and Power; Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Jayaratna N  (1986) Normative Information Model-based Information Systems Analysis and Design  
(NIMSAD): A  framework for understanding and evaluating methodologies; Journal o f  A pp lied  Systems 
A nalysis, vol. 13.
Jayaratna N  (1994) Understanding and Evaluating Methodologies. NIMSAD: A  Systemic Framework; 
McGraw-Hill, London.
Jayaratna N, D'Arcy B (1995) Never Ending Systems Enquiry; in: Lundberg B.G.; Proceedings o f  the 2nd  
Scandinavian Research Seminar on Information and D ecision Networks; Vaxjo University, Sweden.
Johnson G (1997) Strategy and Everyday Reality: The case for the study o f micro-strategy; Plenary address 
to the 3rd International Conference on the Dynamics o f Strategy; University o f Surrey, April.
Johnston L. (1988) Controlling Police Work: Problems o f Organisational Reform in Large Public 
Bureaucracies; Work, Employment & Society, vol.2, 1, pg.51-70.
Jones M.R. (1995) Learning the Language o f the Market: Information Systems Strategy Formation in a 
UK District Health Authority; Accounting, M anagement & Information Technology, vol. 4, 3, 119-147.
Jones T., Smith D.J. (1993) The Future o f Policing in Britain; P olicy Studies, vol. 14, 1, pg.36-44.
Kable (1995) Police Market Profile; April; London.
Kay J (1993) Foundations o f Corporate Success; Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Kelle, U. (1997) Theory Building in Qualitative Research and Computer Programs for the Management o f  
Textual Data; Sociological Research Online; 2, 2;
<http ://www. socresonline. org.uk/socresonline/2/2/2. html>
Kettinger WJ, Grover V, Segars AH (1995) Do Strategic Systems Really Pay off?; Information System s 
Management', Winter 1995, pg.35-43.
Klein H.K., Myers D (1999) A  Set o f Principles for Conducting and Evaluating Interpretive Field Studies 
in Information Systems; M IS Quarterly, Vol. 23, 1.
Kling R (1980) Social Analyses o f Computing: Theoretical Perspectives in recent Empirical Research; 
A C M  Computing Surveys', vol. 12, 1; pg.61-110.
Kling, R. (1987) Defining the Boundaries of Computing Across Complex Organisations, in: B oland R.J., 
Hirschheim R.A., Critical Issues in Information Systems Research, Wiley, Chichester; pg.307-362.
Kling, R., Scacchi, W. (1982) The Web o f Computing: Computing Technology as Social Organisation; 
Advances in Computers, V ol.21, Academic Press, New York.
Knights D; Murray F (1994) Managers Divided: Organisation Politics and Information Technology  
Management; Wiley, Chichester.
Knights, D ., Morgan, G. (1990) The Concept o f Strategy in Sociology: A Note o f Dissent, Sociology, 24,
3, pg. 475-483.
Knights, D ., Vurdubakis, T. (1994) Foucault, Power, Resistance and All That, in: Jerm ier J.M., Knights 
D., N ord W.R., Resistance and Power in Organisations, Routledge, London', pg. 167-198.
Knights D, Wilmott H (1999) Management Lives: Power and Identity in Work Organisations; Sage, 
London.
291
Kvale S (1989) Issues o f Validity in Qualitative Research; Studentlitteratur, Lund.
Land F.F. (1992) The Information Systems Domain; in: Galliers R.D. (ed) Information System s Research; 
A lfred  Waller, Henley-on-Thames.
Latour B (1995) Social Theory and the Study o f Computerised Work Sites; in: Orlokowski W.J., Walsham 
G., Jones, M.R., D eG ross J.I.; Information Technology and Changes in O rganisational Work; 
Proceedings o f  IFIP WG8.2. Working Conference; Chapman & H all, London.
Lederer A.L, Salmela H (1996) Toward a Theory o f Strategic Information Systems Planning; Journal o f  
Strategic Information Systems', 5, 237-253.
Lederer A.L, Sethi V  (1992) Meeting the Challenges o f Information Systems Planning; Long Range 
Planning, vol.25, 2, 69-80.
Lee A  (1991) Integrating Positivist and Interpretive Approaches to Organisational Research; Organisation  
Science', 2, 342-365.
Leishmann F, Savage S (1993) The Police Service; in: Famham D ., Horton S., M anaging the New Public 
Services, Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Levine, H.G., Rossmore, D. (1995) Politics and the function o f Power in a Case Study o f  IT 
Implementation, Journal o f  M anagement Information Systems, 11, 3, 115-133.
Lindblom C.E. (1959) The Science of'M uddling Through'; Public Adm inistration Review , vol. 19, Spring, 
79-88.
Loveday B (1993) Management and Accountability in Public Services: A  Police Case Study; in: Isaac- 
Henry, K., Painter C; Barnes, D.; M anagement in the Public Sector: Challenges and Change; Chapman 
& Hall, London.
Lukes, S. (1974) Power: A  Radical View, Macmillan, London.
Lynch R (1998) Corporate Strategy; Pitman, London.
Mansell G (1991) Action Research in information systems development; Journal o f  Information Systems, 
v o l.l, 29-40.
March J.G. (1989) Decisions and organizations; Blackwell,
March J.G., Olsen J.P. (1976) Ambiguity and Choice in Organisations; Universitetsforlaget, Bergen.
Markus M.L. (1983) Power, Politics and MIS Implementation; Communications o f  the ACM ; 26, 6, 430- 
444.
MarkusM.L.; Bjom  Anderson N. (1987) Power over Users: Its exercise by systems professionals; 
Communications o f  the ACM ; 30, 6, 498-504.
Markus M.L., Pfeffer J. (1983) Power and the design and implementation o f  accounting and control 
systems; Acounting, Organisations and Society; wol. 8, 2/3, 205-218.
McCracken, G. (1988) The Long Interview; Sage University Paper Series on Qualitative Research 
Methods; Vol. 13; Sage, Newbury Park, CA.
McLoughlin I.; Clark J. (1994) Technological Change at Work; Open University Press, Buckingham.
M iles, M .B., Huberman, A.M. (1994) Qualitative Data Analysis; Sage, Thousand Oaks.
M iller H.W (1988) Developing Information Technology Strategies; Journal o f  System s M anagement; vol. 
Sept, 28-35.
M ills C.W. (1959) The Sociological Imagination; Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Mintzberg, H. (1978) Patterns in Strategy Formation; M anagem ent Science; 24, 9, 934-948.
Mintzberg H. (1979) The Structuring o f  Organisations; Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J..
Mintzberg H (1983) Power in and Around Organisations; Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J..
Mintzberg H (1990) Strategy Formation - Schools o f Thought; in: Fredrickson J. W.; P erspectives on 
Strategic Management; H arper Business, New York.
Mintzberg H., Waters, J.A. (1985) O f Strategies, Deliberate and Emergent; Strategic M anagem ent
292
Journal; 6, 3, 257-272.
Morgan G. (1986) Images o f Organisation; Newbury Park, California, Sage.
Moynihan T (1990) What Chief Executives and Senior Managers want from their IT departments; M IS  
Quarterly, vol. 14, 1, pg. 15-26.
Mumford E, Hirschheim R, Fitzgerald G, Wood-Harper A  (eds.) (1985) Research Methods in Information 
Systems, Elsevier North Holland, Amsterdam.
Myers M  (1995) A  disaster for everyone to see: an interpretive analysis o f a failed IS project: Accounting, 
M anagem ent and Information Technology; 4, 4, 185-201.
Myers, M  (1997) Interpretive Research in Information Systems; in Mingers, J., Stowell, F.; Information 
Systems: An Em erging Discipline?; 1997; McGraw-Hill, Maindenhead.
NCC (National Computing Centre (1990) Report for Case D Police Force; NCC.
Narayanan, V.K., Fahey, L. (1982) The Micro-Politics o f Strategy Formulation; A cadem y o f  M anagem ent 
Review; 1, 1, 25-34.
Neumann S (1994) Strategic Information Systems; Macmillan, New York.
Newman M; Noble, F (1990) User involvement as an interactive process: a case study; Information  
Systems Research; 1, 1, 89-113.
Niederman, F., Brancheau, J.C., Wetherbe, J.C. (1991) Information Systems Management Issues for the 
1990's; M IS Quarterly; 15, 4, 475-500.
Nissen H.-E.(1985) Acquiring Knowledge o f Information Systems - Research in a M ethodological 
Quagmire; in: M umford E, Hirschheim R, F itzgerald G, Wood-Harper A (eds.) Research M ethods in 
Information Systems, North Holland, Amsterdam.
Case D Police Force (1990) Fourth Development Plan: 1990-1995.
Case D Police Force (1992) Information Technology Strategy.
Case D Police Force (1993) CCRS Project Initiation Document; September.
Case D Police Force (1997) Chief Constable's Annual Report.
Orlikowski W.J. (1991) Integrated Information Environment or Matrix of Control? The Contradictory 
Implications o f Information Technology; 1, 1, 9-42.
Orlikowski W.J., Baroudi J. (1991) Studying Information Technology in Organisations: Research 
Approaches and Assumptions; Information Systems Research; 2, 1, 1-28.
Pant S, Hsu C (1999) An integrated framework for strategic information systems planning and 
development; Information Resources M anagement Journal, vol. 12, 1, 15-26.
Parsons T (1951) The Social System, Tavistock, London.
Peppard J (1993) IT Strategy for Business; Pitman, London.
Pettigrew A.M. (1973) The Politics o f Organisational Decision Making; Tavistock, London.
Pettigrew, A.M. (1977) Strategy Formulation as a Political Process; International S tudies o f  M anagem ent 
& Organisation; 7, 2, 78-87.
Pettigrew A.M. (1985) Contextualist Research and the Study o f  Organisational Change Processes; in: 
M umford E, Hirschheim R, F itzgerald G, Wood-Harper A (eds.) Research M ethods in Information  
Systems, North Holland, Amsterdam.
Pettigrew A.M. (1985a) The Awakening Giant: Continuity and Change in ICI; Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Pettigrew A.M. (1990) Longitudinal Field Research on Change: Theory and Practice; Organisational 
Science, 1, 3, p267-292.
Pettigrew A.M.; Whipp R. (1991) Managing change for competitive success; Blackwell, Oxford.
Pettigrew A.M. (1992a) The Character and Significance o f Strategy Process Research; Strategic  
M anagement Journal; 13, Winter Special Issue; p5-16.
Pettigrew A.M. (1992b) On Studying Managerial Elites; Strategic M anagem ent Journal; 13, Winter
293
Special Issue, p i63-182.
Pettigrew A.M.; McNulty T. (1995) Power and Influence In and Around the Boardroom; Human 
Relations, 48, 8, p845-873.
Pfeffer, J. (1981) Power in Organisations, Pitman, Boston.
Phillips, N. (1997) Bringing the organisation back in: A  comment on conceptualisations o f power in  
upward influence research, Journal o f  Organisational Behaviour, 18, 43-47.
Porter ME, Millar VE (1985) How Information Gives You Competitive Advantage; H arvard Business 
Review, July/Aug., pg. 149-160.
Premkumar G, King W.R. (1992) An Empirical Assessment o f Information Systems Planning and the 
Role o f Information Systems in Organisations; Journal o f  M anagem ent Information Systems, Vol.2, Fall, 
99-125.
Preston AM  (1991) The 'Problem' In And O f Management Information Systems; Accounting,
Management, and Information Technology, 1, 1, pg. 43-69.
Prince E.T (1994) Real World Planning for I.S.: New Directions in Strategic Planning; Information 
Strategy: The Executives Journal, vol. 10, 4, 34-40.
Quinn J.B. (1980) Strategies for change : logical incrementalism; R.D. Irwin, N ew  York.
Reed M.I. (1985) Redirections in Organisational Analysis; Tavistock, London.
Reed M.I. (1992) The Sociology o f organisations : themes, perspectives and prospects; Harvester- 
Wheatsheaf; London.
Reiner R. (1989) The Politics o f Police Research in Britain; in: Weatheritt M; Police Research: Some 
Future Prospects; Avebury, Aldershot.
Reiner R. (1992) Policing a Postmodern Society; The M odern Law Review, vol. 55, 6, pg.761-781.
Reiner R. (1994) Policing and the Police; in: Maguire M., Morgan R., Reiner R.; The Oxford Handbook o f  
Criminology, Clarendon Press, London.
Reponen T (1998) The Role o f Learning in Information Systems Planning and Implementation; in:
G alliers R.D., Baets W.R.J; Information Technology and Organisational Transformation; John Wiley & 
Sons, Chichester.
Robson W (1997) Strategic Management and Information Systems; Pitman, London.
Royal Commission on the Police (1962) Final report, Cmnd. 1728. HMSO, London.
Rubin, H.J., Rubin, I.S. (1995) Qualitative Interviewing: The Art o f Hearing Data; Sage, Thousand Oaks, 
California.
Savage S., Leishman F. (1996) Managing the Police: A  Force for Change?, in: Famham D., Horton S., 
M anaging the New Public Services, 2nd Edition, London, Macmillan.
Scarborough H (1998) Linking Strategy and IT-based Innovation: The Importance o f the 'Management o f  
Expertise'; in: G alliers R.D., Baets W.R.J.; Information Technology and O rganisational Transformation; 
John Wiley & Sons, Chichester.
Scarborough H, Corbett J.M. (1992) Technology and Organisation: Power, M eaning and Design; 
Routledge, London.
Schamber L. (1994) Relevance and Information Behaviour; Annual R eview  o f  Information Science and  
Technology, vol. 29, 3-28.
Schon D (1983) The Reflective Practitioner - How Professionals Think in Action; Basic Books, N ew  York.
Scottish Office (1997) The Police in Scotland, Factsheet 10, Dd.8403816 10/97; 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library/documentsl/flO.htm.
Scott-Morton, M. (1988) Strategy Formulation Methodologies and IT, in: Earl, M., Information  
Management: The Strategic Dimension, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 54-67.
Shapland J., Hobbs R. (1989) Policing on the Ground; in: M organ R., Smith D .; Coming to Terms with 
Policing; pg. 11-30; London, Routledge.
294
Sheehy, Sir Patrick (1993) Report into Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and Rewards; London, HMSO.
Sillince J.A.A., Mouakket S (1997) Varieties o f Political Process During Systems Development; 
Information Systems Research', 8, 4, 368-397.
Silverman D  (1970) The Theory o f Organisation: A  sociological framework; Heinemann, London.
Silverman, D. (1993) Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and Interaction; 
Sage, London.
Simon, H.A. (1957) Administrative behavior : a study o f decision-making process in administrative 
organization; 2nd Ed.; Free Press, New York.
Smircich L., Stubbart C (1985) Strategic Management in an Enacted World; A cadem y o f  M anagement 
Review, vol.4, 724-736.
Spinelli E (1989) The Interpreted World; Sage, London.
Stebbins, R.A. (1972) The Unstructured Research Interview as Incipient Interpersonal Relationship; 
Sociology and Social Research', 56, 2, 164-177.
Stewart J., Clarke M. (1987) The Public Service Orientation: Issues and Dilemmas; Public Administration', 
vol. 65, 2.
Case E Police Force (1987) Chief Constable's Annual Report.
Case E Police Force (1988) Deputy Chief Constable's Policy Statement to the Home Office; PL88 
41/103/2.
Case E Police Force (1994) Crime Management System Briefing Paper.
Taylor J.A., W illiams H. (1992) Police M anagem ent, Office Automation and Organisational Change. New 
Technology, Work and Employment, vol. 7, 1, pg. 44-53.
Terrill R. (1992) Organisational Change for England’s Police: An American Perspective; Policing and  
Society, vol. 2, 3, pg. 173-191.
The Guardian (1998) Police Board Moves to Oust Chief; 22 April.
The Guardian (1999) The Deception in the Figures, 16.2.99.
The Scotsman (1999) Report on force by police inspectorate 'politically biased'; 30 April 1999, pg.8.
Tsoukas H (1994) Review of: Hassard J., 1993, Sociology and Organisation Theory: Positivism, Paradigms 
and Postmodernism; Journal o f  M anagement Studies, p.287-291.
Van D e Ven A.H. (1992) Suggestions for Studying Strategy Process: A  research Note; Strategic  
M anagem ent Journal, vol. 13, 169-188.
W aem a, T.M., Walsham, G. (1990) Information Systems Strategy Formation, Information & 
M anagement, 18, 29-34.
Walsham, G. (1995) Interpretive Case Studies in IS Research; Nature and Method; European Journal o f  
Information Systems', 4, 74-81.
Walsham, G (1993) Interpreting Information Systems in Organisations; Wiley, Chichester.
Ward J, Griffiths P, Whitmore P (1990) Strategic Planning For Information Systems, W iley, Chichester.
Ward J., Griffiths, P (1996) Strategic Planning for Information Systems; 2nd Edition; W iley, Chichester.
Weatheritt M  (1986) Innovations in Policing; Croom Helm/Police Foundation, London.
Weber, M. (1968) Economy and Society; Roth, G., Wittich, C.,; Volume 2; Bedminister Press, N ew  York.
Weick K.E. (1995) Sensemaking in Organisations; Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.
Westwood S. (1994) The Computer Peace Treaty; Policing; 10, 1, 23-34.
Whittington R (1993) What is Strategy ... and does it matter? Routledge, London.
W ilson T.D. (1989) The Implementation o f Information Systems Strategies in UK Companies: aims and 
barriers to success; International Journal o f  Information M anagement, v.9.
295
W illcocks L. (1994) Managing Information Systems in UK Public Administration: Issues and Prospects; 
Public Administration', 72, (Spring), 13-32.
W illcocks L, Mason D  (1987) Computerising Work: People, Systems Design and Workplace Relations; 
Paradigm Press, London.
W illiamson O.E. (1991) Strategizing, Economizing and Economic Organisation; Strategic M anagement 
Journal', 12, 75-94.
Wilmott H. (1987) On the Nature o f Managerial Tasks and Skills; Journal o f  M anagem ent Studies', 26, 
209-224.
Wilson B (1990) Systems: Concepts, Methodologies and Applications; Wiley, Chichester.
W infield I (1991) Organisations and Information Technology: Systems, Power and Job Design; Blackwell 
Scientific Publications; Oxford.
Winograd T, Flores F (1986) Understanding Computers and Cognition; Ablex, Norwood NJ.
Wiseman C (1988) Strategic Information Systems; Irwin, Illinois.
Yin R.K. (1989) Case Study Research; Sage, California.
Y in R.K. (1993) Applications o f Case Study Research; Sage, California.
Zaleznik A  (1970) Power and Politics in Organisational Life; H arvard Business Review; May-June, pg. 
47-60.
296
